Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Brian L. Sheehy, as trustee, sued Chicago Title Insurance Company over a dispute involving an easement on his property. Plaintiff designated an attorney, who had previously represented the defendant, as an expert witness to testify about the defendant's handling of the claim. The defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude this expert, arguing that the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct prohibited the attorney from testifying adversely to the defendant. The trial court granted the motion to exclude the expert.Plaintiff then filed a petition for a writ of mandate with the Court of Appeal, which was summarily denied. Concurrently, plaintiff appealed the trial court's ruling, citing Brand v. 20th Century Insurance Company/21st Century Insurance Company (2004) for the proposition that the order was appealable. The Court of Appeal stayed the preparation of the record, considered dismissing the appeal, and requested briefing from the parties. A hearing was subsequently held.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, dismissed the appeal. The court held that it only has jurisdiction over direct appeals from appealable orders or judgments. The court emphasized that, in ordinary civil cases, appeals are generally only permitted from final judgments to prevent piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals. The court distinguished between orders on motions to disqualify counsel, which are appealable, and orders on motions in limine, which are not. The court disagreed with the precedent set in Brand, concluding that orders on motions in limine are not appealable as they are not final collateral orders or injunctions. The court decided that such orders should be reviewed only by writ petition or by appeal from the final judgment. View "Sheehy v. Chicago Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Two workers' compensation claimants, represented by attorney David Graham, settled their claims with Southeast Alaska Regional Health Consortium (SEARHC) except for attorney's fees. The Alaska Workers' Compensation Board awarded Graham significantly less than he requested. The Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board's decision, but the Alaska Supreme Court reversed it, instructing the Commission to consider enhanced fees. On remand, the Commission did not change the fee award, leading to another appeal.The Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission initially affirmed the Board's reduced fee award. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed this decision, clarifying that the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act allows for enhanced fees and remanded the case for reconsideration. On remand, the Commission again awarded $450 per hour, citing past awards and the factors in Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a), but did not enhance the fee despite acknowledging the complexity and novelty of the issues.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the Commission's decision, finding that the Commission abused its discretion by not adequately considering the factors that supported an enhanced fee. The Court emphasized the need for the Commission to apply the modified lodestar method, which involves calculating a baseline fee and then considering whether to adjust it based on various factors, including the complexity and novelty of the case and the contingent nature of the work. The Court vacated the Commission's fee award and remanded the case, directing the Commission to enhance the fees based on its findings. The Court also clarified that the Commission must consider all relevant factors and not rely solely on past awards. View "Rusch v. Southeast Alaska Regional Health Consortium" on Justia Law

Jason Kertz applied for social security disability benefits in October 2019, citing disabilities including PTSD, back and leg problems, and sleep apnea, with an onset date of March 16, 2018. His initial claim was denied, and an SSA administrative law judge (ALJ) also found him not disabled after a hearing. The SSA Appeals Council upheld this decision in February 2021. Kertz then hired attorney Nicholas Coleman to represent him in federal court. Coleman and Kertz agreed on a contingent-fee arrangement of 25% of any past-due benefits awarded.Coleman filed a civil action in the Eastern District of Arkansas, which resulted in the court remanding the case to the SSA for further proceedings. The district court awarded Coleman $5,426.08 in attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). On remand, the ALJ issued a Fully Favorable Decision in December 2022, finding Kertz disabled since the alleged onset date. The SSA notified Kertz of his entitlement to $96,349.00 in past-due benefits, withholding 25% as potential attorney fees. Coleman then sought 25% of the past-due benefits as per the contingent-fee agreement.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted Coleman’s motion for attorney’s fees in part, awarding $10,667.50 instead of the requested $24,087.25. The court found that the full 25% fee was not reasonable given the circumstances, including the limited time Coleman spent on the case and the lack of substantive court review due to the unopposed remand.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in reducing the fee award, as it appropriately considered the reasonableness of the fee in light of the services rendered and avoided a windfall to the attorney. View "Kertz v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Karsen H. Rezac was involved in a vehicular collision on December 23, 2022, in Lincoln, Nebraska, which resulted in the shooting death of Kupo Mleya. Rezac, who was identified as a suspect based on vehicle debris and witness reports, admitted to firing shots at Mleya's vehicle after the collision. Rezac was charged with second-degree murder and use of a firearm to commit a felony. He later pled no contest to second-degree murder as part of a plea agreement, and the firearm charge was dropped.The district court for Lancaster County, Nebraska, denied Rezac's motion to continue his sentencing hearing, which he requested to allow more time to gather and review his mental health records. The court proceeded with the sentencing, considering the presentence investigation report and supplemental items. Rezac was sentenced to 60 years to life imprisonment. Rezac appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion in denying the continuance and imposing an excessive sentence, and that his trial counsel was ineffective in several respects.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that Rezac forfeited his argument regarding the denial of the continuance by failing to raise the issue at the sentencing hearing. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the sentencing, as the district court had considered the relevant mitigating factors. The court rejected Rezac's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel related to the failure to move to suppress his statement to law enforcement and the failure to explain the penalties for second-degree murder, finding that the record refuted these claims.However, the court found the record insufficient to address Rezac's claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for advising him that self-defense was not a viable argument, failing to explain the difference between second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter, and failing to provide his mental health records to probation or the court. The court affirmed Rezac's conviction and sentence but noted that these claims of ineffective assistance of counsel could not be resolved on direct appeal due to the insufficient record. View "State v. Rezac" on Justia Law

Judge Carlos Moore, a municipal court judge for the cities of Clarksdale and Grenada, faced allegations of misconduct related to his social media posts and public comments. The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance (the Commission) claimed that Moore's actions violated the Mississippi Constitution, the Code of Judicial Conduct, and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Commission and Moore. The Commission's allegations stemmed from Moore's social media activity in 2021 and 2022, where he posted content that could be perceived as advertising his law practice and making racially charged comments.The Commission had previously warned Moore in 2019 about posting information on social media regarding cases he heard in court. In 2020, Moore and the Commission entered into an MOU, where Moore agreed to limit his social media posts to court-related information and not use his judicial title for personal or political purposes. Despite this agreement, Moore continued to post under the name "Judge Carlos Moore" and made public comments that the Commission deemed inappropriate.The Commission filed a Formal Complaint against Moore in July 2022, alleging violations of the Mississippi Constitution and the Code of Judicial Conduct. Moore did not respond to the complaint or participate in the Commission's proceedings. The Commission recommended Moore's removal from office, a six-year suspension, and a $5,000 fine.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and found that Moore's actions constituted willful misconduct and were prejudicial to the administration of justice. The Court held that Moore's comments on social media and television violated the judicial-conduct canons and the MOU. The Court ordered Moore's removal from the bench, a $3,000 fine, and assessed all costs. The Court emphasized that Moore's actions undermined public confidence in the judiciary and warranted a harsh sanction. View "Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Moore" on Justia Law

In 2017, John Cridler-Smith was convicted of possession with intent to distribute more than five pounds of marijuana. The case began when a postal worker in Loudoun County, Virginia, noticed a suspicious parcel from California, a known source state for marijuana trafficking. Law enforcement obtained a search warrant and found over six pounds of marijuana in the parcel. A controlled delivery was conducted to Cridler-Smith’s brother’s residence, where Cridler-Smith was later seen. Inside the residence, officers found drug paraphernalia and another parcel containing marijuana. Cridler-Smith admitted to shipping the marijuana during an interview with Detective Chris Staub.The Loudoun County Circuit Court denied Cridler-Smith’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. Cridler-Smith argued that his pre-trial counsel advised him to cooperate with law enforcement without adequate investigation and that his trial counsel failed to move to suppress his incriminating statements. The circuit court found that counsel’s advice was tailored to Cridler-Smith’s objectives of protecting his brother and minimizing jail time. The court initially found that Cridler-Smith had stated a claim regarding the failure to suppress his confession but later dismissed the claim upon reconsideration.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and found that counsel’s initial advice regarding cooperation was reasonable given Cridler-Smith’s stated objectives. However, the court determined that the failure to seek suppression of Cridler-Smith’s confession might constitute ineffective assistance. The court noted that the applicability of Rule 3A:8(c)(6) to the confession required resolution of a factual question that the circuit court did not definitively address. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve whether the statements were made in connection with an offer to plead guilty. View "Cridler-Smith v. Clarke" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, a local attorney, was contracted by Theory Wellness, a marijuana dispensary operator, to assist in obtaining a host community agreement from the City of Medford, Massachusetts. Instead of legitimate lobbying, the defendant attempted to bribe Medford's chief of police through the chief's brother. This led to the defendant's convictions on two counts of honest-services wire fraud and one count of federal programs bribery.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts presided over the trial, where a jury convicted the defendant on all counts. The defendant was sentenced to concurrent twenty-four-month terms of imprisonment. The defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of certain testimony, and the jury instructions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated the honest-services wire fraud convictions, finding that the district court erroneously admitted the only evidence establishing the jurisdictional element of those counts. However, the court affirmed the federal programs bribery conviction, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the defendant intended to bribe the chief of police.The court held that the defendant's actions constituted a bribery scheme under 18 U.S.C. § 666, even if the defendant did not believe the chief had accepted the bribe. The court also found that the district court's failure to instruct the jury on the requirement of an "official act" was harmless, as the evidence overwhelmingly supported the conclusion that the defendant sought official acts from the chief. The court rejected the defendant's entrapment defense, finding no improper inducement by the government and that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. View "United States v. O'Donovan" on Justia Law

Larenzo Burnett pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. During sentencing, a dispute arose regarding whether Burnett’s prior conviction under Iowa Code § 708.6(2) was a "crime of violence," which would increase his base offense level. The probation office recommended the increase, but Burnett objected. The parties reached a sentencing agreement where Burnett withdrew his objection and stipulated that the prior conviction was for a crime of violence. The district court imposed a sentence of 99 months and 14 days in prison.Burnett later filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to file a notice of appeal. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and found that Burnett had not asked his attorney to file a notice of appeal within the 14-day period allowed by rule. Consequently, the court denied Burnett’s motion to vacate his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Burnett needed to show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced his defense. The court found that Burnett’s defense counsel testified credibly that Burnett never requested an appeal. The district court’s credibility determination was not clearly erroneous, as it was based on the observation of witness demeanor and the consistency of the testimony. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that there was no clear error in the finding that Burnett did not ask his attorney to file a notice of appeal. View "Burnett v. United States" on Justia Law

Bellin Memorial Hospital hired Kinsey & Kinsey, Inc. to upgrade its computer software. Kinsey failed to implement the agreed-upon software, leading Bellin to sue Kinsey in Wisconsin state court for breach of contract and other claims. Bellin also sued Kinsey’s president and a senior product consultant. Kinsey’s insurer, Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company, provided a defense under a professional liability insurance policy. During the trial, Bellin and Philadelphia Indemnity entered into a partial settlement, resolving some claims and specifying the conditions under which Bellin could collect damages from Kinsey. Bellin prevailed at trial and was awarded damages.The Wisconsin circuit court ruled that the limited liability provision in the Agreement did not apply due to Kinsey’s material breach. The court granted a directed verdict on the breach of contract claim against Kinsey, leaving the question of damages to the jury. The jury awarded Bellin $1.39 million, later reduced to $750,000 plus costs. The jury found Kinsey and its president not liable for intentional misrepresentation and misleading representation.Philadelphia Indemnity filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking a declaration that the state court’s judgment was covered by the insurance policy and that the $1 million settlement offset the $750,000 judgment. The district court ruled for Bellin, concluding that the state court judgment was not covered by the insurance policy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the insurance policy covered only negligent acts, errors, or omissions, and the state court’s judgment was based on a breach of contract, not negligence. Therefore, the $1 million set-off provision did not apply, and Bellin could recover the full amount of the judgment. View "Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. v Kinsey & Kinsey, Inc." on Justia Law

Berry Alexander Davis was involved in the kidnapping and murder of Monique Baugh and the attempted murder of her boyfriend, Jon, on New Year’s Eve in 2019. Baugh was abducted, placed in a U-Haul truck, and fatally shot. Davis and a co-defendant, Cedric Lamont Berry, were charged with first-degree premeditated murder, attempted first-degree premeditated murder, and kidnapping. The State's theory was that Davis and Berry attacked Jon on behalf of Lyndon Wiggins, who had a falling out with Jon. Detective Briana Johnson testified about the relationship between Davis, Berry, and Wiggins, indicating they were involved in drug dealing together. Davis waived his right to testify, and the jury found him guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of release.On direct appeal, Davis argued that the district court erred in joining his trial with Berry’s and that Detective Johnson’s testimony was inadmissible and prejudicial. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected these arguments and affirmed his conviction and sentence. Davis also filed a pro se supplemental brief raising several claims, including that his sentence violated his constitutional right to a sentencing jury under Blakely v. Washington. The court found these claims lacked merit.Davis subsequently filed a postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and constitutional violations in his sentencing. The district court summarily denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that even if Davis proved the facts alleged, he would not be entitled to relief as a matter of law.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Davis’s postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing, as his claims failed on their merits as a matter of law. View "Davis vs. State" on Justia Law