Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Ronald Norweathers was convicted by a jury and sentenced to 250 months’ imprisonment for possessing and distributing child pornography. He claimed that he was acting under the direction of an FBI agent, Joseph Bonsuk, who misled him into collecting and forwarding child pornography as part of a nonexistent undercover operation. The jury rejected his defense, and his post-trial motions and direct appeal were unsuccessful. Norweathers then moved to vacate his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request certain jury instructions and for not calling a computer forensics expert as a witness. The district court denied his motion without a hearing.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied Norweathers’s § 2255 motion, finding that his claims lacked merit. The court concluded that the failure to request an apparent authority or entrapment by estoppel jury instruction was immaterial because Norweathers’s testimony did not establish reasonable reliance on a government agent’s authority. The court also dismissed his claim regarding the computer forensics expert, deeming it insufficiently cogent to suggest constitutional error.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Norweathers’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims were without merit. It found that his testimony did not support a reasonable reliance on Bonsuk’s authority, making the jury instructions irrelevant. Additionally, the court determined that the decision not to call the computer forensics expert was a strategic choice within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. The court concluded that Norweathers failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of a different result had the expert testified, and thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion without an evidentiary hearing. View "Norweathers v USA" on Justia Law

Members of a local union sued their national parent organization for imposing an illegal trusteeship. The plaintiffs, members of NABET-CWA Local 41, claimed that the national union imposed the trusteeship in bad faith following a local officer election. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and issued a temporary restraining order, later converting it into a preliminary injunction. The parties eventually settled, resulting in a consent judgment that dissolved the trusteeship and required the national union to pay Local 41 approximately $26,000 in trusteeship costs. The only unresolved issue was whether the plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys' fees.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied the plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees. The court acknowledged its broad discretion and the American Rule, which presumes against fee shifting. It considered two exceptions: bad faith and common benefit. The court found that while the national union acted in bad faith in imposing the trusteeship, both parties litigated the dispute in good faith, thus not justifying fee shifting. Additionally, the court recognized that the plaintiffs conferred common benefits on Local 41 and the national union but concluded that these benefits were not substantial enough to merit an award of attorneys' fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court affirmed the district court's ruling, finding that the lower court had appropriately applied the American Rule and its exceptions. The district court's decision to deny attorneys' fees was deemed reasonable and within its broad discretion, as it provided a sound explanation for its conclusions. The appellate court emphasized the highly deferential standard of review for such decisions and upheld the district court's judgment. View "Siddiqui v National Association of Broadcast Employees & Tec" on Justia Law

William Hudson was convicted in Wisconsin state court of conspiracy to commit first-degree intentional homicide and conspiracy to commit arson. The convictions stemmed from an agreement Hudson made with another inmate, Scott Seal, to kill Seal’s ex-girlfriend and commit arson in exchange for payment. Seal, however, was an informant. After Hudson was released, he met with an undercover officer posing as Seal’s defense attorney, accepted an envelope with $6,000 and the targets' addresses, and was arrested. Hudson claimed he never intended to commit the crimes but was trying to scam Seal to support himself and his sister, Dana Hudson.Hudson filed a direct appeal alleging outrageous governmental conduct and ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not arguing the government’s conduct. The Wisconsin circuit court denied postconviction relief, and the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied review. Hudson then filed a postconviction motion under Section 974.06, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not calling Dana as a witness and not investigating her testimony. The Wisconsin circuit court held evidentiary hearings and denied relief, finding counsel’s performance was not deficient. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed, and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied review.Hudson filed a habeas petition in federal court, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel and postconviction counsel. The district court denied the petition, holding that the state court had not misapplied Strickland v. Washington and that trial counsel’s performance satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that even if counsel’s performance was deficient, Hudson failed to demonstrate that the deficiencies prejudiced the outcome of the case. View "Hudson v DeHaan" on Justia Law

Bellin Memorial Hospital hired Kinsey & Kinsey, Inc. to upgrade its computer software. Kinsey failed to implement the agreed-upon software, leading Bellin to sue Kinsey in Wisconsin state court for breach of contract and other claims. Bellin also sued Kinsey’s president and a senior product consultant. Kinsey’s insurer, Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company, provided a defense under a professional liability insurance policy. During the trial, Bellin and Philadelphia Indemnity entered into a partial settlement, resolving some claims and specifying the conditions under which Bellin could collect damages from Kinsey. Bellin prevailed at trial and was awarded damages.The Wisconsin circuit court ruled that the limited liability provision in the Agreement did not apply due to Kinsey’s material breach. The court granted a directed verdict on the breach of contract claim against Kinsey, leaving the question of damages to the jury. The jury awarded Bellin $1.39 million, later reduced to $750,000 plus costs. The jury found Kinsey and its president not liable for intentional misrepresentation and misleading representation.Philadelphia Indemnity filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking a declaration that the state court’s judgment was covered by the insurance policy and that the $1 million settlement offset the $750,000 judgment. The district court ruled for Bellin, concluding that the state court judgment was not covered by the insurance policy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the insurance policy covered only negligent acts, errors, or omissions, and the state court’s judgment was based on a breach of contract, not negligence. Therefore, the $1 million set-off provision did not apply, and Bellin could recover the full amount of the judgment. View "Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. v Kinsey & Kinsey, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, West Bend filed a legal malpractice action based on the performance of attorney Schumacher and his firm, RLGZ, in a 2005-2006 workers’ compensation matter. The parties agreed to a dismissal of that claim and entered into a tolling agreement pending the resolution of related actions. After the resolution of those claims, West Bend filed a malpractice suit against Schumacher in 2013. The district court dismissed the first and an amended complaint, concluding that the allegations were too speculative or vague. The court stated that allegations about failure to depose a doctor, failure to contact witnesses prior to the hearing, the disclosure of certain facts to opposing counsel, and that Schumacher had represented that West Bend would accept liability, did not explain “how any of these alleged acts and omissions harmed its defense.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The complaint did not adequately plead a claim for legal malpractice under Illinois law; it fails to allege plausibly that the outcome of the underlying action would have been more favorable to West Bend, had it not been for Schumacher’s alleged litigation conduct View "West Bend Mutual Insurance Co v. Schumacher" on Justia Law

When Chelsea was five months old, she was dropped and suffered a skull fracture. As the fracture expanded, a cyst formed. The fracture and cyst were not a problem until, at age 17, she was hit in the head and suffered a loss of consciousness, blurred vision, and dizziness. After CT and MRI scans confirmed the extent of the fracture and the cyst, Chelsea underwent “cranioplasty” surgery. She was discharged after one day and was found dead in her bed three days later. A board‐certified forensic pathologist was unable to identify a cause of death and, based on the opinion of a neuropathologist, concluded that Chelsea had died from a seizure brought about by surgical damage. Neither doctor was aware of or had reviewed the pre‐surgery CT and MRI scans when they made their findings. Chelsea’s mother sued the hospital and doctors, arguing that anti-seizure medicine should have been prescribed. The defendants argued that no seizure had occurred and that a heart‐related ailment was the likely cause of death. A jury found in the defendants’ favor. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that one defense expert lacked the requisite qualifications to opine that a heart ailment was the likely cause of death and that there was a significant chance that the erroneous admission of the testimony affected the trial’s outcome. View "Hall v. Flannery" on Justia Law

The Joyce law firm purchased professional liability insurance from Professionals Direct. In 2007 the firm won a large damages award for a class of securities-fraud plaintiffs and hired another law firm to sue to collect the money from the defendant’s insurers. Some class members thought the Joyce firm should have handled enforcement of the judgment itself under the terms of its contingency-fee agreement. They took the firm to arbitration over the extra fees incurred. Professionals Direct paid for the firm’s defense in the arbitration. After the arbitrator found for the clients and ordered the firm to reimburse some of the fees they had paid, the insurer refused a demand for indemnification. The district judge sided with the insurer, concluding that the award was a “sanction” under the policy’s exclusion for “fines, sanctions, penalties, punitive damages or any damages resulting from the multiplication of compensatory damages.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the arbitration award was not functionally a sanction, another provision in the policy excludes “claim[s] for legal fees, costs or disbursements paid or owed to you.” Because the arbitration award adjusted the attorney’s fees owed to the firm in the underlying securities-fraud class action, the “legal fees” exclusion applies. View "Edward T. Joyce & Assocs. v. Prof'ls Direct Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Illinois attorney Jahrling was contacted and paid by attorney Rywak to prepare documents for the sale of 90-year-old Cora’s home. Rywak’s clients paid $35,000 for Cora’s property, which was worth at least $106,000 and was later resold by the purchasers for $145,000. Cora later alleged he understood that he would keep a life estate to live in the upstairs apartment of the home rent-free. Jahrling’s sale documents did not include that life estate. Jahrling and Cora could not communicate directly and privately because Cora spoke only Polish and Jahrling spoke no Polish. Jahrling relied on counsel for the adverse parties for all communication with Cora. After the buyers tried to evict Cora, Cora sued Jahrling in state court for legal malpractice. After a partial settlement with a third party and offsets, the court awarded Cora’s estate $26,000, plus costs. Jahrling filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. Cora’s estate filed an adversary proceeding alleging that the judgment was not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(4) because the debt was the result of defalcation by the debtor acting as a fiduciary. The bankruptcy court found in favor of the estate. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.Jahrling’s egregious breaches of his fiduciary duty were reckless and the resulting malpractice judgment is not dischargeable. View "Jahrling v. Estate of Cora" on Justia Law

Hassebrock hired the Bernhoft Law Firm in 2005 to help with legal problems, including a federal criminal tax investigation, a civil case for investment losses, and a claim against Hassebrock’s previous lawyers for fees withheld from a settlement. Hassebrock was ultimately found guilty, sentenced to 36 months in prison, and ordered to pay a fine and almost $1 million in restitution. In 2008, Hassebrock fired the Bernhoft firm. In a malpractice suit against the Bernhoft attorneys and accountants, Hassebrock waited until after discovery closed to file an expert-witness disclosure, then belatedly moved for an extension. The court denied the motion and disallowed the expert, resulting in summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the judge should have applied the disclosure deadline specified in FRCP 26(a)(2)(D) rather than the discovery deadline set by court order. The disclosure deadline specified in Rule 26(a)(2)(D) is just a default deadline; the court’s scheduling order controls. It was well within the judge’s discretion to reject the excuses offered by Hassebrock to explain the tardy disclosure. Because expert testimony is necessary to prove professional malpractice, summary judgment was proper as to all defendants. View "Hassebrock v. Bernhoft" on Justia Law

In 1988, Department of Professional Regulation investigator visited Gekas, a Springfield, Illinois dentist, and expressed concern that Gekas had administered nitrous oxide to a child. He ordered Gekas to provide information on all prescriptions on a continuing basis. Gekas contacted Deputy Governor Riley for assistance. After a meeting, the Department imposed less onerous requirements. In 2002, a Department investigator raided Gekas’ offices, with the assistance of the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency. After failed negotiations, the Department issued a cease and desist order against Gekas for the unlicensed practice of medicine and prescribing controlled substances while not a licensed physician and sought to have his license suspended, on grounds that Gekas had prescribed 4,600 doses of Hydrocodone and Vicoprofen to a patient. Gekas contacted his Senator. In 2008, the cease-and-desist was vacated and the complaint dismissed. Gekas submitted a FOIA request concerning the administrative complaint. The Department responded that no public documents were available. In 2009, Gekas filed suit; it was dismissed by stipulation in 2010. Meanwhile, a Chairman on the Illinois Board of Dentistry issued subpoenas against Gekas, stating that there was reasonable cause to believe that Gekas had violated the Illinois Dental Practice Act. Gekas filed suit, alleging First Amendment retaliation. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, finding no evidence of retaliatory motive. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Gekas v. Vasiliades" on Justia Law