Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Respondent Wickham Corwin, judge in the East Central Judicial District, objected to the Judicial Conduct Commission's findings that he violated provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct and its recommendation that he be suspended for two months, without net pay, and be assessed the costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceedings. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded there was clear and convincing evidence Judge Corwin violated N.D. Code Jud. Conduct Canons 3(C)(1), and N.D. Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3(C)(2). The Court ordered Judge Corwin be suspended from his position as district judge for one month without pay effective December 1, 2014, and that he be assessed costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceedings. View "Judicial Conduct Commission v. Corwin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellees Jackie and Marcia Ellison, along with Richard M. Healy, P.C., Jayne Jarnigan Robertson, P.C., and Michael J. Blascheke, P.C., sued defendants-appellants, Michael D. Campbell and M.D. Campbell & Associates, L.P., for breach of contract. Plaintiffs alleged that Campbell failed to render a defensible expert opinion in underlying litigation in Canadian County, and subsequently abandoned the task for which he was hired. Campbell counterclaimed for "uncompensated professional services." A jury returned a verdict in plaintiffs' favor. Based on the jury's verdict, the trial court entered judgment for the plaintiffs for $408,748.68, plus statutory interest. Campbell filed a motion for new trial or, in the alternative, a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. After hearing argument, the trial court overruled the motions and Campbell appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed, finding that the breach of contract cause of action failed because plaintiffs did not prove their case by presenting an expert witness. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that in this case the expert witness indicted his own performance in the underlying matter: "Supporting testimony made it clear that Campbell did not produce a document which accurately represented the state of the groundwater underlying the Ellisons' property or the source of its pollution. Any lay person could consider the testimony presented and conclude that the Ellisons did not receive the services for which they contracted. The expert witness's testimony was such that any reasonable juror might question his candidness." Under these unique facts, it was unnecessary for plaintiffs to rely upon expert testimony to prevail in their breach of contract claim. View "Ellison v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Clifford Lippitt was a certified geologist employed at S.W. Cole, Inc. Worcester Associates retained S.W. Cole to provide the necessary technical assistance in order to complete the closure of a landfill Worcester owned. After S.W. Cole drilled bedrock wells and collected data from them, Lippitt submitted a report presenting the results of the tests and concluding that there was no evidence the landfill was impacting neighboring residential wells. The Board of Certification for Geologists and Soil Scientists determined that Lippitt had violated the Code of Ethics applicable to geologists and soil scientists because he had provided a professional opinion “without being as thoroughly informed as might be reasonably expected.” The Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s judgment affirming the Board’s decision, holding (1) the Board’s disagreement with a geologist’s opinion, without a concurrent determination that the opinion is false, is based on false data, or reflects the geologist’s incompetence, cannot be the basis for a determination that the opinion constitutes a violation of the geologists’ Code of Ethics; and (2) the Board erred in determining that Lippitt violated the Code of Ethics on the grounds that Lippitt’s opinion was not “reasonable” in light of the underlying data. View "Lippitt v. Bd. of Certification for Geologists & Soil Scientists" on Justia Law

Petitioner, which operated an animal crematory, filed an action against Respondent, a planning and engineering firm, alleging breach of contract and professional negligence. The complaint failed to attribute Respondent's alleged failings to a licensed engineer and was not accompanied by a certificate of a qualified expert. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for failure to file a certificate within the required time period. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that where the allegations of Petitioner's complaint did not fault a licensed engineer, it was premature to conclude that an expert certificate was required, as the certificate requirement applies only to a cause of action based on a licensed engineer's negligent act or omission in rendering engineering services within the scope of the engineer's license.View "Heavenly Days Crematorium, LLC v. Harris, Smariga & Assocs." on Justia Law

In a medical malpractice action, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether the Superior Court erred by denying appellants' motion for judgment as a matter of law, and by excluding certain evidence. Dr. Jennifer Barlow performed a Caesarean section on Laura Cooney-Koss to deliver her baby. There were no apparent complications from the delivery, and Laura was discharged from the hospital three days later. A month later, Laura experienced heavy vaginal bleeding, and she returned to the hospital. In an attempt to slow or stop her bleeding, a hospital physician determined that Laura would need a dilation and evacuation (D&E) procedure. Dr. A. Diane McCracken performed the D&E; further attempts to stop the bleeding were unsuccessful. McCracken decided to perform a hysterectomy, believing that Laura would die otherwise. The doctor removed Laura's uterus, and Laura eventually stopped bleeding. Laura and her husband, Jerome Koss, filed a complaint against McCracken, Barlow, their employer, All About Women of Christiana Care, Inc., and Christiana Care Health Services, Inc., alleging that McCracken negligently failed to undertake an appropriate number of conservative treatment options to stop Laura's bleeding before performing the hysterectomy, which was unnecessary. After trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Kosses. The Superior Court denied McCracken's motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. Upon review of the Koss' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly determined that appellees' medical expert evidence supported a verdict in their favor. Thus, its denial of the motion for judgment as a matter of law is affirmed. The trial court's evidentiary rulings, however, constituted an abuse of discretion requiring a new trial. View "Cooney-Koss v. Barlow" on Justia Law

The Comptroller of the Currency found that petitioner, as the CEO and a director of the Bank, had engaged in a pattern of willfully misrepresenting the Bank's capital reserves to the OTS and the Bank's board of directors, and he issued orders prohibiting petitioner from participation in the affairs of any federally insured financial institution and assessing a civil penalty of one million dollars. Petitioner sought dismissal of the Comptroller's decision and orders, inter alia, on the grounds of legal error in relying on later-developed standards in the OTS New Directions Bulletin of 2009 when there were no clear standards at the relevant times, and in applying a "should have known" scienter standard in findings that required a more demanding level of scienter. The court concluded that petitioner failed to show that the stringent statutory requirements of 12 U.S.C. 1818 for an order of prohibition were not met. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Dodge v. Comptroller of the Currency" on Justia Law

Longview Energy Company filed a complaint against William Huff, Richard D'Angelo, and Riley-Huff Energy Group as a result of a breach of fiduciary duty committed by Huff and D'Angelo in connection with their usurpation of a corporate opportunity. The corporate opportunity belonging to Longview related to property interests in a large area of land in south Texas called Eagle Ford. A Texas court entered a judgment against Defendants and imposed a constructive trust in favor of Longview on the profits and ownership of Riley-Huff's interests in Eagle Ford and a damage award against Huff and D'Angelo. Huff and D'Angelo appealed and sought indemnification from Longview, a Delaware corporation they served on as directors. The Court of Chancery granted Longview's motion to dismiss the complaint because it did not state a ripe claim.View "Huff v. Longview Energy Co." on Justia Law

Luis Alicea pleaded guilty to a firearm offense and was sentenced to three and one-half years' incarceration. Alicea later filed suit in federal court against his former defense counsel, Lawrence McGuire, alleging that McGuire's conduct resulted in Alicea's serving an illegal sentence. The district court judge granted summary judgment for McGuire. While the federal case was pending, Alicea filed an action in the superior court against the Commonwealth as McGuire's employer, asserting claims of malpractice and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Alicea's claims were premised on the allegation that McGuire had caused Alicea to serve an illegal sentence. The superior court granted summary judgment for the Commonwealth, concluding that the judgment entered in the federal action precluded Alicea from litigating the issue of his purported illegal sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the central issue of Alicea's claims in the superior court was decided in the federal action, application of the doctrine of issue preclusion prevented Alicea from relitigating the issue.View "Alicea v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. Plaintiffs claimed that the bonds that they invested in were an unsuitable investment for the Plans' funds and that defendant made multiple oral misrepresentations to plaintiffs in violation of his fiduciary duties. The district court ruled that there was a disputed issue of material fact as to whether defendant was an ERISA fiduciary, but nonetheless granted summary judgment because defendant provided plaintiffs with written disclosures. The court concluded that defendant did not qualify as a fiduciary under ERISA subsection 1002(21)(A)(i) because he did not exercise discretionary authority or control over the investment at issue; subsection 1002(21)(A)(ii) because he did not receive a fee from the Plans in connection with the investment; and section 1002(21)(A)(iii) because it was inapplicable in this instance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Tiblier, et al. v. Dlabal, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a licensed physician and surgeon, was charged with violating the applicable standard of care in his treatment of two children. The Connecticut Medical Examining Board (board) found that Plaintiff had violated the standard of care with respect to his treatment of both children and ordered a reprimand, imposed fines, and placed Plaintiff on probation for two years. The trial court primarily affirmed, as did the appellate court. Plaintiff appealed, asserting that the appellate court incorrectly concluded that the preponderance of the evidence standard applied in his disciplinary hearing rather than the clear and convincing evidence standard. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the preponderance of the evidence standard applied at the proceeding because the board is an administrative agency subject to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, under which the preponderance of the evidence is the default standard of proof; and (2) the use of the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof at a physician disciplinary proceeding does not offend a physician's due process rights.View "Jones v. Conn. Med. Examining Bd." on Justia Law