Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

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In this case, the plaintiffs, Tsz Keung Wong and Huechi Wong, filed a malicious prosecution action against Yi Dong and his attorneys, alleging that Dong's previous cross-complaint in an earlier lawsuit was filed with malicious intent and lacked probable cause. The Wongs had initially sued Dong over unpaid rent, and Dong responded with a cross-complaint, which he later voluntarily dismissed while an anti-SLAPP motion by the Wongs was pending. The trial court ruled that the Wongs' anti-SLAPP motion would have been granted, entitling them to attorney fees.Dong then filed a motion to strike the Wongs' malicious prosecution action under the anti-SLAPP statute and sought dismissal under Civil Code section 1714.10, which requires pre-filing approval for conspiracy claims against attorneys. The trial court denied both motions, leading Dong to file an interlocutory appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of Dong's anti-SLAPP motion because the Wongs' action qualified as a SLAPPback, which is only reviewable by a peremptory writ petition, not an interlocutory appeal. The court dismissed this portion of Dong's appeal.Regarding the denial of Dong's motion under Civil Code section 1714.10, the court affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the Wongs' malicious prosecution action did not require pre-filing approval because it sought to hold the attorneys independently liable for their own actions, not based on a conspiracy with Dong. The court found that the allegation of conspiracy was surplusage and did not affect the applicability of section 1714.10.In conclusion, the court dismissed Dong's appeal concerning the anti-SLAPP motion and affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion under Civil Code section 1714.10. View "Wong v. Dong" on Justia Law

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The defendant was charged with first-degree manslaughter after fatally stabbing her boyfriend during a violent altercation. She claimed that she acted in self-defense, citing a history of severe physical abuse by the victim, including multiple incidents of strangulation and a recent sexual assault immediately preceding the stabbing. Several witnesses corroborated the defendant’s account of ongoing abuse, and an order of protection had previously been issued against the victim.The case was tried in Supreme Court, Erie County, where the defendant’s counsel pursued a justification defense under Penal Law § 35.15. During summation, the prosecutor misrepresented the defendant’s testimony by stating that she had never claimed to fear for her life, despite clear testimony to the contrary. The prosecutor also repeatedly accused the defendant of lying, using the term “lies” numerous times. Defense counsel did not object to these remarks. The jury convicted the defendant. On appeal, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed the conviction, holding that the issue was unpreserved and that counsel’s failure to object did not constitute ineffective assistance. However, the Appellate Division did grant sentencing relief under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the defendant was denied meaningful representation due to her counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s improper summation remarks. The Court found that the prosecutor’s misstatement of the evidence and repeated personal attacks on the defendant’s credibility exceeded permissible advocacy and undermined the fairness of the trial. The Court concluded that, in the absence of any strategic justification for counsel’s silence, the defendant was deprived of a fair trial. The order of the Appellate Division was reversed, and a new trial was ordered. View "People v T.P." on Justia Law

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This case involves a dispute over the sale of real property. Patricia Ann Scott, the seller, previously sued real estate agent Kaylee Schnelle for professional negligence, alleging mishandling of the sale. Schnelle's motions for summary judgment and directed verdict were denied, and the jury found in her favor. Subsequently, Schnelle filed a malicious prosecution claim against Scott and her attorneys, arguing they lacked probable cause and conspired against her. The defendants moved to dismiss, citing the prior denials as evidence of probable cause.The district court denied the motion to dismiss, stating that the previous denials were factors to consider but did not conclusively establish probable cause. The court found Schnelle's allegations sufficient to support her claim. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, agreeing that the denials did not create a rebuttable presumption of probable cause.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case to determine if such denials should create a rebuttable presumption of probable cause. The court concluded that while the denials are factors in the probable cause analysis, they do not create a rebuttable presumption. The court emphasized the need for a careful, case-by-case analysis rather than a bright-line rule. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that the denials of summary judgment and directed verdict motions do not establish probable cause as a matter of law. View "Cantafio v. Schnelle" on Justia Law

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Elena Gaston was indicted on charges of trafficking persons for sexual servitude, conspiracy, deriving support from prostitution, and money laundering. The Commonwealth alleged that she ran an escort service where her employees provided sexual services for money. On the day of her trial, a plea agreement was proposed, but during the plea colloquy, Gaston denied key elements of the charges, leading the judge to proceed to trial. During the trial, defense counsel made improper opening statements, conceding Gaston's guilt and inviting the jury to consider irrelevant factors, which led the Commonwealth to move for a mistrial.The trial judge initially opted for a curative instruction instead of a mistrial but later declared a mistrial after concluding that defense counsel's actions constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The judge noted that defense counsel's failure to consult with Gaston on his opening statement and the detrimental impact of his strategy on her defense warranted a mistrial. Gaston, represented by new counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the indictments on double jeopardy grounds, which the trial judge denied.Gaston then filed a petition in the county court seeking relief from the denial of her motion to dismiss. The petition was denied by a single justice, and she appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the single justice's decision, holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in declaring a mistrial due to manifest necessity. The court found that the trial judge carefully considered alternatives and provided both parties with opportunities to be heard before declaring a mistrial. The court concluded that defense counsel's conduct was manifestly unreasonable and deprived Gaston of a substantial ground of defense, justifying the mistrial. View "Gaston v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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Fourteen plaintiffs, including pilots, a physician, a nurse, and an attorney, were required to undergo alcohol testing to maintain their employment and professional licenses. The tests, developed by United States Drug Testing Laboratories, Inc. (USDTL), indicated positive results for alcohol consumption, leading to significant professional harm. The plaintiffs alleged that the tests were unreliable and sued USDTL and its officers under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and state law. They also sued Choice Labs Services (CLS) and its owners, who provided the tests to the administrators.The plaintiffs initially filed suit in the Southern District of Florida, asserting claims for fraud and negligence. The district court dismissed the case without prejudice, finding the complaint insufficient. The plaintiffs then filed a second amended complaint, adding CLS as defendants. The case was transferred to the Northern District of Illinois, where the district court dismissed the RICO claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and denied supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend the judgment was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish proximate causation for their RICO claims, as they did not adequately allege a direct link between USDTL's alleged misrepresentations and their professional injuries. The court also found that the plaintiffs did not meet the heightened pleading requirements for fraud under Rule 9(b). Consequently, the RICO claims were dismissed with prejudice, and the state law claims were dismissed without prejudice. View "Ratfield v United States Drug Testing Laboratories, Inc." on Justia Law

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Tom Smith Masonry (Smith Masonry) and WIPI Group USA, Inc. (WIPI) entered into a contract for Smith Masonry to construct a fence on WIPI’s property. After completing most of the work, Smith Masonry requested final payment, which WIPI withheld due to a dispute over the installation of a gate operator. Smith Masonry filed a mechanic’s lien and subsequently a lawsuit to foreclose on the lien, seeking the unpaid balance. WIPI counterclaimed for breach of contract and other issues, seeking damages for alleged faulty workmanship.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Lincoln County, South Dakota, denied relief to both parties, finding that Smith Masonry’s work was defective and that WIPI’s damages were not established with exactitude. Smith Masonry appealed, and the South Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, directing the lower court to enter a judgment of foreclosure in favor of Smith Masonry for the full amount of the lien and to reconsider Smith Masonry’s request for attorney fees.On remand, the circuit court entered a judgment in favor of Smith Masonry on the lien but denied the request for attorney fees. Smith Masonry appealed again. The South Dakota Supreme Court found that the circuit court violated the law of the case doctrine by revisiting issues already settled in the first appeal and by speculating on what might have occurred had the trial resumed. The Supreme Court also held that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying attorney fees based on irrelevant factors and an overly narrow interpretation of the statute governing attorney fees in mechanic’s lien cases.The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s denial of attorney fees and remanded for a determination of an appropriate award of attorney fees consistent with its opinion. The court also awarded Smith Masonry $30,000 for appellate attorney fees. View "Smith Masonry v. Wipi Group Inc." on Justia Law

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The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder for the fatal stabbing of a 20-year-old in August 2007, when he was 16 years old. The prosecution presented police-arranged single photo identifications made the day after the crime. The defendant moved to suppress these identifications, arguing they were conducted in a suggestive manner. The Supreme Court ordered a Rodriguez/Wade hearing to determine the admissibility of the identifications, but the hearing was never held. During the trial, the prosecution called an eyewitness who identified the defendant as the perpetrator, despite earlier stating they would not call this witness. The defense counsel did not object to the witness being called or request a Rodriguez/Wade hearing.The Supreme Court convicted the defendant, and he appealed, arguing that the missing transcript of jury deliberation proceedings constituted a mode of proceedings error and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The Supreme Court summarily denied the defendant's CPL 440.10 motion without an evidentiary hearing and denied his motion for a reconstruction hearing. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by reducing the defendant's sentence but affirmed the order denying the CPL 440.10 motion, rejecting the defendant's claims.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and rejected the defendant's mode of proceedings claim, holding that a missing transcript alone does not entitle a defendant to vacatur of their conviction. The court stated that the proper remedy for a missing transcript is a reconstruction hearing, provided the defendant's conduct shows a good faith effort to obtain prompt and effective reconstruction. The court also held that the Supreme Court abused its discretion by summarily denying the CPL 440.10 motion without an evidentiary hearing, as the defendant's ineffective assistance claim could not be resolved without resolving questions of fact. The case was remitted to the Supreme Court for an evidentiary hearing on the CPL 440.10 motion. View "People v Salas" on Justia Law

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Dr. Jeffery Weisman filed a lawsuit after resigning from Washington University’s residency program, alleging that he was forced to resign due to hostile treatment and that Washington University and Barnes Jewish Hospital prevented him from transferring to another residency program. Weisman brought claims for breach of contract, tortious interference, fraudulent inducement, and defamation under Missouri law. Washington University and Barnes Jewish Hospital counterclaimed for a violation of the Missouri Computer Tampering Act (MCTA).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed Weisman’s tortious interference and fraudulent inducement claims, and some of his breach of contract claims. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Barnes Jewish Hospital on the remaining breach of contract claims and the defamation claim. The court also dismissed the MCTA counterclaims and the defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees. Weisman appealed the adverse judgments on his claims, and the defendants cross-appealed the dismissal of the MCTA counterclaims and denial of attorneys’ fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the statute of frauds barred Weisman’s breach of contract claim related to the Lab-Residency Contract, as it was an oral agreement for a term of five years. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the tortious interference claims, concluding that Evers and Benzinger, as agents of Washington University, were not third parties to the contracts. Additionally, the court upheld the dismissal of the fraudulent inducement claims, as the alleged Separation Agreement did not exist. Finally, the court affirmed the dismissal of the MCTA counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as Weisman’s tender of full payment rendered the claims moot. View "Weisman v. Barnes Jewish Hospital" on Justia Law

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A man was charged with six counts of statutory rape involving his eleven-year-old daughter, who lived with him after her mother was incarcerated. The daughter testified that her father raped her on multiple occasions, providing detailed accounts of the assaults. Evidence included her birth certificate, which established both her and her father’s ages, and testimony from family members and investigators. The defendant denied the allegations, suggesting the accusations were fabricated due to disciplinary issues.The Circuit Court of Yazoo County conducted a jury trial, during which the defendant’s counsel submitted jury instructions that omitted the statutory requirement that the defendant be at least twenty-four months older than the victim. The State agreed to use the defense’s instructions. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts, and he was sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the omission of the age-gap element from the jury instructions constituted reversible error.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that, under the invited-error doctrine, a defendant cannot complain on appeal about an error in jury instructions that he himself requested and received. The Court found that the defendant was estopped from challenging the omission of the age-gap element, as he had submitted the instructions and the State and trial court had accepted them. The Court also rejected the defendant’s other claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel, sufficiency of the evidence regarding venue, improper admission of hearsay, and a Batson challenge. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstated and affirmed the conviction and sentence imposed by the Circuit Court of Yazoo County. View "Allen v. State" on Justia Law

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Ron Griffin filed a legal malpractice lawsuit against the law firm Snow Christensen & Martineau (SCM). On the last day for timely service, Griffin’s process server attempted to serve SCM’s registered agent but was unsuccessful. Instead, the process server left the complaint with Dawn Chapman, SCM’s administrator. SCM moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Chapman was not authorized to receive service under rule 4(d)(1)(E) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires service on an officer, managing or general agent, or other authorized agent. The district court agreed, finding that Chapman did not exercise general power involving judgment and discretion in her role.Griffin appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, which reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court, relying on previous cases Beard v. White, Green & Addison Associates, Inc. and In re Schwenke, held that Chapman was a managing or general agent because she was more than a mere employee and had some responsibility for the firm’s affairs. The court also found that it was fair to conclude that service on SCM was proper under the circumstances.SCM petitioned for certiorari review, and the Utah Supreme Court granted the request. The Supreme Court concluded that Chapman was not a managing or general agent under rule 4(d)(1)(E). The court defined a managing or general agent as someone with general power involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, which Chapman did not have in her role as an administrator. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Griffin v. Snow Christensen and Martineau" on Justia Law