Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

In this case, the petitioner, Aaron W., appealed an order from the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia (ICA) that dismissed his appeal of a family court order. The family court had disqualified Aaron W.'s attorney from representing him in a divorce proceeding due to a conflict of interest, as the attorney had previously represented both parties in a related personal injury case. The family court's order included language indicating it was a final, appealable order.Initially, Aaron W. sought a writ of prohibition from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County to prevent the family court from ruling on the disqualification motion, arguing that the family court lacked jurisdiction. The circuit court denied the writ, and the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed, holding that family courts have the authority to disqualify attorneys in cases of conflict of interest.Aaron W. then appealed the family court's disqualification order to the ICA, which dismissed the appeal, concluding that the order was interlocutory and that it lacked jurisdiction over such appeals. Aaron W. subsequently appealed the ICA's dismissal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the ICA's dismissal, holding that the family court's disqualification order was not a final order because it did not terminate the litigation on the merits. The court explained that the ICA generally does not have appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals, as specified by West Virginia Code § 51-11-4(d)(8). The court also noted that the family court's inclusion of finality language in its order did not transform the interlocutory order into a final, appealable order. Consequently, the ICA correctly dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Aaron W. v. Evelyn W." on Justia Law

The case involves a petition for a writ of prohibition filed by Judge Timothy L. Sweeney of the Circuit Court of Pleasants County, West Virginia. The petition was filed against the Hearing Panel Subcommittee (HPS) of the West Virginia Lawyer Disciplinary Board (LDB) and several attorneys. The case stems from consolidated lawyer disciplinary proceedings concerning several lawyers who were involved with a program operated by the City of St. Marys, West Virginia, called “Slow Down for the Holidays.” The program allowed certain criminal charges to be dismissed in exchange for donations to benefit needy children and seniors during the holiday season. Judge Sweeney reported the program to the appropriate authorities, leading to disciplinary proceedings against the involved attorneys.The HPS granted a motion by one of the attorneys to depose Judge Sweeney, who then moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that the requested deposition testimony and documents were protected by the judicial deliberative privilege. The HPS denied the motion to quash, leading to Judge Sweeney's petition for a writ of prohibition.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted the writ of prohibition. The court found that the HPS clearly erred in ordering Judge Sweeney to submit to a deposition and produce documents. The court held that the testimony and records sought by the subpoena were protected by the judicial deliberative privilege. The court also found that the HPS erred in failing to hold a mandatory hearing pursuant to Hatcher v. McBride, which sets forth the limited circumstances in which judicial testimony may be compelled. The court concluded that the HPS exceeded its legitimate powers by ordering Judge Sweeney to appear for a deposition and produce documents. View "State ex rel. Sweeney v. Mundy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents in this medical negligence suit brought pursuant to the West Virginia Medical Professional Liability Act, holding that the circuit court did not err by granting summary judgment for Respondents.In his lawsuit, Petitioner claimed that Respondents overprescribed and improperly filled prescriptions for controlled substances that were known to have addictive qualities, causing him to develop an addiction to pain medication. Respondents filed motions to dismiss asserting that Petitioner's complaint was filed after the expiration of the relevant statute of limitations. The circuit court converted the motions to dismiss for motions for summary judgment and granted summary judgment for Respondents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by granting summary judgment for Respondents and dismissing the complaint. View "Sager v. Duvert" on Justia Law

In the underlying case asserting claims of accounting malpractice the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Petitioners' Rule 59(e) motion to amend or alter the court's order granting partial summary judgment to Respondents and denying Petitioners' Rule 60(b) motion for relief from an earlier circuit court order, holding that there was no error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court (1) did not abuse its discretion in summarily striking Petitioners' standard of care expert witnesses; (2) did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents when expert testimony on the standard of care was not required to prove all claims for relief asserted against Respondents; and (3) did not err in denying Petitioners' motion for relief from judgment or order. View "Chafin v. Boal" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders entered by the circuit court granting summary judgment to Defendants in the underlying action brought after investigators identified unsafe, non-sterile injection techniques, holding that the circuit court did not err.Plaintiffs, a pain management clinic and its physician, brought the underlying action alleging that the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, West Virginia Bureau for Public Health, and its former Commissioner and State Health Officer (collectively, the DHHR Defendants) breached their duty of confidentiality when they issued a press release announcing that Defendants used unsafe injection practices and encouraging Plaintiffs' patients to be tested for bloodborne illnesses. Plaintiffs also sued the West Virginia Board of Ostseopathic Medicine and its executive director (together, the BOM Defendants), asserting a due process claim for failing to timely provide a hearing after their summary suspension of the physician's medical license. The circuit court concluded that the DHHR defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and that the claim against the BOM defendants was barred by res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the circuit court's judgment. View "Chalifoux v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Resources" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition in this original jurisdiction case prohibiting the circuit court from enforcing its order denying Petitioner's motion to dismiss the amended complaint brought by Respondents, Angela and Denny Seth Lester, holding that the complaint failed to follow the pre-suit notice requirements set forth in the Medical Professional Liability Act, W. Va. Code 55-7B-1, et seq.Respondents sued Petitioner-hospital and other entities asserting that each negligently mishandled fetal remains following Angela's treatment at the hospital for a stillbirth. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that a stillborn fetus cannot be a "patient" under the MPLA, and therefore, Respondents were not required to comply with the MPLA's pre-suit notice requirements. View "State ex rel. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc. v. Honorable Thompson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of prohibition sought by the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DCR) that would effectively dismiss a wrongful death lawsuit filed against it by Mary Jane McComas, administratrix of the estate of Deanna McDonald, holding that DCR failed to establish that it was entitled to the writ.McComas, as administratrix of McDonald's estate, sued DCR alleging state law and common law claims and causes of action, including intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and wrongful death. DCR filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the amended complaint asserted claims sounding in medical professional liability under the Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA) that could not be brought against DCR. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, after which DCR filed its writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court denied the requested writ, holding that the MPLA does not apply to DCR, and therefore, the circuit court did not commit clear error as a matter of law in declining to dismiss the amended complaint. View "State ex rel. W. Va. Division of Corrections & Rehabilitation v. Honorable Ferguson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's professional malpractice claim brought under the West Virginia Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA), holding that the circuit court did not err in dismissing the claim with prejudice.Plaintiff sent to Defendant a notice of claim and certificate of merit consistent with the pre-suit notice requirements of the MPLA. Defendant neither requested pre-suit mediation nor declined it. Long after the expiration of the statute of limitations and any statutory tolling periods, Plaintiff received a response letter from Defendant explicitly declining pre-suit mediation. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed her claim. The circuit court dismissed the claim on the grounds that the MPLA does not permit an indefinite tolling of the statute of limitations to facilitate pre-suit mediation and there was no evidence of any affirmative conduct by Defendant that would have induced Plaintiff to delay filing her claim so as to equitably toll the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the circuit court's decision. View "Adkins v. Clark" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the circuit court's order granting Respondent's motion to dismiss this Petitioners' claims asserting, inter alia, medical negligence, res ipsa loquitur, and loss of consortium, but vacated the court's decision to grant the dismissal with prejudice, holding that the court erred in dismissing the action with prejudice.At issue on appeal was whether Petitioners' failure to serve a screening certificate of merit upon Respondent before filing their complaint warranted a dismissal of Petitioners' complaint with prejudice. The Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to proceed in this case due to Petitioners' failure to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements of the West Virginia Medical Professional Liability Act, W. Va. Code 55-7B-6; and (2) therefore, the circuit court properly dismissed the civil action, but erred in dismissing it with prejudice. View "Tanner v. Raybuck" on Justia Law

In this legal malpractice action, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court effectively granting summary judgment to Defendants, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that the continuous representation doctrine was not applicable to the facts presented in this case.The circuit court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that the applicable two-year statute of limitations on Plaintiff's claim had expired before the filing of his legal malpractice lawsuit. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in failing to apply the continuous representation doctrine to find that his complaint was timely filed. The Supreme Court converted the dismissal to summary judgment because the lower court considered matters outside the pleadings and affirmed, holding that because there was no continuing representation of Plaintiff by Defendants, the circuit court properly ruled that Plaintiff's complaint was time-barred. View "Hupp v. Monahan" on Justia Law