Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

A man, David Wayne Eady, who was charged with multiple robberies in Nashville over a month, appealed the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals which denied his motion to disqualify the District Attorney General’s Office from prosecuting his case. Eady argued that the District Attorney General's office should be disqualified because the District Attorney had represented him in a previous case approximately thirty years earlier. The Supreme Court of Tennessee disagreed, finding that the District Attorney did not have an actual conflict of interest under the Rules of Professional Conduct because the current case and the previous case were not "substantially related." The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the appearance of impropriety should disqualify the District Attorney General’s Office, noting that the Rules of Professional Conduct did not retain the concept of appearance of impropriety.Eady also argued that his trial was improperly conducted as a single trial for multiple offenses under the theory that the separate crimes were all parts of a larger, continuing plan. The Supreme Court of Tennessee agreed with Eady on this point, finding that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the offenses. The court held that the evidence did not support a finding that the offenses were parts of a larger, continuing plan, and remanded the case for a new trial on one of the counts. View "State v. Eady" on Justia Law

In the case under review, the appellant, David Wallace Lee, was convicted of two counts of malice murder related to the shooting deaths of Meghan Bowen and James Harden. The appellant argued on several grounds, including insufficiency of evidence, trial court errors, and ineffective assistance of counsel.The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the appellant's convictions. The evidence demonstrated a history of abuse, jealousy, and threats by the appellant towards Bowen, which escalated in the months leading up to the murders. The appellant's claims of trial court errors were also rejected, as the court found no abuse of discretion in the admission of testimony regarding the appellant's possession of a gun similar to the murder weapon and found no actual conflict of interest necessitating the disqualification of an assistant district attorney.Further, the appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were also rejected. The court held that the appellant failed to demonstrate that his counsel’s performance was professionally deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result.Therefore, the court affirmed the appellant's convictions and sentence. View "LEE v. STATE" on Justia Law

The defendant, Luis Vendrel, was convicted for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of Nova Jill Saffles. Vendrel appealed his convictions, arguing that he suffered a constructive denial of his right to counsel or otherwise received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He claimed that his counsel failed to interview defense witnesses before trial, failed to prepare him to testify, and failed to conduct factual research or consult with experts to prepare to challenge the prosecution’s forensic evidence. The Supreme Court of Georgia found that Vendrel failed to establish that any of these alleged deficiencies in counsel's performance prejudiced his defense. Therefore, the court affirmed Vendrel's convictions. The court held that the defendant did not meet the stringent standard to raise a presumption of prejudice under United States v. Cronic, as he did not demonstrate that his counsel entirely failed to subject the State’s case to adversarial testing. Instead, the court applied the two-part Strickland test and found that Vendrel failed to show that his counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient or that this deficient performance prejudiced him. View "VENDREL v. STATE" on Justia Law

In 2018, Hassan Shareef Rashad was indicted for numerous charges including the malice murder of two-year-old Adrian Mitchell. The Supreme Court of Georgia upheld Rashad's conviction. The evidence presented at trial showed that Rashad, who was in a romantic relationship with Adrian's mother, Sydney Dean, was the only adult present when Adrian suffered fatal injuries. Witnesses reported observing concerning behavior between Rashad and Adrian, including verbal abuse and physical punishment. In October 2017, Adrian was taken to the hospital with a fractured leg, which doctors concluded was likely caused by non-accidental trauma. In April 2018, Adrian was found unresponsive and later died from what doctors concluded were non-accidental, significant force injuries. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a jury to find Rashad guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the malice murder of Adrian. Rashad's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were also rejected. View "RASHAD v. STATE" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of Georgia, Dedric Jackson and Dimitrius Castle were found guilty of felony murder and other related crimes after the fatal shooting of Norman Ray Moore, Jr. at a party. Jackson appealed, arguing that he received ineffective legal assistance in several ways. He alleged that his trial lawyer withdrew a request for a jury charge on justification, failed to request a charge on defense of habitation, did not object to evidence of a prior crime and bad character, and did not object to specific witness testimonies and jury instructions. Jackson also argued that the trial court should have given a jury charge on justification, even though he withdrew the request. Castle argued that the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction for battery, his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request certain jury instructions and by calling a defense witness, and that the trial court erred by not merging the aggravated assault verdict into the felony murder conviction. The court rejected all these arguments and affirmed the convictions in both cases. View "JACKSON v. STATE" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Laura Mullen, claimed that the defendants, a youth volleyball club and its owners, fraudulently concealed previous sexual abuse allegations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, but also imposed sanctions against them and their lawyer for improperly interfering with the class notice process. The defendants appealed the sanctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion or commit clear error in imposing the sanctions. The court found that the defendants had intentionally interfered with the class notice and opt-out process and that their communications with class members during the notice period were potentially coercive. The court also upheld the decision of the district court to impose monetary sanctions against the defendants, which included the plaintiff’s reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses, as well as a civil penalty for each defendant.The court also affirmed the non-monetary sanctions imposed against the defendants' lawyer, who had contacted a class member directly and made a false statement to the court. Although the defendants argued that the lawyer had acted in good faith and did not knowingly or intentionally violate the rules of ethics, the court found that she had taken deliberate action to avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing.Finally, the court rejected the defendants' argument that the plaintiff should have been sanctioned. The defendants claimed that the plaintiff’s use of the term “rape” was inaccurate and irrelevant, that her actions before and after filing the complaint were inconsistent, that she did not have a proper basis for bringing the suit, and that she misrepresented evidence. The court found no merit in these arguments and affirmed the district court’s decision to deny sanctions against the plaintiff. View "Mullen v. Butler" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the conviction of Gregory M. Collins for selling a controlled drug resulting in death. Collins had appealed the conviction, arguing that the Superior Court erred by not recusing the Strafford County Attorney’s Office due to a conflict of interest and by denying his motions to dismiss the charge based on insufficient evidence. The conflict of interest arose from Collins' prior romantic relationship with a legal assistant in the Strafford County Attorney’s Office. The Supreme Court ruled that any conflict of interest from this relationship could not be attributed to the entire county attorney’s office, and the measures taken by the office were sufficient to avoid any appearance of conflict. Regarding the sufficiency of evidence, the court found that Collins had not met his burden of demonstrating that the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt. The court held that there was enough evidence to support the finding that the decedent died of acute fentanyl toxicity and that Collins was the source of the lethal dose. View "State v. Collins" on Justia Law

The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed a decision by the Court of Appeals, ruling that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying an order as a final partial judgment under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. The case arose from a dispute between the City of Elk River and Bolton & Menk, Inc. over a large construction contract for a wastewater treatment plant improvement project. The City sued Bolton for alleged breach of contract and professional negligence. Bolton responded by filing a third-party complaint against three other parties involved in the contract. The district court dismissed Bolton's third-party complaint and Bolton sought to have the dismissal order certified as a final judgment for immediate appeal. The district court granted this certification, but the Court of Appeals dismissed Bolton's appeal, determining that the district court had abused its discretion in certifying the order as a final judgment. The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the district court had offered valid reasons for its certification, including that the third-party claims presented distinct issues from the principal claims and that the case was in its early stages at the time of certification. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Elk River vs. Bolton & Menk, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the decision of the Superior Court to grant summary judgement in favor of an attorney, John Wallace, in a case brought against him by the estate of a deceased entrepreneur. The estate, represented by Courtney Guerra, blamed Wallace for the financial mismanagement of the estate by its previous personal representative, Robert Nesbitt, who Wallace had represented. The estate alleged that Wallace was liable for damages due to his negligent performance of duties as Nesbitt's attorney. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that Wallace had no duty of care to the estate's beneficiaries, as they were not his clients. Furthermore, the estate's claims of malpractice against Wallace were waived due to insufficient briefing in their appeal. The court concluded that Wallace didn't know or have reason to know that Nesbitt was mismanaging the estate's funds, and therefore, he had no legal duty to prevent or rectify Nesbitt's actions. View "Guerra v. Nesbitt" on Justia Law

In this case, Richard Huff, a convicted murderer serving a life sentence, filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging that his life sentence was unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey. The petition was automatically advanced to the second stage due to the time limit, and counsel was appointed. However, appointed counsel did not amend the pro se petition and instead stood on the allegations in the petition. The Cook County circuit court dismissed the petition, and the appellate court affirmed. Huff argued that his postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance by standing on a meritless petition, rather than moving to withdraw or amending the pro se petition. The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois held that Huff failed to rebut the presumption of reasonable assistance and affirmed the dismissal of the pro se petition. The court found no indication that Huff's postconviction counsel knew that his claim was frivolous or patently without merit. The court also noted that while Huff's claim was ultimately unsuccessful, there was no duty for his counsel to withdraw under these circumstances. View "People v. Huff" on Justia Law