Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued defendants in Missouri state court, on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated borrowers, alleging that defendants engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Mo. Rev. State 484.020 when they charged certain fees in the course of refinancing plaintiff's mortgage. Defendants moved the suit to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d) and plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's judgment. The court held that plaintiff failed to show that she was charged any fees, directly or indirectly, for legal work performed by non-lawyers. Therefore, plaintiff had not shown injury and did not have standing to bring her claim. In light of plaintiff's lack of standing, the district court should have dismissed for lack of jurisdiction rather than reaching the merits of the summary judgment motion. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions that the action be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Hargis v. Access Capital Funding, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Tara Thomas filed a lawsuit against her former attorney, Grant Kidani. Kidani represented Thomas in a real estate dispute wherein the jury decided the case against Thomas. Following that trial, Thomas sued Kidani, alleging legal malpractice. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Kidani, and the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) the ICA applied an incorrect standard of review on appeal where it invoked the clearly erroneous standard rather than a de novo review of Kidani's motion for summary judgment; but (2) Kidani was entitled to summary judgment in this case because Thomas did not meet her burden of proving that she would have prevailed at trial. View "Thomas v. Kidani" on Justia Law

Ernie and Karen Cline sued M. Jay Carter for breach of contract after Carter signed a real estate contract with the intent to purchase residential property from the Clines but was unable to do so because he failed to obtain financing approval. Carter filed a third-party complaint against the real estate agent and company that represented him in the transaction (Jones Defendants). The circuit court consolidated the two lawsuits for trial. The jury returned a verdict (1) against Carter and in favor of the Clines on their breach of contract claim, and (2) against the Jones Defendants and in favor of Carter on Carter's negligence claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred by denying Carter's motion for a directed verdict and his subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because there was a condition precedent included in the real estate contract that required Carter to obtain financing for the purchase, which he was unable to do, and as a result, there was no contract. Remanded. View "Carter v. Cline" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Darrell Kasberg farmed piece of property leased from the Wheelers. The Wheelers agreed to loan Plaintiff money, using farmland he owned as collateral. When disagreements arose, the Wheelers threatened to evict Plaintiff from both his land and the leased land. On the day of the eviction trial, Plaintiff told his lawyer from Defendant firm Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP that he would be willing to give up his right to repurchase the leased farmland if the Wheelers would remove a crop lien placed on the land in time for him to meet a planting deadline. Plaintiff's lawyer met with the Wheelers' lawyer and they negotiated an oral settlement agreement. Plaintiff was not present at that meeting. The agreement required (amongst other things) that Plaintiff relinquish any interest or claim of interest in, and surrender possession of his collateral farmland. In exchange, the Wheelers agreed to dismiss their breach of contract action and to remove the lien. Plaintiff would later learn and inform his lawyer that the Wheelers had not removed the lien. This resulted in Plaintiff missing the planting deadline, and he lost an opportunity to receive both money from the sale of the crop and related government subsidies. Plaintiff wished to file an suit against the Wheelers for their handling of the crop lien, and approached his lawyer to handle the case. Though his lawyer lead Plaintiff to believe he would be successful in pursuit of the Wheelers, the lawyer had in reality given bad advice with regard to the statute of limitations that governed Plaintiff's suit. Plaintiff then initiated suit against his former lawyer and Defendant firm, alleging legal malpractice in handling the Wheeler lien dispute. The trial court decided that the facts did not present a genuine issue as to whether Plaintiff knew or should have known before he filed his action, that Defendant had negligently negotiated the oral settlement agreement. The court concluded that Plaintiff's action was thus time-barred. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Plaintiff proffered evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that he did not have actual knowledge that his attorney's acts or omissions were a cause of his damages. As such, the Court reversed the trial court's holding and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kaseberg v. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP" on Justia Law

A real estate agent served as the seller's agent for two sales of the same house. The initial purchaser submitted a bid for the house and, the same day, hired the initial seller's agent to serve as seller's agent for the second sale. A few days later, the agent convinced the initial seller to accept the initial purchaser's bid without disclosing his conflict of interest or the purchaser's interest in flipping the house. After one day of trial concerning the initial seller's complaint against the agent alleging, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duties, the trial judge granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The court held that because plaintiff raised issues of material fact concerning whether defendant breached his fiduciary duties to the seller, the court remanded the case for a new trial. View "Estate of Eller v. Bartron" on Justia Law

Respondent Atlantic Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC brought an action against Petitioner Laura Lewis for negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract.  In 2003, Petitioner, acting through a leasing agent, entered into a commercial lease whereby Respondent would lease from Petitioner property located in Beaufort County.  Although Petitioner represented in the lease that the property could lawfully be used for a building and construction office, the property was zoned "rural," meaning virtually all commercial uses were prohibited. Respondent occupied the property and made numerous alterations to it. A few months later, a Beaufort County zoning official served Respondent with notice and warning of two violations for Respondent's failure to obtain a certificate of zoning compliance before occupying the premises and its failure to obtain a sign permit before erecting a sign.  Respondent vacated the property, relocated its business, and ceased making rental payments. Respondent then instituted this action. Petitioner denied the allegations and made a counterclaim for breach of contract.  The master in equity entered judgment in favor of Respondent. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the master properly granted judgment in favor of Respondent. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Petitioner did not appeal all grounds on which the master's judgment was based.  Namely, she did not challenge the determination that Respondent was entitled to recover based on unjust enrichment.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the master-in-equity's and appellate court's decisions in favor of Respondent. View "Atlantic Coast Builders & Contractors v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Fox Rest Associates (Fox Rest) was formed to purchase Fox Rest Apartments. Defendants in this case were George Little, Fox Rest's legal counsel through his law firm, George B. Little and Associates (GBL&A), George Little's wife, and GBL&A. This action took place after Mr. Little sold the Apartments without knowledge of Fox Rest and transferred a portion of the proceeds from the sale in an account he held with Mrs. Little. Unable to satisfy a previous judgment finding Mr. Little and GLB&A liable to Fox Rest for, inter alia, malpractice and double billing, Fox Rest filed this action against Defendants, seeking to void various transactions by Mr. Little as fraudulent conveyances and voluntary conveyances. The court granted Defendants' motion to strike, finding that Fox Rest did not present sufficient evidence in its case in chief to establish a prima facie case for its claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that, except for a portion of the claims relating to the sale of certain equipment, the circuit court erred in striking Fox Rest's fraudulent conveyance and voluntary conveyance claims. Remanded. View "Fox Rest Assocs., L.P. v. Little" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendants, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the Alaska Department of Transportation (Alaska), and the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (Alyeska), in federal court, alleging causes of action for inverse condemnation, injunctive relief, nuisance, breach of fiduciary duties, and civil rights violations. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed the action against the BLM and Alaska on the basis of sovereign immunity. The court held that federal sovereign immunity barred plaintiff's inverse condemnation, injunctive relief, and civil rights violations claims against the United States, but that the Federal Tort Claims Act, 25 U.S.C. 345, could provide a waiver of the government sovereign immunity for plaintiff's nuisance and breach of fiduciary duties claims. Additionally, the court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred plaintiff's action against Alaska in its entirety. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded. View "Jachetta v. United States, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioners appealed from a Memorandum and Order and Final Order of Forfeiture entered by the district court dismissing their petition for an ancillary hearing and rejecting their claim as beneficiaries of a putative constructive trust in defendant's forfeiture assets. At issue was whether the remission provision of 21 U.S.C. 853(i) precluded the imposition of a constructive trust in petitioners' favor and whether imposing a constructive trust would be consistent with a forfeiture statutory scheme provided by section 853. Because the court concluded that section 853(i) did not preclude, as a matter of law, recognizing a constructive trust and because a constructive trust was not inconsistent with the forfeiture statute, the court vacated the Final Order of Forfeiture and remanded the case to the district court to consider whether, pursuant to Vermont law, a constructive trust should be recognized in favor of petitioners. View "United States v. MacKay, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition for dissolution in district court and the only contested issue between the parties was the valuation and division of the marital home and surrounding acreage, which was purchased for $45,000 in the mid-1990's. Petitioner had obtained a letter from a realtor stating that the marital home could be worth approximately $250,000-275,000 if the home was in good condition. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied petitioner's M.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) motion, which was filed after the district court found the marital home was valued at $22,423, where petitioner alleged that her attorney grossly neglected her case when she failed to identify the realtor as an expert, or any other qualified real estate expert, and failed to prepare any evidence for trial to reflect petitioner's estimated value of the marital home. The court held that under the unique circumstances, where the district court had a statutory obligation to equitably apportion the marital estate and petitioner's counsel totally failed to present evidence on the issue, the district court abused its discretion in denying her Rule 60(b)(6) motion and should have granted the motion, thereby allowing her to present evidence regarding the value of the marital home so that the district court could make an equitable distribution. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.