Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Elena Gaston was indicted on charges of trafficking persons for sexual servitude, conspiracy, deriving support from prostitution, and money laundering. The Commonwealth alleged that she ran an escort service where her employees provided sexual services for money. On the day of her trial, a plea agreement was proposed, but during the plea colloquy, Gaston denied key elements of the charges, leading the judge to proceed to trial. During the trial, defense counsel made improper opening statements, conceding Gaston's guilt and inviting the jury to consider irrelevant factors, which led the Commonwealth to move for a mistrial.The trial judge initially opted for a curative instruction instead of a mistrial but later declared a mistrial after concluding that defense counsel's actions constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The judge noted that defense counsel's failure to consult with Gaston on his opening statement and the detrimental impact of his strategy on her defense warranted a mistrial. Gaston, represented by new counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the indictments on double jeopardy grounds, which the trial judge denied.Gaston then filed a petition in the county court seeking relief from the denial of her motion to dismiss. The petition was denied by a single justice, and she appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the single justice's decision, holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in declaring a mistrial due to manifest necessity. The court found that the trial judge carefully considered alternatives and provided both parties with opportunities to be heard before declaring a mistrial. The court concluded that defense counsel's conduct was manifestly unreasonable and deprived Gaston of a substantial ground of defense, justifying the mistrial. View "Gaston v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Fourteen plaintiffs, including pilots, a physician, a nurse, and an attorney, were required to undergo alcohol testing to maintain their employment and professional licenses. The tests, developed by United States Drug Testing Laboratories, Inc. (USDTL), indicated positive results for alcohol consumption, leading to significant professional harm. The plaintiffs alleged that the tests were unreliable and sued USDTL and its officers under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and state law. They also sued Choice Labs Services (CLS) and its owners, who provided the tests to the administrators.The plaintiffs initially filed suit in the Southern District of Florida, asserting claims for fraud and negligence. The district court dismissed the case without prejudice, finding the complaint insufficient. The plaintiffs then filed a second amended complaint, adding CLS as defendants. The case was transferred to the Northern District of Illinois, where the district court dismissed the RICO claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and denied supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend the judgment was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish proximate causation for their RICO claims, as they did not adequately allege a direct link between USDTL's alleged misrepresentations and their professional injuries. The court also found that the plaintiffs did not meet the heightened pleading requirements for fraud under Rule 9(b). Consequently, the RICO claims were dismissed with prejudice, and the state law claims were dismissed without prejudice. View "Ratfield v United States Drug Testing Laboratories, Inc." on Justia Law

Tom Smith Masonry (Smith Masonry) and WIPI Group USA, Inc. (WIPI) entered into a contract for Smith Masonry to construct a fence on WIPI’s property. After completing most of the work, Smith Masonry requested final payment, which WIPI withheld due to a dispute over the installation of a gate operator. Smith Masonry filed a mechanic’s lien and subsequently a lawsuit to foreclose on the lien, seeking the unpaid balance. WIPI counterclaimed for breach of contract and other issues, seeking damages for alleged faulty workmanship.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Lincoln County, South Dakota, denied relief to both parties, finding that Smith Masonry’s work was defective and that WIPI’s damages were not established with exactitude. Smith Masonry appealed, and the South Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, directing the lower court to enter a judgment of foreclosure in favor of Smith Masonry for the full amount of the lien and to reconsider Smith Masonry’s request for attorney fees.On remand, the circuit court entered a judgment in favor of Smith Masonry on the lien but denied the request for attorney fees. Smith Masonry appealed again. The South Dakota Supreme Court found that the circuit court violated the law of the case doctrine by revisiting issues already settled in the first appeal and by speculating on what might have occurred had the trial resumed. The Supreme Court also held that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying attorney fees based on irrelevant factors and an overly narrow interpretation of the statute governing attorney fees in mechanic’s lien cases.The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s denial of attorney fees and remanded for a determination of an appropriate award of attorney fees consistent with its opinion. The court also awarded Smith Masonry $30,000 for appellate attorney fees. View "Smith Masonry v. Wipi Group Inc." on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder for the fatal stabbing of a 20-year-old in August 2007, when he was 16 years old. The prosecution presented police-arranged single photo identifications made the day after the crime. The defendant moved to suppress these identifications, arguing they were conducted in a suggestive manner. The Supreme Court ordered a Rodriguez/Wade hearing to determine the admissibility of the identifications, but the hearing was never held. During the trial, the prosecution called an eyewitness who identified the defendant as the perpetrator, despite earlier stating they would not call this witness. The defense counsel did not object to the witness being called or request a Rodriguez/Wade hearing.The Supreme Court convicted the defendant, and he appealed, arguing that the missing transcript of jury deliberation proceedings constituted a mode of proceedings error and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The Supreme Court summarily denied the defendant's CPL 440.10 motion without an evidentiary hearing and denied his motion for a reconstruction hearing. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by reducing the defendant's sentence but affirmed the order denying the CPL 440.10 motion, rejecting the defendant's claims.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and rejected the defendant's mode of proceedings claim, holding that a missing transcript alone does not entitle a defendant to vacatur of their conviction. The court stated that the proper remedy for a missing transcript is a reconstruction hearing, provided the defendant's conduct shows a good faith effort to obtain prompt and effective reconstruction. The court also held that the Supreme Court abused its discretion by summarily denying the CPL 440.10 motion without an evidentiary hearing, as the defendant's ineffective assistance claim could not be resolved without resolving questions of fact. The case was remitted to the Supreme Court for an evidentiary hearing on the CPL 440.10 motion. View "People v Salas" on Justia Law

Dr. Jeffery Weisman filed a lawsuit after resigning from Washington University’s residency program, alleging that he was forced to resign due to hostile treatment and that Washington University and Barnes Jewish Hospital prevented him from transferring to another residency program. Weisman brought claims for breach of contract, tortious interference, fraudulent inducement, and defamation under Missouri law. Washington University and Barnes Jewish Hospital counterclaimed for a violation of the Missouri Computer Tampering Act (MCTA).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed Weisman’s tortious interference and fraudulent inducement claims, and some of his breach of contract claims. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Barnes Jewish Hospital on the remaining breach of contract claims and the defamation claim. The court also dismissed the MCTA counterclaims and the defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees. Weisman appealed the adverse judgments on his claims, and the defendants cross-appealed the dismissal of the MCTA counterclaims and denial of attorneys’ fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the statute of frauds barred Weisman’s breach of contract claim related to the Lab-Residency Contract, as it was an oral agreement for a term of five years. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the tortious interference claims, concluding that Evers and Benzinger, as agents of Washington University, were not third parties to the contracts. Additionally, the court upheld the dismissal of the fraudulent inducement claims, as the alleged Separation Agreement did not exist. Finally, the court affirmed the dismissal of the MCTA counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as Weisman’s tender of full payment rendered the claims moot. View "Weisman v. Barnes Jewish Hospital" on Justia Law

A man was charged with six counts of statutory rape involving his eleven-year-old daughter, who lived with him after her mother was incarcerated. The daughter testified that her father raped her on multiple occasions, providing detailed accounts of the assaults. Evidence included her birth certificate, which established both her and her father’s ages, and testimony from family members and investigators. The defendant denied the allegations, suggesting the accusations were fabricated due to disciplinary issues.The Circuit Court of Yazoo County conducted a jury trial, during which the defendant’s counsel submitted jury instructions that omitted the statutory requirement that the defendant be at least twenty-four months older than the victim. The State agreed to use the defense’s instructions. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts, and he was sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the omission of the age-gap element from the jury instructions constituted reversible error.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that, under the invited-error doctrine, a defendant cannot complain on appeal about an error in jury instructions that he himself requested and received. The Court found that the defendant was estopped from challenging the omission of the age-gap element, as he had submitted the instructions and the State and trial court had accepted them. The Court also rejected the defendant’s other claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel, sufficiency of the evidence regarding venue, improper admission of hearsay, and a Batson challenge. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstated and affirmed the conviction and sentence imposed by the Circuit Court of Yazoo County. View "Allen v. State" on Justia Law

Ron Griffin filed a legal malpractice lawsuit against the law firm Snow Christensen & Martineau (SCM). On the last day for timely service, Griffin’s process server attempted to serve SCM’s registered agent but was unsuccessful. Instead, the process server left the complaint with Dawn Chapman, SCM’s administrator. SCM moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Chapman was not authorized to receive service under rule 4(d)(1)(E) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires service on an officer, managing or general agent, or other authorized agent. The district court agreed, finding that Chapman did not exercise general power involving judgment and discretion in her role.Griffin appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, which reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court, relying on previous cases Beard v. White, Green & Addison Associates, Inc. and In re Schwenke, held that Chapman was a managing or general agent because she was more than a mere employee and had some responsibility for the firm’s affairs. The court also found that it was fair to conclude that service on SCM was proper under the circumstances.SCM petitioned for certiorari review, and the Utah Supreme Court granted the request. The Supreme Court concluded that Chapman was not a managing or general agent under rule 4(d)(1)(E). The court defined a managing or general agent as someone with general power involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, which Chapman did not have in her role as an administrator. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Griffin v. Snow Christensen and Martineau" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, 640 Octavia LLC and Edward Kountze, owned an apartment building in San Francisco and hired Walston Law Group to represent them in a federal unlawful detainer action against a tenant. During the trial, it was discovered that Walston's attorney had created a document with new house rules during the trial, which led to the federal judge excluding the document and giving a curative instruction to the jury. The jury found in favor of the tenant, and plaintiffs subsequently sued Walston for legal malpractice, alleging various breaches and negligence.The San Francisco Superior Court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice due to their failure to comply with discovery orders, and the case proceeded to trial on Walston's cross-complaint for unpaid attorney fees. The jury awarded Walston $78,905.43 in damages plus $29,826.25 in prejudgment interest. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial court's pretrial order excluding evidence of their malpractice allegations was erroneous and prejudicial.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of claim or issue preclusion to exclude evidence supporting plaintiffs' malpractice allegations. The appellate court held that the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint was interlocutory and not a final judgment, thus preclusion doctrines did not apply. The court found that the exclusion of evidence was prejudicial, as it prevented the jury from properly considering plaintiffs' defense that Walston's alleged malpractice excused them from paying the fees.The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, allowing plaintiffs to present evidence of Walston's alleged malpractice. View "640 Octavia LLC v. Walston" on Justia Law

Shawn Russell Sorensen was convicted of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment based on prior state convictions for drug offenses. He filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for not contesting the qualification of his prior convictions as "felony drug offenses" under 21 U.S.C. § 841’s sentencing enhancement scheme.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota dismissed Sorensen's motion. The court found that his counsel's performance was not deficient, as the argument regarding the categorical approach to his prior convictions was considered novel at the time of sentencing. Sorensen appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that even if counsel's performance was deficient, Sorensen failed to demonstrate prejudice. The court applied the categorical and modified categorical approaches to determine that Sorensen's prior convictions under Arizona and South Dakota statutes qualified as felony drug offenses. The Arizona statute was found to be divisible, and Sorensen's conviction for possession of methamphetamine matched the federal definition of a felony drug offense. Similarly, the South Dakota statute was also deemed divisible, and Sorensen's conviction for possession of methamphetamine under this statute qualified as a felony drug offense. Therefore, Sorensen's sentence was upheld, and the district court's judgment was affirmed. View "Sorensen v. United States" on Justia Law

A criminal defendant was charged with operating while intoxicated after being pulled over for speeding. The arresting officer used radar to determine the defendant's speed. The assistant county attorney, Theron Christensen, prosecuted the case. After the defense exposed weaknesses in the State's case during depositions, Christensen filed a motion in limine to exclude certain evidence. The defendant resisted and moved for sanctions against Christensen, arguing the motion was frivolous and in bad faith. Christensen later withdrew the motion and dismissed the case, allegedly to avoid the officer testifying about radar calibration issues.The Iowa District Court for Story County dismissed the charges and later imposed a $2,072 monetary sanction on Christensen under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.413 and Iowa Code § 619.19, finding his actions sanctionable. Christensen filed a petition for writ of certiorari, challenging the sanctions.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that neither Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.413 nor Iowa Code § 619.19 applies to criminal cases. The court emphasized that these rules and statutes are intended for civil cases only and that the rules of civil procedure do not apply to criminal proceedings unless explicitly stated. The court held that the district court erred in imposing monetary sanctions on Christensen based on these civil rules and statutes. Consequently, the Iowa Supreme Court sustained the writ and reversed the sanctions order and the monetary sanction imposed on Christensen. View "Christensen v. Iowa District Court For Story County" on Justia Law