Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Kay Ellison, co-founder of a charter airline, was convicted of federal wire fraud, bank fraud, and conspiracy. The airline, Direct Air, faced cash flow issues and Ellison siphoned millions from an escrow account through fictitious reservations and falsified records. She was charged alongside Judy Tull and chose not to testify or present a defense at trial. The jury convicted her on all counts, and she was sentenced to ninety-four months in prison and ordered to pay over $19 million in restitution. Her convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.Ellison filed a motion to vacate her sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. She argued her attorney incorrectly advised her that if she did not testify, she could not present other evidence, which she claimed prejudiced her defense. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied her motion without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that even if her counsel was ineffective, she could not show prejudice because there was no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted her if she had testified or presented other witnesses.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Third Circuit applied the Strickland v. Washington standard, which requires showing a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for the attorney's errors. The court found that Ellison failed to demonstrate such a probability, as her proposed testimony and that of her witnesses would not have likely changed the jury's verdict given the strong evidence against her. Thus, the denial of her habeas corpus petition was upheld. View "Ellison v. USA" on Justia Law

A criminal defendant, convicted of aggravated manslaughter and sentenced to thirty years in prison, twice instructed his attorney to file a plenary appeal. However, his intake appellate counsel designated the appeal for the expedited sentence-review track (ESOA). The ESOA panel did not transfer the case to the plenary calendar and affirmed the sentence. The defendant's subsequent post-conviction relief applications in state court, which included claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, were unsuccessful.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied the defendant's habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which included claims related to the ESOA designation. The court also denied his Rule 60(b) motion, which specifically challenged the intake appellate counsel's decision to place the appeal on the ESOA calendar.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Rule 60(b) motion was not a second or successive habeas application because it was filed within 28 days of the underlying judgment. However, the court found that the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was procedurally defaulted because it was not exhausted in state court and he could not show the requisite prejudice to overcome the default. The court applied the Strickland standard for prejudice, requiring a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for counsel's errors, rather than the Flores-Ortega standard, which applies when the entirety of direct appellate review is rendered unavailable. The court affirmed the denial of the habeas petition and the Rule 60(b) motion. View "Ross v. Administrator East Jersey State Prison" on Justia Law

The case arose from appellant Khamal Fooks' claim that his attorney misled him about the parole eligibility related to his plea agreement. Fooks had pleaded guilty to third-degree murder, conspiracy, and carrying an unlicensed gun in a Pennsylvania state court. He later alleged that his lawyer incorrectly assured him he would be eligible for parole after ten years, when in reality, he had to serve at least twenty. His allegations, if true, would demonstrate that his lawyer’s advice was ineffective.Both the state and the federal district courts dismissed his claims without providing an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing. Fooks then appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Circuit Court found that Fooks' allegations, if proven, would indeed establish ineffective assistance of counsel, thereby warranting habeas relief.The Circuit Court held that the district court erred in not affording Fooks an evidentiary hearing to substantiate his allegations. The court emphasized the importance of giving petitioners a fair chance to prove their allegations and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. The court did not rule on Fooks' entitlement to relief, instead emphasizing the need for a fair opportunity to present evidence supporting his claims. View "Khamal Fooks v. Superintendent Smithfield SCI" on Justia Law

Claude P. Lacombe appealed the United States District Court for the District of Delaware's denial of habeas relief, arguing that the Delaware Supreme Court wrongfully denied his claims that the State breached its plea agreement and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to demand specific performance of the plea agreement. Lacombe had pleaded guilty to several counts, including second-degree murder, in exchange for the State's agreement to recommend a sentence of 22 years. Instead, Lacombe received a life sentence. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's denial of habeas relief. The Court held that even if the State breached its plea agreement and Lacombe's counsel was ineffective, any constitutional error was harmless under Brecht, Strickland, and Puckett v. United States, as Lacombe could not establish that he suffered "actual prejudice" as a result of the State's rhetoric and his counsel's failure to object. The court did not decide whether the State actually breached the plea agreement, citing that a failure to show either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats an ineffectiveness claim. View "Lacombe v. Warden" on Justia Law

In the case of Robert Wharton, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office conceded that Wharton's death sentence should be vacated without conducting a comprehensive investigation into evidence against Wharton’s habeas claim. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that the office did not disclose key facts about the claim, leading the District Court to find misconduct and impose mild sanctions.Wharton had been sentenced to death for terrorizing and ultimately murdering a family over a disputed debt. On appeal, the Third Circuit ordered an evidentiary hearing on whether Wharton's counsel was ineffective for not investigating prison records or presenting evidence showing that Wharton had adjusted well to prison life. However, before this hearing could take place, the District Attorney’s Office filed a notice of concession. The District Court did not accept the concession and appointed the Pennsylvania Attorney General as amicus curiae to investigate Wharton’s prison adjustment.The court found that the District Attorney’s Office violated Rule 11(b)(3) by failing to investigate the facts of Wharton's case reasonably and by failing to communicate adequately with the victims' family. Consequently, the court ordered District Attorney Larry Krasner to apologize in writing to the victims' family members and to provide a "full, balanced explanation" of the facts when conceding federal habeas cases in the future. This case highlights the importance of conducting thorough investigations and maintaining honesty and forthrightness in court procedures. View "Wharton v. Graterford" on Justia Law

Titus’s solo medical practice, in its last 13 months, earned $1.1 million by distributing more than 20,000 prescriptions for Schedule II drugs. Titus often did only cursory physical examinations before prescribing opioids. He kept prescribing drugs despite signs that his patients were diverting or abusing them. At least two of Titus’s patients overdosed. Other doctors filed professional complaints. Titus closed his practice. Federal agents raided the homes of Titus and two of his employees and found thousands of patient files. Titus was indicted on 14 counts of unlawfully dispensing and distributing controlled substances (based on 14 prescriptions) and maintaining drug-involved premises, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 856(a)(1).The government's statistician, using the Prescription Monitoring Program, identified 1,142 patients for whom Titus had prescribed controlled drugs, drew a random sample of 300 patients, and extrapolated to conclude that Titus had provided 29,323 controlled substance prescriptions to 948 patients with at least one inconsistent drug test and 1,552 such prescriptions to 352 patients he had already discharged from his practice. The government’s medical expert reviewed 24 of those files and determined that Titus had written illegal prescriptions for 18 of the patients.The district court held Titus responsible for at least 30,000 kilos, citing “general trial evidence” and extrapolating from the 24-file sample. The Third Circuit affirmed Titus’s convictions but vacated his 240-month sentence. The government failed to prove that extrapolating from a small sample satisfied its burden to prove the drug quantity by a preponderance of the evidence. View "United States v. Titus" on Justia Law

Pretrial detainee Wilson complained to Philadelphia Federal Detention Center medical staff about a lump on his testicle in November 2017. They allegedly stated that such a lump was probably cancerous. Wilson subsequently complained that his condition worsened but received no further treatment. Wilson was transferred to Bureau of Prisons custody, where a urologist determined in February 2018 that the lump was cancerous. Wilson's right testicle was surgically removed. Wilson believed that if his cancer had been addressed earlier, treatment would not have involved chemotherapy and surgery.Wilson alleged medical negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The court granted extensions for Wilson (pro se) to act on Pennsylvania Rule 1042.3, which requires medical malpractice plaintiffs to certify either that they have expert support for their claims or will proceed without an expert. Wilson explained that he wanted an expert but conceded the impossibility of obtaining one during the pandemic prison lockdowns. He stated that his medical records would demonstrate that his injury “was not inevitable" and specifically identified documents as discoverable material to substantiate his allegations, The court granted the government summary judgment stating that, while a factfinder could find without expert testimony that the delay in treatment was unreasonable, the issue of whether the delay caused the need to remove Wilson’s testicle required expert testimony.The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the FTCA does not incorporate Rule 1042.3. Wilson did not otherwise have an adequate opportunity to seek out an expert or conduct discovery due to his unique position as a pro se inmate during the pandemic. View "Wilson v. United States" on Justia Law

Brace, a farmer, owns hundreds of acres in Erie County, Pennsylvania. He cleared 30 acres of wetlands, draining it to grow crops. In 1994, the Third Circuit affirmed that Brace had violated the Clean Water Act. In 2012, Brade bought 14 additional acres of wetlands. Again, he engaged in clearing, excavation, and filling without required permits. During a second suit under the Act, Brace’s counsel submitted perfunctory pleadings and failed to cooperate in discovery, repeatedly extending and missing deadlines. Counsel submitted over-length briefs smuggling in extra-record materials. The court repeatedly struck Brace’s materials but generally chose leniency. Eventually, the court struck Brace’s opposition to summary judgment after analyzing the “Poulis factors,” then granted the government summary judgment on liability, holding that Brace had violated the Act. The court ordered Brace to submit a proposed deed restriction and restoration plan.The Third Circuit rejected Brace’s appeal. While “it stretches credulity [to believe that Brace had] no idea how counsel [wa]s conducting this case,” the court gave Brace the benefit of the doubt. Brace’s lawyer’s misconduct forced the government to waste time and money “deciphering incomprehensible pleadings, scouring through noncompliant briefs, and moving again and again for compliance" to no avail. Counsel acted in bad faith; repeated orders to show cause, warnings, and threats of sanctions did not deter counsel’s chronic misbehavior. The sanction “was hardly an abuse of discretion.” View "United States v. Brace" on Justia Law

Ramsey, a medical student. unsuccessfully sought testing accommodations for dyslexia and ADHD from the National Board of Medical Examiners. Ramsey sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Third Circuit affirmed the award of a preliminary injunction, requiring the Board to provide her accommodations. Ramsay established irreparable harm because she would likely be forced to withdraw from medical school if she could not take the initial test with accommodations and pass. The balance of equities tipped in her favor because granting her accommodations would not undermine the Board’s interests in fair and accurate testing and it was in the public interest for the ADA to be followed, to increase the number of physicians. Evidence that Ramsay’s reading, processing, and writing skills were abnormally low by multiple measures provided a sufficient comparison of her abilities to those of the general population to support the finding of disability. While the district court viewed Ramsay’s experts more favorably and found the Board’s experts unpersuasive, there is no indication that the court believed that it was compelled to defer to Ramsay’s experts; the court discounted the Board’s experts because they never met with Ramsay, engaged in too demanding an analysis of whether Ramsay had a disability, and overly focused on Ramsay’s academic achievements. View "Ramsay v. National Board of Medical Examiners" on Justia Law

In 2009, D. was delivered at Sharon Hospital by Dr. Gallagher and sustained an injury, allegedly causing her shoulder and arm permanent damage. In 2010-2011, preparing to file D.’s malpractice case, counsel requested records from Sharon and Gallagher, limited temporally to the delivery. Counsel believed that Gallagher was privately employed. Sharon was private; Gallagher was listed on the Sharon website. Counsel did not discover that Gallagher was employed by Primary Health, a “deemed” federal entity eligible for Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), malpractice coverage. D.'s mother had been Gallagher's patient for 10 years and had visited the Primary office. In contracting Gallagher, counsel used the Primary office street address. Gallagher’s responses included the words “Primary Health.” The lawsuit was filed in 2016; Pennsylvania law tolls a minor plaintiff’s action until she turns 18.The government removed the suit to federal court and substituted the government for Gallagher. The district court dismissed the suit against the government for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the FTCA. The case against Sharon returned to state court. After exhausting administrative remedies, counsel refiled the FTCA suit. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit as untimely, rejecting a claim that D. was entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period because counsel had no reason to know that Gallagher was a deemed federal employee or that further inquiry was required. D. failed to show that she diligently pursued her rights and that extraordinary circumstances prevented her from timely filing. View "D.J.S.-W. v. United States" on Justia Law