Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Edwin Leo Brown was indicted in October 2016 on four counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The government had evidence of Brown selling cocaine base and discovered a firearm upon his arrest. Brown faced up to 90 years in prison. His attorney, Frank Harper, initially advised him that he was likely facing up to 120 months’ imprisonment and presented two plea agreements limiting his prison exposure to ten years. Brown, skeptical of Harper’s advice, did not trust him and Harper withdrew as counsel. Brett Wentz then became Brown’s attorney and erroneously advised him that his sentencing exposure would be the same whether he accepted a plea deal or not. Brown rejected the plea offers and later pleaded guilty to all counts, receiving a 210-month sentence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina found that Brown’s attorney performed deficiently but concluded that Brown failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by his attorney’s advice. The magistrate judge recommended denying Brown’s motion to vacate his sentence, stating that Brown presented no contemporaneous evidence to support his claim that he would have accepted the plea agreement if properly advised. The district court adopted this recommendation and denied Brown’s motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and found that the district court erred in applying the standard from Lee v. United States, which concerns accepted plea deals, to Brown’s case involving a rejected plea deal. The Fourth Circuit held that Brown demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea offer if properly advised, given the significant disparity between the plea offer and the sentence he received. The court reversed the district court’s denial of relief, remanded the case, and required the government to re-offer Brown the same plea agreements. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

James Ervin pleaded guilty to possessing a semi-automatic rifle as a convicted felon, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He later sought to withdraw his guilty plea through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and that the government provided false inculpatory information about the rifle. Ervin's arguments centered on the interpretation of the phrase “in or affecting commerce” in § 922(g).The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied Ervin's motion to vacate his plea. The court found that the rifle had traveled in interstate commerce, thus meeting the statutory requirement. Ervin's ineffective assistance claim failed because he could not establish prejudice, as the firearm's interstate travel was sufficient to satisfy the commerce element of § 922(g). The court also denied his motion for reconsideration and his request for a certificate of appealability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the phrase “in or affecting commerce” in § 922(g) should be interpreted broadly, consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Scarborough v. United States. The court found that the rifle, which traveled from North Carolina to Louisiana, Georgia, and back to North Carolina, met the interstate commerce requirement. Consequently, Ervin's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations were rejected. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Ervin's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, concluding that his interpretation of the statute was incorrect and that his defense would have been meritless. View "United States v. Ervin" on Justia Law

Christine Sugar filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the Eastern District of North Carolina in September 2019. Her confirmed bankruptcy plan required her to make monthly payments and prohibited the sale of non-exempt property valued over $10,000 without court approval. Despite this, Sugar sold her residence without obtaining prior court authorization, believing it was fully exempt based on her attorney's advice. The sale resulted in proceeds of approximately $94,000.The bankruptcy court found that Sugar's sale of her residence violated the confirmed plan and the local bankruptcy rule. The court dismissed her Chapter 13 case and barred her from filing another bankruptcy application for five years. Additionally, the court imposed monetary sanctions on her attorney, Travis P. Sasser, for advising her incorrectly and for his conduct during the proceedings.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina affirmed the bankruptcy court's findings and sanctions. Sugar and Sasser appealed the decision, arguing that the local rule was invalid, the property was exempt, and that paying off the plan balance entitled Sugar to immediate discharge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the bankruptcy court's determination that Sugar violated the local rule by selling her residence without prior court approval. However, it vacated the judgment dismissing Sugar's Chapter 13 case and the five-year filing bar, remanding the case for the bankruptcy court to consider the effect of Sugar's reliance on her attorney's advice. The court affirmed the monetary sanctions against Sasser, finding that his advice and conduct warranted the penalties imposed. View "Sugar v. Burnett" on Justia Law