Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Jensen was charged as a coconspirator in a felony indictment alleging a scheme under which members of the Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Department issued hard-to-obtain concealed firearms permits in exchange for substantial donations to an independent expenditure committee supporting the reelection campaign of Sheriff Smith. Jensen is a sheriff’s department captain identified as the individual within the sheriff’s department who facilitated the conspiracy. Jensen unsuccessfully moved to disqualify the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office from prosecuting him, alleging that that office leaked grand jury transcripts to the press days before the transcripts became public which created a conflict of interest requiring disqualification. He also joined in codefendant Schumb’s motion to disqualify the office due to Schumb’s friendship with District Attorney Rosen and Rosen’s chief assistant, Boyarsky.The court of appeal rejected Jensen’s arguments for finding a conflict of interest requiring disqualification: the grand jury transcript leak, Schumb’s relationships with Rosen and Boyarsky, and a dispute between Rosen and Sheriff Smith about access to recordings of county jail inmate phone calls. The trial court could reasonably conclude Jensen did not demonstrate that the district attorney’s office was the source of the leak. Jensen himself does not have a personal relationship with Rosen or Boyarsky. The trial court could reasonably conclude that Jensen did not establish a conflict of interest based on the existence of a dispute between the district attorney and the elected official with supervisory power over Jensen. View "Jensen v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Schumb was charged as a coconspirator in a felony indictment alleging a quid pro quo scheme in which members of the Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Department issued hard-to-obtain concealed firearms permits in exchange for substantial monetary donations to the reelection campaign of Sheriff Smith. Schumb is an attorney with a history of fundraising for elected officials; he accepted the donations as a treasurer of an independent expenditure committee supporting Sheriff Smith’s reelection. Schumb is a friend of Rosen, the elected Santa Clara County District Attorney, and previously raised funds for Rosen’s campaigns.Schumb unsuccessfully moved to disqualify the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office from prosecuting him, arguing that his friendships with Rosen and Rosen’s chief assistant, Boyarsky, created a conflict of interest making it unlikely Schumb would receive a fair trial. Schumb asserted that he intends to call Rosen and Boyarsky as both fact and character witnesses at trial and. despite their personal connections to the case, neither Rosen nor Boyarsky made any effort to create an ethical wall between themselves and the attorneys prosecuting the case. The court of appeal vacated and directed the lower court to enter a new order disqualifying the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office in Schumb's prosecution. View "Schumb v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his medical corporation appeal from the trial court's order of his motion for a preliminary injunction against CVS. In June 2020, CVS stopped filling plaintiff's prescriptions for controlled substances for his patients, citing concerns about his prescribing patterns. The trial court denied the injunction on several grounds, including the conclusion that plaintiff should have first sought relief from the California State Board of Pharmacy (Board).The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's conclusion, which was based on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, on the alternative, but closely related ground under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In this case, the Board has primary jurisdiction to consider the particular statutory obligations underlying plaintiff's injunction motion. The court concluded that the trial court correctly recognized that an order requiring CVS to honor particular prescriptions would involve judgments concerning the statutory obligations of pharmacists that the Board is both expected and equipped to resolve. Furthermore, the Board is also empowered to issue an abatement order, if warranted, that would perform the equivalent role of an injunction in providing the relief that plaintiff seeks. Accordingly, the trial court reasonably ruled that plaintiff should first seek relief from the Board before pursuing his claims in court. View "Bradley v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Sekayi White was an incarcerated and self-represented plaintiff who filed suit after his criminal defense lawyer, respondent Michael Molfetta, failed to respond to repeated requests for his case file. Having exhausted all avenues of direct state appeal of his conviction, White wanted to use the file to help him prepare petitions for collateral habeas relief. Molfetta received White’s letters, but believed he was prohibited from producing the file because it included protected materials. Instead of explaining the problem directly to his former client and producing the unprotected parts of the file, Molfetta effectively ignored the letters. Molfetta produced the file, minus protected materials, only after being ordered to do so by the trial judge in the underlying litigation here. By the time of the production, White’s deadline to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus had expired; his petition in the state court was also denied. White sued to recoup the money he spent reconstructing the file, later asking for emotional distress damages. He got neither. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment in Molfetta’s favor, “but we publish in the hope the embarrassment we feel about the case can lead to improvement. … absent a miscarriage of justice (of which we have no evidence here) our moral and professional assessments, however deeply felt, cannot create a cause of action in tort. As explained herein, we must agree with the trial court: White failed to adequately plead and prove injury from Molfetta’s wrongful behavior.” View "White v. Molfetta" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the single justice of the court affirming the decision of the Board of Registration in Medicine revoking Joseph Knight's inchoate right to renew his medical license, holding that the Board's decision was amply supported by the evidence and that Knight failed to demonstrate prejudice from any alleged legal or procedural defect.During his career as a physician, Knight was licensed to practice medicine in multiple jurisdictions in the United States. After receiving complaints about his prescription practices, Knight applied for a second renewal of his Massachusetts license. On his application, Knight admitted that he had been the subject of a disciplinary action but denied other allegations. The Board then issued a statement of allegations against Knight, and the disciplinary proceedings proceeded. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that there was no doubt that the Board was justified in reach the result it did. View "Knight v. Board of Registration in Medicine" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition seeking to vacate the circuit court's order denying Petitioners' motion to dismiss the underlying suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the circuit court erred in failing to dismiss the claims.Respondents sued Petitioners - various medical providers, pharmacists, and pharmacies - under the West Virginia Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA) asserting claims of medical negligence, pharmacist negligence, and loss of consortium. Petitioners moved to dismiss the claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that Respondents did not serve a notice of claim upon Petitioners before filing their complaint. The circuit court denied the motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to proceed due to Respondents' failure to comply with the MPLA's pre-suit requirements. View "State ex rel. Hope Clinic, PLLC v. Judge McGraw" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Michael O’Shea hired attorney Susan Lindenberg to represent him in a child support action. After O’Shea’s ex-wife was awarded what he believed to be an excessive amount of child support, he filed this action, alleging Lindenberg should have retained a forensic accountant. The case went to trial and the jury concluded, in a special verdict, that Lindenberg owed a professional duty of care that she breached. The jury was unable to agree, however, on whether the breach of duty caused him damage, and the judge declared a mistrial. Lindenberg moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that the evidence presented at trial did not support a finding of causation, specifically, that without the alleged malpractice, O’Shea would have received a better result. The trial court agreed and directed a verdict in Lindenberg’s favor. After review, the Court of Appeal found O’Shea failed to present sufficient testimony on the issue of causation, and therefore affirmed the directed verdict. View "O'Shea v. Lindenberg" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court affirming a decision by the Department of Health and Human Services excluding Stephen Doane, MD from participation in and reimbursement from Maine's Medicaid program, MaineCare, holding that the superior court did not err.In 2015, the Board of Licensure in Medicine censured Dr. Doane based on his prescription practices leading to the 2012 death of a patient by apparent overdose. In 2015, the Department terminated Dr. Doane's participation in MaineCare. Thereafter, Doane filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the Department lacked jurisdiction to terminate his MaineCare participation. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the Department had jurisdiction. Thereafter, the acting Commissioner ruled that the Department correctly terminated Doane's participation in the MaineCare program. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the Department's decision. View "Doane v. Department of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

In 2014, ALADS filed suit against defendants for breaches of their fiduciary duty to ALADS as members of its board of directors. ALADS obtained a temporary restraining order requiring the return of $100,000, and several weeks later a preliminary injunction preventing Defendant Macias from claiming to be a director. In 2018, the trial court entered judgment for ALADS, awarding damages sustained by ALADS and a permanent injunction, but found ALADS did not have standing to recover monetary compensation for its members. Afterwards, ALADs sought cost-of-proof sanctions, which the trial court denied. Both parties appealed.The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court did not err in its conclusion that defendants breached their fiduciary duties to ALADS, or in its award of damages for harm to ALADS (except in one very minor respect), or in its award of a permanent injunction. However, the trial court did err when it concluded that ALADS did not have standing to seek the $7.8 million in damages on behalf of its members. The court explained that ALADS proved those damages without objection from defendants and had standing to do so. The court further concluded that ALADS was entitled to cost-of-proof sanctions. Accordingly, the court amended the judgment to include the $7.8 million in damages to ALADS's members, affirmed the judgment as amended, and remanded for the trial court to determine the appropriate amount of cost-of-proof sanctions. View "Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Macias" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting Defendants' motion to dismiss this legal malpractice complaint and to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision in the parties' engagement agreement, holding that the district court erred when it failed to stay the malpractice action.On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the arbitration provision and the engagement agreement were unenforceable and that the district court erred when it failed to stay the malpractice action as required by the Wyoming and Utah Uniform Arbitration Acts. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) the district court properly limited the scope of its arbitrability ruling to address only the enforceability of the arbitration provision; and (2) the district court erred when it dismissed the legal malpractice action upon ordering arbitration. View "Inman v. Grimmer" on Justia Law