Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendant, an ophthalmologist, and dismissing Plaintiff's claim of professional negligence on statute of limitations grounds, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds.In granting summary judgment in Defendant's favor the district court described the case as a medical malpractice suit that was clearly barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant waived the right to seek dismissal on statute of limitations grounds based on evidence outside the complaint, and it was not apparent from the face of the complaint that his claims were barred; and (2) therefore, the district court erred in granting Defendant summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. View "Schuemann v. Timperley" on Justia Law

The Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (“the Commission”) recommended public censure and thirty-day unpaid suspension of former district court Judge Mark Thompson of the Fifth Judicial District. These sanctions stemmed from former Judge Thompson’s guilty plea to a reduced charge of disorderly conduct in Summit County District Court. Former Judge Thompson’s plea reflected his admission to having “recklessly” displayed an AR-15 style assault rifle during a dispute with his adult stepson. View "In the Matter of: Former Judge Mark D. Thompson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in this medical malpractice action brought by Parents against the two doctors involving in the birth and emergency care of their infant son, holding that Parents were not entitled to relief on their allegations of error.On appeal, Parents argued that the district court abused its discretion by excluding expert testimony concerning causation due to a lack of pretrial disclosure and lack of foundation and that a reasonable jury could have found in their favor of their malpractice claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion by excluding the expert testimony; and (2) the district court correctly directed verdicts for the defendants because Parents failed to present sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to make findings in their favor on each element of their malpractice claims. View "Carson v. Steinke" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of Defendants in this dental malpractice action following the grant of Defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that the superior court correctly found that Plaintiff's complaint was time-barred.Plaintiff filed a dental malpractice claim against Defendants, and Defendants filed answers asserting affirmative defenses related to the statute of limitations. The superior court granted summary judgment and final judgment in favor of Defendants, determining that Plaintiff's complaint was not timely filed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's dental malpractice claims against Defendants were time-barred. View "Smith v. Paquette" on Justia Law

Berry sued Frazier, a veterinarian, for nominal and punitive damages based on the circumstances surrounding the euthanasia of her cat. Her complaint alleged that Berry secured Frazier’s services to perform humane euthanasia on her cat. Instead, and without Berry’s informed consent, Frazier performed the euthanasia by means of an unnecessary and unjustified intracardiac injection, resulting in a horrific and painful death for her cat and great emotional distress to Berry. The trial court dismissed, without leave to amend, claims for fraud/deceit/intentional misrepresentation, conversion/trespass to chattels, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of Civil Code section 3340, which allows for an award of exemplary damages for wrongful injuries to animals committed willfully or with gross negligence in disregard of humanity. Berry voluntarily dismissed the sole remaining claim.The court of appeal reversed; the complaint contained sufficient allegations to withstand demurrer to the causes of action for fraud/deceit/intentional misrepresentation, conversion/trespass to chattels, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Berru should be allowed to allege a request for section 3340 exemplary damages in connection with other pleaded causes of action. View "Berry v. Frazier" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Virginia-licensed mental health counselor, appealed from a district court judgment dismissing her First Amendment and Due Process challenges to a New York law requiring her to obtain a further license in that state to provide mental health counseling to New York residents. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in (1) dismissing her as-applied challenges for lack of standing, (2) construing her First Amendment facial challenge as alleging overbreadth and concluding therefrom that she failed to state a plausible claim for relief, and (3) overlooking her facial Due Process claim.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because Plaintiff need not satisfy the particular requirements for initial licensure to provide mental health counseling to New York residents, she can allege no injury from, and therefore has no standing to challenge, that part of the law. Moreover, as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims, the court explained that New York’s license requirement withstands intermediate scrutiny as a matter of law because there is no question that the law (i) serves an important government interest in promoting and protecting public health, specifically, public mental health; and (ii) is narrowly tailored by statutory definition and exemptions to advance that interest without unduly burdening speech. View "Brokamp v. James" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court convened a Special Tribunal for the imposition of discipline to Judge Lance Timbreza, formerly of the Mesa County District Court. The Special Tribunal was convened because the Supreme Court had to recuse itself in this matter under Rule 41(b) of the Colorado Rules of Judicial Discipline (“RJD”). Before the entry of the First Stipulation, Judge Timbreza resigned his position. As part of the First Stipulation, Judge Timbreza also stipulated to the entry of a public censure. He and the Commission further agreed that the issue of whether any additional sanctions should be imposed; ultimately the Special Tribunal recommended Judge Timbreza pay attorney fees and costs to the State of Colorado. Discipline was recommended for the Judge's violation of Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct Canon Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 2.3 following an encounter with a young attorney at a Colorado Bar Association Conference/retreat. The Special Tribunal adopted the recommendations. View "In the Matter of: Lance P. Timbreza, a Judge" on Justia Law

Law firm Halscott Megaro, P.A. (“Halscott Megaro” or “the firm”) sued former clients and their guardians (collectively “former clients”), seeking to recover unpaid legal fees and expenses. A district court dismissed the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court took judicial notice of a North Carolina State Bar Disciplinary Hearing Commission (“Commission”) decision that found the firm’s lead partner misled the former clients and engaged in other unethical conduct. The court then held the firm was precluded from relitigating issues decided by the Commission. It held that Halscott Megaro failed to plausibly plead claims for which relief could be granted. Halscott Megaro appealed, arguing the district court improperly considered matters outside the pleadings and failed to accept its allegations and all reasonable inferences from them as true in concluding that the Commission’s decision as to its lead partner bound the law firm.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed and held that the district court committed no reversible error in granting the former clients’ motion to dismiss or in denying the law firm’s motion for recusal. The court wrote that it agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the Commission was acting in a judicial capacity when it entered its discipline order against Megaro. The court also agreed that Megaro received a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues and due process protections. Further, the court held that the firm’s allegations of impartiality were not related to any particular facts, sources or statements. A presiding judge is not required to recuse himself simply because of unsupported or highly tenuous speculation. View "Halscott Megaro, P.A. v. Henry McCollum" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Department of Health and Human Services1 appealed a district court judgment reversing the Department’s order affirming the denial of Joseph Jahner’s application to enroll as a Medicaid provider. n December 2020, Jahner applied with the Department to be an enrolled provider with North Dakota Medicaid as a peer support specialist. In June 2021, the Department denied Jahner’s application. The Department stated its Medicare Provider Enrollment Screening Policy (“1915(i) Policy”) prohibited Jahner “from enrolling as a provider with ND Medicaid” because of his criminal history. Between 2002 and 2017, Jahner was convicted of 13 crimes, including negligent homicide, reckless endangerment, aggravated assault, assault, and menacing. After the hearing, the ALJ recommended reversing the Department’s decision, concluding the Department should have done a thorough review of Jahner’s criminal history to determine if any offenses had a direct bearing on the position of peer support specialist. The Department did not adopt the ALJ’s recommended decision, and affirmed its decision denying Jahner’s application. The Department concluded peer support specialists serve a vulnerable population, Jahner’s criminal offenses have a direct bearing on the position of peer support specialist, and he was not sufficiently rehabilitated. The Department’s decision prevented Jahner from becoming a Medicaid provider but did not affect his ability to work as a peer support specialist. The district court reversed the Department's decision, holding the Department’s decision was not in accordance with the law. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the Department’s findings of fact were supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and its conclusions of law were supported by its findings of fact. It therefore reversed the district court’s judgment and reinstated the Department’s order. View "Jahner v. NDDHS" on Justia Law

The Commission on Teacher Credentialing (Commission) and its Committee of Credentials (Committee) (collectively, defendants) appealed the grant of mandamus relief to petitioner Russell Earnest, setting aside the Committee’s disciplinary recommendation against him and enjoining the Commission from acting on that recommendation. Defendants argued the trial court erred in finding: (1) Earnest was excused from exhausting his administrative remedies; and (2) the Committee lacked jurisdiction to conduct a formal review pursuant to Education Code1 section 44242.5 (d). They further asserted the trial court should have denied the petition under the doctrine of judicial restraint. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded all three factors outlined in Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Bd., 35 Cal.4th 1072 (2005) weighed in favor of excusing Earnest from exhausting his administrative remedies. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court found that although section 44242.5 (b)(3) generally provided a jurisdictional basis for the Committee to commence initial reviews, as discussed post, the provision was also incorporated in section 44242.5 (d)(3) to provide a jurisdictional basis for the Committee to commence formal reviews. It was this jurisdictional provision the Committee relied upon in commencing a formal review of Earnest’s fitness to hold a credential. The Court thus concluded the plain language of section 44242.5(b)(3) imposed the onus on the employer to determine whether to provide a notifying statement to the Committee, and thus only the employer may determine whether an enumerated action was the “result of an allegation of misconduct,” triggering the Committee’s jurisdiction. Applying that interpretation to the facts of this case, the Court concluded the Committee did not have jurisdiction to commence a formal review of Earnest’s fitness to hold a credential. The grant of mandamus relief was thus affirmed. View "Earnest v. Com. on Teacher Credentialing" on Justia Law