Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the district court entering summary judgment in this action concerning the assignability of the proceeds from a legal malpractice action, holding that the district court properly invalidated the assignment at issue.In question was the assignment of proceeds to an adverse party in the underlying litigation from which the alleged legal malpractice arose. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) public policy prohibits an assignment of proceeds from a legal malpractice claim to an adversary in the underlying litigation; (2) the district court properly invalidated the assignment at issue; and (3) an invalid assignment does not, by itself, preclude an injured client from pursuing a legal malpractice claim if the assignment has been set aside. View "Beavor v. Tomsheck" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint for failure to attach an affidavit of merit after concluding that her allegations sounded in professional negligence, holding that remand for further proceedings was required.At issue in this case was the relationship between Nevada's professional negligence statutes, Nev. Rev. Stat. Ch. 41A, and Nevada's elder abuse statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.1395, and the statutes' application to claims against skilled nursing home facilities. The district court concluded that Plaintiff's allegations sounded in professional negligence, which claims require Plaintiffs to include an affidavit of merit as part of their complaint, and then dismissed the complaint for failure to attach such an affidavit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) on the face of Plaintiff's complaint it was unclear whether the gravamen of her claims sounded in professional negligence rather than elder abuse; and (2) remand was required for further factual development before such a determination can be reached. View "Yafchak v. South Las Vegas Medical Investors, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing this action for professional negligence, holding that Plaintiff's failure to include an affidavit from a medical expert in her complaint rendered her medical malpractice claim void ab initio.At issue was Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.100(1)(a), which allows an exemption from the requirement that an action for professional negligence be filed with an affidavit from a medical expert, when "[a] foreign substance other than medication or a prosthetic device was unintentionally left within the body of a patient following surgery." The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Plaintiff's medical malpractice claim was not exempt from the affidavit requirement and that Plaintiff's premises liability claim sounded in medical malpractice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 41A.100(1)(a) is unambiguous and does not include bacteria in the definition of foreign substance; and (2) Plaintiff's premises liability claim sounded in medical malpractice. View "Montanez v. Sparks Family Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the "common knowledge" exception to the affidavit requirement for professional negligence claims against a provider of health care can also be applied to determine whether a claim that appears to sound in professional negligence, and does not fall under Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.100, actually sounds in ordinary negligence and thus is not subject to Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071.A nursing home nurse mistakenly administered morphine to a patient that had been prescribed for another patient. The patient died three days later from morphine intoxication. The patient's estate sued the nursing home but did not explicitly assert any claim for professional negligence or file an expert affidavit under section 41A.071. The district court granted summary judgment for the nursing home, concluding that the complaint's allegations sounded in professional negligence and, therefore, the estate was required to file an expert affidavit. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the mistaken administration of another patient's morphine constituted ordinary negligence that a lay juror could assess without expert testimony, and such a claim is not subject to section 41A.071's medical expert affidavit requirement; and (2) the district court correctly granted summary judgment on the allegations regarding the failure to monitor, as those allegations required expert testimony to support. View "Estate of Mary Curtis v. Las Vegas Medical Investors, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court dismissing Appellant's complaint because he filed it, though he did not serve it, without an affidavit and expert report, holding that an initial pleading filed under Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.258(1) is void ab initio only when it is served without a concurrent filing of the required attorney affidavit and expert report.In dismissing Appellant's complaint the district court relief on a statement in Otak Nevada, LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 260 P.3d 408 (2011), that "a pleading filed under [section] 11.258 without the required affidavit and expert report is void ab initio." The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order granting the motion to dismiss and remanded the matter to the district court for further consideration, holding that a pleading is void ab initio under section 11.258(1) only where the pleading is served without a concurrent filing of the required attorney affidavit and expert report, not where the pleading is merely filed. View "Reif v. Aries Consultants, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents, a real estate appraisal company and a professional real estate appraiser, as to Appellants' allegations that Respondents' negligence prevented them from refinancing their home loan, holding that Appellants' claims lacked evidentiary support and were based on little more than conclusory allegations and accusations.After purchasing a home, Appellants brought this action against Respondents asserting claims for professional negligence, negligent misrepresentation, breach of the statutory duty to disclose a material fact, and breach of contract as third-party beneficiaries. Specifically, Appellants alleged that Respondents negligently relied on inaccurate information in calculating the home's size and market value, which resulted in a misleading appraisal report and inflated purchase price. The district court granted summary judgment for Respondents. The Supreme Court affirmed and took the opportunity of this case to emphasize the important role of summary judgment in promoting sound judicial economy. View "Boesiger v. Desert Appraisals, LLC" on Justia Law

In this legal malpractice action the Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court dismissing Appellants' claims, holding that the district court erred by finding that Appellants' claims against Respondents were time barred by Nevada's statute of limitations for legal malpractice claims.Appellants filed a complaint in Nevada's federal district court claiming legal malpractice as to Charles Damus, Esq. The federal court granted Damus' motion to dismiss. While the federal action was ongoing Appellants entered into a legal services agreement with Respondents. Appellants later filed a malpractice complaint in state court against Respondents arguing that Respondents failed to sue Damus in state court. At issue was the interplay between Nevada's litigation malpractice tolling rule and 28 U.S.C. 1367(d), a federal tolling statute, on a legal malpractice claim. The district court granted Respondents' motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court held (1) 28 U.S.C. 1367(d) tolled claims brought by Appellants only until the claims were dismissed, and therefore, the district court erred by finding that Appellants' claims against Damus were tolled until the remaining claims in the federal action were also dismissed; and (2) the litigation malpractice tolling rule did not apply to the claims against Respondents, and therefore, the district court erred by finding that Appellants' claims against Respondents were time-barred. View "Kim v. Dickinson Wright, PLLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a physician’s due process rights do not attach at the investigative stage of a complaint made to the Nevada State Board of Medical Examiners (Board), thereby extending the holding in Hernandez v. Bennett-Haron, 287 P.3d 305 (Nev. 2012).Appellant, a physician, filed a writ petition and a motion for injunctive relief in the district court, arguing that the Board violated his due process rights by keeping a complaint filed against him and identity of the complainant confidential during its investigation. The district court denied relief. On appeal, Appellant argued that the Board’s investigative procedures violated his due process rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court appropriately applied Hernandez to find that the investigation did not require due process protection because it did not also adjudicate the complaint, and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for a preliminary injunction; and (2) the Board reasonably interpreted Nev. Rev. Stat. 630.336 to mean that the complaint and complainant may be kept confidential from the licensee. View "Sarfo v. State Board of Medical Examiners" on Justia Law

At issue in this civil lawsuit was whether a stipulation to a discovery schedule that expressly waived the usual requirement that written reports be produced and exchanged summarizing the anticipated testimony of all expert witnesses designated to appear at trial continued when the district court entered a scheduling order that extended the deadline of identifying expert witnesses but said nothing about whether the stipulation to waive expert reports continued in effect or not.The Supreme Court held (1) the intent of the parties controlled the duration and scope of the stipulation; and (2) in the absence of any intention that the stipulation be deemed to have been superseded by the new order, the stipulation should be read to continue in effect until and unless expressly vacated either by the court or by a subsequent agreement between the parties. View "Dechambeau v. Balkenbush" on Justia Law

Tower Homes, LLC retained William Heaton and his law firm (collectively, Heaton) for legal guidance in developing a residential common ownership project. The project eventually failed, and Tower Homes entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. The plan of reorganization and confirmation order stated that the trustee and bankruptcy estate retained all legal claims. The trustee subsequently entered into a stipulation with a group of creditors (collectively, the Creditors) permitting the Creditors to pursue any legal malpractice claims in the Tower Homes’ name. The bankruptcy court then entered an order authorizing the trustee to permit the Creditors to pursue Tower Homes’ legal malpractice claim in Tower Homes’ name. The Creditors subsequently filed a legal malpractice lawsuit against Heaton, naming Tower Homes as plaintiff. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Heaton, concluding that the stipulation and order constituted an impermissible assignment of a legal malpractice claim to the Creditors. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the stipulation and order constituted an assignment, which is prohibited under Nevada law; and (2) the Creditors may bring a debtor’s legal malpractice claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 1123(b)(3)(B) when certain conditions are met, but those conditions were not met in this case. View "Tower Homes, LLC v. Heaton" on Justia Law