Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff retained Attorneys to pursue a medical malpractice action against the Veteran’s Administration, the University of Rochester, and an opthalmologist. A federal district court disposed of the majority of Plaintiff’s claims on summary judgment. After Plaintiff was informed by Attorneys that he was unlikely to succeed on his remaining claim, Plaintiff discontinued the underlying action. Subsequently, Plaintiff retained new counsel to sue Attorneys for legal malpractice in failing to timely sue the University and the opthalmologist. Defendants argued that Plaintiff was estopped from commencing this action because he failed to appeal the underlying action. Supreme Court denied Attorneys’ motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a failure to appeal bars a legal malpractice action only where the client was likely to have succeeded on appeal in the underlying action; and (2) in this case, Attorneys failed to provide sufficient evidence to determine that Plaintiff would have been successful on appeal. View "Grace v. Law" on Justia Law

Nayak owned outpatient surgery centers and made under-the-table payments to physicians that referred patients to his centers, including cash payments and payments to cover referring physicians’ advertising expenses. Nayak instructed some of his collaborators not to report these payments on their tax returns. Nayak was charged with honest-services mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341 and 1346, and obstruction of the administration of the tax system, 26 U.S.C. 7212(a). Although the indictment a alleged that Nayak intended “to defraud and to deprive patients of their right to honest services of their physicians” through his scheme, there was no allegation that Nayak caused or intended to cause any sort of tangible harm to the patients in the form of higher costs or inferior care. After denial of his motion to dismiss, Nayak entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal denial of his motion to dismiss the mail fraud charge. On appeal he argued that tangible harm to a victim is a necessary element of honest-services mail fraud, at least in cases not involving fraud by a public official. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that actual or intended tangible harm is not an element. View "United States v. Nayak" on Justia Law

In 2002, David hired the Attorneys to represent him in petitioning for his appointment as probate conservator of the person and estate of his mother, Donna. In his petition, David represented there were no conservatorship assets and that all of Donna’s assets were held in her Trust, so that no bond was required. Donna actually owned significant assets, including real property and several individual retirement accounts (IRAs), individually and not as assets of her Trust. The probate court appointed David as conservator of both Donna’s person and estate and waived bond. The Attorneys continued to represent David and allegedly “knew that Donna . . . had assets in her name that under California law were assets of the conservatorship,” but never informed the probate court of their existence nor petitioned the court to require or increase a bond. David subsequently misappropriated over one million dollars. Stine, a subsequently-appointed licensed professional fiduciary sued David for financial elder abuse and conversion and the Attorneys for legal malpractice. The trial court dismissed the Attorneys. The court of appeal reversed holding that the successor trustee is not subject to any defense that can be interposed against David and David’s malfeasance. View "Stine v. Dell'Osso" on Justia Law

The Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (Department) permanently revoked the health care licenses of physicians (plaintiffs) pursuant to the Department of Professional Regulation Law (20 ILCS 2105/2105-165) as a result of plaintiffs’ prior misdemeanor convictions for battery and criminal sexual abuse of their patients. The circuit court of Cook County dismissed their challenges. The appellate court and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting claims that the Act: did not apply to individuals who were convicted of a triggering offense prior to the Act’s effective date; was impermissibly retroactive and impaired certain fundamental rights, in violation of substantive due process; violated procedural due process; was unenforceable based on the res judicata effect of the previous discipline imposed by the Department; violated federal and state constitutional protections against double jeopardy; violated the constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder; violated the federal takings clause; and violated federal and state constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto law. View "Hayashi v. IL Dep't of Fin. & Prof'l Regulation" on Justia Law

In lieu of undergoing a formal audit, Louisiana law requires justices of the peace to file a sworn annual financial statement with the Louisiana Legislative Auditor. Officials who fail to file timely financial statements are notified that their names have been placed on a noncompliance list. According to a database maintained by the Legislative Auditor, respondent failed to file her annual financial statement for 2007, 2008, 2009. As of May 2013, when the hearing was held in this matter, respondent was still out of compliance for those years. In December 2010, the Chief Executive Officer of the Commission authorized the Office of Special Counsel to open a file regarding respondent based on the news report from a New Orleans television station that respondent's name had been placed on the Auditor's list. The Supreme Court found that the record established by clear and convincing evidence that respondent failed to comply with the filing requirement of La. Rev. Stat. 24:514, thereby subjecting her to discipline. Respondent was ordered suspended without pay for twelve months, with six months deferred conditioned on her filing the requisite sworn annual financial statements for years 2007, 2008, and 2009 within three months of the date of this judgment. Respondent was further ordered to reimburse and pay to the Commission $246.70 in costs. View "In re Justice of the Peace Meyers" on Justia Law

Petitioner was fired from her job at the Indiana Department of Workforce Development for alleged misconduct. After it was discovered that Petitioner kept several items of state property in her possession, Petitioner was charged with theft. The charges were later dismissed. Thereafter, the State filed an ethics proceeding against Petitioner, alleging that she violated 42 Ind. Admin. Code 1-5-12. After an adjudicative hearing, the Indiana State Ethics Commission found that Petitioner did commit the alleged violation and barred her from future State executive branch employment. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision, holding (1) double jeopardy did not bar the proceeding before the Commission, and the criminal court’s probable cause determination was not binding upon the Commission; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the Commission’s determination; and (3) the sanction imposed in this case was within the Commission’s discretion. View "Ind. State Ethics Comm’n v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

In 2009 the doctor was hired by a small rural Wisconsin critical access hospital, as the director of its emergency room. Fired just months after being hired, he sued the hospital in under Title VII, claiming that the hospital had discriminated against him because of his Indian ethnicity. He alleged that a hospital employee said to him “you must be that Middle Eastern guy whom they hired as ER director” and accused him of taking her job, spat at him, and told him he belonged to a terrorist class of people and was a danger to the hospital. Hospital personnel complained to the plaintiff’s superior that he was incompetent—that he had poor patient skills, behaved unprofessionally, misdiagnosed patient ailments, and couldn’t get along with staff. His superior urged him to resign after he had worked only 12 shifts. After delays because the plaintiff initially acted pro se, and filings that were inadequate or nonresponsive, the judge dismissed the case for failure to respond to a motion for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that “the pratfalls of a party’s lawyer are imputed to the party” and that plaintiff offered no excuse for missing the deadline. View "Sheikh v. Grant Reg'l Health Ctr." on Justia Law

In December 1995, Teresa Schmidt slipped and fell while visiting a Tacoma grocery store. She retained Timothy Coogan to represent her in a claim against the store. Just days before the statute of limitations ran, Coogan filed a complaint naming the wrong defendant. He subsequently filed two amended complaints, but the trial court dismissed the case as barred by the statute of limitations. Schmidt filed a complaint against Coogan, asserting claims for negligence and breach of contract. The case went to trial in November 2003, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Schmidt and granted recovery for past economic and noneconomic damages. The trial court granted a new trial on the issue of damages only, finding that Coogan was denied a fair trial: Schmidt's counsel gave an improper closing argument, and the damages were so excessive as to unmistakably indicate that the verdict was the result of passion and prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order granting a new trial. In 2010, Schmidt moved for leave to amend the complaint to add a claim for outrage/reckless infliction of emotional distress, alleging that Coogan harassed, intimidated, and belittled her when she raised the problem of the statute of limitations before it expired. In the 2003 trial, the jury was instructed to determine general damages arising out of Coogan's conduct and malpractice. In the second trial, however, Coogan challenged the availability of general damages in legal malpractice cases. Because her counsel could not find settled authority either affirming or denying the availability of emotional distress damages in Washington, Schmidt sought to add a claim that encompassed the damages. The trial court denied Schmidt's motion to amend. Schmidt also filed a motion for summary judgment on the availability of general damages and a motion in limine. The court denied both motions. After Schmidt rested her case in the damages-only trial, Coogan moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that collectibility was an essential element of legal malpractice and that Schmidt presented no evidence that a judgment against Grocery Outlet would have been collectible. The court denied the motion, and the jury again returned a verdict in favor of Schmidt. Coogan appealed the jury verdict, and Schmidt cross appealed on the ground that general damages are available in attorney malpractice claims and that the trial court erred in denying her motion to amend the complaint. The Court of Appeals concluded that collectibility was an essential component of damages that Schmidt failed to prove, and it reversed the trial court's denial of Coogan's motion. This case presented two issues of first impression for the Supreme Court: (1) whether the elements of legal malpractice include the collectibility of an underlying judgment; and (2) whether emotional distress damages are available in legal malpractice cases. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court's judgment, holding that the uncollectibility of an underlying judgment is an affirmative defense to legal malpractice that defendant-attorneys must plead and prove. Furthermore, the Court held that the trial court properly denied emotional distress damages because Coogan's actions were not particularly egregious, nor was the subject matter personal. View "Schmidt v. Coogan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased FCH stock through Shearson’s broker, Steinberg, between 1987 and 1990. FCH filed for bankruptcy in 1991. Plaintiffs retained the law firm to represent them in claims under the Illinois Securities Law. At that time, they had a viable claim for rescission. The firm failed to serve the required rescission notice. In 1992, plaintiffs hired new counsel to pursue their claims against Shearson, which were later dismissed as time-barred. In 1994 plaintiffs filed a malpractice action against the law firm. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the Illinois Securities Law claim, but reversed as to common law fraud and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. In 2007, plaintiffs settled those claims for $3.2 million. Later, the trial court found the law firm liable and calculated damages: plaintiffs’ $3.2 million settlement would be deducted from the total they paid for their 11 stock purchases, and 10% interest would be calculated on the remaining amount based on the dates of the stock purchases, for a total award of $4,091,752.19 plus attorney fees of $1,636,700.80, and $207,167.28 in costs and expenses. The appellate court affirmed, but remanded for recalculation of damages and attorney fees. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded for calculation of statutory interest damages on the full amount paid for each security from the date of purchase to the 2007 date of settlement, then deducting the $3.2 million recovery.View "Goldfine v. Barack, Ferrazzano, Kirschbaum & Perlman" on Justia Law

From 1989 to 2006, Larry Sax, a certified public accountant, prepared federal and state income tax returns for Plaintiff on behalf of the accounting firm Cohen Burger, Schwartz & Sax, LLC. In 2009, Plaintiff filed a professional malpractice and negligence action against Sax and the accounting firm (collectively, Defendants). Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the applicable three year statute of limitations. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that a genuine issue of material fact did not exist as to whether Defendants’ alleged fraudulent concealment tolled the statute of limitations. The Appellate Court affirmed. Plaintiff appealed, contending that, in connection with a claim of first impression regarding shifting the burden of proving fraudulent concealment in cases involving fiduciaries, the Appellate Court improperly concluded that there was no fiduciary duty under the facts of this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff failed to establish a fiduciary relationship with Defendants, his theory of fraudulent concealment did not serve to toll the three year statute of limitations for torts. View "Iacurci v. Sax" on Justia Law