Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

In 2018, Brevan Bringhurst Baugh was charged with two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child. The prosecution presented evidence of three instances of alleged abuse, distinguished by location, while the charges were distinguished by date. During closing arguments, the prosecution told the jury they could use any two of the three instances to fulfill the elements of the charged counts. The jury convicted Baugh on one count and acquitted him on the other.Baugh appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, arguing that the jury might not have unanimously agreed on which instance of abuse supported the conviction. He also claimed his counsel was ineffective for not requesting specific jury instructions on unanimity. The court of appeals agreed, finding that the jury instructions were ambiguous and could have led to a non-unanimous verdict. The court vacated Baugh’s conviction.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case on certiorari. The court affirmed the court of appeals' decision, holding that Baugh’s counsel performed deficiently by failing to request more specific unanimity instructions. The court noted that the risk of a non-unanimous verdict was significant due to the way the evidence and charges were presented. The court also found that there was a reasonable probability that the jury would not have convicted Baugh if proper unanimity instructions had been given. Therefore, the court concluded that Baugh’s counsel was ineffective, and the conviction was vacated. View "State v. Baugh" on Justia Law

Douglas Lovell was convicted in 2015 for the murder of Joyce Yost, a crime he committed in 1985. Lovell had previously pled guilty to the murder in 1993 and was sentenced to death, but his plea was later withdrawn, leading to a new trial. During the new trial, Lovell did not contest his guilt but argued for a lesser sentence, presenting evidence of his remorse and rehabilitation.In the lower courts, Lovell's 1993 guilty plea was vacated by the Utah Supreme Court in 2011 due to procedural errors. The case was remanded for a new trial, where Lovell was again convicted and sentenced to death. Lovell appealed, arguing that the district court improperly admitted his testimony from the 1993 proceedings and that his counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court assumed, without deciding, that the district court erred in admitting Lovell's 1993 testimony but found the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming evidence of Lovell's guilt. However, the court agreed with Lovell that his counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase. The court found that counsel failed to adequately object to prejudicial testimony regarding Lovell's excommunication from the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and the Church's doctrine on repentance and remorse. This testimony improperly suggested that the jury could rely on the Church's assessment of Lovell's remorse rather than making their own determination.The Utah Supreme Court held that this ineffective assistance of counsel prejudiced Lovell's ability to have a fair sentencing hearing. As a result, the court vacated Lovell's death sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing proceeding. View "State v. Lovell" on Justia Law

Linzi Labrum, the petitioner, sought a waiver of rules 14-704(c)(2) and 14-704(c)(3) of the Utah Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice. These rules require graduates of non-ABA-accredited law schools to practice law in another state for ten years before becoming eligible to take the Utah bar exam. Labrum graduated from Concord Law School, an online, non-ABA-accredited institution, and was admitted to practice law in California in 2021. She has since worked in Utah as a law clerk, mediator, and supervised pro bono attorney.The Utah State Bar denied Labrum's application to take the Utah bar exam, citing her insufficient years of practice. Labrum petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for a waiver, arguing that her education and experience met the rules' purposes and that her circumstances were extraordinary.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Labrum satisfied the burden of proof established in Kelly v. Utah State Bar. The court found that Concord's education, while not on par with ABA-accredited schools, was sufficient when combined with Labrum's practical experience. Her work in Utah, including her roles as a law clerk, mediator, and pro bono attorney, demonstrated her competence and ethical standards. The court also noted the significant changes in the accreditation of online law schools and the strong recommendations from Utah legal practitioners who supervised her work.The court concluded that Labrum's case was extraordinary due to the unique challenges she faced, her commitment to serving an underserved area in Utah, and the substantial support from the legal community. The Utah Supreme Court granted her petition for waiver, allowing her to take the Utah bar exam. View "Labrum v. Utah State Bar" on Justia Law

Lippa and Manmohan Grewal sold a gas station to Theodore Hansen, who later sold it to Junction Market Fairview, L.C. (JMF). The sale contract required Hansen to make regular installment payments, with the final balance due after three years. Hansen missed many payments and failed to pay the full balance when due. The Grewals initiated foreclosure proceedings over six years after Hansen's first missed payment. The applicable statute of limitations for a breach of contract action is six years, raising the question of when the statute begins to run for installment contracts.The Sixth District Court in Sanpete County granted partial summary judgment in favor of JMF, concluding that the statute of limitations began when Hansen missed the first payment, making the Grewals' foreclosure action too late. The court awarded sole control of the gas station to JMF and ordered the Grewals to release the title. When the Grewals failed to comply, JMF seized the station and sold it to a third party. The district court also awarded JMF attorney fees under the Public Waters Access Act and the reciprocal attorney fees statute.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the sale of the gas station to a third-party bona fide purchaser rendered the Grewals' appeal on the title issue moot, as no court action could affect the litigants' rights to the property. However, the issue of attorney fees was not moot. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to JMF under the reciprocal attorney fees statute. The court affirmed the award of attorney fees and remanded to the district court to determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees JMF incurred in defending against the appeal. View "Grewal v. Junction Market Fairview" on Justia Law

The case involves the trustees of the Stanley and Sandra Goldberg Trusts, C. Leon Nelson and Marilynn Tetrick, who hired legal counsel to assist them in their duties. The same attorneys later defended them in a lawsuit brought by several beneficiaries of the trusts. The jury found that the trustees had breached their fiduciary duties, and the district court entered a judgment against them, most of which was payable to the trusts. The court then removed the trustees and appointed successor trustees. The former trustees, still represented by the same attorneys, asked the court to reduce the amount of the judgment against them. The successor trustees moved to disqualify the former trustees’ attorneys, arguing that a conflict had surfaced under rule 1.9(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. The district court agreed and disqualified the attorneys.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah reversed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court held that an attorney-client relationship does not automatically arise merely because an attorney represents a trustee. In this case, the attorneys represented the former trustees only, not the trusts, which were not named in the suit. Thus, because the attorneys never represented the trusts in the litigation, rule 1.9(a) does not prevent the attorneys from continuing to represent the former trustees. View "In re Estate of Goldberg" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the district court that Plaintiff's post-judgment motion was timely, holding that the district court's order of dismissal did not constitute a separate judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(1), and therefore, the judgment was not complete and entered until 150 days after the clerk recorded the order of dismissal.This appeal stemmed from a legal malpractice claim. The district court dismissed the complaint. On April 10, the district court signed the proposed order of dismissal with prejudice. On May 9, Plaintiff filed a post-judgment motion requesting various forms of relief. Defendant argued that the motion was untimely because it was filed more than twenty-eight days after the April 10 order. The district court granted Plaintiff's motion and vacated the April 10 order, concluding that the order was not a separate judgment under Rule 58A(a) and therefore did not start the time to file post-judgment motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that the April 10 order was not a separate judgment pursuant to Rule 58A(a); and (2) because the April 10 order did not constitute an "entry of judgment" that started the time to file post-judgment motions, Plaintiff's post-judgment motion was timely. View "Griffin v. Snow Christensen & Martineau" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court declined to accept Cypress Fund, LLC's request that the Court declare, as a matter of public policy, that Cougar Canyon Loan, LLC cannot foreclose on Cypress's cause of action for legal malpractice, holding that the policy concerns raised by Cypress were insufficient to override the plain language of Utah R. Civ. P. 64 and 64E, the rules governing the foreclosure of legal claims through a writ of execution.In a separate case, Cougar Canyon obtained a $4 million judgment against Cypress. Cypress filed a malpractice suit against its former legal counsel, believing that the judgment resulted from that counsel's malpractice. In its effort to collect on its judgment against Cypress, Cougar Canyon foreclosed on Cypress's right to bring the malpractice claim. At issue on appeal was whether public policy requires that this foreclosure be undone. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Cypress's motion to quash the writ of execution, holding that the plain language of the rules of civil procedure allowed Cougar Canyon to execute on Cypress's legal malpractice claim, and any change to those rules should be sought through the normal rule-making process. View "Cougar Canyon Loan, LLC v. Cypress Fund, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs' malpractice claim against Defendant, their attorney, as untimely, holding that Plaintiffs' claim was timely.Plaintiffs lost their opportunity to collect $874,805.68 owed to them in a bankruptcy proceeding when Defendant failed to file Plaintiffs' nondischargeability claim before the expiration of the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs later brought this malpractice action against Defendant. The district court dismissed the claim as untimely, finding that the statute of limitations had expired four years after Defendant missed the filing deadline for the nondischargeability claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the malpractice claim did not accrue until the bankruptcy court confirmed the final distribution plan, and therefore, Plaintiffs' claim was timely. View "Moshier v. Fisher" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court declining to grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment in this legal malpractice action, holding that Thomas v. Hillyard, __ P.3d __ (Utah 2019), squarely addressed the issues presented in this case.On advice from Defendant, Plaintiff, an optometrist, pled guilty to charges arising out of Plaintiff's Medicaid billing for his services. Plaintiff later sued Defendant for legal malpractice, alleging that Defendant failed to inform him of the consequences of pleading guilty or to advise him of the likelihood of success at trial. Defendant moved for summary judgment asking the district court to conclude that Plaintiff's claims failed as a matter of law under two rules embraced in other jurisdictions - the exoneration rule and the actual innocence requirement. The district court declined to adopt either rule. Around the time the Supreme Court heard Plaintiff's appeal, the Court decided Thomas, holding that neither the exoneration rule nor the actual innocence requirement have a place in malpractice law. Thus, based on Thomas, the Court affirmed in this case. View "Paxman v. King" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant on grounds that Plaintiff's malpractice action was barred by the statute of limitations, holding that Plaintiff's claim was timely filed.In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he was convicted of two felonies due to the malpractice of Defendant, his trial counsel. After Plaintiff hired new counsel he secured a new deal that replaced his two felony convictions and three misdemeanor convictions. At issue in this case was when Plaintiff's cause of action accrued. The district court concluded that Plaintiff's malpractice action was untimely filed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's malpractice claim accrued at the conclusion of his criminal case when he pled guilty to three misdemeanors, and not at the time the jury first returned its guilty verdict, and therefore, Plaintiff's malpractice action was filed within the statute of limitations. View "Thomas v. Hillyard" on Justia Law