Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Several homeowners initiated a lawsuit against an individual, alleging conversion, trespass, outrage, reformation of restrictive covenants, quiet title, and seeking injunctive relief to prevent interference with their use of common areas in a real estate development. The defendant retained counsel and filed a timely answer. However, when the homeowners moved for summary judgment, the defendant’s attorney failed to respond or inform his client about the motion. The district court granted summary judgment for the homeowners, awarding substantial actual and punitive damages, as well as attorney’s fees, far exceeding the amount requested in the motion.After more than 30 days had passed since judgment, the defendant moved to vacate the judgment in the District Court of Cherokee County, Oklahoma, arguing that unavoidable casualty or misfortune, fraud, and irregularity had prevented him from defending the action. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion to vacate. The defendant appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals, Division III, affirmed the district court’s decision, finding that the defendant had not properly pled a valid defense and that his attorney’s negligence was imputed to him.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the attorney’s abandonment of the case without the client’s knowledge, combined with a breakdown in office procedures and lack of communication, constituted unavoidable casualty or misfortune under Oklahoma law. The court further found that the district court’s award of damages and attorney’s fees without a hearing or proper evidentiary support violated the defendant’s due process rights. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. It also vacated the appellate attorney fee award previously granted to the homeowners. View "Bjorkman v. Noble" on Justia Law

Sylvia Noland was hired by the defendants to work as a leasing agent and sales representative for two properties in Los Angeles. She was promised compensation for administrative work, commissions for securing tenants and booking events, and a monthly draw against earnings. Noland alleged that defendants failed to pay her the agreed amounts, including a substantial commission, minimum wage, overtime, and proper wage statements. She also claimed she was constructively terminated after refusing to participate in leasing activities she believed were unlawful. Her complaint included 25 causes of action, ranging from wage and hour violations to breach of contract and emotional distress.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County first denied defendants’ initial motion for summary judgment on procedural grounds. After a trial continuance due to defense counsel’s medical issues, defendants refiled their summary judgment motion. The trial court overruled plaintiff’s objections to the successive motion, finding it permissible since the prior denial was not on the merits. After considering the parties’ arguments, the court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding Noland was an independent contractor, not entitled to wage protections, and not owed the claimed commission. The court also denied plaintiff’s motion for sanctions and her requests to reopen discovery, finding no evidence of bad faith or procedural error.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the court had discretion to consider the renewed summary judgment motion and that plaintiff’s substantive arguments lacked merit. The appellate court also imposed a $10,000 sanction on plaintiff’s counsel for filing briefs containing fabricated legal citations generated by AI, directed counsel to serve the opinion on his client, and ordered the clerk to notify the State Bar. Respondents were awarded appellate costs. View "Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P." on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization sought to provide free legal advice to low-income New Yorkers facing debt-collection lawsuits by training nonlawyer “Justice Advocates” to help individuals complete a state-issued check-the-box answer form. The organization and a prospective Justice Advocate argued that many defendants in such cases default due to lack of understanding, leading to severe consequences. However, New York law prohibits nonlawyers from providing individualized legal advice, and all parties agreed that the proposed activities would violate the state’s unauthorized practice of law (UPL) statutes.The plaintiffs filed a pre-enforcement challenge in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming that applying the UPL statutes to their activities would violate their First Amendment rights. The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing and were likely to succeed on the merits, holding that the UPL statutes, as applied, were a content-based regulation of speech that could not survive strict scrutiny. The court granted a preliminary injunction, barring the Attorney General from enforcing the UPL statutes against the plaintiffs and participants in their program.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that the UPL statutes, as applied, regulate speech. However, the Second Circuit held that the regulation is content neutral, not content based, and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny. Because the district court applied the wrong standard, the Second Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings under the correct legal standard. The court did not reach a final decision on whether the statutes, as applied, ultimately violate the First Amendment, leaving that determination for the district court on remand. View "Upsolve, Inc. v. James" on Justia Law

Tyree M. Neal, Jr. was indicted for conspiracy to distribute cocaine under federal law. After evading arrest in a high-speed chase and carjacking, he was eventually apprehended. The government sought a sentencing enhancement based on Neal’s prior Illinois conviction for unlawful delivery of cocaine, which, if applied, increased his statutory maximum sentence from 20 to 30 years. Neal pleaded guilty, represented by several attorneys during plea negotiations and sentencing. At sentencing, the district court found the enhancement applicable and imposed the 30-year maximum. Neal appealed, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary and lacked a factual basis, but did not challenge the enhancement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction.Subsequently, Neal filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. §2255 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that his appellate, sentencing, and plea counsel were deficient for failing to raise the argument that his Illinois cocaine conviction could not support the federal enhancement, an argument that later succeeded in United States v. Ruth. The district court denied relief, finding that counsel were not deficient for failing to anticipate a change in law, and held an evidentiary hearing regarding appellate counsel’s performance. The court concluded appellate counsel was not ineffective, as the unraised argument was not “obvious nor clearly stronger” than those presented.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that, although later precedent established the categorical approach to such enhancements, counsel’s failure to raise the argument did not constitute ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington. The court found that none of Neal’s attorneys performed below an objective standard of reasonableness given the law at the time, and thus denied collateral relief. View "Neal v USA" on Justia Law

The plaintiff brought a lawsuit against the City and County of San Francisco, seeking $5,000,000 in damages for injuries sustained after falling from a scooter that struck a pothole. During discovery, the City sought information about the plaintiff’s intoxication at the time of the incident. The plaintiff’s counsel failed to provide timely and complete responses to certain form interrogatories related to requests for admission about intoxication, despite repeated requests and meet and confer efforts by the City. Additionally, during an independent medical examination, observers chosen by the plaintiff’s attorney interfered with the process, preventing the examining doctor from completing the evaluation.The Superior Court of San Francisco City and County addressed two discovery disputes. First, it granted the City’s motion to compel responses to the interrogatories and imposed a $6,500 sanction against the plaintiff’s counsel for failing to provide timely, code-compliant responses. Second, it imposed a $1,500 sanction after finding that the plaintiff’s observers had improperly interfered with the medical examination. The parties settled the underlying action, but the plaintiff appealed the sanctions. The City moved to dismiss portions of the appeal, arguing that some orders were not appealable and that the sanctions for the medical exam were below the statutory threshold for appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, granted the City’s motion to partially dismiss the appeal, finding that the orders regarding the protective order and the $1,500 sanction were not appealable. The court affirmed the $6,500 sanction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing it, as the plaintiff’s counsel lacked substantial justification for opposing the motion to compel. The appellate court also imposed $30,000 in sanctions against the plaintiff’s counsel for filing a frivolous appeal and referred the matter to the State Bar. View "Morales v. City of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The case involved a defendant who was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted murder, all arising from a gang-related shooting in Visalia, California. The prosecution presented evidence that the defendant was a member of the North Side Visalia gang and that he shot individuals he believed to be rival gang members, resulting in one death and serious injury to another. The prosecution’s case relied heavily on expert testimony to establish the defendant’s gang membership and the gang-related nature of the crimes, as well as evidence of prior offenses by the defendant and other gang members. The defense argued that the shooting was not premeditated or gang-motivated, but rather stemmed from a personal dispute, and presented evidence that the defendant had renounced gang affiliation.The Tulare County Superior Court denied the defendant’s pretrial motion to recuse the entire District Attorney’s Office after his former defense attorney joined that office, finding that an effective ethical wall had been established. At trial, the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, found true the gang enhancements and the gang-murder special circumstance, and returned a death verdict. The trial court entered judgment accordingly.On automatic appeal, the Supreme Court of California reviewed the case. The court held that, due to subsequent legal developments—specifically, its decision in People v. Sanchez and legislative amendments to Penal Code section 186.22 by Assembly Bill 333—the evidence was insufficient to support the gang enhancements and the gang-murder special circumstance. As a result, the court reversed the gang-related findings and the death judgment. The court also ordered a limited remand to allow the defendant to further develop his claim that his trial counsel violated his Sixth Amendment right of autonomy over the defense, as articulated in McCoy v. Louisiana. The convictions and death judgment were reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "P. v. Cardenas" on Justia Law

The appellant was represented by an attorney in a criminal contempt proceeding after allegedly violating a civil protective order. During the course of representation, the appellant twice made statements to his attorney threatening to kill the Assistant Attorney General prosecuting his case, including specific language and gestures indicating an intent to cause harm. The attorney, disturbed by these threats, initially sought to withdraw from representation and later disclosed the threats to the court after being ordered to do so. The attorney subsequently testified before a grand jury and at trial regarding the threats, which led to the appellant being charged and convicted by a jury of threatening a public official and obstruction of justice.Following conviction in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the appellant challenged the admissibility of his attorney’s testimony, arguing that the statements were protected by the attorney-client privilege. The trial court rejected this argument, finding that the threats were not made for the purpose of seeking legal advice and thus were not privileged. On appeal, a division of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals initially vacated the convictions, holding that the statements were privileged and their admission was not harmless error. The United States successfully petitioned for en banc review, and the full court vacated the division’s decision, limiting the scope of review to the attorney-client privilege issue.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, held that the attorney-client privilege does not protect communications that themselves constitute criminal threats to cause death or serious bodily harm. The court reasoned that such threats are an abuse of the attorney-client relationship and fall outside the privilege, regardless of whether the technical elements of the privilege are otherwise met. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s admission of the attorney’s testimony and remanded the case for consideration of the appellant’s remaining arguments. View "Moore v. United States" on Justia Law

Jessica De'Andrea, a patrol officer with the Montgomery Police Department, was involved in a motor vehicle collision while on duty. The driver of the other vehicle, Clint Walters, later sued De'Andrea individually for negligence, resulting in a $550,000 judgment against her after a jury trial. De'Andrea alleged that the City of Montgomery, which had procured liability insurance and acted as a self-insurer for its employees, failed to properly defend her, did not communicate settlement or appeal options, and refused to satisfy the judgment. She claimed these failures led to her bankruptcy and brought multiple claims against the City, including breach of contract, bad faith, fraudulent misrepresentation, and violations of the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act.The Montgomery Circuit Court denied the City's motions to dismiss, finding it was not apparent beyond doubt that De'Andrea could prove no set of circumstances entitling her to relief. The City then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus, seeking dismissal of all claims on the basis of statutory immunity and other defenses.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed only the City's immunity defense as to the fraudulent misrepresentation claim, because the City had not preserved immunity arguments for the other claims in the lower court. The Court held that municipal immunity under § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, does not automatically bar all fraudulent misrepresentation claims, as such claims can be based on innocent or mistaken misrepresentations, not just intentional torts. The Court denied the City's petition for a writ of mandamus, allowing De'Andrea's claims to proceed. The City may raise its other defenses on appeal if necessary. View "De'Andrea v. City of Montgomery" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was shot five times in his apartment parking lot and, in the chaos, dropped his black iPhone and a satchel. His girlfriend took the satchel but left the phone, which was later recovered by police near some shrubs. The police also seized a different (white) iPhone from the defendant at the hospital. The black iPhone remained in police evidence for over two years, until it became relevant in a separate federal drug investigation. The government ultimately used data from the black iPhone, along with other evidence, to charge the defendant with drug trafficking, firearm offenses, and money laundering.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon presided over the trial. Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress evidence from the black iPhone, arguing that he retained a privacy interest in the device and its data, and also sought recusal of the district judge due to her prior service as U.S. Attorney when he was prosecuted for unrelated charges over fifteen years earlier. The district court denied both motions, finding that the defendant had abandoned the black iPhone and thus lacked standing to challenge its search, and that recusal was not warranted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s finding that the defendant had abandoned his privacy interest in the black iPhone, holding that the circumstances—dropping the phone while fleeing after being shot—did not show intent to abandon the device or its data. However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the suppression motion because federal agents obtained a warrant and searched the phone within a reasonable period. The court also affirmed the denial of the recusal motion, concluding that a reasonable person would not question the judge’s impartiality under these facts. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "USA V. HUNT" on Justia Law

Maurice Devalle, a former North Carolina State Highway Patrol sergeant, was terminated in April 2017 after an internal investigation revealed he had falsified his home address to meet residency requirements, submitted false time sheets, and was untruthful about his work activities. Shortly after his termination, Devalle accepted a position as a deputy sheriff and school resource officer in Columbus County and applied for justice officer certification from the North Carolina Sheriffs’ Education and Training Standards Commission. Over the following year and a half, Devalle received strong character endorsements from his new supervisors and colleagues, who testified to his rehabilitation and positive impact in his new role.After reviewing Devalle’s application, the Commission’s Probable Cause Committee determined he lacked good moral character based on his prior misconduct and did not conduct a new investigation into his recent conduct. Devalle challenged the denial in a contested case before an administrative law judge (ALJ), who found his supporting witnesses credible but noted Devalle’s own testimony was evasive and lacked candor. The Commission ultimately denied certification, citing Devalle’s lack of truthfulness during the hearing. Devalle sought judicial review in Superior Court, Columbus County, which reversed the Commission’s decision, finding insufficient evidence to support the denial and ordering retroactive certification.The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding the Commission’s decision was arbitrary and capricious compared to its handling of a prior, similar case. On discretionary review, the Supreme Court of North Carolina applied the whole record test and found substantial evidence supported the Commission’s conclusion that Devalle lacked the requisite candor and truthfulness. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstating the Commission’s indefinite denial of certification. View "Devalle v. Sheriffs’ Education & Training Standards Commission" on Justia Law