Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

A family of six Mexican citizens entered the United States without authorization and were subsequently placed in removal proceedings. They hired an attorney to help them apply for asylum. Despite having nearly fifteen months to prepare, the attorney requested a continuance only eight days before the hearing, citing the government shutdown as a reason for her lack of preparation. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied the continuance and, due to the attorney's unpreparedness, deemed the asylum applications abandoned, ordering the family's removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision.The family appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The court dismissed the cases of two family members due to lack of jurisdiction, as their removal proceedings had been terminated after they received special immigrant status. The remaining four family members argued that the IJ erred in denying the continuance and that their attorney was ineffective. The court found that the IJ did not abuse his discretion in denying the continuance, as the attorney had ample time to prepare and failed to do so. The court also noted that the attorney's unpreparedness did not violate the family's due process rights.Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court acknowledged the attorney's failure to prepare but noted that the family did not present this claim to the BIA, thus failing to exhaust administrative remedies. Consequently, the court could not consider the ineffective assistance claim. The court suggested that the family could seek to reopen the proceedings through a motion to reopen or by requesting equitable tolling of the deadline.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed the petitions of two family members and denied the petitions for review of the remaining four family members. View "Bustos-Millan v. Garland" on Justia Law

Timothy Upchurch engaged in a prolonged campaign of harassment against his neighbors, Timothy and Margaret O’Brien, over a disputed easement on their property. Upchurch was convicted of disorderly conduct, criminal damage to property, and theft after trespassing and stealing a security camera from the O’Briens. In retaliation, Upchurch filed a baseless RICO lawsuit against the O’Briens, their lawyer, the local district attorney, and three sheriff’s deputies, alleging interference with his claimed easement. The lawsuit was frivolous as Upchurch did not own an easement. Facing sanctions motions, Upchurch dropped the case, but the district judge awarded sanctions, ordering Upchurch and his attorney, Timothy Provis, to pay the defendants’ costs and attorney’s fees.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin handled the initial case. The court found Upchurch’s lawsuit to be without merit and filed for the purpose of harassment. The judge imposed sanctions under Rules 11 and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure due to the baseless nature of the claims and Upchurch’s failure to comply with discovery obligations. Upchurch and his attorney were ordered to pay the defendants’ costs and attorney’s fees, and Provis was required to disgorge any fees paid by Upchurch.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Upchurch’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as the notice of appeal was filed outside the 30-day statutory deadline. The court also found the appeal to be frivolous and granted the defendants’ motion for sanctions under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court held that Upchurch and Provis were jointly and severally liable for the costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in defending the appeal. The court directed the O’Briens and Lucareli to submit an accounting of their fees and costs within 15 days. View "Upchurch v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

Robert Mason Elliott was charged with multiple federal offenses, including possession of firearms, sexual exploitation of a minor, and plotting to murder the minor and her mother. Elliott retained Attorney Brandon Sample for his defense. Over a year into the representation, Sample discovered a controlled substance hidden in documents meant for Elliott and sought to withdraw from the case. The court, however, denied Sample's motion, emphasizing Elliott's right to counsel of his choice. Elliott later reached a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to five counts.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana initially handled the case. After Sample's motion to withdraw was denied, Elliott continued with Sample as his attorney. Elliott later filed a second motion to determine his mental competency, which the court granted, and he was found competent to stand trial. Elliott eventually entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to two counts of murder for hire, two counts of witness tampering, and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The court sentenced him to 520 months of imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Elliott argued that Sample had a conflict of interest and that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right by not informing him of this conflict, rendering his guilty plea involuntary. The appellate court held that Elliott's Sixth Amendment claim was not foreclosed by the appellate waiver in his plea agreement. However, the court concluded that even if Sample had a conflict of interest, Elliott could not demonstrate that he was adversely affected by it. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "USA v. Elliott" on Justia Law

In 2015, two plaintiffs sued the Chicago Board of Education and various officials, alleging violations of their First Amendment rights and state law. During a deposition in 2017, a confrontation occurred between plaintiffs' attorney Caryn Shaw and opposing counsel Lisa Dreishmire. Shaw allegedly assaulted Dreishmire, leading to police involvement and a complaint to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC). The district court held an evidentiary hearing and found that Shaw misled the court about the incident, prolonging the litigation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois sanctioned Shaw by removing her from the case and ordering "Plaintiffs' counsel" to reimburse the defendants for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. Shaw and her co-counsel, Anne Shaw and Donald Villar, appealed the sanctions. The district court's sanctions were based on findings that Shaw intentionally pushed Dreishmire and misrepresented the incident to the court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the sanctions against Caryn Shaw, finding that she had adequate notice and opportunity to respond to the potential sanctions. However, the court vacated the sanctions against Anne Shaw and Donald Villar, concluding that they did not have sufficient notice or opportunity to respond. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in calculating the fee award against Caryn Shaw. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Vega v. Chicago Board of Education" on Justia Law

Anthony D. Lee, Sr. was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault in 1996 and sentenced to 100 years in prison. Lee's defense was that the victim had voluntarily entered his car and that any sexual activity was consensual. He later sought postconviction relief, arguing that his attorney, Richard Friedman, had failed to interview several potential witnesses who could have corroborated his testimony. Lee supported his motion with six affidavits from these potential witnesses. The trial court denied Lee's ineffective-assistance claim, and the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the decision.Lee then sought relief in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied his petition, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The appellate court found that the state court had based its prejudice analysis on the flawed assumption that each witness would have merely repeated their affidavits and refused to say another word if called to testify. The appellate court vacated and remanded the case to the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on Lee's claim.After a three-day hearing, the district court again denied Lee's § 2254 petition. The court concluded that Lee failed to establish that Friedman's performance fell below an objective standard of professional competence. Alternatively, the court concluded that any errors Friedman might have committed did not meaningfully compromise Lee's defense given the strength of the state's case. Lee appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that Lee failed to demonstrate a "reasonable probability" that the result of his trial would have been different had Friedman not committed professional errors. The court noted that none of the affidavits provided an explanation for the severity of the victim's injuries, and that the additional testimony from the witnesses may have ultimately weakened Lee's defense by contradicting his testimony or their own affidavits. View "Lee v. Galloway" on Justia Law

The case involves Taiwo Onamuti, who was charged with 23 crimes related to his involvement in a tax-fraud scheme. He pleaded guilty to one count each of identity theft, aggravated identity theft, and presenting false claims for tax refunds. After several changes in defense counsel and an unsuccessful motion to withdraw the guilty plea, Onamuti was sentenced to 204 months in prison. Later, Onamuti moved to vacate his convictions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that his attorney had been ineffective for failing to move to dismiss the charge and for advising him to plead guilty. The judge vacated the aggravated identity theft conviction, reduced Onamuti’s prison sentence by 24 months, and denied all other relief.Onamuti filed a motion in his criminal case seeking attorney’s fees under the Hyde Amendment for the legal expenses he had incurred to fight the charges of aggravated identity theft. He argued that the government had pursued those charges vexatiously and in bad faith. The government objected on procedural grounds, arguing that the Hyde Amendment does not apply in a § 2255 proceeding. The judge denied the motion for fees, concluding that the motion was procedurally deficient.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Onamuti did not show that the government’s position was frivolous, vexatious, or in bad faith. The court also held that the civil deadline applies to a motion for attorney’s fees under the Hyde Amendment because it is a civil matter ancillary to the criminal case. Therefore, Onamuti was not entitled to an award of attorney fees under the Hyde Amendment. View "United States v. Onamuti" on Justia Law

Jan Kowalski, an attorney, was accused of using her position to hide her brother's assets during his bankruptcy proceedings. She allegedly concealed around $357,000 in her attorney trust account and made false statements under oath to cover up the concealment. Kowalski was charged with four counts of bankruptcy fraud and one count of concealing assets from the bankruptcy trustee. She pleaded guilty to the charge of concealing assets.Prior to her trial, Kowalski had been involved in her brother's bankruptcy proceedings, where she used her attorney trust account to hide her brother's assets from his creditors and the bankruptcy trustee. She also made false statements under oath and fabricated documents to cover up her actions. The bankruptcy trustee confronted Kowalski with inconsistencies between her personal bank records and her earlier testimony, but she continued to lie under oath.Kowalski was sentenced to 37 months' imprisonment by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The court applied two sentencing enhancements: the § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) sophisticated-means enhancement, and the § 3B1.3 abuse of position of trust enhancement. Kowalski appealed her sentence, arguing that the district court erred in applying these enhancements and that her sentence was substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Kowalski had indeed used sophisticated means to commit the offense and had abused her position of trust. The court also found her sentence to be substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Kowalski" on Justia Law

The defendant, Otho Harris, visited a Boost Mobile store for assistance with his broken cellphone. When told it could not be repaired, he became enraged and later set fire to the store, causing extensive damage. Harris was charged with arson and, after difficult relationships with three different appointed attorneys, he chose to represent himself and eventually pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to eight years in prison and ordered to pay $195,701 in restitution.The case moved slowly due to Harris's disagreements with his appointed counsel. After the third appointed lawyer moved to withdraw, Harris decided to represent himself. He filed numerous pretrial motions and requests with the court. A few weeks before the scheduled trial date, he agreed to plead guilty and signed a written plea agreement with the government. The judge accepted his guilty plea and set the case for sentencing.On appeal, Harris challenged only the restitution order, arguing that it was not supported by a proper investigation and determination of the loss amount. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that Harris had waived his right to challenge the restitution order by expressly affirming the accuracy of the factual material in the presentence report at the sentencing hearing. The court noted that Harris had ample notice of the restitution amount, the factual basis for it, and an opportunity to object. He did not object; on the contrary, he affirmed that he was satisfied with the accuracy of the factual material in the presentence report. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

In 1996, Robert Pope was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He sought post-conviction relief, but his lawyer, Michael J. Backes, abandoned him and failed to take necessary steps to protect Pope's rights. After 14 months of inaction, Pope sought help from Wisconsin's public defender, who informed him that he first needed an extension from the court of appeals. However, the court of appeals denied his request, stating that he had waited too long. Pope then sought relief from the trial court, which also denied his request due to the appellate decision. Despite multiple attempts to reinstate his appeal rights, all were unsuccessful until 2016 when the state acknowledged his right to an appeal.The state court of appeals and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed a 2017 decision granting Pope a new trial due to the absence of a trial transcript, which was not ordered by his lawyer and was later destroyed. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that a new trial based on the absence of a transcript is only appropriate if the defendant first makes a "facially valid claim of arguably prejudicial error" that requires a transcript to substantiate. Pope, not being a lawyer and barely remembering the events of 1996, was unable to do so.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Pope filed a petition for collateral review under 28 U.S.C. §2254. The district court issued a conditional writ and directed the state to release Pope unless it set a retrial in motion within six months. The state appealed, leading to a deferral of the deadline. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, modifying it to include deadlines for Pope's release on bail and unconditional release if a trial does not start within the specified timeframes. The court noted that Pope had suffered at least two violations of his constitutional rights: the right to assistance of counsel and the right to an appeal equivalent to that available to well-heeled litigants. View "Pope v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Keith Henyard was charged with eight drug-related felonies in Wisconsin. During his preliminary hearing, Court Commissioner Frank Parise presided. Later, Henyard hired Parise as his attorney. Parise secured a plea deal for Henyard, who pleaded guilty to four of the eight charges. The remaining four charges were dismissed but considered during sentencing. Henyard did not raise any objections about Parise's potential conflict of interest during these proceedings. He was sentenced to 12 years in prison followed by 5 years of extended supervision for one count, and 6 years of probation for the other three counts.Henyard later petitioned the Kenosha County Circuit Court for postconviction relief, arguing that Parise's previous role in his preliminary hearing constituted a conflict of interest, rendering his representation ineffective. The circuit court denied his petition, finding that Henyard had not demonstrated an actual or serious potential conflict of interest. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals also rejected Henyard's petition, stating that he had failed to show that Parise's alleged conflict of interest had adversely affected his performance. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied Henyard's petition for review.Henyard then sought a writ of habeas corpus from the federal district court, which also denied his petition. The court found that Henyard needed to show a conflict that affected counsel's performance, as per the precedent set by the United States Supreme Court. The court concluded that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' decision complied with this precedent and reasonably applied the law to deny Henyard relief.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Henyard argued that Parise's conflict of interest rendered his representation ineffective. The court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, stating that Henyard had not demonstrated that Parise actively represented conflicting interests or that the alleged conflict adversely affected his performance. The court concluded that the state court's denial of Henyard's petition was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. View "Henyard v. Eplett" on Justia Law