Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Appellants Farouk Abadir, Hosny Gabriel, Ricardo Ramos, Alfredo Rivas and Michael Vega sued their former attorney Mark Dellinger and his law firm Bowles Rice McDavid Graff & Love, LLP because Mr. Dellinger settled a case in which they were all defendants without their consent. The circuit court dismissed the case, concluding that the Supreme Court had already decided that Mr. Dellinger had the âapparentâ authority to settle. Furthermore, the court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded Appellants from challenging what Mr. Dellinger had done. In this latest appeal, Appellants alleged that the circuit court erred in granting Mr. Dellingerâs motion to dismiss because the court failed to distinguish between the âactualâ and âapparentâ authority an attorney had to settle a case. After a thorough review of the record, the Supreme Court agreed, and held that the circuit court erred in granting Mr. Dellingerâs motion to dismiss. The Court remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.

Attorney Marie Wheeler and the law firm of Roderick Linton, LLP appealed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee New Destiny Treatment Center. The Center sued Attorney Wheeler and her firm over representation of a dissident member of the Centerâs board of trustees who tried to regain control of the Center. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether attorneys who were retained by the dissident member of the Center could actually be sued by the Center for malpractice. The Supreme Court found in this case that the law firm represented only the dissident trustee, not the Center. No attorney-client relationship ever existed between the law firm and the Center. Accordingly, there was no basis for the Center to maintain a cause of action against the firm. The Court reversed the appellate court, and reinstated the trial courtâs judgment in favor of Attorney Wheeler and the law firm.

Plaintiff, an attorney who handled Chapter 11 proceedings for a client, submitted a petition for fees after the case was converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding. The bankruptcy court denied the petition because of the attorney's failure to comply with disclosure rules, abusive conduct toward others involved in the case, excessive or incomplete billing, and disruptive behavior. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the attorney's "flagrant" disregard of deadlines and the rules for appeal.

Plaintiff filed a complaint for breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, and breach of contract against defendants, an attorney and his law firm, where the attorney agreed to represent plaintiff in its effort to obtain approval of a redevelopment project, the attorney terminated the representation about two years later, and then the attorney became involved in a campaign to thwart the same redevelopment project by soliciting signatures on a referendum petition to overturn the city council's approval of the project. At issue was whether the court of appeals properly found that plaintiff's claims arose from protected activity in violation of the anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation ("anti-SLAPP") statute, Code Civ. Proc., 425.16, and whether plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on them. The court reversed the court of appeals and held that, based on the respective showings of the parties, plaintiff's claims for breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, and breach of contract possessed at least minimal merit within the meaning of the anti-SLAP statute.

Appellants appealed an order revoking their pro hac vice admissions in connection with a putative class action suit where the suit alleged that appellants' clients breached supplemental cancer insurance policies that they had issued. At issue was whether the district court erred in revoking appellants' pro hac vice status where the revocation was based on motions appellants filed in response to plaintiffs' request for class certification, chiefly a motion to recuse the district judge based on his comments during an earlier hearing. The court vacated the revocation order and held that, even though the recusal motion had little merit, the district court erred in revoking appellants' pro hac vice admissions where it did not afford them even rudimentary process.

A jury found David Safavian, Chief of Staff of the General Services Administration ("GSA"), guilty on four counts of a five-count indictment where his convictions were related to a golf trip he took with Jack Abramoff, a lobbyist, who had asked Safavian for information about two properties the GSA owned. At issue was whether Counts Three and Five should be vacated on the grounds of prosecutorial vindictiveness; whether Counts Two and Five should be vacated on the grounds that the government failed to prove Safavian's false statements to the ethics officer and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") were materially within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(1); and whether a new trial should be granted on Count One and Count Three where the district court improperly admitted evidence regarding the cost of the private plane. The court held that so long as Safavian's false statements were capable of influencing the course of the FBI's investigation, those statements were material within the meaning of section 1001(a)(1). The court also held that the district court did not clearly err in presuming vindictiveness on the part of the prosecution or in holding that the government overcame that presumption when it offered two reasons why the addition of Count Five was not vindictive. The court further held that its reasons for rejecting Safavian's arguments pertaining to Counts One, Two, and Three were the same as those of the district court and did not need to repeat them.

Plaintiff, a shareholder in Avenir Corporation ("Avenir"), brought a shareholder derivate suit naming Avenir and its three principal officers ("principals") as defendants and alleged that the principals engaged in various forms of financial misconduct as Avenir's managers. At issue was whether the district court properly granted attorney's fees for abuse of discretion to plaintiff where plaintiff originally filed in Superior Court and defendants removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under 28 U.S.C. 1441, where Avenir's primary place of business was in D.C., and where the district court found removal improper under section 1441(b). The court held that the district court improperly awarded attorney's fees to plaintiff where Avenir was a nominal defendant and defendants' reasoning had at least some logical and precedential force behind it.

The Supreme Court reviewed the appellate courtâs decision against Plaintiffs Jack and Danette Steele. In their claim, Plaintiffs alleged that attorney Katherine Allen gave them incorrect information about a statute of limitations, which led to missing a filing deadline in a negligence suit. The trial court dismissed both their claims of negligent misrepresentation and professional negligence. Plaintiffs only appealed the dismissal of their negligent misrepresentation claim. The appellate court held that Plaintiffs had a claim against the attorney. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, finding that Plaintiffsâ evidence was not sufficient to support their claim. The Court reversed the decision of the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In 2001, a company calling itself âComputer Geeks, a California corporation,â sued Plaintiff Jason Wright in Utah state court for failing to assign a domain name. Mr. Wright did not respond to the companyâs motion for summary judgment, and in 2006, the state court granted the motion and entered judgment against him. Mr. Wright hired Appellant-Attorney Russell Cline to have the judgment set aside or modified. In 2008, Appellant filed a motion to set the judgment aside. As it turns out, âComputer Geeks, a California corporationâ is not related to the company that held the Utah state judgment. Appellant was made aware of the mistaken identity soon after Appellant served âComputer Geeks, a California corporation.â Appellant represented to the clerk of the district court that he had properly served âComputer Geeks, a California corporation.â The clerk entered a default, and Appellant moved for a default judgment. Within a few weeks, Defendant CompGeeks.com moved to vacate the default judgment. At the hearing, Appellant acknowledged he knew the difference between the two companies, but that he served the correct holder of the Utah judgment. The district court found that Appellant had filed a frivolous action in violation of state law, and dismissed the case. The court referred Appellant to the state attorney disciplinary committee, and awarded attorneyâs fees to CompGeeks.com, making Mr. Wright and Appellant jointly and severally liable for the award. Appellant moved to vacate the award of attorneyâs fees, alleging the district court abused its discretion in its decision. On review, the Tenth Circuit âsympathize[d] with the district courtâs frustration with [Appellantâs] conduct,â but held that â Rule 11 does not allow a sua sponte award of attorney fees.â Accordingly the monetary sanctions order was vacated, and the Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

In a memorandum opinion, the court addressed whether defense counsel gave implied consent to a mistrial. The court held that there was ample basis on the record for the trial court to conclude that defendants agreed that a mistrial on the undecided charges was the appropriate course of action. The court also held that, because it found no basis to disturb the Appellate Division's factual finding of implied consent, it had no occasion to address the People's alternative argument that there was manifest necessity for the mistrial.