Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Lattimore brought a wrongful death action against two doctors and Salinas Valley Memorial Healthcare arising from their care and treatment of Yvonne’s father, who had gone to the hospital for a blood transfusion, experienced gastrointestinal bleeding, and died. The trial court granted defendants summary judgment. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the declaration of Lattimore’s medical expert was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact on whether treatment of her father violated the applicable standards of care applicable to physicians and surgeons. However, the medical expert declaration did not raise a triable issue of fact on the standard of care applicable to nurses and hospitals in general. View "Lattimore v. Dickey" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a failed development project undertaken by BRN Development, Inc. in Coeur d’Alene. The project was for the development of a high-end 325-unit residential and golf course community on the west side of Lake Coeur d'Alene known as "Black Rock North." American Bank was the lender for this project. The Bank ultimately brought a foreclosure action against BRN. BRN brought a cross-claim against Taylor Engineering, Inc., alleging negligence for its role in the development. Taylor recorded a lien against the development. BRN defaulted on the loan, and the Bank named BRN, Taylor, and any other entity claiming an interest in the development. Taylor made a demand on BRN for payment for services rendered. The demand stated that Taylor would "complete the necessary documents" and request the necessary signatures from the local government entities involved in the final PUD approval. Taylor advised BRN that "if the final subdivision approval is not completed and recorded by May 29, 2009, the PUD and preliminary plat approval will expire, the PUD and plat will not vest in the recorded ownership to the real property involved, and the property will revert to its prior zoning and density." This statement was erroneous; it was undisputed that the final plat did not need to be recorded by May 29 in order to vest the PUD. In BRN's cross-claim against Taylor, it alleged professional negligence, negligent and intentional misrepresentation, and failure to disclose based on the erroneous statement Taylor made in its demand letter. The district court separated the claims between Taylor and BRN from the remainder of the American Bank litigation and ultimately held that Taylor was not liable to BRN. BRN appealed. The Supreme Court found no reversible error with the district court's judgment that BRN failed to meet its burden of proving its claims against Taylor, and affirmed that court's judgment. View "American Bank v. BRN Dev." on Justia Law

After the merger of NationsBank and BankAmerica, shareholders filed class actions alleging violations of securities laws. The district court appointed Oetting as lead plaintiff and the Green law firm, as lead counsel. The litigation resulted in a $333 million settlement for the NationsBank class. The Eighth Circuit affirmed approval of the settlement over Oetting’s objection. On the recommendation of Green, the court appointed Heffler as claims administrator. A Heffler employee conspired to submit false claims, resulting in fraudulent payment of $5.87 million. The court denied Green leave to file a supplemental complaint against Heffler. Oetting filed a separate action against Heffler that is pending. After distributions, $2.4 million remained. Green moved for distribution cy pres and requested an additional award of $98,114.34 in attorney’s fees for post-settlement work. Oetting opposed both, argued that Green should disgorge fees for abandoning the class, and filed a separate class action, alleging malpractice by negligently hiring and failing to supervise Heffler and abandonment of the class. The court granted Green’s motion for a cy pres distribution and for a supplemental fee award and denied disgorgement. The Eighth Circuit reversed the cy pres award, ordering additional distribution to the class, and vacated the supplemental fee award as premature. The district court then dismissed the malpractice complaint, concluding that Oetting lacked standing. The Eighth Circuit affirmed that collateral estoppel precluded the rejected disgorgement and class-abandonment claims; pendency of an appeal did not suspend preclusive effects. View "Oetting v. Norton" on Justia Law

Matthew and Caralynn Fonder purchased a home and obtained a mortgage from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Wells Fargo selected Wells Fargo Insurance, Inc. Flood Services (WFFS) to conduct a flood hazard determination on the Fonders’ home. WFFS determined the home was not in a special flood hazard area, and therefore, the Bank did not require the Fonders to obtain flood insurance. A flood later destroyed the Fonders’ home. Wells Fargo later filed a complaint to foreclose on the Fonders’ home. The Fonders cross-claimed against WFFS seeking to recover damages sustained a result of their reliance on WFFS’s erroneous flood determination. The circuit court dismissed the cross-claim for failure to state a claim and dismissed the Fonders’ motion to amend their third-party complaint to assert a claim of negligent misrepresentation on the grounds that WFFS did not owe the Fonders a duty. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred when it dismissed the Fonders’ claims for professional negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress but did not err in dismissing the Fonders’ breach-of-fiduciary duty claim; and (2) upon remand, the Fonders may amend their cross-claim to include negligent misrepresentation. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Fonder" on Justia Law

Amber Johnson filed suit against her closing attorney, Stanley Alexander, arguing he breached his duty of care by failing to discover the house Johnson purchased had been sold at a tax sale the previous year. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Johnson as to Alexander's liability. On appeal, the court of appeals held Alexander could not be held liable as a matter of law simply because the attorney he hired to perform the title work may have been negligent. Instead, the court determined the relevant inquiry was "whether Alexander acted with reasonable care in relying on [another attorney's] title search"; accordingly, it reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals: even absent Alexander's admissions, the Court found it was error to equate delegation of a task with delegation of liability. The Court therefore agreed with Johnson that an attorney was liable for negligence in tasks he delegates absent some express limitation of his representation. Applying this standard to the facts, the Court found the grant of summary judgment was proper because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to liability. The case was remanded back to the trial court for a determination of damages. View "Johnson v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Amber Johnson filed suit against her closing attorney, Stanley Alexander, arguing he breached his duty of care by failing to discover the house Johnson purchased had been sold at a tax sale the previous year. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Johnson as to Alexander's liability. On appeal, the court of appeals held Alexander could not be held liable as a matter of law simply because the attorney he hired to perform the title work may have been negligent. Instead, the court determined the relevant inquiry was "whether Alexander acted with reasonable care in relying on [another attorney's] title search"; accordingly, it reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals: even absent Alexander's admissions, the Court found it was error to equate delegation of a task with delegation of liability. The Court therefore agreed with Johnson that an attorney was liable for negligence in tasks he delegates absent some express limitation of his representation. Applying this standard to the facts, the Court found the grant of summary judgment was proper because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to liability. The case was remanded back to the trial court for a determination of damages. View "Johnson v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Taylor was injured while attempting to secure a vehicle on a Cottrell car-hauling trailer. Dr. Odor operated on Taylor to complete a two-level cervical fusion. More than two years later, Taylor was again injured when he fell approximately 10 feet from a Cottrell trailer. He was taken to the emergency room and was discharged home with pain medication. The same month, Taylor reported to Dr. Odor with neck and back pain. After testing, Dr. Odor observed several disc protrusions and a disc desiccation. These injuries led to another complex spinal surgery with Dr. Odor, the cost of which exceeded $450,000. Two weeks before trial Cottrell claimed it had uncovered copies of agreements between Taylor's counsel and Dr. Odor which evidenced an impermissible contingent-fee agreement. The court found there was a contingency agreement and excluded Odor’s testimony as an expert witness, dismissed claims for Taylor's neck and back injuries, and stayed claims related to shoulder injuries. The Eighth Circuit reversed; the district court failed to articulate the precise interest Odor had in the outcome of the litigation and failed to explain why any such interest overcomes the general rule that Odor's bias and credibility should be resolved by the jury. View "Taylor v. Cottrell, Inc." on Justia Law

Taylor was injured while attempting to secure a vehicle on a Cottrell car-hauling trailer. Dr. Odor operated on Taylor to complete a two-level cervical fusion. More than two years later, Taylor was again injured when he fell approximately 10 feet from a Cottrell trailer. He was taken to the emergency room and was discharged home with pain medication. The same month, Taylor reported to Dr. Odor with neck and back pain. After testing, Dr. Odor observed several disc protrusions and a disc desiccation. These injuries led to another complex spinal surgery with Dr. Odor, the cost of which exceeded $450,000. Two weeks before trial Cottrell claimed it had uncovered copies of agreements between Taylor's counsel and Dr. Odor which evidenced an impermissible contingent-fee agreement. The court found there was a contingency agreement and excluded Odor’s testimony as an expert witness, dismissed claims for Taylor's neck and back injuries, and stayed claims related to shoulder injuries. The Eighth Circuit reversed; the district court failed to articulate the precise interest Odor had in the outcome of the litigation and failed to explain why any such interest overcomes the general rule that Odor's bias and credibility should be resolved by the jury. View "Taylor v. Cottrell, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging claims for breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, and legal malpractice, and defendants moved to strike the entire complaint as to the individual plaintiffs Klotz and Spitz because defendants had no independent legal duty to plaintiffs nor did they act for their personal financial gain. Plaintiffs alleged that a former business associate of theirs, Stephen Bruce, who was a client of defendants, conspired with defendants to unlawfully withdraw from plaintiff SageMill and to usurp a nascent business opportunity of SageMill. The trial court denied the motion. The court reversed the trial court‘s order on plaintiffs‘ second cause of action for conspiracy as to the individual plaintiffs Klotz and Spitz, finding that any advice defendants gave Bruce arose from an attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute, and thus was within the ambit of section 1714.10. The court affirmed as to the remaining claims. View "Klotz v. Milbank,Tweed, Hadley & McCloy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging claims for breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, and legal malpractice, and defendants moved to strike the entire complaint as to the individual plaintiffs Klotz and Spitz because defendants had no independent legal duty to plaintiffs nor did they act for their personal financial gain. Plaintiffs alleged that a former business associate of theirs, Stephen Bruce, who was a client of defendants, conspired with defendants to unlawfully withdraw from plaintiff SageMill and to usurp a nascent business opportunity of SageMill. The trial court denied the motion. The court reversed the trial court‘s order on plaintiffs‘ second cause of action for conspiracy as to the individual plaintiffs Klotz and Spitz, finding that any advice defendants gave Bruce arose from an attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute, and thus was within the ambit of section 1714.10. The court affirmed as to the remaining claims. View "Klotz v. Milbank,Tweed, Hadley & McCloy" on Justia Law