Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court consolidated two appeals related to the circuit court's summary judgment rulings in the professional negligence lawsuit brought by Michael and Madelynn Hoven against Banner Associates, Inc. and remanded for the circuit court to dismiss the suit, holding that it was untimely pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 15-2-13(1).The Hovens sued Banner for professional negligence. Banner moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Hovens' claims were barred by the relevant statute of limitations and the statute of repose. The circuit court granted summary judgment in part, holding (1) there were material issues of fact in dispute as to whether the statute of limitations had expired; and (2) there were material issues of fact in dispute on the Hovens' claims of fraudulent concealment. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred in concluding that S.D. Codified Laws 15-2A-3 was the only limitation period applicable to the Hovens' lawsuit and that S.D. Codified Laws 15-2-13 did not apply; (2) it was undisputed that the Hovens' lawsuit was not commenced within six years from the date their cause of action accrued; and (3) therefore, the circuit court is directed on remand to dismiss the Hovens' negligence suit against Banner as untimely. View "Hoven v. Banner Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court granting Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing Plaintiff's fraud and deceit claims, holding that the claims were time barred.Plaintiff sued a law firm and its attorneys, alleging legal malpractice, fraud and deceit related to their representation of Plaintiff on criminal charges. The circuit court granted judgment on the pleadings for Defendants, concluding that the claims were time-barred by the three-year statute of repose for legal malpractice under S.D. Codified Laws 15-2-14.2. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in dismissing the fraud and deceit claims because those claims were subject to a six-year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff's fraud and deceit claims were subsumed within his malpractice claim; and (2) therefore, all of Plaintiff's claims were precluded under the repose statute. View "Slota v. Imhoff" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the judgment of the circuit court entering summary judgment in favor of Attorney in this legal malpractice action and dismissing the action, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Attorney's amendment to her answer but erred in determining that Plaintiff's claims were untimely under S.D. Codified Laws 15-2-14.2.Plaintiff brought this action against Attorney and Law Firm arising from Attorney's representation of Plaintiff on a claim for personal injuries. The circuit court determined that the action was time barred by section 15-2-14.2 and dismissed the action. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not abuse its discretion by permitting Attorney to amend her answer to allege section 15-2-14.2 as an affirmative defense; but (2) erred in determining that this action was barred by the repose period under section 15-2-14.2. View "Robinson-Podoll v. Harmelink, Fox, & Ravnsborg Law Office" on Justia Law

In this legal malpractice action against Plaintiff's former attorneys the Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court granting one attorney's motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction and granted summary judgment in favor of all the former attorneys, holding that while the court erred when it dismissed one attorney for lack of personal jurisdiction it correctly granted summary judgment to that attorney and the other defendants.Plaintiff, a physician, filed this action against three attorneys he retained to prosecute a legal malpractice claim against his former divorce attorney. The court granted one attorney's motion to dismiss, finding it lacked personal jurisdiction due to insufficient minimum contacts in South Dakota. The court then granted summary judgment for all the defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court erred when it determined it did not have personal jurisdiction over one attorney because that attorney's conduct and connection with South Dakota were such that it could reasonably anticipate being haled into a South Dakota court; but (2) because Plaintiff failed to establish a submissible case of legal malpractice against the defendants the circuit court correctly granted summary judgment. View "Zhang v. Rasmus" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and in part reversed the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, a physical therapy company and a hospital, on Plaintiffs’ negligence claims, holding that the physical therapist failed to demonstrate an absence of any genuine issue of material fact.The plaintiff patient in this case was diagnosed with a fractured femur after a physical therapy session following her hip surgery. Plaintiffs, the patient and her husband, alleged that the physical therapist was negligent during the physical therapy session and that the hospital was negligent in failing timely to diagnose the fractured femur. The circuit court granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court correctly granted the hospital summary judgment because Plaintiffs were required to, but did not, support their claim with proper expert testimony; and (2) there was sufficient evidence in the record to create a material issue of fact concerning whether the physical therapist deviated from the required standard of care. View "Hanson v. Big Stone Therapies, Inc." on Justia Law

Total Auctions and Real Estate, LLC (Total Auctions) was a licensed automobile dealer that intended to hold automobile auctions in Lincoln County. Total Auctions met with a dealer agent employed by the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) on how to comply with the applicable law. Total Auctions informed the agent that its business plan included the sale of vehicles consigned from dealers outside Lincoln County, the county of Total Auctions’ place of business. The agent failed to inform Total Auctions that state law prohibited auctioning vehicles consigned from dealers outside Lincoln County. After incurring expenses setting up its business, Total Auctions was informed that there was a problem with the out-of-county consignments. Total Auctions sued the DMV agent, the DMV, its director, and the Department of Revenue and Regulation, alleging negligence and negligent supervision. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Total Auctions’ claimed damages were caused by the agent’s alleged misrepresentation of law, relief was barred as to all claims because misrepresentations of law are not actionable. View "Total Auctions & Real Estate, LLC v. S.D. Department of Revenue & Regulation" on Justia Law

Westside Gilts RE, LLC submitted an application to the Beadle County Planning Commission for a conditional use permit (CUP) to construct and operate a concentrated animal feeding operation. The Planning Commission recommended approval of the CUP. The Beadle County Board of Adjustment (Board) approved the CUP. Petitioners appealed, arguing that the Board was without authority to issue the CUP because the county zoning ordinances passed in 2011 (Ordinances), which authorized the Board to grant the permit, were improperly enacted. The circuit court reversed the Board’s decision granting the CUP, concluding that the Ordinances were improperly enacted. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court’s ruling reversing the Board’s decision to grant the CUP, holding that the Ordinances were invalid because the Planning Commission failed to comply with S.D. Codified Laws 11-2-18, and therefore, the Board lacked jurisdiction to grant a CUP; but (2) reversed the circuit court’s order declaring the Ordinances invalid, as the order exceeded the options available to the court under its limited scope of review on certiorari. View "Wedel v. Beadle County Comm’n" on Justia Law

Curley Haisch and his wife Rose owned Mulehead Ranch. Joe Duling was the Haisches' financial advisor as well as a realtor and broker. When Curley was ninety years old, he decided to sell the ranch and signed a listing agreement with Joe. Approximately one year later, Joe suggested that Curley and Rose form a charitable remainder trust (Trust) into which the ranch and chattels could be gifted. Curley and Rose executed the Trust, to which the Ranch was transferred. The Trustee then sold the Ranch to Joe and Lynne Duling. Later, it was discovered that the Trust contained multiple defects. The Trustee brought suit against the Dulings, their businesses, and the Mulehead Ranch on behalf of the Trust and the Haisches. The complaint alleged negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duties. A jury found in favor of the Trust awarded Plaintiffs $1,568,200, including punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded for a new trial on damages, holding (1) the circuit court erred in failing to give a proper instruction on the statutes of limitation applicable to Plaintiffs' claims for future tax consequences related to the defects in the Trust; and (2) the court did not err in the remainder of its judgment. View "Bailey v. Duling" on Justia Law

In a disciplinary proceeding, the South Dakota Real Estate Commission found that Cheri St. Pierre, a licensed broker associate, had engaged in unprofessional conduct involving dishonesty. The Commission suspended her license for one year, but held the suspension in abeyance on conditions, including the payment of a penalty and repayment of the Commission's attorney's fees. The circuit court reversed the Commission's conditional suspension. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and reinstated all terms of the Commission's conditional suspension except the provision requiring the repayment of the Commission's attorney's fees, holding (1) St. Pierre engaged in unprofessional conduct within the meaning of S.D. Codified Laws 36-21A-71(15); (2) the Commission was without authority to conditionally order St. Pierre to reimburse the Commission for its attorney's fees expenses as part of its discipline; and (3) the Commission had authority to order St. Pierre to pay a $1,000 penalty as a condition of avoiding a suspension. View "St. Pierre v. State ex rel. S.D. Real Estate Comm'n" on Justia Law