Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

After allegations of professional misconduct, the Board of Registration of Social Workers suspended Sandra Clark's license to practice as a licensed independent clinical social worker for five years. A single justice of the Supreme Court affirmed the Board's order. The Supreme Court affirmed the single justice's judgment, holding that the decision of the justice correctly rejected Clark's claims of error, as (1) Clark failed to demonstrate that the Board's decision to suspend her license was not supported by substantial evidence, or that it was arbitrary or capricious or based on any error of law; and (2) the Board's proceedings did not violate Clark's due process rights. View "Clark v. Bd. of Registration of Social Workers" on Justia Law

The Labairs lost their newborn baby after an early delivery by C-section. The Labairs retained Steve Carey and Carey Law Firm (Carey) to pursue their medical malpractice claim against their obstetrician. More than two and a half years later, Carey filed a complaint against the obstetrician. However, Carey failed to file an application with the Montana Medical Legal Panel (MMLP) before filing a complaint with the district court as required by statute and further failed to file an MMLP application within the three-year statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice claims. The district court later dismissed the Labairs' medical malpractice case with prejudice as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The Labairs subsequently filed a complaint for legal malpractice against Casey. The district court entered summary judgment for Carey, concluding that Carey's conduct of failing to file the application with the MMLP did not cause the Labairs injury or damages because the Labairs failed to show that the underlying medical malpractice claims would have succeeded but for the error. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the Labairs' loss of their medical malpractice case was an injury; and (2) the damages associated with that injury remained unproven. View "Labair v. Carey " on Justia Law

Defendants pleaded guilty to defrauding health-care insurers by billing for pain injections that they never administered. Defendants appealed the district court's order that they pay over $43 million in restitution to 32 victims defrauded by the scheme. The court concluded that the record did not support the entire restitution amount recommended and therefore the district court abused its discretion in adopting the unsupported figure. The court held, however, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply a restitution credit. Accordingly, the court vacated the order of restitution and remanded for recalculation. As defendants' plea agreements stipulated to a forfeiture money judgment in the same amount as the restitution award, the court also vacated the amount of the forfeiture award and remanded for recalculation. The court further held that the government did not breach the plea agreements with defendants. View "United States v. Sharma" on Justia Law

While Brenda Osborne was at home alone, an airplane pilot crashed his airplane into Osborne's home. Osborne subsequently hired Attorney to assist her recovering her losses from the pilot, but when the lawsuit was finally filed, the federal court dismissed the action as barred by limitations. Osborne filed this action against Attorney asserting breach of contract, legal malpractice, and fraud and deceit. A jury found in favor of Osborne, resulting in a judgment against Attorney in excess of $5 million. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment in part but vacated a large portion of the damage award. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court properly tried this case using the suit-within-a-suit method but erred when it failed to instruct the jury on Pilot's negligence, thus resulting in Osborne's failure to establish that Attorney's malpractice proximately caused her loss; (2) emotional-distress plaintiffs must first satisfy the elements of a general negligence claim; and (3) punitive damages are not recoverable against an attorney in a legal malpractice case. View "Osborne v. Keeney" on Justia Law

A bar served a man alcohol while he was visibly intoxicated, and the man murdered a woman later that evening. The lawyer representing the bar in the subsequent dram shop action did not attempt to add the murderer as a party for apportionment of fault. Following entry of a large judgment against the bar, the bar brought a legal malpractice suit against its attorney. The attorney moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, arguing that where case law is unsettled, as a matter of law an attorney cannot be held liable for an error in judgment. The superior court granted the motion and the bar appealed. "Because the existence of unsettled law does not excuse an attorney from fulfilling a duty of care," the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "L.D.G., Inc. v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Hernandez developed Parkinson’s disease, allegedly as the result of his exposure to chemicals at Central Steel, where he worked from 1968 to 1995. From 1995 to 1996, Hernandez was represented by a firm that filed a social security disability claim. From 1999 to 2002, he was represented by Bernstein, Grazian and Volpe, who filed a 1999 workers’ compensation claim, alleging chemical exposure at work. A third law firm was retained in 2004 and filed suit for civil damage recovery, strict product liability and negligence lawsuit against various companies involved in the manufacture and sale of those chemicals; that suit dismissed as time-barred. Hernandez alleged that the Bernstein firm should have advised him that he had other ways to recover beyond seeking workers’ compensation benefits and should have advised that he file a legal malpractice action against the first law firm for its failure to file a product liability suit. In 2009 the circuit court dismissed on grounds of res judicata. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the elements of res judicata had not been proven.View "Hernandez v. Pritikin" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff experienced dizziness and difficulty walking, she was admitted into a medical clinic (Clinic) and seen by the on-duty physician (Doctor). Doctor diagnosed Plaintiff with vertigo. Two days later, Plaintiff was unable to move her right arm or leg and was later diagnosed with having suffered a stroke. Defendant subsequently filed a complaint alleging negligence by Doctor and Clinic (collectively, Defendants) for the failure to diagnose a transient stroke. After a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $1.25 million but denied Plaintiff's motion for prejudgment interest. The court thereafter denied Defendants' motion for a new trial based upon the cumulative effect of Plaintiff's counsel's alleged unprofessional conduct during the trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) denying Defendants' motion for a new trial, despite Plaintiff's counsel's dissatisfying behavior; and (2) denying the discretionary award of prejudgment interest. View "Wisner v. Laney" on Justia Law

The underlying case in this matter concerned a property dispute between BNSF Railway (BNSF) and Roy D. Mercer, LLC (Mercer) and the interpretation of an easement. BNSF claimed a right to construct large berms on Mercer's property (to divert water from railroad tracks) pursuant to a 1936 easement granted to BNSF's predecessor in interest by Mercer's predecessor in interest. BNSF hired Gandy Dancer, LLC to construct the new berms. Mercer objected and threatened to remove them. Relying upon its easement claim, BNSF filed suit in state court against Mercer seeking to enjoin Mercer from removing the berms and requesting damages. Mercer filed a counterclaim against BNSF for tort damages and inverse condemnation, and joined Gandy Dancer as a party defendant for trespass, negligence, and prima facie tort. Once joined as a party, Gandy Dancer, through its attorneys Riley, Shane & Keller, P.C. (Riley Law Firm), removed the matter to federal court. Upon removal, Mercer hired the Wagner Ford Law Firm. At that time, the firm consisted of attorneys Kenneth Wagner and Lisa Ford. Although the firm was named "Wagner Ford," Ford was only an associate. In January 2010, Mercer added another law firm, Law & Resource Planning Associates, P.C. (the LRPA Law Firm) to represent it in the state court proceeding because of water law issues involved in that case. The Wagner Ford Law Firm ceased representing Mercer in late 2010. In late June 2012, while the state court proceeding was ongoing, the LRPA law firm learned via the Riley firm's website that the Riley firm had hired Ford as a new associate. LRPA promptly sent a letter to the Riley firm raising Ford's conflict of interest and stating that the Riley firm could no longer represent Gandy Dancer in the litigation with Mercer, Ford's former client. The Riley firm filed a motion in the state case seeking judicial approval of a Rule 16-110(C) screening process for Ford that Riley believed would allow its continued representation of Gandy Dancer. The court found that Ford had previously represented Mercer in the same or a substantially similar matter, her role was substantial, and she had a conflict of interest. Nevertheless, the district court found that the equities favored Gandy Dancer and declined to disqualify the Riley firm. Mercer appealed the district court's decision not to disqualify the Riley Firm. In interpreting and applying the rule to this case, the Supreme Court held that when an attorney has played a substantial role on one side of a lawsuit and subsequently joins a law firm on the opposing side of that lawsuit, both the lawyer and the new firm are disqualified from any further representation, absent informed consent of the former client. "We also specifically conclude under the same rule that screening the new attorney from any involvement in the lawsuit is not an adequate response to the conflict." View "Mercer v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

The Board of Licensure in Medicine revoked Petitioner's medical license. The superior court dismissed Petitioner's complaint seeking judicial review, concluding (1) it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the Board's decision because the district court had exclusive jurisdiction to review nonconsensual license-revocation orders pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 10, 8003(5); and (2) Petitioner's 42 U.S.C.S. 1983 claim should be dismissed because the Board members had authority to revoke her license and were immune from suit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court properly dismissed Petitioner's petition for review of the Board order revoking her license because the district court had exclusive jurisdiction in such matters; and (2) because the Board acted within its authority in revoking Petitioner's license and, on appeal, Petitioner did not otherwise assert a denial of her constitutional rights, Petitioner's section 1983 claim was properly dismissed. View "Michalowski v. Bd. of Licensure in Med." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a physician could be held answerable as a matter of professional discipline solely on the basis of a physicians assistant’s (PA) unprofessional acts. The Board of Medical Practice concluded that it was not required to find Dr. Jon Porter guilty of unprofessional conduct based solely on the acts of a PA whom he supervised. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that state law did not make supervising physicians answerable as a matter of professional discipline solely for the unprofessional acts of PAs they supervise because the applicable statute does not pertain to professional responsibility. Furthermore, state law provides no basis for disciplining a supervising physician whose PA has committed an unprofessional act where the supervising physician has met or exceeded all standards of care. View "In re Jon Porter, M.D." on Justia Law