Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Steven M. Hohn, the defendant, was convicted of multiple drug and firearm charges. While awaiting trial, he was detained at CoreCivic, where the Kansas U.S. Attorney’s Office (Kansas USAO) obtained and listened to his attorney-client phone calls. Hohn later discovered this and filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition to vacate his judgment or reduce his sentence, arguing that the government’s intrusion violated his Sixth Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas denied Hohn’s § 2255 petition. The court found that Hohn did not have a reasonable expectation of confidentiality in his attorney-client call because he knew the call would be recorded and did not follow the proper steps to privatize it. The court also concluded that Hohn waived the attorney-client privilege by making the call despite knowing it would be recorded. Consequently, the court did not reach a direct Sixth Amendment analysis, as it determined that the privilege was a necessary underpinning of Hohn’s Sixth Amendment right.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case en banc. The court overruled its precedent in Shillinger v. Haworth, which had established a structural-error rule presuming prejudice when the government intentionally intrudes into the attorney-client relationship without a legitimate law-enforcement purpose. The Tenth Circuit held that a Sixth Amendment violation of the right to confidential communication with an attorney requires the defendant to show prejudice. Since Hohn conceded that he suffered no prejudice from the prosecution’s obtaining and listening to his six-minute call with his attorney, his claim failed. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision denying Hohn’s § 2255 petition. View "United States v. Hohn" on Justia Law

Patricia Burnette Chastain was appointed as the clerk of superior court in Franklin County in May 2013 and was subsequently elected to the position in November 2013 and reelected in 2017. In July 2020, an attorney named Jeffrey Thompson filed an affidavit requesting an inquiry into Ms. Chastain's conduct, alleging various instances of misconduct, including distributing gift certificates to jurors, allowing a judicial candidate to address a jury, and acting unprofessionally with correctional officers, among other allegations.Judge John M. Dunlow initially suspended Ms. Chastain and set a hearing date. However, due to a conflict of interest, Judge Dunlow and another judge were recused, and Judge Thomas H. Lock was appointed to preside over the removal inquiry. After an evidentiary hearing, Judge Lock issued an order in October 2020 permanently removing Ms. Chastain from her position based on findings of willful misconduct. Ms. Chastain appealed, and the Court of Appeals vacated the order, holding that Judge Lock lacked authority under Article IV of the North Carolina Constitution to remove her and remanded the case for reconsideration under Article VI.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that Judge Lock had the authority to preside over the removal proceeding as a replacement for the recused senior regular resident superior court judge. The court also held that procedural due process requires that removal be based only on conduct identified in the initiating affidavit. Furthermore, the court clarified that the standard for removal under Article IV is "misconduct," not "willful misconduct." The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for reconsideration of removal under the proper standards. The court also noted that discretionary review was improvidently allowed regarding the procedure for disqualification under Article VI. View "In re Chastain" on Justia Law

Jaimen Anthony Scott Aisenbrey pled guilty to two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver as part of a plea agreement. The agreement stipulated that the State would not argue against probation if the presentence investigation (PSI) recommended it. The PSI recommended a split sentence, but at sentencing, the State requested incarceration. The district court sentenced Aisenbrey to concurrent terms of eight to ten years in prison. Aisenbrey appealed, claiming the State breached the plea agreement and that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the State's recommendation.The District Court of Platte County accepted Aisenbrey's guilty plea and the plea agreement terms. However, at sentencing, the State argued for incarceration despite the PSI's split sentence recommendation. Aisenbrey's counsel did not object to this recommendation. The district court imposed the prison sentence as requested by the State.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the State did not breach the plea agreement because a split sentence, which includes a period of confinement, is not equivalent to probation, which does not involve confinement. Therefore, the State's recommendation for incarceration did not violate the plea agreement. The court also found that Aisenbrey's counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the State's recommendation, as there was no breach of the plea agreement to object to. The court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Aisenbrey v. State" on Justia Law

Allison J. Littlefield filed a verified petition against Scott Littlefield, David Littlefield, and Denise Sobel, who are co-trustees of The Pony Tracks Ranch Trust and its sub-trusts. The petition alleged misuse of Trust funds, concealment of information, conversion of Allison’s personal property, wrongful removal of Allison from the board, and imposition of restrictions on her and her husband’s use of the Ranch. Allison sought removal of the co-trustees, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the Trust, and declaratory and injunctive relief, including an order enjoining the co-trustees from harassing, disparaging, or defaming her.The San Mateo County Superior Court denied the co-trustees' special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that the co-trustees failed to show that Allison’s petition arose from protected activity. The court also denied Allison’s request for attorney’s fees, finding that the anti-SLAPP motion was not frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the anti-SLAPP motion, agreeing that the co-trustees did not meet their burden of showing that the petition arose from protected activity. The court found that the co-trustees’ motion was overreaching and did not identify specific allegations of protected activity. The court reversed the trial court’s denial of Allison’s request for attorney’s fees, determining that the anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous because no reasonable attorney would conclude that the motion had merit. The case was remanded for a determination of the appropriate award of attorney’s fees for Allison. View "Littlefield v. Littlefield" on Justia Law

Minority partners in various cellular telephone partnerships hired attorney Michael A. Pullara to pursue breach of fiduciary duty claims against the majority partner, AT&T. The client agreements allowed Pullara to hire joint venture counsel, and he retained Ajamie LLP. Both firms agreed to a 50% discount on their hourly rates in exchange for a contingency fee if they prevailed. After lengthy litigation, the minority partners reached a favorable settlement with AT&T. However, a dispute arose between Pullara and Ajamie over the fee division, leading Ajamie to file for a charging lien to secure its fee.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware granted a charging lien to preserve Ajamie’s claim against the settlement proceeds. Ajamie then sought to enforce the lien. The court held that the fee-sharing agreement between Pullara and Ajamie was unenforceable under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct because the clients had not consented to the specific terms of the fee-sharing arrangement. However, the court ruled that Ajamie was still entitled to reasonable compensation under the principle of quantum meruit.The court calculated Ajamie’s lodestar at $13,178,616.78, based on market rates adjusted annually. Considering the Mahani factors, the court found that an upward adjustment was warranted due to the complexity and duration of the litigation, the significant results obtained, and the partially contingent nature of the fee arrangement. The court awarded Ajamie a total fee of $15,814,340.14, including a 20% increase for the contingency risk. After deducting amounts already paid, Ajamie was awarded $13,014,721.87 plus pre- and post-judgment interest. The court ordered the escrow agent to release this amount to Ajamie. View "Cellular Telephone Company Litigation cases" on Justia Law

Hamzah Ali, a legal immigrant from Yemen and Dubai, retained Azhar Chaudhary as his attorney in February 2017 and paid him $810,000 over three months. Chaudhary claimed this was a nonrefundable retainer, while Ali asserted it was for hourly billing. The bankruptcy court found that Chaudhary did little work of value for Ali and that much of his testimony was false. Ali fired Chaudhary in October 2017 and later learned from another attorney that most of Chaudhary’s advice was misleading or false.Ali sued Chaudhary and his law firm in Texas state court in 2018 for breach of contract, quantum meruit, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, negligence, and gross negligence. In October 2021, Riverstone Resort, an entity owned by Chaudhary, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. In May 2022, Ali sued Chaudhary, his law firm, and Riverstone in bankruptcy court, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment, and seeking a constructive trust over Riverstone’s property. The bankruptcy court dismissed Ali’s claims against Chaudhary and his firm, citing lack of jurisdiction or abstention, and granted a take-nothing judgment for Riverstone based on the statute of limitations.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed all appeals and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s judgment. Ali appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the bankruptcy court erred in not equitably tolling the statute of limitations and that Chaudhary had fraudulently concealed his cause of action.The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeals of Chaudhary, his law firm, and Riverstone, as they were not aggrieved parties. The court reversed the district court’s judgment in favor of Riverstone and remanded the case to the bankruptcy court to consider whether equitable tolling should apply due to Chaudhary’s alleged misconduct. View "Azhar Chaudhary Law v. Ali" on Justia Law

Two Connecticut attorneys, Mario Cerame and Timothy Moynahan, challenged Connecticut Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(7), which prohibits harassment or discrimination by lawyers based on fifteen protected categories. They argued that the rule violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments by imposing content-based and viewpoint-based restrictions on speech and being unconstitutionally vague. They claimed that the rule's broad language could potentially sanction their speech on controversial topics, thus chilling their First Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dismissed their complaint, ruling that Cerame and Moynahan lacked standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge. The court found that they did not demonstrate a "real and imminent fear" of enforcement under Rule 8.4(7) and that their allegations were too general to establish a credible threat of enforcement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Cerame and Moynahan have standing to seek pre-enforcement relief. The court held that they had sufficiently alleged an intention to engage in conduct arguably proscribed by Rule 8.4(7) and faced a credible threat of enforcement. The court noted that the rule's broad language and the lack of clear guidelines for enforcement created a substantial risk of disciplinary action, which was sufficient to establish an injury in fact. Consequently, the Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to consider whether the Eleventh Amendment bars the plaintiffs' claims. View "Cerame v. Slack" on Justia Law

In July 2009, veteran John H. Casey filed a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) with the VA challenging the denial of service connection for disabilities. In June 2010, Robert Goss entered into a contingent fee agreement with Casey, agreeing to represent him in his pursuit of benefits from the VA and receive twenty percent of any past-due benefits awarded. Goss filed the necessary forms with the VA, and in January 2011, Casey terminated their attorney-client relationship. Despite this, the VA awarded past-due benefits to Casey in September 2011 and February 2012, and paid Goss twenty percent of these benefits. Casey challenged the payment of fees to Goss, arguing that Goss did not perform any work on his case.The VA issued a Statement of the Case (SOC) denying Casey’s challenge, and Casey appealed to the Board of Veterans Appeals (Board). The Board remanded the case to the VA Regional Office (RO) three times, instructing the RO to request an itemized account of Goss’s work to determine the reasonableness of the fees. Goss refused to provide this information, and the RO repeatedly denied Casey’s claim without providing full reasons and bases. In November 2020, the Board found the twenty percent fee unreasonable, as Goss had not contributed significantly to the case, and Casey’s NOD was filed before Goss’s appointment.Goss appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the Board lacked jurisdiction over the reasonableness of the fee award. The VA initially opposed but later conceded this point. The Veterans Court accepted the VA’s concession, vacated the Board’s decision on reasonableness, and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Goss then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The Federal Circuit reversed the Veterans Court’s decision, holding that the Board did have jurisdiction to review the reasonableness of the fee award. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this determination. View "Goss v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Niv Goomai and Bar Hajbi purchased a property in Cincinnati and contracted with H&E Enterprise, L.L.C., Ohad Investment Group, and Avi Ohad for renovations. The renovations were not completed, leading Goomai to sell the property. Goomai then sued the defendants for breach of contract, violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and fraudulent misrepresentation, seeking actual damages but not injunctive relief.A jury trial was held before a magistrate, where the jury found that H&E had breached its contract and awarded Goomai $30,604.09 in damages. The jury also found that H&E and Ohad had engaged in deceptive trade practices but awarded $0 in damages for this violation. The jury ruled in favor of the defendants on the fraudulent misrepresentation claim. Goomai subsequently filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs, which the magistrate denied, reasoning that Goomai did not qualify as a prevailing party under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act since they did not obtain any relief on the merits of their claim. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision, and Goomai appealed.The First District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that a prevailing party under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act is one who obtains a judgment in their favor, regardless of whether they received a remedy. The court remanded the case to the trial court to determine the amount of attorney’s fees to which Goomai was entitled.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and concluded that to be a prevailing party under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, a plaintiff must obtain actual damages or injunctive relief. Since Goomai did not receive any monetary damages or injunctive relief, they were not considered prevailing parties. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment denying attorney’s fees. View "Goomai v. H&E Enterprise, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The case involves a medical malpractice suit brought by the parents of a stillborn child against the midwives who attended the birth. The plaintiffs alleged that the midwives failed to obtain informed consent for delivery by midwife at a birth center instead of by a physician at a hospital. They claimed the midwives did not disclose the risks associated with midwife delivery for an expectant mother of advanced maternal age with a history of miscarriage. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the midwives, ruling that the plaintiffs failed to present evidence that midwife delivery caused the stillbirth.The superior court found that the plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence to establish proximate cause, a necessary element in informed consent claims. The court noted that the plaintiffs needed to show both that they would not have consented to the treatment if properly informed and that the treatment caused the injury. The midwives presented expert testimony indicating that their care did not cause the stillbirth, and the plaintiffs failed to rebut this with their own expert evidence.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court's summary judgment in favor of the midwives. The court held that the plaintiffs did not present admissible evidence to dispute the midwives' expert opinion that the stillbirth was caused by an infection unrelated to the midwives' care. The court also affirmed the superior court's award of enhanced attorney’s fees to the midwives, finding that the plaintiffs engaged in vexatious or bad faith conduct during the litigation. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' failure to provide necessary expert testimony on causation was fatal to their claims. View "Goodwin v. Mat-Su Midwifery, Inc." on Justia Law