Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Board issued an administrative investigative subpoena seeking complete, certified records of three of plaintiff's patients on the grounds that there was good cause to believe that plaintiff departed from the standard of care in connection with the treatment of those patients. Plaintiff's petitions to quash the subpoena were denied, and the Board’s petition to compel compliance was granted in part, with the limitation that the records to be provided should be limited by time period. The court concluded that the Board had pointed out specific instances of prescribing irregularities, which were sufficient for a finding of good cause; substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding of good cause; and there is no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that Dr. Pollak was qualified to render an expert opinion in this matter. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to convince the court that, if the evidence of medical records at issue was obtained in violation of Civil Code section 56.26, the Board was not permitted to use it in the investigation. While the trial court may not have specifically stated it was engaging in a balancing test, the long discussion of good cause shows careful consideration of the patients’ right to privacy versus the state’s interest in safeguarding its citizens from negligent medical care. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's claim that the subpoena was overbroad where the trial court did not err in failing to modify the subpoena in more ways than it already did in applying time restrictions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fett v Medical Bd. of CA" on Justia Law

Jorgenson & Koka, LLP (J&K) filed this professional negligence action against the Nevada Department of Transportation (NDOT) and real parties in interest PWREO Eastern and St. Rose LLC (collectively, PWREO) and the City of Henderson. J&K, which leased a portion of a shopping center owned by PWREO, alleging that water entered its premises on two separate occasions and that NDOT failed to prevent the flooding. PWREO filed a cross-claim against NDOT and the City. NDOT moved to dismiss the amended complaint and the cross-claim for failure to comply with the mandatory filing requirements of Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.258. The district court denied the motions. This petition for writ relief followed. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that NDOT is not a design professional as envisioned by the legislature in Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.2565(1)(a), and therefore, the requirements of section 11.258 are inapplicable to NDOT since the action would not statutorily qualify as “an action involving nonresidential construction.” View "Nev. Dep’t of Transp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Jesse's father, Crow, a retired physician, was aware that Jesse had a history of fights and arrests, including brandishing a gun on the highway. Crow first met Ryann after she married Jesse and saw her fewer than 10 times. Once, Crow went to their house and found the couple intoxicated. Ryann was in pain and stated that her foot had been run over by a stranger. Crow’s wife arranged for Ryann to see Dr. Williams. Ryann’s injuries were consistent with her explanation. Ryann did not mention abuse. Ryann’s mother, Pipitone, later learned that Jesse had run over Ryann’s foot. Jesse, with help from Crow, paid Ryann $5,000. Ryann signed an agreement, stating that the incident was an accident; Pipitone signed as a witness. Pipitone eventually reported the abuse to the police. Ryann’s sister also reported. Ryann was not cooperative. Ryann admitted that Jesse had deliberately run her over, that she felt threatened, and that he had “guns and a lot of illegal things.” Six months after their marriage Jesse murdered Ryann, and with assistance, dismembered and dumped her body into the San Francisco Bay. Jesse committed suicide in jail. Pipitone brought a wrongful death action against Doctors Crow and Williams for failure to report suspected abuse under Penal Code 11160. The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment, on grounds of duty and causation. The court of appeal affirmed. View "Pipitone v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendants Chaim Woolf and Steven Camhi were attorneys who represented plaintiffs in a prior civil action. They appealed an order granting plaintiffs' motion to set aside the dismissal of a legal malpractice action. The court dismissed the case after plaintiffs Michael Younessi and Alea Investments, LLC failed to timely file an amended complaint in response to an order sustaining demurrers to the original complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiffs filed motions to dismiss the appeal, for relief from default in failing to file a respondents' brief, and for judicial notice. The Court of Appeals denied plaintiffs' motions. But the Court "reluctantly" affirmed the trial court's order vacating the dismissal: while the evidence did not support granting relief for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, since the dismissal resulted from plaintiffs' newly retained attorney's failure to oppose the demurrers and timely file an amended complaint, plaintiffs were entitled to relief under Code Civ. Proc. section 473, subdivision (b)'s attorney-fault provision. View "Younessi v. Woolf" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued his former criminal defense attorneys for legal malpractice, alleging that they allowed him to plead guilty to a crime that lacked a factual basis. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the attorneys on the basis that Plaintiff could not show he was actually innocent of any offense that formed the basis for the underlying criminal case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a criminal defendant’s showing of actual innocence is not a prerequisite to bringing a legal malpractice against his or her former criminal defense attorney. Instead, innocence or guilt should be taken into account when determining whether the traditional elements of a legal malpractice claim have been established. Remanded. View "Barker v. Capotosto" on Justia Law

The Arkansas State Medical Board found Dr. Mahmood Ahmad in violation of the Arkansas Medical Practices Act. While Ahmad’s administrative appeal was pending in the circuit court, Ahmad filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Board and the Board’s chairman (collectively, the Board), alleging that portions of the Chronic Intractable Pain Treatment Act and certain Board regulations were unconstitutional. The Board moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that, because Ahmad’s exclusive remedy was an administrative appeal of the Board’s order, Ahmad’s complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief was barred as a matter of law. Ahmad responded by filing a motion for temporary restraining order seeking an order prohibiting the Board from pursuing any administrative action against him until both his administrative appeal and his declaratory and injunctive action were concluded. The circuit court granted the Board’s motion to dismiss and denied Ahmad’s motion for a restraining order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in dismissing Ahmad’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (2) the circuit court did not err in denying, on jurisdictional grounds, Ahmad’s request for a temporary restraining order. View "Ahmad v. Beck" on Justia Law

Defendant, an attorney, represented Plaintiff in post-final judgment divorce proceedings. Defendant later withdrew as counsel with the family court’s approval. Three years later, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant, alleging legal malpractice, negligence, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty. The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendant on each of Plaintiff’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff’s legal malpractice and fraud claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and the trial justice did not err in concluding that the discovery rule did not toll the statute of limitations; (2) Plaintiff’s malpractice claims necessarily failed because she did not retain an expert witness to testify in support of her case; and (3) Plaintiff’s remaining claims on appeal were wholly without merit. View "Behroozi v. Kirshenbaum" on Justia Law

Sheppard Mullin, J-M's former attorneys, sought recovery of attorney fees relating to litigation in which Sheppard Mullin represented J-M. Sheppard Mullin was disqualified from that litigation because, without obtaining informed consent from either client, Sheppard Mullin represented J-M, the defendant in the litigation, while simultaneously representing a plaintiff in that case, South Tahoe. The trial court ordered the case to arbitration based on the parties’ written engagement agreement, and a panel of arbitrators found that the agreement was not illegal, denied J-M’s request for disgorgement of fees paid, and ordered J-M to pay Sheppard Mullin’s outstanding fees. The trial court confirmed the award. The court concluded that, under California law, because J-M challenged the legality of the entire agreement, the issue of illegality was for the trial court, rather than the arbitrators, to decide. The court further concluded that the undisputed facts establish that Sheppard Mullin violated the requirements of California Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3-310 by simultaneously representing J-M and South Tahoe. Sheppard Mullin failed to disclose the conflict to either J-M or South Tahoe, and it failed to obtain the informed written consent of either client to the conflict. The representation of both parties without informed written consent is contrary to California law and contravenes the public policy embodied in Rule 3-310. Therefore, the trial court erred by enforcing the contract between the parties and entering judgment on the arbitration award based on that contract. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. The court remanded for factual findings on the issue of disgorgement of all fees paid to Sheppard Mullin. View "Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton v. J-M Manufacturing Co." on Justia Law

James Kelly, as trustee of the Beverly Snodgrass Clark Inter Vivos 1999 Separate Property Trust, sued Barbara J. Orr, Joseph Holland, Gretchen Shaffer, and DLA Piper LLP (US) (Defendants) for professional negligence in relation to legal advice they provided to his predecessor trustee of the Trust. Defendants demurred on statute of limitations grounds, arguing his action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6. The trial court sustained Defendants' demurrer without leave to amend, and Kelly filed a timely notice of appeal. On review of the matter, the Court of Appeal concluded the statute of limitations was tolled under section 340.6, subdivision (a)(2), until March 22, 2013, the date Kelly alleged Defendants ceased representation of Kelly's predecessor trustee. Because Kelly filed suit on February 27, 2014, less than one year after Defendants ceased representation of the predecessor trustee, the Court of Appeal concluded Kelly's action was not time-barred. The Court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kelly v. Orr" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants, attorneys Eric Turton and Oscar Gonzalez and the Law Office of Oscar C. Gonzalez, alleging that they misappropriated $75,000 in trust funds that Turton received after settling a case on Plaintiff’s behalf. The jury found that all three defendants were engaged in a joint enterprise and a joint venture with respect to Plaintiff’s case and committed various torts in relation to Plaintiff. In response to a proportionate-responsibility question, the jury assigned forty percent to Turton, thirty percent to Gonzalez, and thirty percent to the Law Office. The trial court entered judgment holding all three defendants jointly and severally liable for actual damages, pre-judgment interest, additional Texas Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act damages, and attorney’s fees. Gonzalez and the Law Office appealed. The court of appeals concluded that Plaintiff could only recover for professional negligence, which amounted to $77,500 in actual damages. The court’s opinion did not address the jury’s proportionate-responsibility findings but nonetheless applied those findings in its judgment, ordering Gonzalez and the Law Firm to each pay Sloan $23,250. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred by failing to address the sufficiency of the evidence of a joint enterprise or joint venture or the legal implications of those findings. Remanded. View "Sloan v. Law Office of Oscar C. Gonzalez, Inc." on Justia Law