Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Texas
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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court that two expert reports provided to support Plaintiff's claims for negligence provided the information required by the Texas Medical Liability Act, Tex. Civ. Proc. & Rem. Code 74.351(a), (l), (r)(6), holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss.Plaintiff, the guardian of a care facility resident, sued Defendant, the facility, alleging negligence. The trial court concluded that the two expert reports provided by Plaintiff to support the claims provided a fair summary of the experts' opinion regarding the standard of care, breach, and the cause of injury, as required by the Act. The court of appeals reversed on the ground that the reports lacked sufficient detail regarding the appropriate standard of care and breach. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the proffered reports provided a fair summary of the experts' opinions as to the appropriate standard of care and breach of that standard. View "Uriegas v. Kenmar Residential HCS Services, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the district court denying Winstead PC's motion to dismiss USA Lending Group, Inc.'s malpractice claim brought under the Texas Citizens Participation Act in this legal malpractice case, holding that Winstead presented prima facie evidence sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.USA Lending hired Winstead PC to sue USA Lending's former employee. Later, USA Lending sued Winstead and its attorney seeking more than $1 million in damages, alleging that Winstead's malpractice caused USA Lending to forfeit its claim for monetary damages. Winstead filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the lawsuit was based on its exercise of the right to petition. The district court denied the motion, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that USA Lending adduced prima facie evidence to support its claim for legal malpractice. View "USA Lending Group, Inc. v. Winstead PC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that the Texas Medical Board is not required by federal law or permitted by Texas law to merely revise an initial report of a temporary sanction, rather than void it, when the Board later finds that the allegations have not been proved.Federal and State law require the Board to report a disciplinary action against a physician to the National Practitioner Data Bank to restrict the ability of incompetent physicians to move from state to state. The Board issued a temporary sanction against Dr. Robert Wayne Van Boven while it investigated misconduct allegations. The Board then issued a final order concluding that Van Boven was not subject to sanctions. Van Bovcen brought this ultra vires action against Board officials directing them to file a Void Report with the Data Bank, which would remove the initial report against him and a subsequent revision-to-action report from disclosure. The trial court denied Defendants' plea to the jurisdiction asserting sovereign immunity. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board officials' actions in this case were ultra vires and that the officials were not immune from Van Boven's claims. View "Van Boven v. Freshour" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals that the attorney-immunity defense was inapplicable to federal wiretap claims but reversed and rendered judgment for the defendant-attorney on Plaintiffs' state wiretap claims, holding that the attorney-immunity defense was inapplicable to the federal wiretap claims but did attach to the state wiretap claims.Plaintiffs brought this private party civil suit asserting that Defendant and others had violated the federal and Texas wiretap statutes by using and disclosing illegally intercepted electronic communications. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that she was immune from liability as a matter of law because Plaintiffs' claims all stemmed from her role as an attorney in a modification proceeding. The trial court agreed and rendered summary judgment for Defendant. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Defendant was entitled to summary judgment on the state wiretapping claims; but (2) Defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on the claims under the federal wiretap statute because this Court is not convinced that federal courts would apply Texas's common-law attorney-immunity defense to that statute. View "Taylor v. Tolbert" on Justia Law

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In this medical malpractice case the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court denying Defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a timely-served expert report demonstrated a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of the Texas Medical Liability Act.Plaintiffs brought this case alleging that negligent perinatal care during labor and delivery caused their infant's brain damage and other serious health conditions. On the infant's behalf, Plaintiffs sued their treating physician and other healthcare providers and served expert reports on Defendants, including a report by Dr. James Balducci, an obstetrician. Plaintiff's treating physician filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals reversed and dismissed the claims against the treating physician with prejudice on the grounds that Dr. Balducci's report was insufficient to support Plaintiffs' healthcare liability claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the expert report satisfied the "fair summary" standard in Tex. Civ. Proc. & Rem. Code 74.351(l), (r)(6). View "E.D. v Texas Health Care, PLLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1991), does not continue to toll the limitations period when a co-party of a malpractice plaintiff pursues the appeal in a higher court but the malpractice plaintiff does not participate in that stage of the proceedings.In Hughes, the Supreme Court held that when an attorney commits malpractice in either the prosecution or defense of a claim that results in litigation, the statute of limitations on the malpractice claim against the attorney is tolled until all appeals on the underlying claim are exhausted. In this case, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant for legal malpractice in the underlying proceedings. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant on limitations grounds, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Hughes tolling applies only to all appeals in which the malpractice plaintiff participates; and (2) Plaintiff's malpractice claim was barred by limitations. View "Zive v. Sandberg" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the district court in favor of Plaintiff in this medical negligence action, holding that the district court erred in how it structured periodic payments after applying the periodic-payments statute in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 74, Subchapter K to Plaintiff's award of future medical expenses.Plaintiff, the mother of A.M.A., brought this action on his behalf alleging that, upon A.M.A.'s delivery, the nurses' delay in summoning the obstetrician when A.M.A.'s heartrate dropped to nondetectable levels for extended periods caused his cerebral palsy. The jury found for A.M.A.and awarded $1.208 million for future healthcare expenses after he turns eighteen. The trial judge applied the periodic payment statute to the award. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that the district court erred in the way that it structured the periodic payments. View "Columbia Valley Healthcare System, L.P. v. A.M.A." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court denying Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's medical negligence claims, holding that Texas Medical Liability Act applied, and therefore, Plaintiff's failure to serve an expert report on Defendants was fatal to her claims.At issue was (1) whether Plaintiff's claims that Defendants negligently administered various treatments that caused scarring and discoloration to her skin constituted "health care liability claims" under the Act, and (2) whether the Act prohibited Plaintiff from filing an amended petition after the Act's deadline for serving expert reports. The Supreme Court held (1) Plaintiff's claims constituted health care liability claims subject to the Act's expert report requirements; (2) the Act did not prohibit Plaintiff from filing an amended petition; and (3) because Plaintiff failed timely to serve an expert report, Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed under the Act. View "Lake Jackson Medical Spa, Ltd. v. Gaytan" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that 42 U.S.C. 1983 preempted the expert report requirement in the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA), set forth in Chapter 74 Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, holding that the court of appeals erred in this respect.The claims in this case were asserted against a state mental health facility and its employees arising from the death of a patient. The claims were pleaded as claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. In response, Defendants asserted that Plaintiff's claims were healthcare liability claims subject to the requirements of the TMLA. Defendants then moved to dismiss the claims for failure to serve an expert report under section 74.351(b). The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that all of Plaintiff's claims were healthcare liability claims but that section 1983 preempted the expert report requirement of the TMLA. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the court of appeals correctly determined that all of the causes of action Plaintiff asserted were healthcare liability claims under the TMLA; but (2) section 1983 does not preempt the TMLA's expert report requirement, and the court of appeals erred in holding otherwise. View "Rogers v. Bagley" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the court of appeals' judgment declaring that the rules issued by the Texas Board of Chiropractic Examiners authorizing chiropractors to perform an eye-movement test for neurological problems known as VONT, holding that the challenged rules do not exceed the statutory scope of the chiropractic practice.The Texas Chiropractic Act defines the practice of chiropractic to include evaluating the musculoskeletal system and improving the subluxation complex. In 2006, the Board adopted a rule defining both terms as involving nerves in addition to muscles and bones. In 2010, the Board adopted a rule authorizing chiropractors to perform vestibular-ocular-nystagmus testing, or VONT. The Texas Medical Association (TMA) challenged the rules in court. The court of appeals concluded that the rules exceeded the scope of practice prescribed in the Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the challenged provisions are valid. View "Texas Board of Chiropractic Examiners v. Texas Medical Ass'n" on Justia Law