Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Smith, a California partnership, hired attorney Moncrief to perform due diligence for its purchase of equipment from Texas Hill in Arizona. Texas Hill was represented by Clark, an Arizona attorney. Moncrief performed a UCC search, called Clark, and left a voicemail. Clark called Moncrief in response and represented that Texas Hill was the sole owner of the equipment. Afterwards Clark sent Moncrief an e-mail, stating: “I have been the attorney for Texas Hill . . . and can state unequivocally that the cooling equipment you are buying is free and clear and is owned by Texas Hill.” Based on Clark’s representations, Moncrief advised Smith to go forward with the purchase. Smith later learned that Texas Hill did not own the equipment when they completed the transaction; New York Community Bank had acquired an interest in the equipment. Smith sued Moncrief for legal malpractice. Moncrief cross-complained against Clark. Clark moved to quash service, arguing that California lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The court granted the motion. Clark’s conduct and his intentional misrepresentations were required to close the sale. Clark personally availed himself of the benefits of California when he reached into California to induce Moncrief’s client to complete the purchase. Moncrief’s claims arise out of Clark’s contacts with California. lark has not demonstrated that exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. View "Moncrief v. Clark" on Justia Law

Respondent filed a medical negligence lawsuit alleging that Appellants negligently failed to timely drain Respondent’s prostate abscess, causing the abscess to rupture. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in Respondent’s favor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellants did not preserve for review their argument that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence certain videotaped deposition testimony; (2) the trial court did not err in failing to find that the verdict was excessive due to jury passion and prejudice or because it exceeded fair and reasonable compensation for Respondent’s injuries; and (3) the Court will not address Appellants’ constitutional challenge to Mo. Rev. Stat. 538.300, which prohibits defendants in medical negligence cases from seeking remittitur, because the statutory prohibition in section 538.300 was not implicated in this case. View "Stewart v. Partamian" on Justia Law

Appellant William Foondle appeals the superior court’s dismissal of his claims for legal malpractice against the public defenders who represented him in a criminal case. A grand jury indicted William Foondle for felony driving under the influence (DUI) in 2007. The DUI charge was a felony because Foondle had been convicted of DUI twice in the preceding ten years: once earlier in 2007 and once in North Dakota in 1999. Assistant public defenders Angela O’Brien and Daniel Lord were assigned to defend Foondle. In dismissing Foondle’s malpractice claims, the superior court relied on the public policy principle that precluded criminally convicted plaintiffs from civil recovery based on the alleged negligence of their former defense counsel. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the superior court’s legal analysis was correct, and affirmed the judgment on that basis. Furthermore, the Court rejected, as unsupported, Foondle’s argument that the dismissal violated his rights to due process and access to the courts. View "Foondle v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

When Bloodman withdrew as Haynes’s attorney in a criminal case, the judge ordered her to return discovery material “as soon as possible” and emailed the order, instructing her “to turn over to the United States Attorney’s Office any and all discovery material previously provided her by the Government.” After 20 days, she had not returned the material. The judge issued an order to return it within a week, or risk a show-cause order and sanctions. Bloodman, no longer on the electronic filing system, did not receive the email; the clerk mailed her a hard copy. She still had not returned the material 11 days later. The judge emailed her a show-cause order. Bloodman sent the material the next day via overnight mail, though delivery was delayed due to weather. At the show-cause hearing, Bloodman apologized. She claimed not to receive the second order, the only one to set an exact date and to have had medical issues. The judge did not find bad faith or hold her in contempt, but ordered her to pay $250 for the government’s “time and effort and energy.” The Eighth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Haynes’s criminal case is still pending. View "United States v. Bloodman" on Justia Law

Mark Colafranceschi brought this action for defamation and professional malpractice against Shawn Briley and Ashley Robinson after a magistrate court appointed Robinson to perform child custody evaluations in two separate cases in which Colafranceschi was a party. Colafranceschi was the plaintiff in two actions against the mothers of his children. Robinson was a licensed masters social worker. Briley was a licensed clinical social worker and was Robinson’s supervisor. In both reports in the two cases, Robinson's evaluations (as Colafranceschi's claim suggested) "did not cast him in a positive light." The district court dismissed the action, finding that quasi-judicial immunity barred Colafranceschi’s claims. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Colafranceschi v. Briley" on Justia Law

After Fannie Mae foreclosed upon and acquired the home at issue in this case, Fannie Mae hired Hayman Residential Engineering Services, Inc. to prepare a structural engineering report on the home. Based on the report, Fannie Mae made some of the recommended repairs. Fannie Mae subsequently sold the home to buyers, who then sold the home to Roger and Dorothy Johnson. Thereafter, the Johnsons discovered that the estimated cost of making all necessary repairs to the home exceeded its value. The Johnsons filed a professional negligence claim against Hayman. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Hayman, concluding that Hayman did not owe the Johnsons a duty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Hayman did not owe a professional duty to the Johnsons because they did not suffer a foreseeable harm stemming from Hayman’s alleged negligence, and therefore, a professional negligence claim could not be established. View "Johnson v. Hayman & Assocs., Inc." on Justia Law

Georgia citizen George Skipper was involved in a motor vehicle accident with a logging truck that was driven by Harold Moors and owned by Specialty Logging, LLC. Specialty had a commercial automobile insurance policy with a $1,000,000 per occurrence limit, which was issued by ACE Property and Casualty Insurance Company (ACE). Following the accident, Skipper retained an attorney who wrote a demand letter to ACE offering to settle the case for the limits of the Policy. ACE retained two lawyers from Atlanta, Brantley Rowlen and Erin Coia, to represent Specialty and Moors. Specialty and Moors offered Skipper $50,000. Not satisfied with that offer, Skipper and his wife filed a lawsuit in the Allendale County Court of Common Pleas against Specialty and Moors. Unbeknownst to ACE or its attorneys, the Skippers entered into a settlement with Specialty and Moors, agreeing to execute a Confession of Judgment for $4,500,000, in which they admitted liability for the Skippers' injuries and losses. The Specialty Parties also agreed to pursue a legal malpractice claim against ACE and its attorneys Rowlen and Coia, and assigned the predominant interest in that claim to the Skippers.1 In exchange for the Specialty Parties' admission of liability, the Skippers agreed not to execute the judgment as long as the Specialty Parties cooperated in the legal malpractice litigation against Defendants. Armed with the assignment, the Skippers and Specialty Parties filed a legal malpractice action against the attorneys, also with the Allendale County court. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. In federal court, ACE and its attorneys argued that the assignment of the malpractice claim was invalid and that the Skippers had no valid claims to assert. Because the question of whether a legal malpractice claim could be assigned between adversaries in litigation in which the alleged malpractice arose was a novel question in South Carolina, the South Carolina Supreme Court accepted a certified question South Carolina law from the federal district court. After review, the South Carolina Court held that in South Carolina, the assignment of a legal malpractice claim between adversaries in litigation in which the alleged malpractice arose was prohibited. View "Skipper v. ACE Property" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured while working at a paper mill. Plaintiff hired Defendant, an attorney, to represent her in her workers’ compensation claim. The Workers’ Compensation Board awarded Plaintiff, still represented by Defendant, partial incapacity benefits. Plaintiff later settled with her employer. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint against Defendant, alleging that, due to Defendant’s failure to exercise due care and negligence, she was awarded partial incapacity benefits rather than total incapacity benefits. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was correctly granted where the jury could not assess damages without resorting to speculation. View "Allen v. McCann" on Justia Law

"This is a case of egregious attorney misconduct." Because of the cumulative effect of the attorney's misconduct, the Court of Appeal felt compelled to reverse the judgment she obtained on behalf of her client, Caltrans. "While Judge Di Cesare showed the patience of Job – usually a virtue in a judge – that patience here had the effect of favoring one side over the other. He allowed [the attorney] to emphasize irrelevant and inflammatory points concerning the plaintiff's character so often that he effectively gave CalTrans an unfair advantage." View "Martinez v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

Bell established mutual funds, raised $2.5 billion, and invested in vehicles managed by Petters, who said that he was financing Costco’s electronics inventory. Instead he was running a Ponzi scheme, which collapsed in 2008. The scheme involved a claim that money lent to Petters entities was secured by Costco’s inventory and that repayment was ensured by a “lockbox” arrangement under which Costco would make payments into accounts that the Funds (not Petters) controlled. Petters insisted that the Funds not contact Costco, to avoid upsetting his favorable business relations. Bell and Petters went to prison for fraud. The Funds’ trustee in bankruptcy filed multiple suits. The district court dismissed a claim of legal malpractice. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Even if Bell was determined to do business with Petters, the Fund’s lawyers ould have explained how to structure the transactions in a less risky way, and if Petters refused to cooperate then Bell might have reconsidered lending the Funds’ money. The Trustee alleges that the firm did not offer any advice about how relative risks correspond to different legal devices, and its complaint states a legally recognized claim. Whether the law firm has a defense, and whether any neglect on its part caused injury, are subjects for the district court. View "Peterson v. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP" on Justia Law