Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute over the rights to stage adaptations of Harper Lee's novel "To Kill a Mockingbird." In 1969, Lee granted The Dramatic Publishing Company (Dramatic) the exclusive rights to develop and license a stage adaptation of the novel for non-first-class productions. Decades later, Lee terminated this grant and authorized a new stage adaptation, with Atticus Limited Liability Company (Atticus) holding the rights to produce this second adaptation. Atticus sought a declaration from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York that its performances did not infringe on any copyright interest held by Dramatic. Dramatic argued that it retained exclusive rights under the Copyright Act's derivative works exception and that Atticus's acquisition of rights was invalid.The district court rejected Dramatic's arguments, ruling in favor of Atticus and awarding it attorney's fees. Dramatic appealed the judgment on the merits and both parties cross-appealed the award of attorney's fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment granting declaratory relief to Atticus, holding that Dramatic's exclusive rights did not survive Lee's termination of the 1969 grant. The court found that the derivative works exception did not preserve Dramatic's exclusive license to stage non-first-class productions after the termination. The court also rejected Dramatic's arguments regarding the invalidity of the 2015 grant to Atticus and the timeliness of Atticus's claim.Regarding attorney's fees, the Second Circuit vacated the district court's award and remanded for further consideration. The court agreed that Dramatic's statute of limitations and res judicata arguments were objectively unreasonable but found that the district court erred in concluding that Dramatic had forfeited its statute of limitations defense and that its discovery requests unnecessarily prolonged the litigation. The court affirmed the district court's decision to deny fees incurred before April 27, 2023, and declined to award Atticus its fees on appeal. View "Atticus Ltd. Liab. Co. v. The Dramatic Publ'g Co." on Justia Law

Christopher Pable, a software engineer with the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA), discovered a cybersecurity vulnerability in the BusTime system, which was developed by Clever Devices, Ltd. Pable reported the vulnerability to his supervisor, Mike Haynes, who tested it on another city's transit system. Clever Devices, which had a significant contract with the CTA, alerted the CTA about the incident, leading to the termination of Pable and Haynes. Pable then sued the CTA and Clever Devices under the National Transit Systems Security Act, alleging retaliation for whistleblowing.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Pable's complaint during the discovery phase, citing the deletion of evidence and misconduct by Pable's attorney, Timothy Duffy. The court also imposed monetary sanctions on both Pable and Duffy. The court found that Pable and Duffy had failed to preserve relevant electronically stored information (ESI) and had made misrepresentations during the discovery process.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Pable's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) due to the intentional spoliation of evidence. The court also upheld the monetary sanctions imposed under Rule 37(e), Rule 37(a)(5), and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, finding that Duffy's conduct unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings. The appellate court declined to impose additional sanctions on appeal, concluding that the appeal was substantially justified. View "Christopher Pable v CTA" on Justia Law

An attorney, Morris S. Getzels, challenged the constitutional validity of State Bar Rule 2.30, which prevents inactive licensees from acting as private arbitrators and mediators. Getzels argued that this rule violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the federal and California Constitutions by treating inactive licensees differently from others. He claimed that the rule impinges on the fundamental liberty of "freedom of contract" and that there is no rational basis for the rule.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the State Bar's demurrer without leave to amend, leading to a judgment of dismissal. The court found that rational basis review was the appropriate standard for evaluating Getzels's equal protection claim. It concluded that funding the State Bar’s regulatory functions was a legitimate government purpose and that requiring licensees to pay the active membership fee was related to this purpose. The court determined that the State Bar had sufficiently articulated a rational basis for the disparate treatment of inactive licensees.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that rational basis review was the correct standard, as the rule did not involve a suspect class or a fundamental right. The court found that the State Bar had a legitimate interest in maintaining a competent bar and ensuring the professional conduct of its licensees. It concluded that Rule 2.30’s distinction between active and inactive licensees was rationally related to this goal, as inactive licensees acting as private arbitrators and mediators could burden the State Bar’s regulatory system. The court affirmed the judgment of dismissal, upholding the constitutionality of Rule 2.30. View "Getzels v. The State Bar of California" on Justia Law

Barbie Jean Schwinn and Deborah Schwinn Bailey filed a lawsuit against Robert Schwinn, TJ Schwinn, and Terry Ann Palazzo to wind up and terminate the Ignaz Schwinn Family Partnership Co. The district court found that the appellants wrongfully dissociated from the partnership, there were no grounds to terminate or wind up the partnership, and the appellants could no longer participate in the management of the partnership. The court granted the appellants a lien against the partnership’s assets for their interests, to be satisfied when the partnership eventually wound up.The district court held a bench trial and dismissed the appellants' claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The court also dismissed the appellants' claims to dissolve and wind up the partnership, finding it was a partnership for a definite term or particular undertaking under Illinois law. The court determined the appellants' dissociation was wrongful and that they were not entitled to payment for their interests until the completion of the undertaking. The court denied the appellees' other counterclaims.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the partnership was an at-will partnership, not one for a particular undertaking. The court held that the appellants' dissociation was not wrongful and that their withdrawal triggered the dissolution and winding up of the partnership under Section 801(1) of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA). The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if the partnership agreement varied the RUPA's default rules and whether winding up was required under Section 801(5)(iii) due to a deadlock in management. The court also instructed the district court to determine if judicial supervision of the winding up was warranted. View "Schwinn v. Schwinn" on Justia Law

In January 2015, Juan Carlos Benitez-Torres, a lawful permanent resident, was stopped by police while driving a car with tinted windows. The car, not registered to him, was searched, and methamphetamine was found in hidden compartments. Benitez was charged with narcotics offenses. His family hired attorney Kenneth Reed for $15,000, but Reed appeared only four times and did not file a motion to suppress the evidence. In August 2015, Reed advised Benitez to accept a three-year plea deal without adequately explaining the immigration consequences. Benitez pleaded guilty and was deported after his release.Benitez filed a motion under Penal Code section 1473.7 in January 2023 to vacate his guilty plea, arguing he did not understand the immigration consequences and was prejudiced by this lack of understanding. The Superior Court of Orange County denied the motion, finding insufficient evidence that Benitez did not understand the consequences of his plea.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that Reed did not provide adequate advice regarding the immigration consequences of the plea, as required by Padilla v. Kentucky. The court determined that Benitez did not meaningfully understand the mandatory deportation consequences of his plea and that there was a reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea had he understood these consequences. The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case with directions to allow Benitez to withdraw his 2015 guilty pleas. View "People v. Benitez-Torres" on Justia Law

Tenants Michael Gogal and Hildy Baumgartner-Gogal, a married couple, prevailed on a retaliatory eviction claim against their former landlords, Xinhui Deng and Jianhua Wu. Michael, a licensed attorney, represented the tenants for most of the lawsuit. Post-judgment, the tenants sought to recover half of Michael’s attorney’s fees, attributing them to his representation of Hildy. Despite declarations from the tenants indicating that Hildy believed she had retained Michael as her attorney, the trial court denied the request, applying the precedent set in Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp., which held that fees are not awardable when spouses’ interests are joint and indivisible.The Superior Court of San Diego County ruled in favor of the tenants on their retaliatory eviction claim, awarding them compensatory and punitive damages. The court also ruled in their favor on most other claims and on the landlords’ cross-claims, resulting in a total judgment against the landlords. Subsequently, the tenants filed a motion to recover attorney’s fees under Civil Code section 1942.5, which mandates an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in retaliatory eviction cases. The trial court granted the motion for fees billed by another attorney but denied it for Michael’s fees, citing the Gorman case.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s application of Gorman but emphasized the need for a nuanced analysis to determine whether a true attorney-client relationship existed between Hildy and Michael. The court concluded that the tenants failed to present sufficient evidence to establish such a relationship, as the record did not demonstrate that Hildy played a significant substantive role in the litigation or that her consultations with Michael were for the purpose of obtaining legal advice in his professional capacity. View "Gogal v. Deng" on Justia Law

Kristopher Birtcher, experiencing a mental health crisis, was reported to law enforcement by a Hobby Lobby manager. Birtcher, unarmed and not threatening anyone, was detained by sheriff’s deputies. During the detention, Birtcher attempted to flee but was subdued by multiple deputies who restrained him in a prone position, applying bodyweight pressure to his back. Despite Birtcher’s pleas that he could not breathe, the deputies maintained the restraint, and Birtcher eventually stopped moving and died from asphyxiation and sudden cardiac arrest.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding no triable issues of material fact regarding the excessive force claim. The court concluded that the deputies’ actions were in accordance with their training and that Birtcher’s restraint was proper. The court also ruled that plaintiff failed to establish a legal basis for the negligent training claim against Sheriff William D. Gore.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that there were indeed triable issues of material fact regarding the excessive force used by the deputies. The appellate court found that the evidence, including expert testimony, suggested that the deputies’ use of bodyweight pressure on Birtcher while he was restrained in a prone position could be considered excessive force. The court also held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the negligent training claim against Sheriff Gore, as there was a statutory basis for the claim and evidence suggesting his involvement in the training policies.The appellate court reversed the judgment in favor of all defendants and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "A.B. v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

Tarlochan Singh, a Sikh man from India, fled to the United States in 2010 after suffering repeated violence due to his political affiliations. The Department of Homeland Security charged him with inadmissibility, and Singh applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. An immigration judge denied his applications in 2017, finding his claims credible but insufficient to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision in 2018.Singh attempted to file a petition for review with the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, but his attorney failed to meet the statutory deadline. Singh then filed a motion to reopen and reissue the BIA's decision, citing ineffective assistance of counsel. The BIA denied this motion, stating that Singh did not meet the procedural requirements. Singh filed another motion to reconsider, which was also denied by the BIA for being untimely and number barred, among other reasons. The Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the BIA to consider the merits of Singh's ineffective assistance claim, but the BIA again denied the motion, citing failure to meet procedural requirements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Singh's petition and upheld the BIA's decision. The court found that Singh failed to comply with the procedural requirements for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim as outlined in Matter of Lozada. Specifically, Singh did not provide a detailed account of his agreement with his attorney, did not notify his attorney of the allegations, and did not provide proof of filing a disciplinary complaint. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit denied Singh's petition for review. View "Singh v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Gravel & Shea PC sued defendant Costello, Valente & Gentry, P.C., claiming unjust enrichment for receiving attorney’s fees without compensating plaintiff for work done to procure a settlement. The dispute arose from lawsuits involving an employee’s injury at work and his employer’s worker’s compensation insurance. Plaintiff represented the employer in a lawsuit against its insurer, Cornerstone Risk Management, LLC, while defendant represented the employee in a personal-injury lawsuit against the employer. The employee settled with Lloyd’s of London, Cornerstone’s professional-liability insurer, and defendant received its contingency fee from the settlement proceeds.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, granted summary judgment to plaintiff, concluding that under the common-fund doctrine, equities required defendant to contribute to plaintiff’s attorney’s fees. The court found that plaintiff’s efforts in the Cornerstone action led to the settlement from which defendant received its fees. The court also held a bench trial on damages and awarded damages to plaintiff. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly expanded the common-fund doctrine and that the facts did not support a claim of unjust enrichment.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to plaintiff. The Supreme Court held that the common-fund doctrine did not apply because there was no common fund created by plaintiff’s efforts that benefitted both parties. The court emphasized that the common-fund doctrine is limited to cases where a party’s efforts create a fund that benefits others who did not contribute to the litigation costs. The court remanded the case for the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of defendant, concluding that plaintiff could not maintain an unjust-enrichment claim under the circumstances. View "WWSAF Special Partners Group, LLC (Series D) v. Costello, Valente & Gentry, P.C." on Justia Law

Roy McAlister invented and patented technologies related to clean fuels and incorporated McAlister Technologies, L.L.C. (MT) to hold and license these patents. In 2009, MT entered into a licensing agreement with Advanced Green Technologies, L.L.C. (AGT), which later retained Loeb & Loeb, L.L.P. for patent matters. Conflicts arose, leading McAlister to terminate the agreement, alleging AGT's breach. McAlister and MT claimed that Loeb & Loeb's actions clouded their patents, causing prospective licensees to back out, resulting in lost profits.The Superior Court in Maricopa County granted summary judgment in favor of Loeb & Loeb on the lost profit damages, finding the plaintiffs' evidence speculative and lacking reasonable certainty. The court excluded the plaintiffs' expert testimony on damages and ruled against them on claims for trespass to chattel, slander of title, and aiding and abetting, but allowed claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent supervision to proceed. Plaintiffs conceded no triable damages remained and stipulated to final judgment against them.The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the exclusion of the expert testimony and the summary judgment on most lost profit claims but reversed on a $5 million initial payment claim, remanding for further proceedings. It also reversed the summary judgment on trespass to chattel and slander of title claims.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on the lost profit damages and trespass to chattel claim. It concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove the lost profit damages with reasonable certainty, as material terms of the prospective licensing agreement were unresolved. Consequently, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Loeb & Loeb on the lost profit damages and trespass to chattel claim, vacating the relevant parts of the Court of Appeals' decision. The case was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings on the slander of title claim. View "McAlister v. Loeb" on Justia Law