Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

This matter comes before the court on the recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana that Judge Sheva M. Sims of the Shreveport City Court, Caddo Parish, be suspended without pay for 90 days and ordered to reimburse the Commission's costs. The charge arose from an incident that occurred between Judge Sims and an assistant city prosecutor, Katherine Gilmer, on April 24, 2012, wherein Judge Sims stated that Ms. Gilmer was “held in contempt” of court and then ordered the dismissal of fifteen criminal cases on the docket that day. After reviewing the record and applicable law, the Supreme Court found that the charge against Judge Sims was supported by clear and convincing evidence. However, the Court rejected the recommended discipline and instead ordered Judge Sims be suspended without pay for a period of 30 days. Furthermore, the Court ordered Judge Sims to reimburse the Commission’s costs incurred relative to its investigation and prosecution of this case. View "In re: Judge Sheva M. Sims, Shreveport City Court, Caddo Parish" on Justia Law

In March 2011, the Chief Judge of the Clayton Judicial Circuit, at the request of the Clayton County District Attorney, issued an order authorizing the impaneling of a special purpose grand jury to investigate certain alleged public corruption. The special purpose grand jury issued subpoenas to various witnesses, including appellee John Lampl, who testified before it in June 2011. In July 2011, the special purpose grand jury returned a 16-count bill of indictment against Lampl on charges of conspiracy in restraint of free and open competition, false statements and writings, and perjury. The indictment was subsequently nolle prossed in the aftermath of the Court of Appeals’ holding in "Kenerly v. Georgia," (715 SE2d 688) (2011)), that the authority of a special purpose grand jury is limited to conducting investigations and does not include the power to issue indictments. Shortly thereafter, in September 2011, Lampl was indicted by a regular Clayton County grand jury on eight counts, including one perjury count, similar to those charged in the special purpose grand jury’s initial indictment. The conspiracy and false statements counts all pertain to alleged conduct by Lampl in his capacity as City Manager for the City of Morrow, in connection with a City real estate development project known as "Olde Towne Morrow." The Georgia Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari in this case to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the superior court’s order dismissing a particular count of the indictment and suppressing statements made by the defendant before the special purpose grand jury. While the Supreme Court agreed with the superior court’s conclusion that the special purpose grand jury exceeded the scope of its authority in its investigation, the Court held that the relief granted was improper. The Court therefore reversed. View "Georgia v. Lampl" on Justia Law

Client retained Attorney to handle various legal claims pertaining to the management of a trust. Attorney later came to represent Client and his wife in matters of their own estate planning and administration. Upon Attorney’s advice, Client made loans to both the Attorney’s law firm and to a business from which Attorney received a commission for the referral. Attorney did not make a written disclosure or advise Client to seek independent legal advice regarding these transactions. The loans were never repaid. Client filed a malpractice action against Attorney for breach of fiduciary duty. Judgment was entered in favor of Client. Client subsequently filed an equitable garnishment action against Attorney’s malpractice insurer (Insurer) seeking to recover the judgment under the policy. The trial court granted summary judgment for Insurer, concluding that coverage was excluded under the policy’s “legal representative of investors” exclusionary clause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the facts of this case, the trial court was correct in holding that the exclusionary clause unambiguously excluded coverage for Attorney’s injurious acts and omissions. View "Taylor v. Bar Plan Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Sanowicz and Bacal are licensed real estate salespersons. Sanowicz alleges that he and Bacal agreed to share commissions earned by either of them on certain sales of real property, but that Bacal breached that agreement. The two did share some commissions. The trial court dismissed, based on Business and Professions Code section 10137,4 which provides that it is unlawful for a real estate agent to accept compensation from any person other than the real estate broker under whom he or she is licensed. The court of appeal reversed, holding that licensed real estate agents may agree to share commissions earned under certain circumstances. In stating that an agent may pay commission to another licensee, the Legislature did not limit the payee to a licensed broker; instead it required that any such payment be made “through the broker” thus permitting payments to be made to licensed real estate professionals, whether agents or brokers. View "Sanowicz v. Bacal" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought to bring a legal malpractice claim against his criminal defense attorneys and their respective law firms. The circuit court dismissed the criminal malpractice claim on the grounds that the settlement and release of some defendants by way of a release agreement was a release of all defendants. Plaintiff subsequently filed a legal malpractice suit against the law firm that represented him in the criminal malpractice claim (Defendant), arguing that the firm breached its duty to him. A jury found Defendant liable to Plaintiff and awarded judgment in the amount of $5.75 million. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s denial of Defendant’s second plea in bar, reversed the circuit court’s order affirming the jury award, vacated the jury award, and remanded the case, holding that the circuit court erred in refusing to sustain Defendant’s second plea in bar in which Defendant argued that Plaintiff was barred from recovering on his legal malpractice claim because, as a matter of law, Defendant did not breach its duty by failing to correctly anticipate a judicial ruling on an unsettled legal issue. View "Smith v. McLaughlin" on Justia Law

Tuzzolino and his law firm represented Coletta. Coletta alleged that, in litigation, Tuzzolino failed to timely disclose expert witnesses; failed to retain needed expert witnesses; advised Coletta to settle for an amount far less than Coletta’s losses; told Coletta that negotiations were continuing after dismissal; and signed settlement documents without informing Coletta. According to Coletta, Tuzzolino offered to pay $670,000 to settle any potential malpractice claim, but never paid. Three months later, shortly before the expiration of the firm’s 2007-08 malpractice policy with ISBA Mutual, Tuzzolino completed a renewal application. In response to: “Has any member of the firm become aware of a past or present circumstance(s), act(s), error(s) or omission(s), which may give rise to a claim that has not been reported?” Tuzzolino checked “no.” Mutual issued the policy. Tuzzolino’s partner, Terpinas, learned of Tuzzolino’s malfeasance a month later, when he received a lien letter from Coletta’s attorney. Terpinas reported the claim to Mutual, which sought rescission and other relief. The circuit court entered summary judgment against Tuzzolino and rescinded the policy, finding that Mutual had no duty to defend Terpinas or the firm against Coletta’s action. The appellate court reversed as to Terpinas, citing the common law “innocent insured doctrine.” The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the rescission, citing 215 ILCS 5/154, which allows rescission in cases involving misrepresentations “made by the insured or in his behalf,” with an actual intent to deceive or that “materially affect the acceptance of the risk or hazard assumed by the insurer.” View "Ill. State Bar Ass'n Mut. Ins. Co. v. Law Office of Tuzzolino & Terpinas" on Justia Law

Guam attorney Lujan was sued in two lawsuits in Hawaii, followed by another in California, which could have cost him millions of dollars, loss of reputation, and possibly his license to practice law. He hired a law firm with offices in San Francisco and Guam to represent him, which included filing two more proceedings. The representation generated significant billings about which Lujan complained, refusing to pay a large balance. The firm withdrew from the representation, and sued. A jury returned a verdict for the firm of $945,947.90 “together with its disbursements and costs, including expert witness fees, in the amount of $_____, prevailing party attorneys’ fees as allowed by contract in the amount of $_____, and pre-judgment interest as allowed by contract in the amount of $_____.” The court later awarded $331,545.51 in prejudgment interest. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. The firm filed a memorandum of costs and a motion for attorney fees based on the engagement letter Lujan had signed. Following thousands of pages of briefing and oral argument, the trial court forwarded $1,532,674 in attorney fees, and $123,227 in expert witness fees, based on a Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer. The court of appeal affirmed. View "Calvo, Fisher & Jacob v. Lujan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed an amended petition against two attorneys who prepared documents in connection with the sale of real and personal property, alleging that Defendants negligently performed legal services in negotiating, drafting, and providing legal advice in connection with the documents. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that summary judgment should not have been granted in favor of either attorney because (1) with regard to the first attorney, the district court identified the incorrect date at which Plaintiffs suffered actual damage; and (2) with regard to the second attorney, a fact question remained for trial. View "Vossoughi v. Polaschek" on Justia Law

Spencer stopped paying her mortgage in 2008. In Wisconsin state court foreclosure proceedings, Spencer’s attorney, Nora, adopted an “object-to-everything litigation strategy and buried the state court in a blizzard of motions.” While a hearing on a summary judgment motion was pending in state court, Nora removed the case to federal court. Finding no objectively reasonable basis for removal, the district court remanded the case and awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the lender, 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). The Seventh Circuit dismissed Spencer’s appeal as frivolous; the district court did not order her to pay anything. The court affirmed the award as to Spencer “because she has not offered even a colorable argument that removal was reasonable” and ordered Nora to show cause why she should not be sanctioned for litigating a frivolous appeal. Several months later, noting Nora’s similar behavior in another case, the court imposed an increased sanction of $2,500, suspended until the time, if ever, that Nora submits further inappropriate filings, and directed the clerk of court to forward a copy of the order and earlier opinion to the Office of Lawyer Regulation of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. View "PNC Bank v. Spencer" on Justia Law

HSBC initiated a Wisconsin foreclosure action on the Rinaldi’s mortgage. The Rinaldis counterclaimed, alleging that the mortgage paperwork had been fraudulently altered and that HSBC lacked standing to enforce the mortgage. The Rinaldis lost at summary judgment and did not appeal. The court later vacated its foreclosure judgment after HSBC agreed to modify the loan. The Rinaldis filed a new state lawsuit reasserting their counterclaims. Before the court ruled on the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Rinaldis filed for bankruptcy. In those proceedings, HSBC filed a proof of claim for the mortgage. The Rinaldis objected and filed adversary claims, alleging fraud, abuse of process, tortious interference, breach of contract, and violations of RICO and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The bankruptcy court found in favor of HSBC and recommended denial of the adversarial claims. The district court agreed, noting the Rinaldis’ failure to comply with Federal Rules. The court dismissed the Rinaldis’ adversary claims as meritless and warned that the Rinaldis would face sanctions if they filed additional frivolous filings because their tactics had “vexatious and time- and resource-consuming” and their filings “nigh-unintelligible.” After additional filings of the same type, the Rinaldis voluntarily dismissed their bankruptcy. Their attorney filed additional frivolous motions. The court ordered the attorney to pay $1,000. The Seventh Circuit upheld the sanction. View "Nora v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A." on Justia Law