Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Barsanti was delinquent on $1.1 million of senior secured debt it owed to BMO Harris Bank. Barsanti’s owner, Kelly, hired attorney Filer and Gereg, a financing consultant. After negotiations with BMO failed, Filer introduced Gereg to BMO as a person interested in purchasing Barsanti’s debt. Filer created a new company, BWC, to purchase the loans. BWC purchased the loans from BMO for $575,000, paid primarily with Barsanti’s accounts receivable. Barsanti also owed $370,000 in delinquent benefit payments to the Union Trust Fund. Filer, Kelly, and Gereg used BWC’s senior lien to obtain a state court judgment against Barsanti that allowed them to transfer Barsanti’s assets beyond the reach of the Union Fund, using backdated documents to put confession-of-judgment clauses into the loan documents and incorrectly claiming that Barsanti owed BWC $1.58 million. Filer then obtained a court order transferring Barsanti’s assets to BWC, which then transferred the assets to Millwork, another new entity, which continued Barsanti’s business after the Illinois Secretary of State dissolved Barsanti for unpaid taxes. Gereg was Millwork's nominal owner in filings with the Indiana Secretary of State. Barsanti filed for bankruptcy. Filer instructed others not to produce certain documents to the bankruptcy trustee.After a jury convicted Filer of wire fraud 18 U.S.C. 1343., the district court granted his motions for a judgment of acquittal. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdicts. View "United States v. Filer" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court compelling discovery pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 37, holding that the trial court was not required to make findings of fact to support its ruling.Plaintiff brought an action for wrongful death against the defendants from which the decedent sought medical care. At issue was Plaintiff's motion to compel Defendants to comply with an existing discovery order. The trial court granted the motion but did not make specific findings of fact. The court of appeals remanded the case for the trial court to enter factual findings and conclusions of law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendants did not specifically request findings of fact regarding the statutory elements set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. 90-21.22A; and (2) in the absence of such a request, the trial court was not required to make any findings of fact in resolving Plaintiff's motion to compel. View "Williams v. Allen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff's claims for breach of fiduciary duties, misrepresentation, and infliction of emotional distress, holding that Plaintiff's appeal was without merit.For thirteen months, Defendant represented Plaintiff in a criminal matter involving Plaintiff's indictment on a federal child pornography charge before withdrawing. After Plaintiff pled guilty to an obscenity charge he sued Defendant. The district court construed Plaintiff's claims as legal malpractice and granted summary judgment for Defendant because Plaintiff failed to offer any evidence that he was actually innocent of the charges for which Defendant was representing him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's claims of court error in the disposition of the parties' competing motions for summary judgment and in prejudgment interlocutory rulings were without merit. View "Buttercase v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying relief in this Administrative Procedure Act (APA) appeal of the Colonel William J. Bryant's denial of Appellant's application to obtain a license for his private security and investigations company, holding that there was no error.Col. Bryant, in his capacity as director of the Arkansas State Police, entered an administrative order finding that Appellant was ineligible to receive a license due to his prior convictions. Appellant filed a petition for judicial review. After a remand, the circuit court denied the petition finding that there was substantial evidence to support the agency's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant cited no authority for the proposition that it was reversible error for the circuit court to decide an APA appeal on a different ground than that found by the administrative agency; and (2) the director did not err in determining that Ark. Code Ann. 17-40-306 controlled over Ark. Code Ann. 17-1-103. View "Hackie v. Bryant" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a negligent credentialing is a separate and independent claim from medical negligence but that a negligent credentialing claim cannot proceed without either a simultaneous or prior adjudication of or stipulation to medical negligence.At issue was whether a hospital's grant of staff privileges to a physician, otherwise known as credentialing a physician, confers a duty upon the hospital that is separate and independent of the duty the physical owes to the hospital's patients. If so, the question remained whether a patient's negligent credentialing claim can proceed in the absence of a prior adjudication or stipulation that the physician was negligent in his care of the patient. The trial court in this case granted the hospital's motion for summary judgment on the negligent credentialing claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a negligent credentialing claim cannot proceed without either a simultaneous or prior adjudication of or stipulation that a doctor committed medical malpractice; and (2) because such an adjudication or stipulation was not present in this case, the negligent credentialing claim was properly dismissed. View "Walling v. Brenya" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the petition brought by the Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission claiming that Judge Carroll violated several rules of the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, including breaching his duty to the public and undermining the fair and impartial administration of justice, holding that disciplinary action was required.In its petition, the Commission agreed to recommend a suspension without pay for ninety days, with thirty days held in abeyance for one year, and certain remedial measures for Judge Carroll's improprieties. The Supreme Court granted the Commission's expedited petition and modified the recommendation sanction by suspending Judge Carroll without pay for eighteen months, with six of those months held in abeyance. The Court further ordered Judge Carroll to perform an assessment and complete a plan with the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program, holding that, given the seriousness of the conduct at issue, the length of the recommended suspension was insufficient. View "Ark. Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm'n v. Carroll" on Justia Law

Hewittel was convicted of armed robbery and related offenses based solely on the testimony of the victim. Three witnesses—one of them having little relationship with anyone in the case—were prepared to testify in support of Hewittel’s alibi that he was at home, almost a half-hour from the crime scene when the crime occurred. Hewittel’s attorney failed to call any of those witnesses at trial, not because of any strategic judgment but because Hewittel’s counsel thought the crime occurred between noon and 12:30 p.m. when Hewittel was at home alone. The victim twice testified (in counsel’s presence) that the crime occurred at 1:00 or 1:30 p.m.—by which time all three witnesses were present at Hewittel’s home. Counsel also believed that evidence of Hewittel’s prior convictions would have unavoidably come in at trial. In reality, that evidence almost certainly would have been excluded, if Hewittel’s counsel asked. Throughout the trial, Hewittel’s counsel repeatedly reminded the jury that his client had been convicted of armed robbery five times before.The trial judge twice ordered a new trial. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, based in part on the same mistake regarding the time of the offense. The federal district court granted a Hewittel writ of habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, calling the trial “an extreme malfunction in the criminal justice system.” View "Hewitt-El v. Burgess" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing this complaint brought by Plaintiffs, Central States Development, LLC and Saint James Apartment Partners, against Defendants, Elizabeth Friedgut and the law firm of DLA Piper, LLP, holding that dismissal was proper.Friedgut, as DLA's employee, represented Plaintiffs in a dispute with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. Plaintiffs later brought a negligence case against Defendants in connection with that representation. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Defendants did not have the requisite minimum contacts with Nebraska to establish personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "Central States Development v. Friedgut" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the district court entering summary judgment in this action concerning the assignability of the proceeds from a legal malpractice action, holding that the district court properly invalidated the assignment at issue.In question was the assignment of proceeds to an adverse party in the underlying litigation from which the alleged legal malpractice arose. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) public policy prohibits an assignment of proceeds from a legal malpractice claim to an adversary in the underlying litigation; (2) the district court properly invalidated the assignment at issue; and (3) an invalid assignment does not, by itself, preclude an injured client from pursuing a legal malpractice claim if the assignment has been set aside. View "Beavor v. Tomsheck" on Justia Law

Pro se plaintiff Gary Wisner, M.D. filed a complaint alleging that defendants Dignity Health and the Dignity Health St. Joseph’s Medical Center (collectively, SJMC) falsely reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) that Wisner surrendered his clinical privileges while under criminal investigation for insurance fraud. The trial court granted a special motion to strike the complaint after concluding that Wisner’s claims arose from a protected activity and that Wisner failed to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits. Wisner contested both aspects of the trial court’s order, and he also argued the court erred by denying his motion to conduct limited discovery prior to the hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion. Finding no error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Wisner v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law