Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-client James Yager appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment to defendant-attorney K. William Clauson on the client’s legal malpractice claim and dismissing that claim as to defendant-law firm Clauson, Atwood & Spaneas. The client’s legal malpractice claim stems from the defendants’ representation of him in two timber trespass actions. In the first action, summary judgment was granted to Mighty Oaks, in part, because the client failed to prove that Mighty Oaks was the entity that cut the timber. In the second action, summary judgment was granted to D.H. Hardwick & Sons, Inc. because the action had been filed more than three years after the timber cutting had ceased and, thus, was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The client filed the instant malpractice action against the defendants alleging that the applicable standard of care was breached because the Hardwick action was not timely filed. In this case, the trial court concluded that a legal expert was necessary for the plaintiff to prove “what result should have occurred” had the Hardwick action been timely filed. The client argues that this was error because he could have used the “trial-within-a-trial” method to prove this. After review, the Supreme Court held that, to the extent that the trial court determined that the trial-within-a-trial method was unavailable to the client, as a matter of law, the trial court erred. The Court found no error with regard to dismissal of claims against the defendant law firm. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Yager v. Clauson" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance issued a Formal Complaint against Chancellor David Shoemake, alleging judicial misconduct. The Complaint contained allegations that Judge Shoemake had contributed to the mismanagement of the conservatorship of Victoria Denise Newsome. After a formal hearing on March 12, 2015, the Commission recommended to the Supreme Court that Judge Shoemake be removed from office, fined $2,500, and assessed costs in the amount of $5,882.67. Judge Shoemake disputes the Commission’s findings and recommendation. After review, the Supreme Court held that Judge Shoemake improperly signed ex parte orders and contributed to the mismanagement of a ward’s estate. However, the Commission did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Shoemake gave testimony that he knew or should have known would be misleading. The Court ordered that Judge Shoemake be publicly reprimanded, be suspended from office for thirty days without pay, pay a fine of $2,500, and pay costs in the amount of $5,882.67. View "Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Shoemake" on Justia Law

In the 1990s, AT&T obtained patents covering the transfer of packetized voice traffic between cellular base stations and switching centers. In 1996, AT&T assigned the patents to Lucent, which later assigned them to Avaya. In 2008, Avaya sold the patents for $2 million to High Point, reserving an interest in any proceeds obtained through litigation. High Point is based in Luxembourg and does not practice the patents. Within three days, High Point began sending demand letters asserting infringement, including to Sprint. Beginning in 1995, Sprint had built a network based on Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), which allows multiple cellphone users to share the same radio frequency. CDMA is now standard. AT&T (later Lucent) supplied equipment for the CDMA network. As that network grew, Sprint used unlicensed equipment from several vendors. In 2004, Sprint began upgrading the Lucent equipment with Motorola equipment. Motorola was not a party to the Lucent-Sprint licensing agreement. In 2006, Alcatel purchased Lucent. High Point claims that act terminated any license for Sprint’s use of Lucent equipment. Nortel began selling equipment to Sprint. Nortel was no longer a licensee to the patents. No infringement concerns were raised until 2008, when High Point sued, asserting violation of the licensing agreements and that the Sprint network operated through the combination of licensed and unlicensed equipment to facilitate the transmission of voice call traffic in an infringing manner. The Federal CIrcuit affirmed summary judgment, based on equitable estoppel. View "High Point SARL v. Sprint Nextel Corp." on Justia Law

This case arose from the revocation of a building permit previously granted to R. Bruce Montgomery and Wanda Haddock (collectively, Montgomery). Montgomery, represented by Judy A.S. Metcalf and William V. Ferdinand Jr. (collectively, the Eaton Peabody attorneys), appealed the revocation of the permit, contesting the revocation of the part of the permit dealing with the construction of a garage. The Georgetown Planning Board left in place a stop-work order on the construction of the garage. Montgomery subsequently hired attorney Clifford H. Goodall to assist him in his attempts to apply for a building permit, without success. Montgomery filed a legal malpractice complaint against the Eaton Peabody attorneys. The superior court dismissed five of the six counts of the complaint. Montgomery subsequently filed a second amended complaint raising legal malpractice claims against Goodall. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Goodall. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court (1) properly granted the Eaton Peabody attorneys’ motion to dismiss counts one through five of Montgomery’s complaint; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying Montgomery’s motion to file a third amended complaint made three years after the commencement of the suit. View "Montgomery v. Eaton Peabody, LLP" on Justia Law

This case arose from the revocation of a building permit previously granted to R. Bruce Montgomery and Wanda Haddock (collectively, Montgomery). Montgomery, represented by Judy A.S. Metcalf and William V. Ferdinand Jr. (collectively, the Eaton Peabody attorneys), appealed the revocation of the permit, contesting the revocation of the part of the permit dealing with the construction of a garage. The Georgetown Planning Board left in place a stop-work order on the construction of the garage. Montgomery subsequently hired attorney Clifford H. Goodall to assist him in his attempts to apply for a building permit, without success. Montgomery filed a legal malpractice complaint against the Eaton Peabody attorneys. The superior court dismissed five of the six counts of the complaint. Montgomery subsequently filed a second amended complaint raising legal malpractice claims against Goodall. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Goodall. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court (1) properly granted the Eaton Peabody attorneys’ motion to dismiss counts one through five of Montgomery’s complaint; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying Montgomery’s motion to file a third amended complaint made three years after the commencement of the suit. View "Montgomery v. Eaton Peabody, LLP" on Justia Law

Kimberly Kirchmeyer, as Executive Director of the Medical Board of California (the Medical Board), launched an investigation of Geoffrey Phillips, M.D., a licensed psychiatrist, based on a complaint that Phillips had carried on a sexual relationship with a patient. As part of the investigation, an investigatory subpoena duces tecum for the production of specified medical records of the patient was served on Phillips. After both he and the patient objected to the subpoena duces tecum, and he failed to produce the medical records, the Kirchmeyer filed a petition to compel their production. The trial court denied the petition and dismissed it. The Kirchmeyer appealed that dismissal. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err and affirmed: "The medical records sought by the investigatory subpoena duces tecum were protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege of Evidence Code section 1014. Because the psychotherapist-patient privilege is grounded in the patient’s constitutional right of privacy, the Director had to show a compelling interest justifying production of the medical records sought. The Director failed to show a compelling interest and has not established that an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege applied to the medial records sought by the investigatory subpoena duces tecum." View "Kirchmeyer v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Kimberly Kirchmeyer, as Executive Director of the Medical Board of California (the Medical Board), launched an investigation of Geoffrey Phillips, M.D., a licensed psychiatrist, based on a complaint that Phillips had carried on a sexual relationship with a patient. As part of the investigation, an investigatory subpoena duces tecum for the production of specified medical records of the patient was served on Phillips. After both he and the patient objected to the subpoena duces tecum, and he failed to produce the medical records, the Kirchmeyer filed a petition to compel their production. The trial court denied the petition and dismissed it. The Kirchmeyer appealed that dismissal. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err and affirmed: "The medical records sought by the investigatory subpoena duces tecum were protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege of Evidence Code section 1014. Because the psychotherapist-patient privilege is grounded in the patient’s constitutional right of privacy, the Director had to show a compelling interest justifying production of the medical records sought. The Director failed to show a compelling interest and has not established that an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege applied to the medial records sought by the investigatory subpoena duces tecum." View "Kirchmeyer v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Chad Bostick petitioned for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion reversing a circuit court judgment that reversed the administrative order issued by the Alabama Board of Examiners of Landscape Architects ("the Board") suspending Bostick's license for one year and imposing a $250 fine against him. Bostick had been employed by GRC Design Group, Inc. (GRC), a landscaping business owned and operated by Greg Curl. A dispute between Bostick and GRC arose, and Bostick resigned from GRC in 2010. Bostick started his own landscaping firm. In February 2010, Curl filed a written complaint with the Board alleging that Bostick had, while employed with GRC, "misrepresented himself to clients as part owner in [GRC] and as a result had clients write checks payable to him which he cashed for his own personal use." Curl claimed that Bostick "admitted to stealing these design fees and eventually to several more acts of fraud." Bostick denied these accusations. Bostick argued on appeal of the circuit court's adoption of the Board's findings, among other things, that the Board's decision was not supported by evidence presented and that the Board acted beyond its jurisdiction and authority in suspending his license to practice landscape architecture and in imposing a fine. After review of the record, the Supreme Court agreed and reversed the circuit court's judgment. View "Ex parte Chad Bostick." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Patricia McKay appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Thomas Walker and Cosho Humphrey, LLP, in a legal malpractice action. McKay contended that Walker negligently drafted a property settlement agreement by failing to include provisions that would have resulted in a judgment lien against payments owed to her husband which were secured by a mortgage. The district court concluded that because a mortgage was personal property and not real property, the failure to include a description of the real property subject to the mortgage and the mortgage’s instrument number would not have resulted in the creation of a security interest. Based upon this legal conclusion, the district court held that Walker had not breached a duty to McKay and the alleged breach was not the proximate cause of any damages. McKay argued the district court erred in its conclusion. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "McKay v. Walker" on Justia Law

Robert Mena was licensed to practice medicine and surgery in Idaho in 2003. In 2007, staff members at the hospital in Jerome where he had privileges reported behaviors that suggested to them that Dr. Mena might have been abusing drugs or alcohol. Dr. Mena was evaluated and tested negative for chemical dependency. But staff, still concerned about Dr. Mena's psychological status, opined that he was not then currently fit to practice medicine. After further evaluation, it was recommended that Dr. Mena curtail his work-weeks to 40 to 50 hours. The Idaho State Board of Medicine ("Board") also had begun an investigation regarding Dr. Mena's training and ability to perform certain medical procedures. The Board and Dr. Mena entered into a Stipulation and Order in 2009, in which he admitted that he had violated the Medical Practice Act by failing to provide health care that met the required standard and in which he agreed to specific conditions of probation and restrictions on his license to practice medicine. On September 26, 2011, the Board issued an order terminating the Stipulation and Order. That same day, the hospital in Jerome gave Dr. Mena written notification that it had granted him limited medical privileges on the condition that he obtain additional training, that he had failed to do so, and that his privileges were forfeited. A month later, the Board sent Dr. Mena a letter asking him to respond to the hospital's action. He eventually submitted a thirteen-page written response that was rambling with many obscure references, grammatical and syntax errors, and vague sentences. More evaluations were ordered. The Board issued its Final Order in early 2014, finding that Dr. Mena suffered from "some level of impairment," and it stated that "sanctions were necessary upon [Dr. Mena's] license." Dr. Mena filed a petition for judicial review to the district court, arguing: (1) the Board initiated proceedings pursuant to the Disabled Physician Act and then imposed sanctions that were not permitted by that Act; (2) the Board's order was not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the hearing officer erred in holding that certain evidence was inadmissible. The district court upheld the Board's action, and Dr. Mena then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that Board's own evaluation of the evidence showed that there was insufficient evidence to support the Board's order. View "Mena v. Idaho Bd. of Medicine" on Justia Law