Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Patrick Gordon, an attorney, was suspended from the rosters of the Maine Commission on Public Defense Services, making him ineligible to represent indigent criminal defendants. The suspension followed an investigation into Gordon’s billing practices and representation of a client. The Commission received information suggesting that Gordon had inaccurately billed for a jury trial that was actually a bench trial and that some billed work was performed by others in his firm. Additionally, there were discrepancies regarding Gordon’s client visits.The Superior Court (Kennebec County) affirmed the Commission’s decision. The investigation began after the Commission received information from a post-conviction review counsel. Gordon was asked to provide documents and clarify billing discrepancies but failed to fully comply. Despite multiple requests and extensions, Gordon did not provide the requested documents or satisfactory explanations. The Commission’s Interim Executive Director, Justin Andrus, ultimately suspended Gordon, a decision upheld by the Commission after an intra-agency appeal.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court found that the Commission’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The evidence showed that Gordon failed to comply with the Commission’s requests, which were within the Commission’s authority. The investigation and subsequent suspension were justified based on Gordon’s non-compliance with the Commission’s rules. The Court concluded that the Commission’s decision was supported by evidence and did not reflect any abuse of discretion or erroneous findings of fact. View "Gordon v. Maine Commission on Public Defense Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Marco Destin, Inc., 1000 Highway 98 East Corp., E&T, Inc., and Panama Surf & Sport, Inc. (collectively, “Marco Destin”) filed a lawsuit against agents of L&L Wings, Inc. (“L&L”), alleging that a 2011 stipulated judgment in a trademark action was obtained through fraud. Marco Destin claimed that L&L had fraudulently procured a trademark registration from the USPTO, which was used to secure the judgment. They sought to vacate the 2011 judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3) and requested sanctions and damages.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. The court found that Marco Destin had a reasonable opportunity to uncover the alleged fraud during the initial litigation. Specifically, the court noted that the License Agreement between the parties indicated that other entities might have paramount rights to the "Wings" trademark, suggesting that Marco Destin could have discovered the fraud with due diligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal for abuse of discretion. The appellate court confirmed that the district court acted within its discretion in declining to vacate the 2011 stipulated judgment. The court emphasized that Marco Destin had a reasonable opportunity to uncover the alleged fraud during the initial litigation and that equitable relief under Rule 60(d)(3) requires a showing of due diligence. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s conclusion that Marco Destin could have discovered the fraud through proper diligence.The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding the dismissal of Marco Destin’s claims. View "Marco Destin, Inc. v. Levy" on Justia Law

A family of six Mexican citizens entered the United States without authorization and were subsequently placed in removal proceedings. They hired an attorney to help them apply for asylum. Despite having nearly fifteen months to prepare, the attorney requested a continuance only eight days before the hearing, citing the government shutdown as a reason for her lack of preparation. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied the continuance and, due to the attorney's unpreparedness, deemed the asylum applications abandoned, ordering the family's removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision.The family appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The court dismissed the cases of two family members due to lack of jurisdiction, as their removal proceedings had been terminated after they received special immigrant status. The remaining four family members argued that the IJ erred in denying the continuance and that their attorney was ineffective. The court found that the IJ did not abuse his discretion in denying the continuance, as the attorney had ample time to prepare and failed to do so. The court also noted that the attorney's unpreparedness did not violate the family's due process rights.Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court acknowledged the attorney's failure to prepare but noted that the family did not present this claim to the BIA, thus failing to exhaust administrative remedies. Consequently, the court could not consider the ineffective assistance claim. The court suggested that the family could seek to reopen the proceedings through a motion to reopen or by requesting equitable tolling of the deadline.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed the petitions of two family members and denied the petitions for review of the remaining four family members. View "Bustos-Millan v. Garland" on Justia Law

Timothy Upchurch engaged in a prolonged campaign of harassment against his neighbors, Timothy and Margaret O’Brien, over a disputed easement on their property. Upchurch was convicted of disorderly conduct, criminal damage to property, and theft after trespassing and stealing a security camera from the O’Briens. In retaliation, Upchurch filed a baseless RICO lawsuit against the O’Briens, their lawyer, the local district attorney, and three sheriff’s deputies, alleging interference with his claimed easement. The lawsuit was frivolous as Upchurch did not own an easement. Facing sanctions motions, Upchurch dropped the case, but the district judge awarded sanctions, ordering Upchurch and his attorney, Timothy Provis, to pay the defendants’ costs and attorney’s fees.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin handled the initial case. The court found Upchurch’s lawsuit to be without merit and filed for the purpose of harassment. The judge imposed sanctions under Rules 11 and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure due to the baseless nature of the claims and Upchurch’s failure to comply with discovery obligations. Upchurch and his attorney were ordered to pay the defendants’ costs and attorney’s fees, and Provis was required to disgorge any fees paid by Upchurch.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Upchurch’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as the notice of appeal was filed outside the 30-day statutory deadline. The court also found the appeal to be frivolous and granted the defendants’ motion for sanctions under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court held that Upchurch and Provis were jointly and severally liable for the costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in defending the appeal. The court directed the O’Briens and Lucareli to submit an accounting of their fees and costs within 15 days. View "Upchurch v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

Robert Mason Elliott was charged with multiple federal offenses, including possession of firearms, sexual exploitation of a minor, and plotting to murder the minor and her mother. Elliott retained Attorney Brandon Sample for his defense. Over a year into the representation, Sample discovered a controlled substance hidden in documents meant for Elliott and sought to withdraw from the case. The court, however, denied Sample's motion, emphasizing Elliott's right to counsel of his choice. Elliott later reached a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to five counts.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana initially handled the case. After Sample's motion to withdraw was denied, Elliott continued with Sample as his attorney. Elliott later filed a second motion to determine his mental competency, which the court granted, and he was found competent to stand trial. Elliott eventually entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to two counts of murder for hire, two counts of witness tampering, and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The court sentenced him to 520 months of imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Elliott argued that Sample had a conflict of interest and that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right by not informing him of this conflict, rendering his guilty plea involuntary. The appellate court held that Elliott's Sixth Amendment claim was not foreclosed by the appellate waiver in his plea agreement. However, the court concluded that even if Sample had a conflict of interest, Elliott could not demonstrate that he was adversely affected by it. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "USA v. Elliott" on Justia Law

June R. Crow-Johnson, an attorney admitted to practice law in Kansas in 1990, faced disciplinary proceedings for multiple violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) and Supreme Court Rules. Crow-Johnson was appointed as trustee of a trust in 2019 and failed to perform her fiduciary duties, including failing to communicate with beneficiaries, safeguard trust property, and file necessary tax returns. Additionally, she misrepresented her actions to the court and failed to cooperate with disciplinary investigations. Crow-Johnson also neglected to file tax returns for the Topeka Bar Association (TBA) and misled them about the status of these filings.The Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys conducted an evidentiary hearing and found that Crow-Johnson violated several KRPC rules, including diligence, communication, safekeeping property, candor toward the tribunal, and misconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The Board recommended disbarment based on these findings.The Supreme Court of Kansas reviewed the case and found clear and convincing evidence supporting the Board's findings. The court noted Crow-Johnson's failure to appear at oral arguments and her lack of cooperation throughout the disciplinary process. The court agreed with the Board's recommendation and ordered Crow-Johnson's disbarment, effective immediately. The court also ordered her name to be stricken from the roll of attorneys licensed to practice law in Kansas and assessed the costs of the proceedings to her. View "In re Crow-Johnson" on Justia Law

Grover D. James was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and criminal possession of a firearm for a 2015 incident where he fatally shot Leon McClennon at a birthday party in Wichita. Surveillance footage showed James entering a store basement with McClennon and others, and later walking past McClennon's collapsed body. James admitted to firing two shots but claimed he did not intend to hit anyone. Witnesses testified that the shooting was deliberate, and the jury found James guilty, sentencing him to a hard 50 life sentence for murder and a concurrent 21-month sentence for firearm possession.James filed multiple petitions for relief in the Sedgwick District Court, including claims of newly discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that an affidavit from a witness, Rance Kindred, recanting his statements to police warranted a new trial. The district court denied these petitions, finding that the evidence could have been produced at trial and was unlikely to change the outcome. James also claimed ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel, arguing that his attorneys failed to protect his speedy trial rights and did not adequately challenge continuances. The district court denied these claims without an evidentiary hearing.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that James did not meet the burden of showing that the newly discovered evidence could not have been produced at trial or that it would likely result in a different outcome. The court also found no merit in James' ineffective assistance claims, noting that his speedy trial rights were not violated and that his appellate counsel's performance was not deficient. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying James' motions and affirmed the denial of relief. View "State v. James" on Justia Law

James M. Briggs, Jr. was charged with two counts of second-degree assault for attacking two employees at the Lincoln Correctional Center (LCC) on April 21, 2021. The charges were based on allegations that Briggs punched one employee, Parwiz Masoodi, multiple times and kicked another employee, Desaray Kerns, in the face while they were trying to restrain him. Both employees sustained bruising and received emergency medical care.The District Court for Lancaster County held a jury trial in May 2023, where both victims testified, and security footage of the incident was presented. Briggs moved to dismiss the charges at the close of the State’s evidence, arguing insufficient evidence, but the court denied the motion. The jury found Briggs guilty on both counts. At sentencing, the court found Briggs to be a habitual criminal and sentenced him to two consecutive terms of 10 to 12 years’ imprisonment, with a 10-year mandatory minimum for each count.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. Briggs argued that the jury instructions were incorrect because they did not include "unlawful" as an element of the offense and that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to this omission. The court found that the instructions, when read as a whole, correctly stated the law and encompassed all material elements of the charged crime. Therefore, Briggs' counsel was not deficient.Briggs also contended that his counsel was ineffective for not informing the court of amendments to the habitual criminal statute that reduced the mandatory minimum sentence. The court noted that the amendments were not in effect at the time of sentencing, so counsel was not deficient. However, applying the rule from State v. Randolph, the court vacated Briggs' sentences and remanded for resentencing under the amended statute, which mitigated the punishment. The convictions were affirmed, but the sentences were vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Briggs" on Justia Law

Marcus Brown was convicted of theft by unlawful taking after he took two scissor lifts from a Menards distribution center. Brown, who had previously worked as a contractor for Menards, claimed he intended to borrow the lifts for a personal construction project and return them. The prosecution argued that Brown intended to permanently deprive Menards of the lifts, as he did not obtain formal permission or inform anyone at the distribution center of his actions. The lifts were recovered only after Menards' investigation and the involvement of law enforcement.The Douglas County District Court denied Brown's motion for a directed verdict and the jury found him guilty. The court sentenced Brown to 90 days in county jail followed by three years of probation, during which he was ordered to pay restitution of approximately $11,000. Brown appealed, arguing insufficient evidence to support his conviction, improper restitution order, and ineffective assistance of counsel.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Brown intended to deprive Menards of the lifts. However, the court identified plain error in the sentencing. The sentence imposed was a determinate sentence of 90 days in jail followed by probation, which is not authorized for a Class IIA felony. The court vacated Brown's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. The court did not address Brown's arguments regarding the restitution order due to the vacated sentence. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel related to witness bias and failure to contact other witnesses were deemed insufficiently supported by the record for review on direct appeal. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

The case involves a petitioner who filed a miscellaneous petition in Family Court concerning a child whose parents are the respondent and the late Christine Hasselbrock. The petitioner, who had a long-standing platonic relationship with Ms. Hasselbrock, provided financial and emotional support to her and her child. After Ms. Hasselbrock's death, the petitioner sought to be declared a de facto parent or to have other parental rights recognized, but the respondent denied him access to the child.Initially, the petitioner filed an amended verified petition in Family Court, asserting both statutory and common law claims for de facto parentage. The first hearing justice dismissed the statutory claim due to lack of standing, as the petitioner had never resided with the child. The justice indicated that the petitioner could pursue his common law claims on the miscellaneous calendar. Consequently, the petitioner filed a new miscellaneous petition asserting various common law claims, including de facto parentage, in loco parentis, and visitation rights.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Family Court's orders. The Court held that the Rhode Island Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) supersedes common law de facto parentage claims, as the statute explicitly outlines the criteria for establishing de facto parentage. The Court also found that the petitioner lacked standing to pursue claims for visitation based on being an "unrelated caregiver" or "de facto relative," as there is no statutory authority granting such rights. Additionally, the Court affirmed the denial of the respondent's motion for attorneys' fees, finding no basis for such an award. View "De Vries v. Gaudiana" on Justia Law