Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants marketed fraudulent franchise opportunities to foreign nationals seeking to invest in the United States to obtain residency visas. The complaint included claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and state-law claims for fraud, breach of contract, and malpractice. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants misrepresented the nature of the investment opportunities, leading the plaintiffs to believe they were purchasing franchises that would qualify them for E-2 or EB-5 visas. Instead, they received licenses that did not meet visa requirements, resulting in financial losses and visa application issues.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The court found that the plaintiffs did not adequately allege a cognizable enterprise under RICO and failed to meet the heightened pleading standards for fraud under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The district court also denied the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint, citing undue delay and the plaintiffs' failure to provide a proposed amended complaint or additional facts that would cure the deficiencies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the plaintiffs failed to plead a RICO enterprise, as the complaint did not provide sufficient factual detail to support the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise. The court also upheld the dismissal of the fraud and fraudulent inducement claims, finding that the plaintiffs did not meet the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b). Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of leave to amend the complaint and the dismissal of claims against certain defendants for failure to effect timely service of process. View "Crosswell v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Federal agents received a tip about methamphetamine being stored at a house in El Paso, Texas. An informant arranged a controlled buy with Carla Dominguez, who confirmed she had methamphetamine for sale. Dominguez and her husband, Samuel Crittenden, were observed by agents; Crittenden retrieved a bag from the house and handed it to Dominguez, who was later intercepted by police with ten pounds of methamphetamine. Crittenden admitted to storing items at the house and giving a bag to Dominguez, claiming he thought it contained marijuana. Additional drugs were found in the attic of the house.Crittenden and Dominguez were charged with conspiracy to possess and distribute methamphetamine and marijuana. The government raised a potential conflict of interest with Crittenden’s attorney, Leonard Morales, who also represented another individual involved in drug activities. The district court held a Garcia hearing, where Crittenden waived his right to conflict-free counsel. The court accepted the waiver, and the trial proceeded. Crittenden was convicted on all counts, but the district court later granted a new trial due to insufficient evidence. The Fifth Circuit reinstated the conviction for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and remanded for sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Crittenden’s appeal, where he argued that the district court erred in accepting his waiver of conflict-free counsel and in denying a lesser-included-offense instruction for simple possession. The Fifth Circuit found that Crittenden’s waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, and that the district court did not err in accepting it. The court also held that the evidence overwhelmingly indicated intent to distribute, making a lesser-included-offense instruction for simple possession inappropriate. The court affirmed the district court’s decisions and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Crittenden" on Justia Law

In 2020, Mix Creative Learning Center, an art studio offering children's art lessons, began selling online art kits during the pandemic. These kits included reproductions of artworks from Michel Keck's Dog Art series. Keck sued Mix Creative and its proprietor for copyright and trademark infringement, seeking enhanced statutory damages for willful infringement.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas found that the fair use defense applied to the copyright claim and granted summary judgment to Mix Creative. The court also granted summary judgment on the trademark claim, even though Mix Creative had not sought it. Following this, the district court awarded fees and costs to Mix Creative under 17 U.S.C. § 505 but declined to hold Keck’s trial counsel jointly and severally liable for the fee award under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that the fair use defense applied because Mix Creative’s use was transformative and unlikely to harm the market for Keck’s works. The court also found that any error in the district court’s sua sponte grant of summary judgment on the trademark claim was harmless, given the parties' concession that the arguments for the copyright claim applied to the trademark claim. Lastly, the appellate court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees to Mix Creative or in refusing to hold Keck’s attorneys jointly and severally liable for the fee award. View "Keck v. Mix Creative Learning Center" on Justia Law

Ryan Haygood, a dentist in Louisiana, faced an investigation by the Louisiana State Board of Dentistry, which led to the revocation of his dental license in 2010. Haygood alleged that competing dentists conspired with Board members to drive him out of business by fabricating complaints and manipulating the Board's proceedings. In 2012, a Louisiana appellate court vacated the Board's revocation of Haygood's license, citing due process violations. Haygood then entered a consent decree with the Board, allowing him to keep his license.Haygood filed a civil action in state court in 2011, alleging due process violations and unfair competition. In 2013, he filed a similar federal lawsuit, claiming violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (LUTPA). The federal district court dismissed the federal complaint, ruling that the § 1983 claim was time-barred and the LUTPA claim was not plausible. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to the defendants, deeming both claims frivolous.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision to award attorney’s fees for the frivolous § 1983 claim, agreeing that it was clearly time-barred. However, the appellate court found that the district court erred in calculating the fee amount. The district court had properly calculated $98,666.50 for the defendants' private attorneys but improperly awarded $11,594.66 for the Louisiana Attorney General’s office without using the lodestar method. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit remitted the fee award to $98,666.50 while affirming the decision to award fees. View "Haygood v. Morrison" on Justia Law

Keiland Construction, L.L.C. entered into a construction subcontract with Weeks Marine, Inc. for a project in Louisiana. Weeks terminated the contract for convenience, leading to a dispute over compensation. Keiland submitted pay applications and demobilization costs, which Weeks partially paid. The disagreement centered on whether the contract required lump-sum payments for work completed before termination or if it converted to a cost-plus basis upon termination.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana held a bench trial and found the contract ambiguous. It construed the ambiguity against Keiland, the drafter, and ruled in favor of Weeks. The court awarded Keiland damages based on Weeks’s interpretation of the contract but denied Keiland’s claims for direct employee and demobilization costs. The court also awarded Weeks attorneys’ fees and costs, though less than requested, and denied Weeks’s motion for post-offer-of-judgment fees and costs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s findings, agreeing that the contract was ambiguous and that the ambiguity should be construed against Keiland. The appellate court upheld the district court’s rulings on damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs, including the denial of post-offer-of-judgment fees and costs. The court also affirmed the award of prejudgment interest to Keiland, finding no abuse of discretion.In summary, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects, including the interpretation of the contract, the award of damages, attorneys’ fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. View "Keiland Construction v. Weeks Marine" on Justia Law

The case involves Sharon Lewis, an African-American woman who worked as an assistant athletic director for Louisiana State University’s (LSU) football team. Lewis alleges that she experienced and witnessed numerous instances of racist and sexist misconduct from former head football coach Les Miles and that she received complaints of sexual harassment from student workers that she oversaw. In 2013, LSU retained Vicki Crochet and Robert Barton, partners of the law firm Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Phillips LLP, to conduct a Title IX investigation of sexual harassment allegations made against Miles. The report and its contents were kept confidential, and allegations brought by the student complainants were privately settled.The district court dismissed Lewis's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) claims against Crochet and Barton because Lewis’s claims were time-barred and she failed to establish proximate causation. On appeal of the dismissal order, a panel of this court affirmed the district court on the grounds that Lewis knew of her injuries from alleged racketeering as early as 2013, and thus the four-year statute of limitations had expired before she filed suit in 2021.The district court ordered Lewis to file a motion to compel addressing the lingering “issues of discoverability and the application of [its Crime-Fraud Exception Order].” The district court denied Crochet and Barton’s motion for a protective order and compelled the depositions of Crochet and Barton and the disclosure of documents drafted during the 2013 investigation. Crochet and Barton timely appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s Crime-Fraud Exception Order and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The court concluded that the district court clearly erred in holding that Lewis established a prima facie case that the Board violated La. R.S. 14:132(B) and that the alleged privileged communications were made in furtherance of the crime and reasonably related to the alleged violation. View "Lewis v. Crochet" on Justia Law

The case involves the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New Orleans ("Archdiocese") which sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief due to numerous lawsuits alleging sexual abuse by priests. The United States Trustee appointed an Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors ("Committee"), which included the appellants. The appellants' attorney, Richard Trahant, violated a protective order by disclosing confidential information related to abuse allegations against a priest. The bankruptcy court found Trahant's breach to be a disruption to the bankruptcy process and ordered the removal of Trahant's clients, the appellants, from the Committee.The appellants appealed their removal from the Committee to the district court, arguing that the district judge who was originally assigned their appeal should have recused himself earlier. The district court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the appellants lacked standing to appeal their removal from the Committee. The appellants then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. It found that the district court did not err in declining to vacate the judgment, and the appellants lacked standing under Article III to prosecute this appeal. The court held that the appellants failed to demonstrate an injury to any legally protected interest. Their substantive rights as creditors in the bankruptcy case were not impaired by their removal from the Committee. The court also noted that the bankruptcy court's order did not amount to a personal sanction against the appellants, but was a consequence of the conduct of their attorney. View "Adams v. Roman Catholic Church" on Justia Law

Levi Rudder, a non-lawyer, was sanctioned by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas for engaging in unauthorized practice of law. Rudder had contacted a detainee facing federal firearm charges and attempted to involve himself in the case, despite being told not to by the defense counsel. He held an unprivileged, monitored video meeting with the detainee, offered legal advice, and encouraged the detainee to sign a form appointing him as additional counsel. The district court found Rudder guilty of unauthorized practice of law and imposed a monetary sanction of $500. He was also barred from filing documents in the Northern District of Texas without the court's permission.Rudder appealed the decision, arguing that the district court lacked the authority to impose these sanctions. He contended that the Constitution does not afford federal courts inherent powers to sanction individuals for engaging in unauthorized practice of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed with Rudder's argument. The court cited previous cases that established federal courts' inherent power to police the conduct of litigants and attorneys who appear before them. The court also noted that a party cannot be represented by a non-lawyer and that a minimum level of competence is required to protect the client, their adversaries, and the court from poorly drafted, inarticulate, or vexatious claims. Therefore, the court concluded that a federal court's power to regulate and discipline attorneys extends to conduct by non-lawyers amounting to practicing law without a license. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sanctions on Rudder and affirmed the lower court's decision. View "In re: Rudder" on Justia Law

In September 2020, George Fluitt was indicted on three counts of fraud and offering kickbacks related to genetic testing services that his company, Specialty Drug Testing LLC, provided to Medicare beneficiaries. As part of a nationwide investigation into genetic testing fraud, the Government executed search warrants at laboratories referred to as the Hurricane Shoals Entities (“HSE”), allegedly operated by Khalid Satary. The Government copied several terabytes of data from HSE, some of which were later determined to be material to Fluitt’s defense.In the lower courts, the Government established a “Filter Team” to review materials seized in its investigation and identify any that might be privileged. The Filter Team’s review was governed in part by a Protocol Order, which established a multi-step process for notifying a third party that it might have a claim of privilege and then adjudicating that claim. HSE and Satary provided privilege logs to the Filter Team, asserting thousands of claims of privilege. Both Fluitt and the Filter Team found these privilege logs to be facially deficient as they made only threadbare assertions of privilege, without any accompanying explanation.In the United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit, the court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the appellants failed to establish their claims of privilege. The court also found that the appellants' argument that they are not bound by the Protocol Order was a red herring, as the magistrate judge evaluated the appellants’ privilege logs under the standards established by federal caselaw. The court also rejected the appellants' argument that Fluitt “has not shown a need for the documents” and has not “demonstrated any kind of relevancy.” The court found that the record suggests that Fluitt “has a need” for the potentially privileged documents, as the Government determined that the potentially privileged materials were material to preparing Fluitt’s defense. View "United States v. Fluitt" on Justia Law

Danny Richard Rivers, an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, filed a second habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 while his first petition was still pending on appeal. The second petition challenged the same convictions as the first but added new claims. Rivers argued that these new claims arose after he was able to review his attorney-client file, which he had long requested and only received after a successful state bar grievance adjudication against his counsel. The district court deemed the second petition "successive" under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which requires an applicant to first get authorization from the appropriate court of appeals for such a petition. The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition without such authorization and transferred the matter to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.Rivers appealed the district court's transfer order, arguing that his second petition should have been construed as a motion to amend his first petition since it was still pending on appeal. He also contended that his claims should not have been considered successive because his counsel withheld his client file that would have allegedly exposed his ineffective assistance, and this information was not available to him when he filed his first petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed with Rivers' arguments. The court found that Rivers' second petition attacked the same conviction as his first petition and added several new claims that stemmed from the proceedings already at issue in his first petition. The court held that the fact that Rivers' later-obtained client file allegedly contained information that was not available to him when he filed his first petition did not excuse him from meeting the standards for seeking authorization under § 2244. The court also held that the timing of Rivers' second petition did not permit him to circumvent the requirements for filing successive petitions under § 2244. The court affirmed the district court's order transferring the matter to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction. View "Rivers v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law