Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Appellant Cynthia Holmes, M.D. appealed a circuit court's grant of a directed verdict on her malpractice claim in favor of respondents Haynsworth, Sinkler & Boyd, P.A., Manton Grier, and James Becker, and award of sanctions against her. Appellant, an ophthalmologist, was previously a member of the consulting medical staff of Tenet HealthSystem Medical, Incorporated, d/b/a East Cooper Community Hospital, Inc. In 1997, appellant lost her privileges to admit patients and perform procedures at the Hospital. Appellant hired respondents to represent her in a legal action against the Hospital in 1998. Respondents pursued an unsuccessful appeal for reinstatement of full admitting privileges through the Hospital's administrative process. In 1999, Respondents filed a lawsuit in federal court on Appellant's behalf. As a result of that suit, the federal district court granted a temporary injunction reinstating Appellant's admitting privileges based, in part, on Appellant's averments in an affidavit that her patients needed urgent surgeries and her inability to perform surgery at the hospital was causing her to lose patients. However, because Appellant did not perform a single surgery in the wake of the temporary injunction, the district court dissolved the injunction in 2000, because "the alleged harm suffered by [Appellant's] current patients had not materialized." Appellant blamed Respondents for the dissolution of the injunction, claiming that Respondents did not act with due diligence on her behalf because she disputed their fees and refused to pay her legal bills. Respondents, however, attributed the dissolution of the injunction to Appellant's failure to utilize the injunction to perform surgery while it was in place and her lack of cooperation during discovery. On January 31, 2000, Appellant filed a pro se motion requesting the district court reconsider the dissolution of the preliminary injunction. In this motion, she also indicated she was dissatisfied with Respondents' representation and was critical of how Respondents had handled her case to that point and sought additional time to obtain substitute counsel and complete discovery. Because Appellant still refused to pay her legal bills, Respondents filed a motion to be relieved as counsel. A few months later, the district court granted summary judgment in the Hospital's favor, and dismissed the pendant state law claims without prejudice. After Respondents and Appellant ended their professional relationship, Appellant sought the return of the $43,000 in attorney's fees she paid pursuant to an addendum to their fee agreement. Respondents refused, and subsequently Appellant filed a Complaint alleging professional malpractice in handling her federal antitrust claims. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Holmes v. Haynsworth, Sinkler & Boyd" on Justia Law

The Gallia County (Ohio) Public Defender Commission contracted with the non-profit Corporation for defense attorneys to represent indigent criminal defendants. The Corporation hired Bright, who represented R.G. before Evans, the county’s only trial judge. Bright negotiated a plea agreement, but R.G. hesitated during the plea colloquy. “Mere seconds” later, R.G. informed Bright and Evans that he would take the deal after all. Evans refused. Bright and the prosecutor met with Evans to convince the judge to accept R.G.’s plea. He refused. In pleadings, Bright criticized Evans’s policies as “an abuse of discretion,” “unreasonable,” “arbitrary … unconscionable.” Bright’s language did not include profanity and did not claim ethical impropriety. Evans subsequently contacted the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and filed a grievance against Bright and filed a public journal entry stating that Bright’s motion, although not amounting to misconduct or contempt, had created a conflict. He ordered that Bright be removed from the R.G. case. He then filed entries removing Bright from 70 other felony cases. The Corporation terminated Bright’s employment, allegedly without a hearing or other due process. Bright sued Evans, the Board, the Corporation, and the Commission. The district court concluded that Evans was “not entitled to absolute judicial immunity because his actions were completely outside of his jurisdiction.” The court held that Bright failed to sufficiently plead that the Board or the Commission retaliated against him for exercising his constitutional rights or that liability attached under the Monell doctrine, then dismissed claims against the Corporation. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to Evans. While Evans’s conduct was worthy of censure, it does not fit within any exception to absolute judicial immunity. The court affirmed dismissal of claims against the Board and Corporation; the First Amendment offers no protection to an attorney for his speech in court.View "Bright v. Gallia Cnty." on Justia Law

In the underlying action, Plaintiff filed a personal injury action against Defendants, the State, and a volunteer driver for the Iowa Department of Human Services. The Supreme Court held that Defendants were entitled to summary judgment under the statute of limitations and the volunteer-immunity provisions of the Iowa Tort Claims Act. Plaintiff subsequently filed this malpractice action against her attorney (Attorney) in the underlying case. The jury returned a verdict finding Attorney was negligent and that his negligence caused damage to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal and reversed on cross-appeal, holding (1) the driver's volunteer immunity did not preclude the State's respondeat superior liability for Attorney's negligence, and therefore, Plaintiff's legal malpractice claim against Attorney did not fail because she could have recovered in the underlying case had the claim been timely filed; (2) Attorney could not reduce the malpractice-damage award by the contingent fee he would have taken if the underlying action had been successful because he did not earn the fee and because Plaintiff must pay new counsel who prosecuted the malpractice action; and (3) Plaintiff was entitled to interest running from the date by which her underlying action should have been tried, absent Attorney's negligence.View "Hook v. Trevino" on Justia Law

Real parties in interest in this case were the owners and developers (collectively, P&R) and the general contractor (PCS) of a construction site in Las Vegas. Petitioner, an architecture firm, designed a housing project at the site. After a fatal automobile accident occurred at the site, Plaintiffs and/or their estates filed complaints against P&R, PCS, and Petitioner. Petitioner and Plaintiffs settled, and the district court determined the settlement was made in good faith. P&R subsequently filed a third-party complaint against Petitioner for breach of contract, professional negligence, and express indemnity, among other claims. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that they were barred as "de facto" contribution and/or equitable indemnity claims. The district court granted the motion in part and dismissed P&R's claim for professional negligence. Petitioner then filed this petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court granted the petition and directed the district court to dismiss P&R's remaining third-party claims against Petitioner, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 17.245(1)(b) bars all claims that seek contribution and/or equitable indemnity when the settlement is determined to be in good faith; and (2) P&R's remaining third-party claims here were "de facto" contribution claims and were thus barred by section 17.245(1)(b). View "Otak Nev., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a licensed physical therapist and the owner of a therapy center that operated two facilities. The West Virginia Board of Physical Therapy revoked Petitioner's license for failure to properly supervise physical therapist assistants and physical therapy aides employed by him. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court properly found that Petitioner failed to directly supervise a physical therapy aide who was performing patient treatment; but (2) the circuit court erred in finding that Petitioner failed appropriately to supervise a physical therapist assistant who was performing patient treatment. Remanded.View "Sorongon v. W. Va. Bd. of Physical Therapy" on Justia Law

Inmate Santiago, complaining of severe pain and a rash, was seen by Dr.Mosher on January 31. Mosher prescribed Tylenol for pain and antibiotics to treat what she thought might be Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). The next day Dr. Ringle diagnosed erythema nodosum (EN), an uncomfortable but non-dangerous skin inflammation that typically disappears in about six weeks but may recur. EN has no known cure. Ringle prescribed an anti-inflammatory and an antibiotic. Four days later, Santiago was transferred to OSU Medical Center, where he was diagnosed with EN and arthralgias, a severe joint-pain condition, and prescribed an anti-ulcer agent and a different anti-inflammatory. Santiago was seen on February 20 by an OSU dermatologist, who recommended a topical steroid, compression hose, and SSKI, which may help treat EN but is not standard treatment. Each day, February 22- 25, Santiago asked prison nursing staff about the treatments. Staff denied knowledge until, on the 25th, nurses found Santiago’s unsigned chart on Ringle’s desk. Ringle had been on vacation. Mosher signed the order on February 27. Santiago received the topical steroid on February 29 and compression stockings on March 10. Santiago waited longer for the SSKI, which is a non-formulary drug. The district court rejected Santiago’s suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) based on the delays. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Santiago did not prove that the delay caused a serious medical need or deliberate indifference.View "Santiago v. Ringle" on Justia Law

In her representation of a client charged with alien smuggling, 8 U.S.C. 1324, Migdal, an attorney who has served as an Assistant Federal Public Defender for nearly 25 years, had a number of disagreements with the federal prosecutor, who ultimately moved for sanctions against Migdal. The prosecutor failed to follow Department of Justice policy requiring supervisory approval of sanctions requests. Despite the government withdrawing the motion and indicating that it did not believe that Migdal acted in bad faith, the district court entered orders strongly publicly reprimanding Migdal. The Sixth Circuit vacated, stating that the record does not support any basis for the orders.View "United States v. Llanez-Garcia" on Justia Law

The Formal Charge against respondent Justice of the Peace Mary Foret arose from a small claims case in her court brought by Norris and Gloria Comeaux against Charles and Carol LeBlanc. Both prior to and after the filing of the lawsuit, respondent engaged in numerous ex parte communications with the parties concerning the substantive issues in the case. Respondent also engaged in improper independent investigation into the background of the case by having her constable obtain the police report of an altercation between Comeaux and LeBlanc. Despite these ex parte communications and independent fact-finding about the case, respondent did not recuse herself. When the Comeaux case was set for hearing, respondent knowingly allowed the constable to participate in the hearing to a significant extent. Respondent also allowed the Constable to participate in her decision-making process by asking him at the conclusion of the hearing what he thought of the case. The Judiciary Commission of Louisiana recommended, and the Supreme Court adopted, that respondent be suspended with pay for sixty days and ordered to pay the costs of the prosecution of these proceedings. View "IIn re: Justice of the Peace Mary Foret" on Justia Law

James Forbes settled a personal-injury action while he was represented by Louis St. Martin. Forbes later sued St. Martin, challenging the validity of his contingency-fee arrangement and the associated attorneys’ fees. The Chancery Court granted summary judgment to St. Martin; the Court of Appeals reversed the chancery court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment, finding that summary judgment in favor of St. Martin was proper. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Louis St. Martin, Deceased: Forbes v. Hixson" on Justia Law

The Judicial Conduct Board filed a complaint against Magisterial District Judge (MDJ) Thomas Carney, alleging that appellee Carney violated Article V, section 18(d)(1) of the Pennsylvania Constitution and Rules 2A and 11 of the Rules Governing Standards of Conduct of Magisterial District Judges. Following the Court of Judicial Discipline’s dismissal of the Board’s complaint, the Board appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the CJD erred in concluding that appellee did not violate any of the enumerated provisions. Two separate incidents gave rise to charges against appellee. One involved his work on an anti-graffiti task force and the solicitation of donations for the group’s work. The other involved a traffic incident in which appellee displayed his middle finger to the occupants of another car he tried to pass along the interstate; the drivers exchanged obscenities, and the incident ended with appellee rolling down his window, driving alongside the other vehicle, and displaying a silver handgun for the other car to see. Police were called, and charges were filed: making terroristic threats, simple assault, disorderly conduct and recklessly endangering another person. Following a trial, the CJD concluded appellee did not violate Rule 11 with regard to the solicitation of donations for the task force. Further, the CJD concluded the Board failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that appellee’s conduct was so extreme as to bring his office into disrepute. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and part. The Court affirmed the CJD in its conclusion with regard to the task-force solicitations. But the Court disagreed that the Board did not establish appellee’s conduct was “so extreme as to brought the judicial office itself into disrepute.” That portion of the CJD’s order was reversed and the case remanded for the imposition of a sanction consistent with the misconduct. View "In Re: Carney, Magisterial District Judge" on Justia Law