Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Daniel Escamilla, a certified fugitive recovery agent, searched the home of Lan Ting Wu and Andy Yu Feng Yang in 2012, looking for Yang’s brother, who was wanted on felony drug trafficking charges. Yang, Wu, and their minor son sued Escamilla for assault, battery, trespass, false imprisonment, and emotional distress. Their lawyer, John Vannucci, represented them. Escamilla defended the search as supported by probable cause and cross-complained against Yang for abuse of process. In 2019, a jury found in favor of Escamilla on all claims and awarded him $20,000 in damages. On August 30, 2021, Escamilla filed a malicious prosecution action against Yang, Wu, and Vannucci.The Alameda County Superior Court granted Vannucci’s motion to strike Escamilla’s complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP), agreeing that the one-year statute of limitations for claims against attorneys under section 340.6 applied, making the suit time-barred. The Court of Appeal affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to determine the appropriate statute of limitations for a malicious prosecution action against an attorney. The court held that section 340.6, which provides a one-year limitations period for certain suits against attorneys, does not apply to claims brought by parties who were never their clients or the intended beneficiaries of their clients. Instead, the two-year statute of limitations under section 335.1 applies to malicious prosecution claims brought by formerly adverse parties. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the Court of Appeal to consider any unaddressed arguments in the anti-SLAPP motion. View "Escamilla v. Vannucci" on Justia Law

Dorothy Golobe died in 1992, leaving behind a three-story building in New York. Her nephew, John Golobe, became the estate's administrator, believing his father, Zangwill Golobe, was Dorothy's only surviving heir. An attorney testified that Dorothy's other brother, Yale Golobe, had predeceased her. Surrogate's Court found Zangwill to be the sole distributee, and he renounced his interest in favor of John, who maintained the property. However, Yale was actually alive at Dorothy's death and should have inherited half of the estate. John discovered this error in 2018 and claimed sole ownership through adverse possession. Yale's successor, the Emil Kraus Revocable Trust, counterclaimed for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.Supreme Court granted summary judgment to John, declaring him the sole owner and dismissing the Trust's counterclaims. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that John had established adverse possession and dismissing the fraud and fiduciary duty claims due to lack of evidence of scienter or reliance and no extraordinary duty to confirm a distributee's death.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that John had acquired sole ownership through adverse possession, as his possession was hostile, under a claim of right, and open and notorious. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Trust's counterclaims, finding no triable issue of fact regarding fraud or breach of fiduciary duty. The court emphasized that a cotenant may obtain full ownership even when neither party is aware of the co-tenancy, provided the statutory period and other adverse possession requirements are met. View "Golobe v Mielnicki" on Justia Law

Henry Lamar Willis was admitted to the Bar in 2006 and established a law firm. In 2012, he failed to respond to a Formal Complaint by the State Bar regarding his improper handling and conversion of $30,000 in settlement funds. The special master entered a default judgment, and the Supreme Court of Georgia disbarred Willis in 2013 for violations of several Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, including acting with reasonable diligence, keeping client funds separate, and not engaging in dishonest conduct.Willis sought readmission to the Bar, claiming a twelve-year rehabilitation process. The Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants reviewed his application and recommended granting it. Willis provided a statement of rehabilitation, explaining personal and professional hardships, including a divorce and loss of a city council re-election bid. He detailed his efforts to rebuild his life, including paying all due funds, engaging in various personal development activities, and receiving support from several attorneys and a city council member.The Fitness Board conducted an investigation, including notifying the State Bar, the public, and the judiciary. The State Bar noted a pending grievance at the time of Willis's disbarment, which was declared moot. Willis paid $4,800 owed to the Clients' Security Fund. At an informal conference, Willis took responsibility for his past conduct and demonstrated his rehabilitation.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the record and concluded that Willis had demonstrated rehabilitation by clear and convincing evidence. The Court granted Willis's Application for Certification of Fitness, allowing him to be readmitted to the Bar upon satisfying all requirements, including passing the Georgia Bar Examination. View "In re Willis" on Justia Law

Misael Padron, a Cuban citizen granted asylum in the United States, appealed the denial of his motion to vacate his conviction for carjacking, which he had entered pursuant to a no-contest plea. Padron argued that he did not understand the immigration consequences of his plea, which included mandatory detention, denial of naturalization, and near-certain termination of asylum and deportation. He provided evidence of his mental health challenges related to persecution in Cuba and claimed his defense counsel did not adequately inform him of the immigration consequences.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Padron’s motion, partly because he did not provide a declaration from his defense counsel and had signed a plea form acknowledging potential deportation. The court also noted that there was no alternative, immigration-neutral plea available to Padron.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Padron demonstrated error affecting his ability to understand the immigration consequences of his plea. The court found that Padron’s defense counsel did not adequately advise him of the mandatory immigration consequences, and Padron’s mental health challenges further impaired his understanding. The court also determined that Padron established a reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea had he understood the consequences, given his strong ties to the United States and the severe impact on his asylum status.The Court of Appeal reversed the denial of Padron’s motion and remanded the case with instructions to vacate Padron’s conviction and permit him to withdraw his plea and enter a different plea. View "People v. Padron" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Christian L. Johnson sued his employer, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), alleging discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. During the litigation, Caltrans attorney Paul Brown sent an email to Johnson’s supervisor, Nicolas Duncan, which Duncan then shared with Johnson. Johnson forwarded the email to his attorney, John Shepardson, who further disseminated it to several experts and individuals. Caltrans sought a protective order, claiming the email was covered by attorney-client privilege. The trial court granted the order and later disqualified Shepardson and three experts for non-compliance with the order.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County issued the protective order, finding the email privileged. Johnson and Shepardson were ordered to destroy all copies and cease further dissemination. Caltrans later filed a motion to enforce the order and subsequently a motion to disqualify Shepardson and the experts, arguing continued non-compliance and misuse of the privileged email. The trial court granted the disqualification, citing Shepardson’s breach of ethical duties and the potential prejudice to Caltrans.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the Brown email was protected by attorney-client privilege. The court found no merit in Johnson’s arguments that the privilege was waived or that the crime-fraud exception applied. The court also upheld the disqualification of Shepardson and the experts, concluding that Shepardson’s actions violated ethical obligations and posed a risk of unfair advantage and harm to the integrity of the judicial process. The court emphasized the importance of maintaining public trust in the administration of justice. View "Johnson v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

An imposter posing as investment advisor Daniel Corey Payne of Lifetime Financial, Inc. stole over $300,000 from Mark Frank Harding. Prior to this, Lifetime had received several inquiries about a potential imposter posing as Payne but did not post a warning or take significant action. Harding sued Lifetime and others for negligence, arguing that as registered investment advisors, they had a duty to post a warning about the imposter on their website and report the complaints to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). Harding claimed that had they done so, he would not have transferred funds to the imposter.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that they owed no duty to Harding. The court noted that Harding was not a client of the defendants and that there was no fiduciary relationship between them. The court also found that there was no statutory or case authority imposing a duty on the defendants to warn nonclients about an imposter.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that the defendants did not owe a duty to Harding to report the imposter on their website or to FINRA. The court found that FINRA Rule 4530 did not apply because the defendants were not the subject of any written customer complaint involving allegations of theft or misappropriation of funds. The court also found that FINRA Rule 2210 did not impose an affirmative duty to warn the general public about a third-party impersonator. The court concluded that the defendants did not owe a duty to Harding and affirmed the summary judgment. View "Harding v. Lifetime Financial, Inc." on Justia Law

James Ervin pleaded guilty to possessing a semi-automatic rifle as a convicted felon, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He later sought to withdraw his guilty plea through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and that the government provided false inculpatory information about the rifle. Ervin's arguments centered on the interpretation of the phrase “in or affecting commerce” in § 922(g).The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied Ervin's motion to vacate his plea. The court found that the rifle had traveled in interstate commerce, thus meeting the statutory requirement. Ervin's ineffective assistance claim failed because he could not establish prejudice, as the firearm's interstate travel was sufficient to satisfy the commerce element of § 922(g). The court also denied his motion for reconsideration and his request for a certificate of appealability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the phrase “in or affecting commerce” in § 922(g) should be interpreted broadly, consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Scarborough v. United States. The court found that the rifle, which traveled from North Carolina to Louisiana, Georgia, and back to North Carolina, met the interstate commerce requirement. Consequently, Ervin's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations were rejected. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Ervin's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, concluding that his interpretation of the statute was incorrect and that his defense would have been meritless. View "United States v. Ervin" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Shalome Kaushansky, retained Stonecroft Attorneys, APC, to represent her in a legal action against her landlord due to various issues during her tenancy, including water leaks, mold, electrical problems, and harassment. Stonecroft filed a complaint but failed to advance the case, conduct discovery, or respond to the landlord's discovery requests. Shortly before the trial, Stonecroft withdrew from the case, leading Kaushansky to settle for $2,500.Kaushansky then sued Stonecroft for professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and unfair competition. The Los Angeles County Superior Court found in favor of Kaushansky, awarding her $91,734.29 for professional negligence and $25,000 for breach of fiduciary duty, totaling $116,734.29. The court found Stonecroft failed to plead all applicable causes of action, conduct discovery, and protect Kaushansky from foreseeable prejudice upon withdrawal. However, the court ruled in favor of Stonecroft on the unfair competition claim and declined to award punitive damages.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court reversed the $91,734.29 award for professional negligence, finding no substantial evidence that Kaushansky could have collected this amount from her landlord. The court noted that Kaushansky failed to prove the landlord's solvency or the collectibility of a hypothetical judgment. However, the court affirmed the $25,000 award for breach of fiduciary duty, finding substantial evidence that Stonecroft's withdrawal constituted intentional misconduct, justifying emotional distress damages. The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part, with each party bearing its own costs on appeal. View "Kaushansky v. Stonecroft Attorneys, APC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Arizona district court challenging the state's voting system, claiming it did not adequately protect voters' rights and should be replaced with a hand-counted paper ballot system. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Subsequently, the district court imposed sanctions on the plaintiffs' attorneys, including Alan Dershowitz, for filing a frivolous complaint.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint and granted the defendants' motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The district court found that the complaint contained false and misleading statements and ordered the plaintiffs' attorneys to pay a portion of the defendants' legal fees. Dershowitz, who signed the complaint as "of counsel," was held jointly and severally liable for a portion of the sanctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's holding that "of counsel" attorneys can be sanctioned under Rule 11 for signing frivolous complaints. The Ninth Circuit rejected Dershowitz's argument that the sanctions violated the First Amendment and found that the district court imposed sanctions to deter frivolous actions, not to silence speech. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the imposition of sanctions on Dershowitz, as the liability of "of counsel" attorneys under Rule 11 had not been clearly articulated in previous case law. The court declined to apply the rule retroactively but stated that it would apply to any signed pleadings after the publication of this opinion. View "Lake v. Gates" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Arizona district court challenging the state's electronic voting system, arguing it should be replaced with a system using exclusively hand-counted paper ballots. They also sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit the use of computerized equipment in elections. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of Article III standing, and the dismissal was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in Lake v. Fontes. Subsequently, the district court granted the defendants' motion for sanctions against the plaintiffs' lead attorneys, Andrew J. Parker and Kurt Olsen, and their law firms, holding them liable for $122,200.00 in fees.The district court found that the lead attorneys made false, misleading, and unsupported factual assertions in their first amended complaint and motion for preliminary injunction, and did not conduct a reasonable pre-filing inquiry. Key false allegations included claims that Arizona does not use paper ballots and that its voting machines are not tested. The district court concluded that these misleading statements rendered the complaint factually insufficient and open to sanction. Additionally, the court found that the attorneys acted recklessly and in bad faith, particularly in the timing and nature of their motion for a preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's imposition of sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees, as the lead attorneys' actions were both baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry. The court also upheld the finding of bad faith, noting that the attorneys' behavior and timing in bringing the motion for a preliminary injunction were reckless. View "Lake v. Gates" on Justia Law