Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, Robert V. Bolinske, Sr., filed a defamation claim against Dale V. Sandstrom and Gail Hagerty, alleging that defamatory statements were made and published online on October 18, 2016. Bolinske served a demand for retraction on January 14, 2017, but Sandstrom did not respond. Bolinske commenced the action on February 26, 2019, beyond the two-year statute of limitations for defamation claims.The District Court of Burleigh County initially dismissed Bolinske’s defamation claim, citing the statute of limitations. However, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed this decision in part, noting that the statute of limitations defense was not specifically pled by answer, and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, Sandstrom answered the amended complaint, including the statute of limitations defense, and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court granted, finding the defamation claim time-barred. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to Sandstrom, deeming Bolinske’s claims frivolous.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the defamation claim was indeed barred by the statute of limitations, as the action was commenced more than two years and 45 days after the publication of the alleged defamatory statements. The court also upheld the award of attorney’s fees, agreeing with the lower court’s assessment that Bolinske’s claims were frivolous and that the fees requested were reasonable. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decisions. View "Bolinske v. Sandstrom" on Justia Law

A Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputy entered the curtilage of Harson Chong’s home without a warrant, leading to the discovery of drugs, guns, and money. Chong and Tac Tran, who was present at the home, were subsequently charged with federal drug and gun offenses. They claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because their attorneys did not object to the search on Fourth Amendment grounds.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially denied their suppression motions, ruling the search justified by the parole-search exception. However, after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Grandberry, the district court reversed, finding insufficient probable cause that Tran resided at Chong’s home. Despite this, the court upheld the search based on exigent circumstances. Chong and Tran were convicted, and their convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. They then filed post-conviction motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the district court denied, finding no ineffective assistance of counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the deputy’s entry onto the curtilage without a warrant, consent, or exigency was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court found Chong’s counsel ineffective for not moving to suppress the evidence, as the search was clearly unlawful. However, Tran lacked standing to challenge the search, as he did not reside at Chong’s home and was merely a visitor. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s denial of Chong’s § 2255 motion and remanded for relief, but affirmed the denial of Tran’s motion. View "Chong v. United States" on Justia Law

The defendant, Otto Keller, was involved in a car accident after falling asleep while driving, resulting in a collision with an unoccupied car and a house. He admitted to using heroin and being involved in a methadone clinic. A blood test revealed multiple drugs in his system. Keller was charged with aggravated driving while intoxicated (ADWI) for causing a collision resulting in serious bodily injury, specifically a broken right humerus.The Superior Court denied Keller's motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Colleen Scarneo, the State’s expert in human performance forensic toxicology, and his motion to dismiss the ADWI charge for insufficient evidence of serious bodily injury. The court found Scarneo’s methodology reliable under RSA 516:29-a and Daubert standards. At trial, Scarneo testified that Keller exhibited signs of impairment consistent with the drugs found in his system. The jury found Keller guilty of ADWI.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in admitting Scarneo’s testimony because her methodology was not sufficiently reliable. The court found that her methodology had not been tested, subjected to peer review, had no known error rate, and was not generally accepted in the scientific community. Additionally, the court determined that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Keller’s broken arm constituted a serious bodily injury as defined by RSA 625:11, VI.The Supreme Court reversed Keller’s ADWI conviction due to insufficient evidence of serious bodily injury and the prejudicial admission of unreliable expert testimony. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion, specifically for a new trial on the lesser-included charge of driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol (DWI). View "State v. Keller" on Justia Law

James Edward Meuret II was sentenced to two years with the Department of Corrections, all time suspended, for criminal possession of dangerous drugs. Meuret appealed, arguing that his attorney at the District Court rendered ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) and requested the court to vacate the judgment and allow him to withdraw his plea of no contest. The case arose from a traffic stop on July 22, 2019, where police found methamphetamine and paraphernalia in Meuret's vehicle after arresting him on an outstanding warrant.Initially, Meuret was represented by Casey Moore from the Office of State Public Defender (OPD). Meuret pleaded not guilty to both charges but reserved the right to file a motion to suppress evidence, which was never filed. On the morning of his trial, Meuret decided to enter a plea of nolo contendere to the drug possession charge in exchange for the dismissal of the paraphernalia charge. He acknowledged waiving his constitutional rights and expressed no issues with his counsel. Later, Meuret considered withdrawing his plea, but no motion was filed by the deadline. A new attorney, Mark Epperson, was assigned and filed a motion to suppress evidence instead of a motion to withdraw the plea, which the District Court rejected as untimely.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and applied the two-pronged test from Strickland v. Washington to assess IAC claims. The court found that the record did not sufficiently demonstrate the reasons behind Moore's and Epperson's actions. The court noted that IAC claims require a developed record, which was lacking in this case. Consequently, the court affirmed the District Court's judgment but allowed Meuret the option to pursue his IAC claims through a petition for postconviction relief. View "State v. Meuret" on Justia Law

Attorney James Hayes faced a four-count petition for discipline filed by the Massachusetts Bar Counsel, accusing him of fraud, violating court orders, mishandling client funds, and other dishonest conduct. These charges stemmed from his representation of a client who concealed lottery winnings to avoid child support. A hearing committee of the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers found merit in all counts and recommended disbarment. Hayes appealed to the Board, which upheld the committee's findings. A single justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) agreed and disbarred Hayes. The SJC affirmed this decision.Upon receiving the SJC's judgment, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ordered Hayes to show cause why reciprocal discipline should not be imposed. Hayes requested a hearing and argued that a term suspension, rather than disbarment, was appropriate. He contended that the SJC's decision was flawed due to errors in assessing the credibility of the principal witness, his former client, and that the SJC mischaracterized his conduct as fraudulent. Hayes also argued that the SJC typically imposes less severe discipline in similar cases and highlighted mitigating factors such as his years of good standing.The First Circuit reviewed the state court record and found no basis to depart from the SJC's findings. The court determined that the hearing committee reasonably credited the former client's testimony and that Hayes failed to show clear and convincing evidence of procedural irregularities or errors in the SJC's decision. The court concluded that Hayes did not demonstrate that less severe discipline was warranted and disbarred him from practicing law before the First Circuit. The Clerk of Court was instructed to forward a copy of the opinion to the SJC. View "In re Hayes" on Justia Law

Rendell Russell was convicted in 2022 for malice murder and related crimes after killing Gregory James with a machete. The incident occurred on October 27, 2020, following Russell's breakup with his girlfriend, Kenisha Shepherd. On the night of the crime, Russell entered Shepherd's apartment uninvited, where James, Shepherd's new boyfriend, was staying. Despite being asked to leave, Russell returned with a machete, confronted James, and ultimately attacked him, resulting in James's death from multiple sharp and blunt force injuries.A Cobb County grand jury indicted Russell on several charges, including malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. The trial court bifurcated the firearm possession count. In March 2022, a jury found Russell guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced him to life without parole for malice murder and additional concurrent and consecutive terms for other charges. Russell's motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court in December 2023, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict, rejecting Russell's claim of self-defense. The court found that Russell was the aggressor and that the State had disproved his justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, the court rejected Russell's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, concluding that his trial counsel's decision not to file a pretrial motion for immunity was a reasonable strategic choice. The court determined that there was little chance such a motion would have been successful given the evidence against Russell. View "Russell v. State" on Justia Law

Pauline Bennett, the settlor of a revocable living trust, engaged attorney Thomas Gentile to draft her estate planning documents. Initially, the trust instrument provided for the distribution of her properties, including a specific property, Wissahican, to her daughter Audrey upon her death. Later, due to concerns about Audrey's financial mismanagement, Pauline amended the trust to remove Audrey as a beneficiary and intended to sell Wissahican to fund her care. After Pauline's death, a dispute arose between her daughters, Madelyn and Audrey, over the ownership of Wissahican.The Circuit Court for Montgomery County ruled that the 2017 trust instrument, which provided Wissahican to Audrey, was still in effect, and thus Audrey was entitled to the property. Madelyn, as the successor trustee, then pursued claims against Gentile for legal malpractice, alleging that his negligent drafting of the 2019 trust instrument caused her to lose Wissahican. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Gentile, holding that the strict privity rule barred Madelyn's claims and that she was not a third-party beneficiary of the attorney-client relationship between Pauline and Gentile.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that the strict privity rule, as established in Noble v. Bruce, remains good law, meaning that a third party not in privity with an attorney cannot sue for negligence absent fraud or collusion. The court also concluded that Madelyn did not qualify as a third-party beneficiary because the primary intent of Pauline's engagement with Gentile was to ensure her own financial security and to exclude Audrey, not to benefit Madelyn directly. Therefore, Madelyn's claims against Gentile were barred, and the summary judgment in favor of Gentile was affirmed. View "Bennett v. Gentile" on Justia Law

Heraclio Osorio-Arellanes was involved in a firefight with U.S. Customs and Border Patrol agents in Arizona, resulting in the death of Agent Brian Terry. Osorio fled to Mexico, where he was later arrested and interrogated by U.S. officials in a Mexico City prison. During this interrogation, he confessed to key elements of the government's case on the advice of a Mexican attorney, Juan Salvador Pimentel. Osorio's confession was later used against him in court.The District Court for the District of Arizona initially suppressed Osorio's confession on Sixth Amendment grounds but later reversed this decision following a government motion for reconsideration. Consequently, the confession was admitted at trial, leading to Osorio's conviction on multiple charges, including first- and second-degree murder, conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery, and assault on a federal officer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Pimentel's advice during the interrogation was deficient and prejudicial under the framework established in Strickland v. Washington. Specifically, Pimentel erroneously advised Osorio that robbing drug smugglers was not a crime, leading Osorio to confess. The court held that this advice was legally unjustifiable and that there was a reasonable probability that, absent this advice, Osorio would not have been convicted.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order reconsidering the suppression of Osorio's confession, vacated his convictions and sentences, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not address Osorio's Fifth Amendment claim, as the Sixth Amendment claim was sufficient to decide the case. The dissenting judge would have affirmed the conviction and required Osorio to pursue his ineffective assistance of counsel claim through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in the district court. View "United States v. Osorio-Arellanes" on Justia Law

Patrick Gordon, an attorney, was suspended from the rosters of the Maine Commission on Public Defense Services, making him ineligible to represent indigent criminal defendants. The suspension followed an investigation into Gordon’s billing practices and representation of a client. The Commission received information suggesting that Gordon had inaccurately billed for a jury trial that was actually a bench trial and that some billed work was performed by others in his firm. Additionally, there were discrepancies regarding Gordon’s client visits.The Superior Court (Kennebec County) affirmed the Commission’s decision. The investigation began after the Commission received information from a post-conviction review counsel. Gordon was asked to provide documents and clarify billing discrepancies but failed to fully comply. Despite multiple requests and extensions, Gordon did not provide the requested documents or satisfactory explanations. The Commission’s Interim Executive Director, Justin Andrus, ultimately suspended Gordon, a decision upheld by the Commission after an intra-agency appeal.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court found that the Commission’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The evidence showed that Gordon failed to comply with the Commission’s requests, which were within the Commission’s authority. The investigation and subsequent suspension were justified based on Gordon’s non-compliance with the Commission’s rules. The Court concluded that the Commission’s decision was supported by evidence and did not reflect any abuse of discretion or erroneous findings of fact. View "Gordon v. Maine Commission on Public Defense Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Marco Destin, Inc., 1000 Highway 98 East Corp., E&T, Inc., and Panama Surf & Sport, Inc. (collectively, “Marco Destin”) filed a lawsuit against agents of L&L Wings, Inc. (“L&L”), alleging that a 2011 stipulated judgment in a trademark action was obtained through fraud. Marco Destin claimed that L&L had fraudulently procured a trademark registration from the USPTO, which was used to secure the judgment. They sought to vacate the 2011 judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3) and requested sanctions and damages.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. The court found that Marco Destin had a reasonable opportunity to uncover the alleged fraud during the initial litigation. Specifically, the court noted that the License Agreement between the parties indicated that other entities might have paramount rights to the "Wings" trademark, suggesting that Marco Destin could have discovered the fraud with due diligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal for abuse of discretion. The appellate court confirmed that the district court acted within its discretion in declining to vacate the 2011 stipulated judgment. The court emphasized that Marco Destin had a reasonable opportunity to uncover the alleged fraud during the initial litigation and that equitable relief under Rule 60(d)(3) requires a showing of due diligence. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s conclusion that Marco Destin could have discovered the fraud through proper diligence.The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding the dismissal of Marco Destin’s claims. View "Marco Destin, Inc. v. Levy" on Justia Law