Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Damone Blalock and Rodalius Eugene Ryan, Jr. were convicted of the malice murder of Jamari Holmes, aggravated assaults of two other individuals, and related crimes. The crimes occurred on February 23, 2019, and the appellants were indicted in May 2019. They were tried together before a jury from September 21 to October 1, 2021, and found guilty on all presented counts. The trial court sentenced them to life in prison for malice murder, with additional consecutive and concurrent sentences for other charges. Their motions for a new trial were denied, leading to this appeal.The appellants argued that their trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in several ways, including failing to object to a witness invoking the Fifth Amendment in front of the jury, not introducing certain evidence, and not objecting to the prosecutor's comments on their silence during closing arguments. Ryan also claimed his counsel failed to investigate his alibi. The trial court found that while counsel was deficient in not reviewing certain evidence, the appellants failed to show that this deficiency prejudiced the outcome of the trial.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the trial counsel's strategic decisions, including not objecting to the witness's invocation of the Fifth Amendment and not pursuing the alibi defense, were reasonable. The court also found that the appellants did not demonstrate that the outcome of the trial would have been different if the alleged deficiencies had not occurred. The cumulative effect of the assumed deficiencies did not warrant a new trial. Thus, the convictions and sentences were affirmed. View "BLALOCK v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth sought to civilly commit a prisoner, previously convicted of a sexual offense, as a "sexually dangerous person" (SDP) under Massachusetts law. The process required expert testimony to establish probable cause and qualified examiners to determine if the case should proceed to trial. The plaintiff, George Mackie, was initially adjudicated as an SDP based on expert reports and testimony, but this decision was later vacated on appeal due to prejudicial error.Mackie then filed separate civil actions against Dr. Katrin Rouse-Weir, a probable cause expert, and Dr. Robert Joss, a qualified examiner, alleging they submitted false reports and testimony. Both defendants moved to dismiss the complaints, claiming immunity. Superior Court judges granted the motions, concluding that the defendants were entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Mackie appealed these decisions.The Appeals Court reversed the dismissals, ruling that the experts were entitled only to qualified immunity, not absolute quasi-judicial immunity. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted further appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court held that qualified examiners like Joss are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity due to their essential and independent role in the judicial process. The court also concluded that probable cause experts like Rouse-Weir are protected by the litigation privilege, which shields them from liability for their statements made during judicial proceedings. Consequently, the court affirmed the Superior Court judgments dismissing Mackie's complaints against both experts. View "Mackie v. Rouse-Weir" on Justia Law

In 2001, Frances Mack-Marion refinanced her property, taking out a new mortgage. In 2020, U.S. Bank National Association, the successor-in-interest to the mortgage, initiated foreclosure proceedings against her. Mack-Marion counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that U.S. Bank was barred from foreclosure because the mortgage closed without attorney supervision, referencing the Matrix Financial Services Corporation v. Frazer decision. The Master-in-Equity dismissed her claim, ruling it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the mortgage was recorded before the effective date of Matrix.The Master-in-Equity interpreted Hambrick v. GMAC Mortgage Corporation to mean only the South Carolina Supreme Court could determine unauthorized practice of law claims. Additionally, the Master found Mack-Marion's claim insufficient as the mortgage predated Matrix. Mack-Marion appealed, and the South Carolina Supreme Court granted her motion to certify the appeal.The South Carolina Supreme Court overruled Hambrick to the extent it held that circuit courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over unauthorized practice of law claims. The Court clarified that circuit courts do have jurisdiction over such claims and reaffirmed that Matrix applies prospectively. The Court held that the Master had subject matter jurisdiction but correctly dismissed Mack-Marion's claim under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, because her mortgage was recorded before the effective date of Matrix. The Court affirmed the Master's dismissal as modified, maintaining that U.S. Bank could pursue foreclosure. View "U.S. Bank National Association v. Mack" on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed a defamation lawsuit against the defendant after she called him a "white supremacist" on a social media page. The defendant made this statement during a heated political discussion on a town's Facebook page, which was in response to a joint statement by local officials regarding the killing of George Floyd. The plaintiff argued that the term "white supremacist" constituted defamation per se.The trial court, the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, granted the defendant's special motion to dismiss under Connecticut's anti-SLAPP statute (§ 52-196a). The court determined that the defendant's statements were nonactionable opinions rather than actionable defamation per se. The court also awarded the defendant attorney’s fees and costs. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court incorrectly concluded that he had failed to show probable cause that he would prevail on the merits of his defamation claim and that the court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the term "white supremacist," without more, is a nonactionable opinion rather than actionable defamation per se. The court reasoned that the term lacks a precise meaning, cannot be objectively verified, and does not necessarily imply that the declarant knew existing, undisclosed defamatory facts. The context in which the defendant made the statement—a heated political debate on social media—further supported the conclusion that the statement was an opinion. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's award of attorney’s fees and costs to the defendant. View "Murphy v. Rosen" on Justia Law

The case involves James B. Church & Associates, P.C. (the Church Firm), which served as legal counsel for Dennis Shogren, the personal representative of the estate of Loren R. Kirk, in a probate action. The estate beneficiaries, including Barbara Sagehorn and the Carter Beneficiaries, alleged that the Church Firm negligently failed to file a protective claim for a refund with the IRS or advise Shogren to do so. This failure purportedly resulted in the estate missing out on a potential $5,000,000 tax refund.The Superior Court of San Bernardino denied the Church Firm's special motion to strike the causes of action under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court found that the firm did not demonstrate that the causes of action arose from its constitutionally protected free speech or petitioning activities. The Church Firm appealed this decision.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court conducted an independent review and agreed with the lower court's ruling. It determined that the alleged acts forming the basis of the petitioners' causes of action—specifically, the Church Firm's failure to file a protective claim for a refund and failure to advise Shogren to file such a claim—were not protected activities under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court emphasized that the anti-SLAPP statute protects statements or writings made before or in connection with an issue under consideration by a judicial body, not failures to act or speak.Therefore, the Court of Appeal affirmed the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that the Church Firm did not meet its burden of proving that the causes of action arose from protected conduct. View "Callister v. James B. Church & Associates" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Brian L. Sheehy, as trustee, sued Chicago Title Insurance Company over a dispute involving an easement on his property. Plaintiff designated an attorney, who had previously represented the defendant, as an expert witness to testify about the defendant's handling of the claim. The defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude this expert, arguing that the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct prohibited the attorney from testifying adversely to the defendant. The trial court granted the motion to exclude the expert.Plaintiff then filed a petition for a writ of mandate with the Court of Appeal, which was summarily denied. Concurrently, plaintiff appealed the trial court's ruling, citing Brand v. 20th Century Insurance Company/21st Century Insurance Company (2004) for the proposition that the order was appealable. The Court of Appeal stayed the preparation of the record, considered dismissing the appeal, and requested briefing from the parties. A hearing was subsequently held.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, dismissed the appeal. The court held that it only has jurisdiction over direct appeals from appealable orders or judgments. The court emphasized that, in ordinary civil cases, appeals are generally only permitted from final judgments to prevent piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals. The court distinguished between orders on motions to disqualify counsel, which are appealable, and orders on motions in limine, which are not. The court disagreed with the precedent set in Brand, concluding that orders on motions in limine are not appealable as they are not final collateral orders or injunctions. The court decided that such orders should be reviewed only by writ petition or by appeal from the final judgment. View "Sheehy v. Chicago Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Two workers' compensation claimants, represented by attorney David Graham, settled their claims with Southeast Alaska Regional Health Consortium (SEARHC) except for attorney's fees. The Alaska Workers' Compensation Board awarded Graham significantly less than he requested. The Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board's decision, but the Alaska Supreme Court reversed it, instructing the Commission to consider enhanced fees. On remand, the Commission did not change the fee award, leading to another appeal.The Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission initially affirmed the Board's reduced fee award. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed this decision, clarifying that the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act allows for enhanced fees and remanded the case for reconsideration. On remand, the Commission again awarded $450 per hour, citing past awards and the factors in Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a), but did not enhance the fee despite acknowledging the complexity and novelty of the issues.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the Commission's decision, finding that the Commission abused its discretion by not adequately considering the factors that supported an enhanced fee. The Court emphasized the need for the Commission to apply the modified lodestar method, which involves calculating a baseline fee and then considering whether to adjust it based on various factors, including the complexity and novelty of the case and the contingent nature of the work. The Court vacated the Commission's fee award and remanded the case, directing the Commission to enhance the fees based on its findings. The Court also clarified that the Commission must consider all relevant factors and not rely solely on past awards. View "Rusch v. Southeast Alaska Regional Health Consortium" on Justia Law

Jason Kertz applied for social security disability benefits in October 2019, citing disabilities including PTSD, back and leg problems, and sleep apnea, with an onset date of March 16, 2018. His initial claim was denied, and an SSA administrative law judge (ALJ) also found him not disabled after a hearing. The SSA Appeals Council upheld this decision in February 2021. Kertz then hired attorney Nicholas Coleman to represent him in federal court. Coleman and Kertz agreed on a contingent-fee arrangement of 25% of any past-due benefits awarded.Coleman filed a civil action in the Eastern District of Arkansas, which resulted in the court remanding the case to the SSA for further proceedings. The district court awarded Coleman $5,426.08 in attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). On remand, the ALJ issued a Fully Favorable Decision in December 2022, finding Kertz disabled since the alleged onset date. The SSA notified Kertz of his entitlement to $96,349.00 in past-due benefits, withholding 25% as potential attorney fees. Coleman then sought 25% of the past-due benefits as per the contingent-fee agreement.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted Coleman’s motion for attorney’s fees in part, awarding $10,667.50 instead of the requested $24,087.25. The court found that the full 25% fee was not reasonable given the circumstances, including the limited time Coleman spent on the case and the lack of substantive court review due to the unopposed remand.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in reducing the fee award, as it appropriately considered the reasonableness of the fee in light of the services rendered and avoided a windfall to the attorney. View "Kertz v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Karsen H. Rezac was involved in a vehicular collision on December 23, 2022, in Lincoln, Nebraska, which resulted in the shooting death of Kupo Mleya. Rezac, who was identified as a suspect based on vehicle debris and witness reports, admitted to firing shots at Mleya's vehicle after the collision. Rezac was charged with second-degree murder and use of a firearm to commit a felony. He later pled no contest to second-degree murder as part of a plea agreement, and the firearm charge was dropped.The district court for Lancaster County, Nebraska, denied Rezac's motion to continue his sentencing hearing, which he requested to allow more time to gather and review his mental health records. The court proceeded with the sentencing, considering the presentence investigation report and supplemental items. Rezac was sentenced to 60 years to life imprisonment. Rezac appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion in denying the continuance and imposing an excessive sentence, and that his trial counsel was ineffective in several respects.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that Rezac forfeited his argument regarding the denial of the continuance by failing to raise the issue at the sentencing hearing. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the sentencing, as the district court had considered the relevant mitigating factors. The court rejected Rezac's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel related to the failure to move to suppress his statement to law enforcement and the failure to explain the penalties for second-degree murder, finding that the record refuted these claims.However, the court found the record insufficient to address Rezac's claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for advising him that self-defense was not a viable argument, failing to explain the difference between second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter, and failing to provide his mental health records to probation or the court. The court affirmed Rezac's conviction and sentence but noted that these claims of ineffective assistance of counsel could not be resolved on direct appeal due to the insufficient record. View "State v. Rezac" on Justia Law

Judge Carlos Moore, a municipal court judge for the cities of Clarksdale and Grenada, faced allegations of misconduct related to his social media posts and public comments. The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance (the Commission) claimed that Moore's actions violated the Mississippi Constitution, the Code of Judicial Conduct, and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Commission and Moore. The Commission's allegations stemmed from Moore's social media activity in 2021 and 2022, where he posted content that could be perceived as advertising his law practice and making racially charged comments.The Commission had previously warned Moore in 2019 about posting information on social media regarding cases he heard in court. In 2020, Moore and the Commission entered into an MOU, where Moore agreed to limit his social media posts to court-related information and not use his judicial title for personal or political purposes. Despite this agreement, Moore continued to post under the name "Judge Carlos Moore" and made public comments that the Commission deemed inappropriate.The Commission filed a Formal Complaint against Moore in July 2022, alleging violations of the Mississippi Constitution and the Code of Judicial Conduct. Moore did not respond to the complaint or participate in the Commission's proceedings. The Commission recommended Moore's removal from office, a six-year suspension, and a $5,000 fine.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and found that Moore's actions constituted willful misconduct and were prejudicial to the administration of justice. The Court held that Moore's comments on social media and television violated the judicial-conduct canons and the MOU. The Court ordered Moore's removal from the bench, a $3,000 fine, and assessed all costs. The Court emphasized that Moore's actions undermined public confidence in the judiciary and warranted a harsh sanction. View "Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Moore" on Justia Law