Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

In 2001, Alphonse Fletcher, Jr. acquired property associated with two apartment units in a residential cooperative corporation controlled by The Dakota, Inc. In 2008, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. approved a loan to Fletcher, secured by his rights in the property. Fletcher, Chase, and The Dakota entered into an agreement recognizing The Dakota's priority to proceeds from any sale or subletting of Fletcher's apartments. In 2011, Fletcher sued The Dakota for racial discrimination, and The Dakota counterclaimed for legal fees and costs based on Fletcher's proprietary lease.The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to The Dakota in the Fletcher action and awarded attorneys' fees and costs. While this action was pending, Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman, LLP initiated a CPLR 5225 proceeding against Chase, The Dakota, and Fletcher to seize and sell Fletcher's apartments to satisfy a judgment for unpaid legal fees. The Dakota claimed a superior interest in Fletcher's property based on the fee judgment, while Chase argued that The Dakota's lien was not superior and that the lease provision authorizing attorneys' fees was either inapplicable or unconscionable.The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to The Dakota, and the Appellate Division affirmed, stating that Chase's contentions were an impermissible collateral attack on The Dakota's judgment. Chase moved for leave to appeal and to intervene and vacate the judgment in the Fletcher action. The Supreme Court denied Chase's motion, but the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.The New York Court of Appeals held that Chase, as a nonparty to the original action, was not barred from challenging the fee award in a separate proceeding. The court concluded that Chase was not required to intervene in the Fletcher action to protect its interests and that doing so would violate Chase's due process rights. The order of the Appellate Division was reversed, and the matter was remitted for further proceedings. View "Matter of Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman, LLP v JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Gary Everett Martin obtained a home-equity line of credit (HELOC) from BBVA USA Bancshares, Inc. (BBVA) in May 2008, secured by a mortgage on his residential property. In June 2008, Martin hired Joseph T. Scarborough, Jr., and Scarborough & Griggs, LLC (S&G) for legal representation in a divorce action. In June 2012, Martin executed a promissory note in favor of S&G for legal fees, secured by a second mortgage on the property. The attorney-client relationship ended in June 2013, and the promissory note and mortgage were later assigned to Scarborough. In June 2019, BBVA foreclosed on the property, and Scarborough purchased it at the foreclosure sale.The Lee Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Scarborough, S&G, and BBVA, dismissing Martin's counterclaims and awarding possession of the property to Scarborough. The court found Martin's claims against the Scarborough parties time-barred under the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act (ALSLA) and dismissed his claims against BBVA as time-barred or unsupported by substantial evidence.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It found a genuine issue of material fact regarding the validity of the foreclosure sale, as the sale price was significantly lower than the property's fair market value, potentially indicating fraud or unfairness. Consequently, the court reversed the summary judgment in favor of Scarborough on his ejectment claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the Scarborough parties and BBVA regarding Martin's counterclaims, finding them time-barred or unsupported by substantial evidence. View "Martin v. Scarborough" on Justia Law

Three petitioners sought to quiet title in mineral rights for parcels of land in McKenzie and Williams Counties, North Dakota. They argued that the state relinquished any claim to these mineral rights when a specific chapter of the North Dakota Century Code became effective in 2017. The petitioners claimed that the state abandoned the minerals, making them available for claim, and that they had claimed them by filing the lawsuit.In the McKenzie County case, the petitioners attempted service by publication on unknown persons. Wesley and Barbara Lindvig answered, claiming ownership of the mineral rights. The petitioners' motions to strike the Lindvigs' answer and for default judgment were denied. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim and awarded attorney’s fees to the Lindvigs, concluding the action was frivolous. The petitioners appealed.In the Williams County case, the petitioners made similar claims. Wesley and Barbara Lindvig, along with Kenneth and Mary Schmidt, answered and moved to dismiss on several grounds, including improper service and lack of ownership by the petitioners. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and awarded attorney’s fees, finding the petition frivolous. The petitioners appealed.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the cases and affirmed the dismissals, holding that the petitioners had no interest in the disputed minerals and could not maintain a quiet title action. The court also affirmed the award of attorney’s fees to the Schmidts in the Williams County case. However, it reversed the award of attorney’s fees to the Lindvigs in both cases, remanding for further findings on whether the Lindvigs had a connection to the disputed mineral interests. View "Nelson v. Persons Unknown" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Sharon Mitzel, Alan Mitzel, and Eric Mitzel, filed a legal malpractice lawsuit against Vogel Law Firm and Jerilynn Brantner Adams, alleging negligence in a divorce action involving the disposition of land known as Section 19. Fred and Sharon Mitzel, who were married and had two sons, formed a family limited partnership and conveyed their farm, including Section 19, to it. During their divorce, they agreed that Section 19 would go to Fred, subject to deeding it to their sons upon his death. However, a subsequent quiet title action determined that the family partnership owned Section 19, nullifying the divorce judgment's property distribution.The District Court of Cass County granted partial summary judgment dismissing Alan and Eric Mitzel’s claims, ruling they lacked standing as non-clients to sue for legal malpractice. The court also granted judgment as a matter of law dismissing Sharon Mitzel’s claims, concluding she presented no evidence that she gave up any marital property to secure the agreement for Section 19 to be deeded to her sons upon Fred’s death. Sharon Mitzel’s claim for attorney’s fees and costs incurred due to Vogel’s alleged malpractice was also dismissed.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision to dismiss Alan and Eric Mitzel’s claims, agreeing they lacked standing. The court also upheld the measure of damages used by the lower court, which was based on what Sharon Mitzel gave up to secure Section 19 for her sons. However, the Supreme Court found that the lower court erred in determining Sharon Mitzel presented no evidence of incurring attorney’s fees and costs due to Vogel’s alleged malpractice. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Mitzel v. Vogel Law Firm" on Justia Law

A group of landowners (the Andersons) sued their neighbors (the Wilsons) over a property dispute involving access to remote parcels near a lake. The Andersons argued that a public easement existed over the Wilsons' property, providing access from a highway to their properties. They claimed this easement was established by patent, subdivision agreement, prescription, and under Revised Statute 2477 (RS 2477). The Wilsons contended that any access was permissive and private. The dispute arose after the Wilsons blocked access due to perceived excessive use by unauthorized individuals.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, held a 12-day bench trial. The court found in favor of the Wilsons, concluding that no public easement existed. It determined that the Andersons had only a private easement over the Wilsons' property. The court also awarded the Wilsons 75% of their attorney’s fees, finding them to be the prevailing party. The Andersons appealed both the easement determination and the attorney’s fee award.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. It affirmed the Superior Court's decision that no public easement existed, agreeing that the Andersons had not provided clear and convincing evidence of public use before the land was withdrawn from the public domain. The court also upheld the finding that no easement by implication, necessity, or estoppel existed. However, the Supreme Court vacated the attorney’s fee award and remanded it for further consideration. It found that the billing records were insufficiently detailed and included fees unrelated to the litigation. The court also noted that the hourly rates charged by the Wilsons' attorney were significantly higher than those customarily charged in the locality, requiring further examination of their reasonableness. View "Anderson v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kimberly Syre appealed an order denying her motion to disqualify California Indian Legal Services (CILS) from representing defendant Mark Douglas. Syre had initially contacted CILS seeking representation for a quiet title lawsuit against Douglas but was declined due to her non-residency in Inyo County. She later filed the lawsuit with other counsel. Douglas, who is homeless and the son of the late property owner Charlotte Willett, successfully obtained representation from CILS. Syre argued that CILS had a conflict of interest due to her prior contact with them.The Superior Court of Inyo County denied Syre's motion to disqualify CILS, finding no conflict of interest. The court noted that Syre had only spoken to a non-attorney intake advocate at CILS and that no confidential information was shared with any attorney at CILS. The intake advocate had merely gathered preliminary information to determine Syre's eligibility for CILS's services, which she did not meet. The court also found that CILS had adequate screening measures in place to protect any confidential information.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that Syre was a prospective client but did not communicate any confidential information to an attorney at CILS. The court emphasized that the information shared was preliminary and necessary to determine eligibility for CILS's services. Additionally, the court noted that public interest law offices like CILS are treated differently from private law firms regarding disqualification rules. The court concluded that there was no substantial relationship between Syre and any attorney at CILS and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to disqualify. View "Syre v. Douglas" on Justia Law

Timothy Upchurch engaged in a prolonged campaign of harassment against his neighbors, Timothy and Margaret O’Brien, over a disputed easement on their property. Upchurch was convicted of disorderly conduct, criminal damage to property, and theft after trespassing and stealing a security camera from the O’Briens. In retaliation, Upchurch filed a baseless RICO lawsuit against the O’Briens, their lawyer, the local district attorney, and three sheriff’s deputies, alleging interference with his claimed easement. The lawsuit was frivolous as Upchurch did not own an easement. Facing sanctions motions, Upchurch dropped the case, but the district judge awarded sanctions, ordering Upchurch and his attorney, Timothy Provis, to pay the defendants’ costs and attorney’s fees.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin handled the initial case. The court found Upchurch’s lawsuit to be without merit and filed for the purpose of harassment. The judge imposed sanctions under Rules 11 and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure due to the baseless nature of the claims and Upchurch’s failure to comply with discovery obligations. Upchurch and his attorney were ordered to pay the defendants’ costs and attorney’s fees, and Provis was required to disgorge any fees paid by Upchurch.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Upchurch’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as the notice of appeal was filed outside the 30-day statutory deadline. The court also found the appeal to be frivolous and granted the defendants’ motion for sanctions under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court held that Upchurch and Provis were jointly and severally liable for the costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in defending the appeal. The court directed the O’Briens and Lucareli to submit an accounting of their fees and costs within 15 days. View "Upchurch v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

Eric Bradley and Jacqueline Chuang filed a lawsuit in the Washtenaw Circuit Court against Linda Frye-Chaiken for breach of contract, specific performance, and promissory estoppel. The dispute arose from an agreement to sell a condominium in the Cayman Islands, which Frye-Chaiken later hesitated to complete following her mother's death. Frye-Chaiken claimed the contract was obtained through coercion or fraud and counterclaimed that her diminished capacity due to her mother's illness invalidated the agreement. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of Bradley and Chuang, ordering specific performance of the contract and dismissing Frye-Chaiken's counterclaims.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, supporting the summary disposition and the order for specific performance. Bradley and Chuang then sought sanctions, arguing that Frye-Chaiken's defenses and counterclaims were frivolous. Frye-Chaiken hired Barry Powers to represent her in the sanctions proceedings. The trial court awarded $16,714.27 in attorney fees to Bradley and Chuang, holding Frye-Chaiken, Powers, and her previous attorneys jointly and severally liable for the sanctions.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that under MCR 1.109(E) and MCL 600.2591, sanctions for frivolous filings should only be imposed on the attorney who signed the frivolous documents and the represented party. The court found that Powers did not sign any of the frivolous documents and was only involved in litigating the amount of sanctions. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by holding Powers jointly and severally liable for the sanctions. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Bradley v. Frye-Chaiken" on Justia Law

Keiland Construction, L.L.C. entered into a construction subcontract with Weeks Marine, Inc. for a project in Louisiana. Weeks terminated the contract for convenience, leading to a dispute over compensation. Keiland submitted pay applications and demobilization costs, which Weeks partially paid. The disagreement centered on whether the contract required lump-sum payments for work completed before termination or if it converted to a cost-plus basis upon termination.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana held a bench trial and found the contract ambiguous. It construed the ambiguity against Keiland, the drafter, and ruled in favor of Weeks. The court awarded Keiland damages based on Weeks’s interpretation of the contract but denied Keiland’s claims for direct employee and demobilization costs. The court also awarded Weeks attorneys’ fees and costs, though less than requested, and denied Weeks’s motion for post-offer-of-judgment fees and costs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s findings, agreeing that the contract was ambiguous and that the ambiguity should be construed against Keiland. The appellate court upheld the district court’s rulings on damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs, including the denial of post-offer-of-judgment fees and costs. The court also affirmed the award of prejudgment interest to Keiland, finding no abuse of discretion.In summary, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects, including the interpretation of the contract, the award of damages, attorneys’ fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. View "Keiland Construction v. Weeks Marine" on Justia Law

Lippa and Manmohan Grewal sold a gas station to Theodore Hansen, who later sold it to Junction Market Fairview, L.C. (JMF). The sale contract required Hansen to make regular installment payments, with the final balance due after three years. Hansen missed many payments and failed to pay the full balance when due. The Grewals initiated foreclosure proceedings over six years after Hansen's first missed payment. The applicable statute of limitations for a breach of contract action is six years, raising the question of when the statute begins to run for installment contracts.The Sixth District Court in Sanpete County granted partial summary judgment in favor of JMF, concluding that the statute of limitations began when Hansen missed the first payment, making the Grewals' foreclosure action too late. The court awarded sole control of the gas station to JMF and ordered the Grewals to release the title. When the Grewals failed to comply, JMF seized the station and sold it to a third party. The district court also awarded JMF attorney fees under the Public Waters Access Act and the reciprocal attorney fees statute.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the sale of the gas station to a third-party bona fide purchaser rendered the Grewals' appeal on the title issue moot, as no court action could affect the litigants' rights to the property. However, the issue of attorney fees was not moot. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to JMF under the reciprocal attorney fees statute. The court affirmed the award of attorney fees and remanded to the district court to determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees JMF incurred in defending against the appeal. View "Grewal v. Junction Market Fairview" on Justia Law