Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a lawsuit filed by Masimo Corporation against John Bauche, BoundlessRise, LLC (Boundless), and Skyward Investments, LLC (Skyward), represented by The Vanderpool Law Firm (Vanderpool). The lawsuit was based on Bauche's misappropriation of corporate funds while he was a Masimo employee. Bauche had fraudulently engaged Boundless, a company he solely owned, as an "outside vendor" for Masimo, and later transferred the money paid for fraudulent vendor services to Skyward, another company he solely owned. Masimo's attempts to obtain substantive discovery responses from the defendants were met with boilerplate objections, leading to a motion to compel responses and a request for discovery sanctions.The case was stayed twice, first due to Bauche's appeal from the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion, and then to allow a federal criminal case against him to be resolved. The referee supervising discovery recommended that the motion to compel be granted and Masimo be awarded $10,000 in discovery sanctions. The trial court agreed and entered an order to that effect, awarding sanctions against Vanderpool and the three defendants.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three, Vanderpool appealed the order, arguing that it had substituted out of the case as counsel before the motion to compel was filed and was therefore unsanctionable. The court rejected this argument, stating that it is not necessary to be counsel of record to be liable for monetary sanctions for discovery misuse. The court affirmed the order, concluding that Vanderpool and its clients were liable for discovery misuse. The court also criticized Vanderpool for its lack of civility in the proceedings. View "Masimo Corporation v. The Vanderpool Law Firm, Inc." on Justia Law

Solomon Bolen was convicted of multiple offenses, including attempted second-degree murder and aggravated assault and battery. Bolen appealed, arguing that the district court violated his due process rights by not instructing the jury on his plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency (NGMI). He also claimed that his attorneys were ineffective for not seeking those instructions. Additionally, Bolen contended that his convictions for attempted second-degree murder and aggravated assault and battery violated his right against double jeopardy.The district court had found Bolen mentally fit to proceed with the trial. Despite Bolen's NGMI plea, the court-designated examiner, Dr. Wilkinson, opined that Bolen did not meet the statutory criteria for an NGMI defense. She noted that Bolen's altered state of mind and psychosis at the time of the crimes were caused by self-induced intoxication, which is specifically excluded from the statutory definition of mental illness or deficiency. Bolen's attorneys did not pursue the NGMI defense and focused instead on the self-induced intoxication defense.The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Bolen did not present competent evidence to support an NGMI defense, and thus was not entitled to have the jury instructed on the defense. The court also found that Bolen's attorneys were not ineffective for not pursuing the NGMI defense, as the instructions would not have been proper even if they had renewed their request for them. Lastly, the court held that Bolen's convictions for attempted second-degree murder and aggravated assault and battery did not violate his right against double jeopardy, as the crimes contained separate elements. View "Bolen v. State" on Justia Law

Levi Rudder, a non-lawyer, was sanctioned by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas for engaging in unauthorized practice of law. Rudder had contacted a detainee facing federal firearm charges and attempted to involve himself in the case, despite being told not to by the defense counsel. He held an unprivileged, monitored video meeting with the detainee, offered legal advice, and encouraged the detainee to sign a form appointing him as additional counsel. The district court found Rudder guilty of unauthorized practice of law and imposed a monetary sanction of $500. He was also barred from filing documents in the Northern District of Texas without the court's permission.Rudder appealed the decision, arguing that the district court lacked the authority to impose these sanctions. He contended that the Constitution does not afford federal courts inherent powers to sanction individuals for engaging in unauthorized practice of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed with Rudder's argument. The court cited previous cases that established federal courts' inherent power to police the conduct of litigants and attorneys who appear before them. The court also noted that a party cannot be represented by a non-lawyer and that a minimum level of competence is required to protect the client, their adversaries, and the court from poorly drafted, inarticulate, or vexatious claims. Therefore, the court concluded that a federal court's power to regulate and discipline attorneys extends to conduct by non-lawyers amounting to practicing law without a license. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sanctions on Rudder and affirmed the lower court's decision. View "In re: Rudder" on Justia Law

The case involves Donald Herrington, who was charged with multiple counts of perjury, obtaining money by false pretenses, filing false or fraudulent income tax returns, failure to file an income tax return, and drug possession. Herrington chose to represent himself in court, waiving his right to counsel. He was eventually convicted on several charges and sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment. Herrington appealed his conviction, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to bring two meritorious arguments on direct appeal.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which rejected Herrington's arguments and denied his petition. Herrington then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. The court found that Herrington knowingly, unequivocally, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, thus affirming that aspect of the district court's decision. However, the court agreed with Herrington that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the jury was erroneously instructed on the requirements for a conviction for failure to file a tax return. The court reversed this part of the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to issue a writ of habeas corpus unless Herrington is afforded a new state court appeal in which he may raise this claim. View "Herrington v. Dotson" on Justia Law

Keith Henyard was charged with eight drug-related felonies in Wisconsin. During his preliminary hearing, Court Commissioner Frank Parise presided. Later, Henyard hired Parise as his attorney. Parise secured a plea deal for Henyard, who pleaded guilty to four of the eight charges. The remaining four charges were dismissed but considered during sentencing. Henyard did not raise any objections about Parise's potential conflict of interest during these proceedings. He was sentenced to 12 years in prison followed by 5 years of extended supervision for one count, and 6 years of probation for the other three counts.Henyard later petitioned the Kenosha County Circuit Court for postconviction relief, arguing that Parise's previous role in his preliminary hearing constituted a conflict of interest, rendering his representation ineffective. The circuit court denied his petition, finding that Henyard had not demonstrated an actual or serious potential conflict of interest. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals also rejected Henyard's petition, stating that he had failed to show that Parise's alleged conflict of interest had adversely affected his performance. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied Henyard's petition for review.Henyard then sought a writ of habeas corpus from the federal district court, which also denied his petition. The court found that Henyard needed to show a conflict that affected counsel's performance, as per the precedent set by the United States Supreme Court. The court concluded that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' decision complied with this precedent and reasonably applied the law to deny Henyard relief.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Henyard argued that Parise's conflict of interest rendered his representation ineffective. The court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, stating that Henyard had not demonstrated that Parise actively represented conflicting interests or that the alleged conflict adversely affected his performance. The court concluded that the state court's denial of Henyard's petition was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. View "Henyard v. Eplett" on Justia Law

The case involves Lamarcus Eugene Drayton, who was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault against his nephew. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where Drayton was found guilty on all charges and sentenced to an aggregate term of 10 to 20 years' imprisonment, followed by five years' probation. Drayton appealed, asserting that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and that the trial court erred when it excluded an alleged prior inconsistent statement by the victim. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, and Drayton did not seek further review.Drayton later filed a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the court sent written instructions to the jury in violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 646, and for failing to call three witnesses whom Drayton claimed would have testified that he had no opportunity to commit the sexual offenses. The PCRA court dismissed Drayton’s petition, and the Superior Court affirmed the dismissal.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted review to consider whether trial counsel’s failure to object, when a trial court provides certain written instructions to the jury during deliberations in contravention of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 646, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel per se such that a PCRA petitioner need not establish prejudice in order to obtain relief. The court held that counsel’s failure to object to a Rule 646 violation is not one of the limited bases establishing ineffectiveness per se. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision of the lower courts. View "Commonwealth v. Drayton" on Justia Law

In September 2020, George Fluitt was indicted on three counts of fraud and offering kickbacks related to genetic testing services that his company, Specialty Drug Testing LLC, provided to Medicare beneficiaries. As part of a nationwide investigation into genetic testing fraud, the Government executed search warrants at laboratories referred to as the Hurricane Shoals Entities (“HSE”), allegedly operated by Khalid Satary. The Government copied several terabytes of data from HSE, some of which were later determined to be material to Fluitt’s defense.In the lower courts, the Government established a “Filter Team” to review materials seized in its investigation and identify any that might be privileged. The Filter Team’s review was governed in part by a Protocol Order, which established a multi-step process for notifying a third party that it might have a claim of privilege and then adjudicating that claim. HSE and Satary provided privilege logs to the Filter Team, asserting thousands of claims of privilege. Both Fluitt and the Filter Team found these privilege logs to be facially deficient as they made only threadbare assertions of privilege, without any accompanying explanation.In the United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit, the court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the appellants failed to establish their claims of privilege. The court also found that the appellants' argument that they are not bound by the Protocol Order was a red herring, as the magistrate judge evaluated the appellants’ privilege logs under the standards established by federal caselaw. The court also rejected the appellants' argument that Fluitt “has not shown a need for the documents” and has not “demonstrated any kind of relevancy.” The court found that the record suggests that Fluitt “has a need” for the potentially privileged documents, as the Government determined that the potentially privileged materials were material to preparing Fluitt’s defense. View "United States v. Fluitt" on Justia Law

The case involves a legal malpractice claim brought by Patricia Kappes against Diana Rhodes and Rhodes Law Firm, LLC. Kappes alleges that Rhodes' negligence resulted in the loss of a legal action against a defendant. The legal action in question pertains to the wrongful death of Kappes' mother, Lula M. Tanner, who was a resident at Deseret Health and Rehab at Rock Springs, LLC. Kappes had sought legal recourse for her mother's death against her mother's healthcare providers. However, Rhodes failed to timely file an application with the Wyoming Medical Review Panel and a wrongful death complaint against Ms. Tanner’s healthcare providers, which Kappes alleges constitutes legal malpractice.The District Court of Laramie County, Wyoming, certified four questions to the Supreme Court of Wyoming. These questions pertained to the role of the collectibility of the judgment in the underlying action in legal malpractice cases in Wyoming. The lower court sought to understand whether the collectibility of a judgment is a relevant consideration in a legal malpractice case, which party bears the burden of proving the underlying judgment would have been collectible, whether collectibility must be pled as an affirmative defense, and whether the Collectibility Doctrine is available as a defense to an attorney who has admitted liability.The Supreme Court of Wyoming concluded that the collectibility of the judgment is an essential part of the causation/damages element of a legal malpractice action. The client, in this case, Kappes, has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that any judgment she would have obtained in the underlying action would have been collectible. The court held that the client's burden includes showing she would have obtained a judgment in the underlying action and the judgment would have been collectible. The court did not find it necessary to answer the third and fourth certified questions as they were predicated on the court deciding collectibility is an affirmative defense to be pled and proved by the attorney. View "Kappes v. Rhodes" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a claim of professional negligence against a law firm, Margolis Edelstein, by its former client, GMG Insurance Agency. Margolis had represented GMG and one of its employees, Howard Wilson, in a non-compete dispute. After GMG failed to fully prevail on a motion for summary judgment and settlement talks broke down, GMG fired Margolis. On the eve of trial, Wilson, represented by separate counsel, filed an affidavit recanting his prior testimony and providing new testimony, which was unfavorable to GMG. GMG then sued Margolis for legal malpractice, asserting that Margolis's negligent representation led to GMG's exposure to the consequences of Wilson's pre-trial change in testimony.The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Margolis, finding that Wilson's affidavit was a superseding cause that broke the causal chain linking Margolis's alleged negligence and GMG's claimed damages. GMG appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware found that the Superior Court erred in its decision. The Supreme Court held that there were disputes of material fact as to whether Margolis deviated from the requisite standard of care. The court also found that the Superior Court erred by failing to address GMG's contention that, but for Margolis's alleged negligence, GMG would have prevailed on all claims in the previous litigation—a circumstance that would have effectively negated Margolis's superseding cause argument. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "GMG Insurance Agency v. Edelstein" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Gail Robinson, who was convicted of heat-of-passion manslaughter for the killing of Bobby Pruitt. The two had a tumultuous relationship, with both having been convicted of domestic violence against each other in the past. On the night of the incident, after a series of altercations, Robinson stabbed Pruitt, who later succumbed to his injuries. Robinson admitted to the stabbing, stating that she was the one who put the knife in Pruitt's chest, not her son who was also present at the scene.Prior to the Supreme Court of Mississippi, the case was heard in the Alcorn County Circuit Court. Robinson was charged with heat-of-passion manslaughter, and the jury was instructed on heat-of-passion manslaughter, self-defense, and reasonable use of force. Robinson was convicted as charged and sentenced to twenty years, with eight years suspended and twelve years to serve in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Robinson's post-trial motion was denied by the trial court.In the Supreme Court of Mississippi, Robinson challenged her conviction on two grounds. First, she argued that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to offer a jury instruction on her right to stand her ground in self-defense. Second, she contended that the State presented insufficient evidence to show she did not act in self-defense. The court affirmed her conviction, stating that the record was not clear enough to address her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. The court also found that the State's evidence was sufficient to disprove Robinson's claim of self-defense. The court noted that Robinson continued to attack Pruitt past the point of any reasonable fear of imminent death or great bodily harm, and the jury had rejected her self-defense claim after weighing the evidence and credibility of the witnesses. View "Robinson v. State" on Justia Law