Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

At issue before the Supreme Court was an order of the district court which held that the statute making peer review records privileged applied to a lawsuit brought by a doctor who claimed that a hospital acted in bad faith by refusing to renew a his attending privileges. After a series of reviews of Physician Petitioner Joseph Verska, M.D.'s (Physician) practice initiated in 2004 by St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (Hospital) and again in 2006 and 2007, Physician requested a hearing before a Fair Hearing Panel in 2008. In 2009, Physician and the Spine Institute of Idaho (a professional corporation he created) sued the Hospital and two of its doctors (Defendants) alleging that Defendants conspired to wrongfully harm them, intentionally and/or negligently interfered with their economic advantage, interfered with Physician’s prospective contractual relations and business expectations, defamed them, and intentionally and/or negligently inflicted emotional distress upon Physician. In addition to damages, Plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring Hospital to restore Physician’s privileges. During this litigation, Plaintiffs initiated discovery related to the process, activities, and decisions that led to Hospital’s decision to deny Physician’s application to be reappointed to the medical staff and to have his privileges renewed. Hospital objected on the ground that such information was protected by the peer review privilege. Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking to compel discovery, and Defendants sought a motion for a protective order. The district court denied the motion to compel and granted the protective order. The Supreme Court found the peer review statute unambiguous: "the statute states that 'all peer review records shall be confidential and privileged'" not subject to subpoena or discovery proceedings or be admitted as evidence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's denial of Physician's motion to compel the records' discovery. View "Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

A real estate agent served as the seller's agent for two sales of the same house. The initial purchaser submitted a bid for the house and, the same day, hired the initial seller's agent to serve as seller's agent for the second sale. A few days later, the agent convinced the initial seller to accept the initial purchaser's bid without disclosing his conflict of interest or the purchaser's interest in flipping the house. After one day of trial concerning the initial seller's complaint against the agent alleging, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duties, the trial judge granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The court held that because plaintiff raised issues of material fact concerning whether defendant breached his fiduciary duties to the seller, the court remanded the case for a new trial. View "Estate of Eller v. Bartron" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC accusing her employer, the Department of the Navy, of discriminating on account of race, sex, national origin, age, and disability. The EEOC found the charge unsupported. In the district court, neither party conducted discovery. Plaintiff sought judgment on the pleadings. The district judge denied the motion. After more than a year of inaction, the district judge dismissed the case for want of prosecution. Plaintiff's lawyer then filed an ex parte motion for relief from judgment, but did not serve the motion on his adversary or explain why a secret motion was authorized. The district judge denied the motion. Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that Local Rule 41.1 (the basis for dismissal for want of prosecution) violates the due process clause as "almost unintelligible." The court characterized the appeal as frivolous, stating that It bypassed the only possible argument:that the district judge abused his discretion by dismissing the suit without first warning about the risks of procrastination. The court gave plaintiff's attorney 21 days to show cause why he should not be subject to monetary sanctions for filing a frivolous appeal and violating Circuit Rule 30, and why he should not be censured, suspended, or disbarred on account of his apparent inability to practice competently and diligently in the federal courts. View "Sambrano v. Mabu" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a formal complaint against Judge Teresa Brown Dearman for violating Canons 1 (charging judges to establish, maintain, and enforce high standards of conduct to uphold the integrity of the judiciary), 2A (charging judges to act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary), 2B (charging judges to avoid lending the prestige of their office to advance the private interests of others), and 3B(2) (charging judges to be faithful to the law and not to be swayed by partisan interests), when she initiated a telephone call to a circuit court judge in Florida. The Commission averred that Judge Dearman reached the voice mailbox of the Florida judge's judicial assistant, identified herself as a judge in Mississippi, and recommended that bond be set for a longtime friend and criminal defendant. It further averred that Judge Dearman personally guaranteed the defendant’s appearance if bond was granted. The Commission recommended that Judge Dearman be publicly reprimanded and ordered to pay $100 in costs, but the Supreme Court found the recommendation insufficient. The Court ordered that Judge Dearman be suspended from office for thirty days without pay in addition to a public reprimand and costs of $100. View "Mississippi Comm'm on Judicial Performance v. Dearman" on Justia Law

Appellants brought various claims before Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) arbitrators against Ameriprise, a financial-services company, for, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation related to the decline in value of various financial assets owned by appellants and managed by Ameriprise. Ameriprise answered appellants' FINRA complaint by asserting, principally, that appellants released their claims by operation of a settlement agreement in a class-action agreement suit that had proceeded between 2004 and 2007 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. After FINRA arbitrators denied Ameriprise's motion to stay appellants' arbitration, Ameriprise moved in the district court, in which the class action had been litigated and settled, for an order to enforce the settlement agreement that would enjoin appellants from pressing any of their claims before FINRA arbitrators. The district court concluded that the class settlement barred all of appellants' arbitration claims and therefore granted Ameriprise's motion and ordered appellants to dismiss their FINRA complaint with prejudice. The court held that the district court had the power to enter such an order and that several of appellants' arbitration claims were barred by the 2007 class-action settlement. Therefore, the court affirmed in part. But because the court concluded that appellants' arbitration complaint plead claims that were not, and could not have been, released by the class settlement, the court vacated in part the district court's judgment, and remanded the case for the entry of an order permitting the non-Released claims to proceed in FINRA arbitration. The court dismissed as moot appellants' appeal from the district court's denial of their motion for reconsideration. View "In Re: American Express Finance Advisors Securities Litigation" on Justia Law

This case was a class action brought on behalf of the former shareholders of Alloy, challenging a going-private transaction (Merger) that cashed out the company's public shareholders for allegedly inadequate consideration. Although the shareholders voted to approve the Merger, two of Alloy's nine directors retained their senior management positions at and received an equity interest in the now privately-held company. The former shareholders claimed that those two directors thus unfairly extracted for themselves an opportunity to share in Alloy's continued growth without offering the same opportunity to the public shareholders. Regarding the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by the directors in negotiating and approving the Merger, the court found that the complaint failed to state a claim for damages. The court also found that the complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to support an inference that the alleged disclosure violations were the product of anything other than good faith omissions by the directors who authorized them. Because of the exculpatory provision of Alloy's certificate of incorporation, the complaint thus failed to state a claim for damages against the Alloy directors for beach of their duty of disclosure. Finally, the court also dismissed the claims for aiding and abetting against defendants who were not affiliated with Alloy. Therefore, the court granted defendants' motions to dismiss in all respects. View "In re Alloy, Inc. Shareholder Litigation" on Justia Law

This matter arose from a recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (Commission) regarding Justice of the Peace Tina Revette LaGrange's failure to comply with the financial disclosure requirements of Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXXIX. The Commission found that Justice of the Peace LaGrange failed to file her 2009 personal financial disclosure statement timely, thereby subjecting her to a monetary penalty. The Commission determined Justice of the Peace LaGrange acted willfully and knowingly in failing to comply with the financial disclosure rule and recommended that she be ordered to pay a penalty and reimburse the Commission for costs. Following the Supreme Court's precedent, the Commission filed an amended recommendation, recommending penalties be limited to $200.00, with no request for reimbursement of costs. After review, the Supreme Court found that the record supported the Commission’s finding that Justice of the Peace LaGrange acted willfully and knowingly in failing to file the financial disclosure statement. Justice of the Peace LaGrange was thereafter ordered to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $500.00. View "In re: Justice of the Peace Tina LaGrange" on Justia Law

This matter arose from a recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (Commission) regarding Justice of the Peace Thomas Threet’s failure to comply with the financial disclosure requirements of Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXXIX. The Commission found that Justice of the Peace Threet failed to file his 2009 personal financial disclosure statement timely, thereby subjecting him to a monetary penalty. The Commission determined Justice of the Peace Threet acted willfully and knowingly in failing to comply with the financial disclosure rule and recommended that he be ordered to pay a penalty and to reimburse the Commission for costs. Following the Supreme Court's precedent, the Commission filed an amended recommendation, recommending penalties be limited to $200.00, with no request for reimbursement of costs. After review, the Supreme Court found that the record supported the Commission’s finding that Justice of the Peace Threet acted willfully and knowingly in failing to file the financial disclosure statement. Justice of the Peace Threet was thereafter ordered to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $300.00. View "In re: Justice of the Peace Thomas Threet" on Justia Law

This matter arose from a recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (Commission) regarding Justice of the Peace Stacie P. Myers’ failure to comply with the financial disclosure requirements of Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXXIX. The Commission found that Justice of the Peace Myers failed to file her 2009 personal financial disclosure statement timely, thereby subjecting her to a monetary penalty. The Commission determined Justice of the Peace Myers acted willfully and knowingly in failing to comply with the financial disclosure rule and recommended that she be ordered to pay the penalty and reimburse the Commission for costs. Following the Supreme Court's precedent, the Commission filed an amended recommendation, recommending penalties be limited to $200.00, with no request for reimbursement of costs. After review, the Supreme Court found that the record supported the Commission’s finding that Justice of the Peace Myers acted willfully and knowingly in failing to file the financial disclosure statement. Justice of the Peace Myers was thereafter ordered to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $500.00. View "In re: Justice of the Peace Stacie Myers " on Justia Law

This matter arose from a recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (Commission) regarding Justice of the Peace David E. Cook's failure to comply with the financial disclosure requirements of Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXXIX. The Commission found that Justice of the Peace Cook failed to file his 2009 personal financial disclosure statement timely, thereby subjecting him to a monetary penalty. The Commission determined Justice of the Peace Cook acted willfully and knowingly in failing to comply with the financial disclosure rule and recommended that he be ordered to pay the penalty and reimburse the Commission for costs. Following the Supreme Court's precedent, the Commission filed an amended recommendation, recommending penalties be limited to $200.00, with no request for reimbursement of costs. After review, the Supreme Court found that the record supported the Commission’s finding that Justice of the Peace Cook acted willfully and knowingly in failing to file the financial disclosure statement. Justice of the Peace Cook was thereafter ordered to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $200.00. View "In re: Justice of the Peace David Cook" on Justia Law