Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

The appellant was represented by an attorney in a criminal contempt proceeding after allegedly violating a civil protective order. During the course of representation, the appellant twice made statements to his attorney threatening to kill the Assistant Attorney General prosecuting his case, including specific language and gestures indicating an intent to cause harm. The attorney, disturbed by these threats, initially sought to withdraw from representation and later disclosed the threats to the court after being ordered to do so. The attorney subsequently testified before a grand jury and at trial regarding the threats, which led to the appellant being charged and convicted by a jury of threatening a public official and obstruction of justice.Following conviction in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the appellant challenged the admissibility of his attorney’s testimony, arguing that the statements were protected by the attorney-client privilege. The trial court rejected this argument, finding that the threats were not made for the purpose of seeking legal advice and thus were not privileged. On appeal, a division of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals initially vacated the convictions, holding that the statements were privileged and their admission was not harmless error. The United States successfully petitioned for en banc review, and the full court vacated the division’s decision, limiting the scope of review to the attorney-client privilege issue.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, held that the attorney-client privilege does not protect communications that themselves constitute criminal threats to cause death or serious bodily harm. The court reasoned that such threats are an abuse of the attorney-client relationship and fall outside the privilege, regardless of whether the technical elements of the privilege are otherwise met. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s admission of the attorney’s testimony and remanded the case for consideration of the appellant’s remaining arguments. View "Moore v. United States" on Justia Law

Jessica De'Andrea, a patrol officer with the Montgomery Police Department, was involved in a motor vehicle collision while on duty. The driver of the other vehicle, Clint Walters, later sued De'Andrea individually for negligence, resulting in a $550,000 judgment against her after a jury trial. De'Andrea alleged that the City of Montgomery, which had procured liability insurance and acted as a self-insurer for its employees, failed to properly defend her, did not communicate settlement or appeal options, and refused to satisfy the judgment. She claimed these failures led to her bankruptcy and brought multiple claims against the City, including breach of contract, bad faith, fraudulent misrepresentation, and violations of the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act.The Montgomery Circuit Court denied the City's motions to dismiss, finding it was not apparent beyond doubt that De'Andrea could prove no set of circumstances entitling her to relief. The City then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus, seeking dismissal of all claims on the basis of statutory immunity and other defenses.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed only the City's immunity defense as to the fraudulent misrepresentation claim, because the City had not preserved immunity arguments for the other claims in the lower court. The Court held that municipal immunity under § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, does not automatically bar all fraudulent misrepresentation claims, as such claims can be based on innocent or mistaken misrepresentations, not just intentional torts. The Court denied the City's petition for a writ of mandamus, allowing De'Andrea's claims to proceed. The City may raise its other defenses on appeal if necessary. View "De'Andrea v. City of Montgomery" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was shot five times in his apartment parking lot and, in the chaos, dropped his black iPhone and a satchel. His girlfriend took the satchel but left the phone, which was later recovered by police near some shrubs. The police also seized a different (white) iPhone from the defendant at the hospital. The black iPhone remained in police evidence for over two years, until it became relevant in a separate federal drug investigation. The government ultimately used data from the black iPhone, along with other evidence, to charge the defendant with drug trafficking, firearm offenses, and money laundering.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon presided over the trial. Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress evidence from the black iPhone, arguing that he retained a privacy interest in the device and its data, and also sought recusal of the district judge due to her prior service as U.S. Attorney when he was prosecuted for unrelated charges over fifteen years earlier. The district court denied both motions, finding that the defendant had abandoned the black iPhone and thus lacked standing to challenge its search, and that recusal was not warranted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s finding that the defendant had abandoned his privacy interest in the black iPhone, holding that the circumstances—dropping the phone while fleeing after being shot—did not show intent to abandon the device or its data. However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the suppression motion because federal agents obtained a warrant and searched the phone within a reasonable period. The court also affirmed the denial of the recusal motion, concluding that a reasonable person would not question the judge’s impartiality under these facts. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "USA V. HUNT" on Justia Law

Maurice Devalle, a former North Carolina State Highway Patrol sergeant, was terminated in April 2017 after an internal investigation revealed he had falsified his home address to meet residency requirements, submitted false time sheets, and was untruthful about his work activities. Shortly after his termination, Devalle accepted a position as a deputy sheriff and school resource officer in Columbus County and applied for justice officer certification from the North Carolina Sheriffs’ Education and Training Standards Commission. Over the following year and a half, Devalle received strong character endorsements from his new supervisors and colleagues, who testified to his rehabilitation and positive impact in his new role.After reviewing Devalle’s application, the Commission’s Probable Cause Committee determined he lacked good moral character based on his prior misconduct and did not conduct a new investigation into his recent conduct. Devalle challenged the denial in a contested case before an administrative law judge (ALJ), who found his supporting witnesses credible but noted Devalle’s own testimony was evasive and lacked candor. The Commission ultimately denied certification, citing Devalle’s lack of truthfulness during the hearing. Devalle sought judicial review in Superior Court, Columbus County, which reversed the Commission’s decision, finding insufficient evidence to support the denial and ordering retroactive certification.The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding the Commission’s decision was arbitrary and capricious compared to its handling of a prior, similar case. On discretionary review, the Supreme Court of North Carolina applied the whole record test and found substantial evidence supported the Commission’s conclusion that Devalle lacked the requisite candor and truthfulness. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstating the Commission’s indefinite denial of certification. View "Devalle v. Sheriffs’ Education & Training Standards Commission" on Justia Law

Roger Contreras and Nancy Bourke were involved in a marriage dissolution proceeding in Cochise County, Arizona, with a decree entered in 2011. The case saw extensive post-decree litigation. In February 2020, all Cochise County Superior Court judges, including Judge Timothy Dickerson, recused themselves from the matter without providing reasons on the record, and the case was reassigned to a Pima County judge. In 2021, Judge Dickerson became the presiding judge of Cochise County Superior Court and subsequently appointed Contreras as a justice of the peace pro tempore. In December 2022, Contreras moved to have Bourke declared a vexatious litigant, and Judge Dickerson, despite his prior recusal, ruled on the motion without explaining his re-entry or giving the parties an opportunity to object.Judge Dickerson designated Bourke a vexatious litigant. Bourke appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Bourke had waived any challenge to Judge Dickerson’s participation by failing to timely seek disqualification under relevant statutes and rules. The appellate majority did not address Bourke’s argument regarding Judge Dickerson’s appointment of Contreras as a justice of the peace pro tempore as a potential conflict, while the dissent argued that waiver should not apply under the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case. It held that once a judge recuses from a case, the judge remains disqualified from further participation unless the judge articulates the reasons why recusal is no longer required and allows the parties an opportunity to object. The court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion, reversed the superior court’s order declaring Bourke a vexatious litigant, and remanded for a different judge to rule on Contreras’ motion. View "CONTRERAS v BOURKE" on Justia Law

A plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging that she was sexually abused by the defendant during a period in 1965 when she was a minor. The plaintiff was represented by two attorneys. The case was initially filed in state court but was later removed to federal court. During discovery, the plaintiff’s attorneys repeatedly failed to meet deadlines for responding to the defendant’s requests for production of documents and interrogatories. Despite multiple extensions and explicit warnings from the court, the attorneys continued to miss deadlines and failed to produce documents that were known to exist, some of which were obtained by the defendant through third-party subpoenas. The plaintiff eventually discharged her attorneys and voluntarily dismissed the case with prejudice.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the defendant’s motion for sanctions against the plaintiff’s attorneys under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. The district court found that the attorneys had violated a specific discovery order by missing a court-imposed deadline and had demonstrated a willful disregard for their discovery obligations over several months, despite repeated warnings. The court imposed monetary sanctions of $5,000 against one attorney and $3,000 against the other, finding that a full award of expenses would be unjust under the circumstances.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing these sanctions. The Second Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion, finding that the attorneys had violated a clear court order and that the sanctions were appropriately tailored. The court affirmed the imposition of sanctions, concluding that the attorneys’ conduct warranted monetary penalties under Rule 37. View "Isaacs v. Zimmerman" on Justia Law

Williams was convicted of malice murder and related offenses after the shooting death of his fiancée, Doninjae Jackson-Neals, in their DeKalb County apartment. The couple had a tumultuous relationship, as evidenced by text messages and testimony. On the morning of the incident, a neighbor heard sounds of a struggle from their apartment, followed by Williams fleeing the scene. Williams later called 911, claiming the shooting was accidental while demonstrating gun safety. Forensic evidence showed the gun was pressed against the victim’s head when fired, contradicting Williams’s account. Williams was arrested at the scene and gave a statement to police.After a mistrial in his first proceeding, Williams was retried in the Superior Court of DeKalb County and found guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for malice murder, plus additional terms for aggravated assault and firearm possession. Williams filed a motion for new trial, which was amended by new counsel. The trial court denied the motion on substantive grounds but granted it as to the merger of aggravated assault into malice murder, indicating a need for resentencing on that issue. Williams then appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Williams’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court held that Williams failed to preserve for review his claims regarding his counsel’s failure to object to certain testimony and related comments during closing argument. As to his remaining claims about the State’s opening statement, the Court found no prejudice, given the trial court’s instructions and the strength of the evidence against Williams. The Court affirmed the judgment, leaving open the possibility of resentencing to correct the merger error. View "WILLIAMS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The case concerns Kenneth Robinson, who was convicted of malice murder and other offenses related to the shooting death of Devontae Jones and the aggravated assault of Charmisa Witherspoon. The evidence showed that Robinson, age fourteen at the time, was involved with the 9 Trey Bloods gang. After a gang member, Jesus Cintron, disappeared, the gang’s leader plotted to kill Witherspoon and her son, fearing Witherspoon would cooperate with law enforcement. Robinson and other gang members went to Witherspoon’s house, where Robinson participated in the assault. Witherspoon escaped, but her son was killed. Robinson was tried alongside several co-defendants.The Superior Court of Fulton County granted Robinson a directed verdict on several counts and dead docketed one count, later nol prossed. The jury found Robinson guilty on the remaining counts except one. He was sentenced to life plus forty-five consecutive years. Robinson filed a motion for new trial, which was denied. His initial appeal was dismissed due to a pending count, but after that count was nol prossed, he filed an amended notice of appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. Robinson argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate a plea offer, that his sentencing procedure violated constitutional and statutory rights, that the trial court misunderstood its sentencing discretion, and that certain counts should have merged for sentencing. The court held that trial counsel did communicate the plea offer, so there was no deficient performance. The court also found no constitutional or statutory violation in the sentencing procedure, noting that neither Robinson nor his counsel objected or requested to be heard. Claims regarding the trial court’s sentencing discretion and merger of counts were found to be waived or without merit. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Robinson’s convictions. View "ROBINSON v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant hired the appellee, an attorney, in 2017 to represent her in a federal disability discrimination lawsuit against her former employer. The federal district court granted summary judgment to the employer on some claims and dismissed the remaining claim at the appellant’s request in May 2019, closing the case. Over three years later, in June 2022, the appellant filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleging legal malpractice and breach of contract, claiming that the attorney’s deficient representation caused her to lose her federal case.The appellee moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations. The Superior Court initially denied the motion, suggesting that COVID-19 tolling orders might have paused the limitations period. However, after the appellant filed an amended complaint and the appellee renewed the motion to dismiss—which the appellant did not oppose—the court reconsidered and dismissed the complaint as untimely. The court found that the COVID-19 tolling orders did not apply because the limitations period did not expire during the relevant emergency period, and that the claims were time-barred under any possible accrual date. The appellant’s motion for reconsideration, based on excusable neglect due to personal issues, was denied.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The court held that the appellant’s claims were untimely under the applicable statute of limitations, that neither the COVID-19 tolling orders nor claims of excusable neglect, non compos mentis status, or the discovery rule justified tolling the limitations period, and that no extraordinary circumstances warranted relief under Rule 60(b)(1). The judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "Baskin v. Pitre" on Justia Law

The appellant, a Slovenian-born U.S. permanent resident, claimed to have discovered billions of dollars dispersed across Africa after the death of Muammar Gaddafi. He sought to repatriate these funds to the United States and enlisted the help of a Washington, D.C. lawyer. The appellant alleged that, during his efforts in Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire, he was unable to complete the repatriation due to issues with verifying the legitimacy of Treasury Department letters. He further claimed that, while detained in Côte d'Ivoire, the funds were stolen and replaced with counterfeit cash, and that he was later arrested for alleged money laundering and misrepresentation of U.S. documents. Upon returning to the United States, the lawyer withdrew representation due to the criminal allegations against the appellant.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the appellant’s fraud claims in two parts. First, it found that the complaint failed to allege any actionable misrepresentation by the lawyer, noting that the lawyer had provided legal services as agreed. Second, for the claims against three federal employees, the court allowed the United States to substitute itself as defendant under the Westfall Act, as the employees were acting within the scope of their employment. The court then dismissed the claim against the United States on the basis of sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that the appellant’s complaint did not allege with particularity any fraudulent misrepresentation by the lawyer at the time of contract formation. Regarding the federal employees, the court found that the appellant failed to rebut the government’s certification that the employees acted within the scope of their employment, and thus sovereign immunity barred the claim. The court also denied the appellant’s request for leave to amend and for jurisdictional discovery. View "Plevnik v. Sullivan" on Justia Law