Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Elmer Gaede, who owned a 120-acre farm together with his wife, died testate on February 2005. Elmer’s daughter, Diean, was named executor under the will. Diean designated Ivan Ackerman to render legal services in the administration of the estate. During the pendency of the probate proceedings, Elmer’s son James and his wife, who were leasing the farm, exercised the option under the lease agreement to purchase the farm. Diean later filed this legal malpractice lawsuit against Ackerman, alleging that Ackerman failed to adequately protect her personal interests relating to the enforceability of the option. The district court granted summary judgment for Ackerman, determining that Ackerman did not have a duty to protect Diean’s personal interests. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a factual dispute existed over the question of whether Diean had a reasonable expectation that Ackerman was representing her personal interests. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that insufficient facts supported Diean’s claim that Ackerman reasonably understood that Diean expected him to protect her personal interests in challenging the option. View "Sabin v. Ackerman" on Justia Law

The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) petitioned for the interim suspension of Wayne Circuit Court Judge Wade H. McCree without pay. With respect to Count I, an appointed special master concluded that respondent should have disqualified himself from a felony nonsupport case as soon as he began a sexual relationship with the complaining witness in the case. With respect to Count II, the master found that respondent had lied to the prosecuting attorney’s office when he reported that the witness was stalking him and trying to extort money from him. With respect to Count III, the master concluded that respondent had improperly acted in another criminal case, one that involved the witness' uncle. With respect to Count IV, the master found that although many of the text messages that respondent exchanged with the witness while he was on the bench were inappropriate, they were used in a private context and did not rise to the level of judicial misconduct. Finally, the master found that the misrepresentations alleged in Count V did not warrant action by the JTC. The JTC recommended that respondent be removed from office, and conditionally suspended without pay for six years. The Supreme Court granted the petition. View "In re McCree" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was working for a BP Amoco Chemical Company (BP) contractor in 2005 when BP's Texas City refinery exploded, killing fifteen workers and injuring many others. Plaintiff signed a power of attorney retaining William Wells to represent him on any claims he had against BP arising from the explosion. In order to increase the settlement in this and three other cases, Wells associated Ronald and Kevin Krist and the Krist Law Firm as additional counsel. After a settlement was obtained, Plaintiff and his wife brought this suit against Wells, the Krists, and the Krist Law Firm (collectively, Attorneys), claiming that the Attorneys failed to obtain an adequate settlement for both plaintiffs. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Attorneys, and the court of appeals affirmed, finding that Plaintiffs had not presented competent evidence of damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an affidavit did not raise a genuine issue of material fact on malpractice damages; (2) discovery disputes in the trial court did not warrant denial of summary judgment on the issue of damages; and (3) the lay testimony of Plaintiffs did not raise a genuine issue of material fact on malpractice damages.View "Elizondo v. Krist" on Justia Law

This case arose after the settlement of Guard v. American Home Products, Inc., which was brought by Kentucky residents who had taken the diet drug known as Fen-Phen. Each Appellant was a plaintiff in the Guard case and was represented under a contingent fee contract by Appellees, a team of four attorneys. Appellants filed a complaint alleging that Appellees breached their fiduciary duties by wrongfully retaining or improperly disbursing a portion of the Guard case settlement money that should have gone to Appellants. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to Appellants, finding three of the attorneys breached their fiduciary duty. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case against the three attorneys for further proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' opinion regarding the issue of the three attorneys' breach of fiduciary duty and reinstated the partial summary judgment entered against them, holding, primarily, (1) the facts established a breach of fiduciary duty that entitled Appellants to summary judgment on the three attorneys' liability as a matter of law; and (2) the court of appeals did not err by declining to review the trial court's denial of summary judgment against the fourth attorney, as the order was not appealable.View "Abbott v. Chelsea " on Justia Law

Plaintiff retained Defendant, a law firm, to represent Plaintiff in an action against other parties. After Plaintiff settled the underlying suit, Plaintiff filed a breach of contract action against Defendant, alleging that Defendant breached its duty of undivided loyalty and failed to follow Plaintiff’s instructions in the underlying lawsuit. The trial court characterized the allegations against Defendant as sounding in legal malpractice and granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice claims. At issue on appeal was whether Plaintiff’s cause of action was one for malpractice, to which a three-year statute of limitation applied, or contract, to which a six-year statute of limitations applied. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly characterized Plaintiff’s claim as sounding in legal malpractice. View "Meyers v. Livingston, Adler, Pulda, Meiklejohn & Kelly, P.C." on Justia Law

Petitioner Dr. Kevin Boulard, D.M.D. appealed a New Hampshire Board of Dental Examiners (Board) finding that he committed professional misconduct and suspending indefinitely his “moderate sedation – unrestricted” permit. The Supreme Court concluded that because the Board was in the process of conducting other investigations of petitioner’s practice, without more, it was error for the Board to continue the suspension of petitioner's permit based on the other facts presented on the record. The Court vacated a portion of the Board's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Appeal of Dr. Kevin D. Boulard, D.M.D." on Justia Law

Appellant was terminated from his employment as a registered nurse at a community hospital after a patient under Appellant’s care departed from the hospital, unescorted, into blizzard-like conditions and died less than 500 feet from the hospital’s entrance. After a two-day disciplinary hearing, the State Board of Nursing found Appellant violated several statutes and Board rules and revoked Appellant’s professional nursing license for two years. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for de novo judicial review in the district court. The district court concluded that it would not rehear the evidence presented to the Board and, after finding “competent evidence” on the record to support the Board’s findings, affirmed the Board’s decision to revoke Appellant’s license. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment, holding that the court erred in its interpretation and application of “de novo judicial review.” Remanded. View "Zablotny v. State Bd. of Nursing" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Dr. Murphy and his employer, ECHO, alleging that Murphy was negligent in treating Anderson, who suffered a severe and permanent brain injury following emergency room treatment. ECHO billed Anderson for services physicians provided him during a previous emergency room visit, but did not bill for Murphy’s services during the Code Blue that resulted in his injury. The hospital billed Anderson for supplies used during the Code Blue. The circuit court concluded that Murphy was immune from liability under the Good Samaritan Act, 745 ILCS 49/25. The appellate court reversed, holding that the Act was meant to apply to volunteers, not to those who treat patients within the scope of their employment and are compensated for doing so. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The Act provides “Any person licensed under the Medical Practice Act of 1987 or any person licensed to practice the treatment of human ailments in any other state or territory of the United States who, in good faith, provides emergency care without fee to a person, shall not, as a result of his or her acts or omissions, except willful or wanton misconduct on the part of the person, in providing the care, be liable for civil damages.” Murphy was fully compensated for his time that day. He responded to the emergency not because he was volunteering to help but because it was his job to do so. The agreement that ECHO had with the hospital and the agreement that ECHO had with Murphy require that ECHO physicians to comply with hospital policies, and the hospital’s written policy was that emergency room physicians were to respond to Code Blues. The legislature never intended that Good Samaritan immunity would be available in this situation.View "Home Star Bank & Fin. Servs. v. Emergency Care & Health Org., Ltd." on Justia Law

Thomas Konrad accepted a loan from Bob Law upon the advice of attorney Douglas Kettering. Law and Kettering had been partners in at least one of Law's business ventures and had an attorney-client relationship. Thomas's parents (the Konrads) provided their land as collateral for Thomas's loan. Thomas later defaulted on the note. Seven months after Kettering passed away, Law brought suit to enforce the note and mortgage against Thomas and the Konrads. Law settled with Thomas and the Konrads. Law then sought to recover from the Kettering Estate the amounts outstanding on the note, claiming that Kettering's acts - including his conflict of interest with Law and his alleged fraudulent inducement of the Konrads into signing the note and mortgage - voided the note and mortgage, and therefore, the Estate was liable to Law for the interest due on the note. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the contract between Law and Thomas did not contravene public policy because it was drafted by an attorney who failed to disclose a conflicting attorney-client relationship; and (2) the theory that Kettering fraudulently induced the Konrads into signing the note and mortgage rested on mere speculation.View "Law Capital, Inc. v. Kettering" on Justia Law

After a botched surgery, Plaintiff sued the two doctors who performed the surgery. The jury entered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. One of the doctors, Dr. Schneider, appealed. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred (1) in allowing Plaintiff to question Schneider about his lack of board certification, and (2) by prohibiting Schneider from testifying about a CAT scan, from an unrelated hospital visit, that Schneider did not use in his treatment of Plaintiff. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in (1) allowing Plaintiff to discuss Schneider's lack of board certification where (i) Schneider testified only as a fact witness instead of an expert witness, and (ii) Schneider's witness accreditation exceeded the reasonable limits for accreditation of a fact witness because it inquired extensively into his professional accomplishments; and (2) excluding the CAT scan, as Schneider's testimony would have gone beyond the legitimate testimony of a fact witness because Schneider had no personal knowledge of the scan.View "Little v. Schneider" on Justia Law