Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Correctional officers at an Illinois state prison brutally beat inmate Larry Earvin, who later died from his injuries. Todd Sheffler and two others were charged with various federal crimes related to the killing and its cover-up. After a mistrial, Sheffler was retried and found guilty by a jury.In the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, Sheffler was convicted on five counts, including conspiracy to deprive civil rights, deprivation of civil rights, conspiracy to engage in misleading conduct, obstruction-falsification of documents, and obstruction-misleading conduct. Sheffler argued that there was no reasonable likelihood that his incident report and interview with state police would reach federal officials, challenging his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1512 and § 1519. He also contended that the district court erred in ruling he breached a proffer agreement and allowed a biased juror to sit on his trial. Additionally, he claimed prosecutorial misconduct during the rebuttal closing argument.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that sufficient evidence supported Sheffler’s convictions, as it was reasonably likely that his false statements would reach federal officials, given the severity of the crime and the cooperation between state and federal authorities. The court also found no clear error in the district court’s conclusion that Sheffler breached the proffer agreement by making false statements during FBI interviews. Furthermore, the court determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in handling the juror bias issue or in denying Sheffler’s motion for a new trial based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Sheffler’s motion for a new trial and upheld his convictions. View "USA v Sheffler" on Justia Law

In 2005, James E. Cooke, Jr. was convicted of the rape and murder of Lindsey Bonistall, a University of Delaware student. Cooke's first conviction was overturned in 2009 due to his defense counsel's strategy, which conflicted with Cooke's plea of not guilty. Cooke was retried in 2012, where he represented himself initially but was later replaced by standby counsel due to his disruptive behavior. He was again convicted and sentenced to death, which was affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court in 2014.Cooke filed a motion for postconviction relief in 2015, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and other errors. The Superior Court denied his motion, leading to this appeal. Cooke argued that his second-trial counsel failed to explore his competency to stand trial, did not adequately investigate the case, and failed to object to the State's peremptory challenges during jury selection. He also claimed cumulative errors and procedural issues with the court's denial of his continuance requests and discovery limitations.The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the claims and found that Cooke's counsel acted reasonably given Cooke's insistence on testifying and his refusal to cooperate with mental health evaluations. The court also found that Cooke was competent to stand trial, and his counsel's decisions were within the bounds of reasonable professional assistance. The court held that Cooke's claims of cumulative error and procedural issues were without merit and affirmed the Superior Court's denial of postconviction relief. View "Cooke v. State" on Justia Law

Matthew A. LeFande, a suspended member of the District of Columbia Bar, was found by the Board on Professional Responsibility to have committed seven violations of the District of Columbia and Maryland Rules of Professional Responsibility. These violations stemmed from his involvement in several legal matters, including the District Title litigation, the Warren bankruptcy matter, the Carvalho bankruptcy matter, and his own personal bankruptcy. LeFande's misconduct included orchestrating a transfer of funds to conceal assets, filing frivolous bankruptcy petitions, making false statements to tribunals, and failing to comply with court orders.In the District Title litigation, LeFande represented Anita Warren and her son, Timothy Day, after District Title erroneously wired funds to Warren. LeFande directed the transfer of $82,051.81 to a New Zealand bank account, which was seen as an attempt to conceal assets. He later refused to comply with court orders to sit for a deposition, resulting in criminal and civil contempt findings. In the Warren bankruptcy matter, LeFande filed a petition to avoid deposition, which was deemed frivolous, leading to sanctions. In the Carvalho bankruptcy matter, LeFande's actions were found to be in bad faith, resulting in sanctions for frivolous filings and misrepresentations.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and agreed with the Board's findings of misconduct. The court noted that LeFande's actions were part of a prolonged pattern of dishonesty and interference with the administration of justice. Given the severity and persistence of his misconduct, along with his lack of remorse and failure to participate in the disciplinary process, the court concluded that disbarment was the appropriate sanction. The court ordered that Matthew A. LeFande be disbarred from the practice of law in the District of Columbia. View "In re LeFande" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Chris Robles and the California Voting Rights Initiative filed a lawsuit against the City of Ontario, alleging violations of the Voting Rights Act and the California Voting Rights Act by conducting at-large elections for city council members, which they claimed diluted the electoral influence of Latino voters. The parties eventually settled, agreeing to transition to district-based elections by 2024 and included a provision for attorney fees incurred up to that point.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County initially sustained the defendants' demurrer with leave to amend, but the parties settled and submitted a stipulated judgment. The stipulated judgment included a provision for $300,000 in attorney fees and outlined the process for transitioning to district elections. Plaintiffs later filed a motion to enforce the stipulated judgment, alleging the city violated several statutory requirements related to the districting process. The trial court found the city had not complied with the stipulated judgment but denied plaintiffs' request for additional attorney fees, stating the settlement did not provide for fees beyond those already paid.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to seek additional attorney fees under the plain language of the stipulated judgment, which allowed for fees incurred in enforcing its terms. The court reversed the trial court's order denying attorney fees and remanded the case to determine whether plaintiffs were prevailing parties and, if so, the appropriate amount of attorney fees to be awarded. The appellate court clarified that the trial court's assessment of the prevailing party should focus on whether the plaintiffs achieved their litigation objectives. View "Robles v. City of Ontario" on Justia Law

Enrique Sanchez, the petitioner, sought a writ of mandate to vacate a trial court order directing the San Bernardino County Public Defender to assign a new attorney to represent him. This order was issued after evidence suggested that the deputy public defender currently assigned to Sanchez's case made racially charged remarks during plea negotiations, potentially violating the Racial Justice Act (RJA). Sanchez argued that the trial court's decision was an abuse of discretion.The trial court received a motion from the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence and evaluate the deputy public defender's conflict of interest. The motion included a declaration from the prosecutor detailing the deputy public defender's remarks, which implied racial bias. During a closed hearing, the trial court read the prosecutor's declaration to Sanchez and asked if he wanted the current public defender to continue representing him. Sanchez expressed his desire to retain his current counsel. However, the trial court later ordered the public defender's office to assign a new attorney, citing potential RJA issues and the risk of ineffective assistance of counsel.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in removing the deputy public defender. The appellate court noted that the RJA's provisions and the potential for implicit bias created an actual conflict of interest that the deputy public defender could not objectively investigate. Additionally, the trial court's decision to prevent potential future RJA claims and ensure adequate representation was within its discretion. The petition for writ of mandate was denied, and the stay on trial court proceedings was vacated. View "Sanchez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Comedy Store, a stand-up comedy venue in Los Angeles, was forced to close for over a year due to COVID-19 restrictions. In July 2021, the Store hired Moss Adams LLP, an accounting firm, to help apply for a Shuttered Venue Operator Grant from the U.S. Small Business Administration. The parties signed an agreement that included a Washington choice of law provision and a forum selection clause mandating disputes be resolved in Washington state courts. The Store alleges Moss Adams failed to inform it of the grant program's impending expiration, causing the Store to miss the application deadline and lose an $8.5 million grant.The Store initially filed a complaint in the United States District Court in Los Angeles, but the case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Store then refiled in the Los Angeles Superior Court, asserting claims including gross negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. Moss Adams moved to dismiss or stay the action based on the forum selection clause. The trial court granted the motion, contingent on Moss Adams stipulating that the Store could exercise its right to a jury trial in Washington state. Moss Adams provided such a stipulation, and the trial court signed an order to that effect.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in failing to properly allocate the burden of proof to Moss Adams to show that litigating in Washington would not diminish the Store’s unwaivable right to a jury trial. The appellate court concluded that Moss Adams did not meet this burden, as it did not demonstrate that Washington law would provide the same or greater rights to a jury trial or that a Washington court would apply California law. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded with instructions to deny Moss Adams’s motion to dismiss or stay the action. View "The Comedy Store v. Moss Adams LLP" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute among co-trustees of The Pony Tracks Ranch Trust, specifically Allison Littlefield, her brothers David and Scott Littlefield, and her aunt Denise Sobel. Allison filed a petition alleging various grievances, including the removal of co-trustees, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of the Trust. She claimed that the co-trustees misused Trust funds, concealed information, converted her personal property, and restricted her and her husband's use of the Ranch. Additionally, she alleged that the co-trustees failed to address misconduct by an employee, Stacey Limbada, who had been hostile towards her and her husband.The San Mateo County Superior Court denied the appellants' special motion to strike under California's anti-SLAPP statute, which is designed to prevent lawsuits that chill the exercise of free speech and petition rights. The court found that the appellants did not meet their burden of showing that Allison's petition arose from protected activity. The court also denied Allison's request for attorney's fees, concluding that the anti-SLAPP motion was not frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the anti-SLAPP motion, agreeing that the appellants failed to demonstrate that the petition was based on protected activity. However, the appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of Allison's request for attorney's fees. The appellate court found that the anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous because it was entirely without merit, as no reasonable attorney would conclude that the petition sought to impose liability based on protected activity. The case was remanded for a determination of the appropriate award of attorney's fees for Allison. View "Littlefield v. Littlefield" on Justia Law

In September 2017, Attorney Karolyn Kovtun held a meeting with Jennifer Shenefield and her client Mark Shenefield, despite a criminal protective order prohibiting Mark from contacting Jennifer. During the meeting, Mark and Kovtun verbally and emotionally abused Jennifer, and Kovtun threatened to remove their daughter from Jennifer’s custody if she did not sign a custody agreement. Jennifer signed the agreement under duress and contacted the police. Kovtun continued to represent Mark, who was later convicted of violating the protective order. Kovtun then sued Jennifer for recording the meeting without consent, prompting Jennifer to file a cross-complaint against Kovtun.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Kovtun’s two anti-SLAPP motions and sustained her demurrer to two of Jennifer’s six causes of action. After a bench trial, the court found Kovtun liable for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation, awarding Jennifer $50,000 in damages. Mark did not appear at trial, and the court entered judgment against him, awarding Jennifer $250,000 in damages.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. Kovtun argued that Jennifer’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 and the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). The court concluded that Kovtun waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to timely and properly plead it. Additionally, the court determined that the litigation privilege did not apply to Kovtun’s communications. The judgment against Kovtun was affirmed. View "Shenefield v. Kovtun" on Justia Law

BrunoBuilt, Inc. contracted with William and Amy Dempsey to build a home in the Boise Foothills. With the help of insurance agent Randy L. Richardson, BrunoBuilt purchased a Tailored Protection Policy (TPP) from Auto-Owners Insurance Company, which included "Builders' Risk" coverage. The policy excluded damage caused by landslides. In 2016, the Dempsey project was not included in the TPP renewal, allegedly due to Richardson's negligence. Shortly after, the nearly completed Dempsey home was damaged by a landslide. BrunoBuilt sued Richardson and Auto-Owners, claiming Richardson negligently failed to advise about landslide coverage and failed to renew the Dempsey project. BrunoBuilt also claimed Auto-Owners was vicariously liable for Richardson's negligence.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho granted summary judgment in favor of Auto-Owners, concluding Richardson was not acting as Auto-Owners' agent and that the policy excluded landslide damage. BrunoBuilt appealed.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment. The court held that the 2015 policy, which excluded only naturally occurring landslides, might still apply because Auto-Owners did not provide the required notice of the reduction in coverage in the 2016 policy, which excluded both naturally occurring and human-caused landslides. The court also determined that Auto-Owners bore the burden of proving the applicability of the landslide exclusion. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the 2015 policy's coverage continued and whether Richardson was acting as Auto-Owners' agent when he failed to renew the policy. The court did not award attorney fees to either party. View "BrunoBuilt, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company" on Justia Law

A client sued its lawyer for legal malpractice after losing a case. The client had previously been sued for fraud and lost, resulting in a significant judgment against it. The client then assigned its malpractice claim against its lawyer to the opposing party in the fraud case, hoping to share in any recovery. However, the court had previously held that such assignments are generally not allowed because they can lead to a reversal of positions that is demeaning to the justice system.In the lower courts, the trial court found the lawyer negligent but not grossly negligent, and the jury awarded damages to the client. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that the client could pursue its own malpractice claim but reversed the directed verdict on gross negligence, remanding the case for a new trial. In the second trial, the jury again found the lawyer negligent and grossly negligent, awarding significant damages. The court of appeals reversed the judgment due to an improper jury instruction and remanded for a third trial.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the client could pursue its own malpractice claim despite the arrangement with the opposing party. The court found that while there was evidence of the lawyer's negligence, the evidence that the lawyer's negligence was the sole cause of the fraud judgment was conclusory. The court also held that there was no evidence of gross negligence. Therefore, the court affirmed the remand for a new trial on negligence but reversed the judgment on gross negligence, rendering a take-nothing judgment on that claim. View "HENRY S. MILLER COMMERCIAL COMPANY v. NEWSOM, TERRY & NEWSOM, LLP" on Justia Law