Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

After several instances of inappropriate behavior and twice failing to show up for a client’s sentencing hearing, mostly due to a problem with substance abuse, attorney Plaintiff was referred by a presiding judge to a three-judge disciplinary panel of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Following an investigation and hearing, the panel sanctioned Plaintiff by suspending him from practicing before that court for 12 months, with the option to reapply upon proof of sobriety during the period of suspension. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that a three-judge panel could not sanction him because the rules say only that “[a] presiding judge” may take disciplinary action. He also says the 12-month suspension is excessive.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court explained that the district court did try a less severe option. An informal panel of judges privately reprimanded him in June 2020. That lesser sanction did not work. The court was thus justified in imposing a harsher sanction like the suspension. Moreover, the sanction here is appropriately tailored to Plaintiff’s unique situation: his inability to practice law stemmed from his alcohol abuse, so the court ordered him not to practice until he is able to demonstrate sustained sobriety for one year. Further, the court wrote that the district court here considered that a lesser, non-suspension sanction had not deterred Plaintiff from reverting to his old ways. The panel also considered that Plaintiff’s conduct had persisted for some time and that he was not remorseful for his conduct. View "In re Sealed Appellant" on Justia Law

Appellant Matthew Johnson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and separately moved to recuse the district judge to whom that petition was assigned. On appeal, The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner’s motion for a certificate of appealability, explaining that each of his arguments had already been considered and rejected by binding precedent. The court also affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to recuse.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that Defendant petitioned for rehearing en banc, arguing that the panel opinion stands for the proposition that a district court has the power to shorten the one-year statute of limitations. The court explained that the opinion stands for no such thing. It holds only that the district court’s case-management order is not a ground for disqualification under 28 U.S.C. Section 455(a). Especially probative for that holding is the fact that the district court ultimately granted Johnson the extension he sought. The court explained that its conclusion that the district court was not required to recuse says nothing about the hypothetical issue of whether a district court would commit legal error if it did order a post-conviction habeas petitioner to file his petition before the deadline provided by the statute of limitations. View "Johnson v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

The attorney appointed to represent Defendant moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Defendant did not file a response.The Fifth Circuit granted the motion to withdraw. The court concurred with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. The court wrote that consistent with Crawley, it holds that Defendant’s restitution order does not present a nonfrivolous issue for appeal because he is liable for the same restitution amount regardless of the ultimate recipients. View "USA v. Fults" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Lewisville Independent School District (“LISD”) and seven school board members, alleging that the district’s at-large election system violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) and seeking injunctive relief. The district court determined that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring his Section 2 claim because he is white. The district court then granted Defendants’ motion for sanctions against Plaintiff, his attorneys, and their law firm based on the findings that Plaintiff’s lawsuit was frivolous under 52 U.S.C. Section 10310(e) and his attorneys multiplied proceedings unreasonably and vexatiously under 28 U.S.C. Section 1927.   
The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s sanctions order and remanded to determine the extent to which the order is footed upon specific contemptuous conduct in the attorneys’ prosecution of the case. The court held that Plaintiff’s lawsuit did not merit sanctions. The court concluded that sanctions against Plaintiff were unwarranted because precedent in the circuit did not squarely foreclose his legal argument and because he sought to extend existing law. Critically, LISD points to no precedent in the circuit considering whether a voter in his position has standing under the VRA, let alone “squarely controlling precedent.” Further, as Plaintiff’s s lawsuit was not frivolous and relied on an “unsettled legal theory,”  his attorneys cannot be sanctioned under Section 1927 simply for filing the action. View "Vaughan v. Lewisville Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law

This case concerns attorney misconduct in the Court-Supervised Settlement Program established in the wake of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil rig disaster. Appellant, a Louisiana attorney representing oil spill claimants in the settlement program, was accused of funneling money to a settlement program staff attorney through improper referral payments. In a disciplinary proceeding, the en banc Eastern District of Louisiana found that Appellant’s actions violated the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct and suspended him from practicing law before the Eastern District of Louisiana for one year. Appellant appealed, arguing that the en banc court misapplied the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct and abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sanction.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the en banc court’s order suspending Appellant from the practice of law for one year each for violations of Rule 1.5(e) and 8.4(a). The court affirmed the en banc court’s holding that Appellant violated Rule 8.4(d). Finally, the court remanded to the en banc court for further proceedings, noting on remand, the court is free to impose on Appellant whatever sanction it sees fit for the 8.4(d) violation, including but not limited to its previous one-year suspension. The court explained that the en banc court misapplied Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(e) and 8.4(a) but not Rule 8.4(d). Additionally, the en banc court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a one-year suspension on Appellant for his violation of 8.4(d). View "In re Jonathan Andry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Board for its refusal to waive the active practice requirement to accommodate his disability. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claim as barred by sovereign immunity.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims under the first prong of United States v. Georgia, because plaintiff did not allege any conduct that violates Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court explained that the active practice requirement ensures that applicants have both achieved and maintained the skill and knowledge required to practice law in Texas. By waiving this requirement to admit a lawyer who has neither passed the Texas bar exam nor practiced law for thirteen years would not inform the Board of whether plaintiff currently has the necessary knowledge and skill to practice law. Therefore, the modification plaintiff sought was not reasonable. The court did not reach the issue relied on by the district court. However, plaintiff's claims should have been dismissed without prejudice and thus the court modified the district court's dismissal. View "Block v. Texas Board of Law Examiners" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a physician licensed in Texas who worked part time at the Red Bluff Clinic in California, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of his Fourth Amendment rights when defendants, employees of the Texas Medical Board, executed an administrative subpoena instanter. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and rendered judgment for defendants. The court held that plaintiff failed to establish a cognizable interest in the subpoenaed records and thus he could not assert a Fourth Amendment claim. View "Barry v. Freshour" on Justia Law

Texas's special tolling rule in Hughes v. Mahoney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. 1991), which suspends the statute of limitations on legal malpractice claims until completion of the litigation from which they arise, does not extend to actions against public adjusters. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action alleging negligence and breach of contract based on defendants' failure to submit proof of loss timely to Fidelity. The court held that plaintiff's claims could not implicate the unique relationship that triggered the bright-line rule from Hughes. The court reasoned that only Texas has the power to say where lawyering ends and adjusting begins, just as its courts have the sole power to decide Hughes's outer bounds. Because Texas law was clear, the court rejected plaintiff's alternative requests for certification of the issue to the Texas Supreme Court. View "Bloom v. Aftermath Public Adjusters, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims against defendant as premature. Plaintiffs alleged that Eisner, seeking to maintain its relationship with Leveraged and some related funds, participated in a scheme to trick plaintiffs into waiving their redemption rights. Louisiana has established a public accountant review panel to review claims against certified public accountants and accounting firms, and plaintiffs conceded that they did not seek panel review before filing suit. The court held that the district court dismissed plaintiffs' suit as premature because they failed to seek pre-suit review by the Louisiana public accountant review panel pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes 37:105. Accordingly, the court remanded for the district court to decide in the first instance whether defendants were entitled to dismissal with prejudice. View "Firefighters' Retirement System v. EisnerAmper, LLP" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's accounting malpractice claims against GT as premature. The court held that plaintiffs' claims against GT were premature because they did not submit them before an accountant review panel prior to filing this lawsuit. The court also held that plaintiffs' claims against GT were time-barred under the relevant preemptive period. Therefore, all of plaintiffs' accounting malpractice claims must be dismissed with prejudice because they were filed outside the relevant preemptive period and thus were extinguished. View "Firefighters' Retirement System v. Grant Thornton, LLP" on Justia Law