Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Michael G. Carson was convicted by a jury in the Emmet Circuit Court of multiple charges, including safebreaking, larceny, and conspiracy, after being accused of stealing money and personal property from his neighbor, Don Billings. Billings had allowed Carson and his girlfriend, Brandie DeGroff, access to his house to help sell items online, but later discovered that valuable items and cash were missing. Carson was arrested, and his cell phone was seized and searched, revealing incriminating text messages. Carson's defense counsel moved to suppress these messages, arguing the seizure of the phone without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment, but the motion was denied.Carson was sentenced to various prison terms for each conviction. He appealed, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for not challenging the search warrant's adequacy. The Court of Appeals reversed his convictions, ruling the search warrant was too broad and the good-faith exception did not apply. They also found trial counsel ineffective for not seeking exclusion of the phone's contents based on the warrant's broadness. The prosecution appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court.The Michigan Supreme Court held that the search warrant was insufficiently particular under the Fourth Amendment, as it allowed a general search of the phone's contents without meaningful limitations. However, the Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, concluding that Carson's counsel's performance was not constitutionally deficient given the evolving nature of Fourth Amendment law regarding digital data. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment on this point and remanded the case for consideration of Carson's remaining issues. View "People Of Michigan v. Carson" on Justia Law

Kenin Edwards was sentenced to 21 months’ imprisonment for tax fraud after a series of procedural complications. Edwards, who was represented by four different attorneys throughout the process, delayed his trial multiple times before pleading guilty. After his guilty plea, he fired his final attorney, decided to represent himself, recanted his admission of guilt, sought to vacate his plea, and filed numerous frivolous motions. The government, which had initially agreed to recommend a five-month split sentence, sought a 21-month sentence due to Edwards's conduct.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois handled the case. Edwards's initial attorneys withdrew due to a breakdown in strategy, and his subsequent attorney was disqualified due to a conflict of interest. Edwards then retained a fourth attorney, with whom he eventually reached a plea agreement. However, Edwards later discharged this attorney as well and chose to represent himself. The district court conducted a Faretta hearing to ensure Edwards's waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent. Despite Edwards's numerous pro se filings and attempts to withdraw his guilty plea, the district court denied his motions and sentenced him to 21 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Edwards argued that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the district court disqualified his attorney and allegedly forced him to proceed pro se at sentencing. He also claimed the government breached the plea agreement by recommending a higher sentence. The Seventh Circuit dismissed Edwards's appeal, finding that he had waived his right to appeal in his plea agreement. The court held that Edwards's claims did not fall within the exceptions to the appeal waiver and that the government did not breach the plea agreement. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law

A law firm, Sutter & Gillham PLLC, and its partners were involved in a contentious wrongful-death lawsuit in Arkansas, representing the family of a teenage boy who died from a gunshot wound. The family suspected foul play, while the boy's friends claimed it was suicide. The state court dismissed the case with prejudice, citing misconduct by the family and its attorneys. Although the firm had withdrawn from the case, it felt unfairly maligned by the court's order. One partner's attempt to intervene and seek recusal of the judge was denied, and no appeal was filed. The family successfully overturned the dismissal, and the case remains pending.The firm faced related litigation, including a state court lawsuit by the wrongful-death defendants against the firm and its partners for alleged misconduct. The firm also filed a federal lawsuit alleging constitutional violations by the wrongful-death defendants and their attorneys, claiming they conspired with the state trial judge. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas dismissed the case under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents federal courts from reviewing state court judgments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply because the federal lawsuit did not seek to overturn the state court judgment but rather targeted the actions of the defendants and their attorneys. The court emphasized that the doctrine only applies when a federal action is essentially an appeal of a state court decision. The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiffs to pursue their claims. View "Sutter & Gillham PLLC v. Henry" on Justia Law

In the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, Ohio ordered the closure of "non-essential businesses." A group of dance-studio owners filed a lawsuit in federal court, alleging that various state and local officials had violated their constitutional rights by issuing these orders. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed this dismissal on August 22, 2022. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing against all defendants except former Ohio Director of Public Health Amy Acton and that the plaintiffs' substantive-due-process and equal-protection claims failed under rational-basis review. The court also affirmed the district court's rejection of the plaintiffs' takings claim.After the appellate court affirmed the dismissal, the district court issued a sanctions order against the plaintiffs' attorneys, Thomas B. Renz and Robert J. Gargasz, for their extensive legal failings throughout the case. The attorneys appealed the sanctions order. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision to impose sanctions. The appellate court agreed that the attorneys had violated Rule 11 by presenting a complaint that was haphazard, incomprehensible, and littered with factual and legal errors. The court also upheld the imposition of sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, finding that the attorneys had unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings with frivolous claims.The appellate court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting sanctions and awarding attorney's fees and costs. The court emphasized that the attorneys' conduct fell short of the obligations owed by members of the bar and that the extreme sanction of attorney's fees was warranted given the egregious nature of their legal failings. The appellate court affirmed the district court's holding that the attorneys violated Rule 11 and section 1927 and upheld the grant of attorney's fees and costs. View "Bojicic v. DeWine" on Justia Law

Dante Small faced charges of battery and two counts of attempted murder for hitting one police officer with a car and narrowly missing another. He claimed that his trial attorney misadvised him about his sentencing exposure, leading him to reject a plea offer and proceed to trial. An Illinois jury convicted him on all counts, and the trial judge sentenced him to the mandatory minimum of 40 years in prison. Small then sought federal habeas relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.In the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Small's attorney indicated that Small wanted to negotiate a plea agreement. During a pretrial hearing, the prosecutor mentioned a 20-year plea offer, which was rejected. Small was ultimately convicted and sentenced to 40 years. He filed a pro se post-conviction petition, arguing that his counsel misinformed him about the sentencing range and that he would have accepted a plea if properly advised. The state trial court denied his petition, and the Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed, finding that the pretrial transcript contradicted Small's claims. The Supreme Court of Illinois denied his petition for leave to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the state court made an unreasonable determination of fact by concluding that the pretrial transcript contradicted Small's claims about being misadvised on sentencing exposure. The Seventh Circuit held that Small was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to develop the factual record regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. View "Small v. Woods" on Justia Law

Robert Fletcher and Bartlow Gallery, Ltd. claimed that a painting depicting a desert scene with a pond was created by renowned artist Peter Doig while he was incarcerated in Canada in the 1970s. Fletcher alleged he purchased the painting from Doig for $100. Doig denied these claims, stating he was never incarcerated in Canada and did not create the painting. Fletcher and Bartlow sought a court declaration that Doig was the artist.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held a bench trial and found that the painting was not created by Peter Doig but by another individual named Peter Doige. The court entered judgment against Fletcher and Bartlow. Subsequently, Doig and other defendants filed a motion for sanctions against Fletcher, Bartlow, and their counsel, William Zieske, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, arguing the case was litigated in bad faith. The district court granted the motion for sanctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Zieske appealed the sanctions, arguing that the district court's denial of summary judgment indicated the claims were not frivolous. The appellate court noted that the standards for summary judgment and sanctions are different, and the denial of summary judgment does not preclude sanctions if the claims later prove to be groundless. The appellate court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions, as the evidence overwhelmingly showed that Doig did not create the painting and that Fletcher, Bartlow, and Zieske should have known their claims were baseless by May 7, 2014. The appellate court affirmed the district court's award of sanctions and its judgment. View "Fletcher v Doig" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the rights to stage adaptations of Harper Lee's novel "To Kill a Mockingbird." In 1969, Lee granted The Dramatic Publishing Company (Dramatic) the exclusive rights to develop and license a stage adaptation of the novel for non-first-class productions. Decades later, Lee terminated this grant and authorized a new stage adaptation, with Atticus Limited Liability Company (Atticus) holding the rights to produce this second adaptation. Atticus sought a declaration from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York that its performances did not infringe on any copyright interest held by Dramatic. Dramatic argued that it retained exclusive rights under the Copyright Act's derivative works exception and that Atticus's acquisition of rights was invalid.The district court rejected Dramatic's arguments, ruling in favor of Atticus and awarding it attorney's fees. Dramatic appealed the judgment on the merits and both parties cross-appealed the award of attorney's fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment granting declaratory relief to Atticus, holding that Dramatic's exclusive rights did not survive Lee's termination of the 1969 grant. The court found that the derivative works exception did not preserve Dramatic's exclusive license to stage non-first-class productions after the termination. The court also rejected Dramatic's arguments regarding the invalidity of the 2015 grant to Atticus and the timeliness of Atticus's claim.Regarding attorney's fees, the Second Circuit vacated the district court's award and remanded for further consideration. The court agreed that Dramatic's statute of limitations and res judicata arguments were objectively unreasonable but found that the district court erred in concluding that Dramatic had forfeited its statute of limitations defense and that its discovery requests unnecessarily prolonged the litigation. The court affirmed the district court's decision to deny fees incurred before April 27, 2023, and declined to award Atticus its fees on appeal. View "Atticus Ltd. Liab. Co. v. The Dramatic Publ'g Co." on Justia Law

Christopher Pable, a software engineer with the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA), discovered a cybersecurity vulnerability in the BusTime system, which was developed by Clever Devices, Ltd. Pable reported the vulnerability to his supervisor, Mike Haynes, who tested it on another city's transit system. Clever Devices, which had a significant contract with the CTA, alerted the CTA about the incident, leading to the termination of Pable and Haynes. Pable then sued the CTA and Clever Devices under the National Transit Systems Security Act, alleging retaliation for whistleblowing.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Pable's complaint during the discovery phase, citing the deletion of evidence and misconduct by Pable's attorney, Timothy Duffy. The court also imposed monetary sanctions on both Pable and Duffy. The court found that Pable and Duffy had failed to preserve relevant electronically stored information (ESI) and had made misrepresentations during the discovery process.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Pable's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) due to the intentional spoliation of evidence. The court also upheld the monetary sanctions imposed under Rule 37(e), Rule 37(a)(5), and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, finding that Duffy's conduct unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings. The appellate court declined to impose additional sanctions on appeal, concluding that the appeal was substantially justified. View "Christopher Pable v CTA" on Justia Law

An attorney, Morris S. Getzels, challenged the constitutional validity of State Bar Rule 2.30, which prevents inactive licensees from acting as private arbitrators and mediators. Getzels argued that this rule violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the federal and California Constitutions by treating inactive licensees differently from others. He claimed that the rule impinges on the fundamental liberty of "freedom of contract" and that there is no rational basis for the rule.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the State Bar's demurrer without leave to amend, leading to a judgment of dismissal. The court found that rational basis review was the appropriate standard for evaluating Getzels's equal protection claim. It concluded that funding the State Bar’s regulatory functions was a legitimate government purpose and that requiring licensees to pay the active membership fee was related to this purpose. The court determined that the State Bar had sufficiently articulated a rational basis for the disparate treatment of inactive licensees.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that rational basis review was the correct standard, as the rule did not involve a suspect class or a fundamental right. The court found that the State Bar had a legitimate interest in maintaining a competent bar and ensuring the professional conduct of its licensees. It concluded that Rule 2.30’s distinction between active and inactive licensees was rationally related to this goal, as inactive licensees acting as private arbitrators and mediators could burden the State Bar’s regulatory system. The court affirmed the judgment of dismissal, upholding the constitutionality of Rule 2.30. View "Getzels v. The State Bar of California" on Justia Law

Barbie Jean Schwinn and Deborah Schwinn Bailey filed a lawsuit against Robert Schwinn, TJ Schwinn, and Terry Ann Palazzo to wind up and terminate the Ignaz Schwinn Family Partnership Co. The district court found that the appellants wrongfully dissociated from the partnership, there were no grounds to terminate or wind up the partnership, and the appellants could no longer participate in the management of the partnership. The court granted the appellants a lien against the partnership’s assets for their interests, to be satisfied when the partnership eventually wound up.The district court held a bench trial and dismissed the appellants' claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The court also dismissed the appellants' claims to dissolve and wind up the partnership, finding it was a partnership for a definite term or particular undertaking under Illinois law. The court determined the appellants' dissociation was wrongful and that they were not entitled to payment for their interests until the completion of the undertaking. The court denied the appellees' other counterclaims.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the partnership was an at-will partnership, not one for a particular undertaking. The court held that the appellants' dissociation was not wrongful and that their withdrawal triggered the dissolution and winding up of the partnership under Section 801(1) of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA). The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if the partnership agreement varied the RUPA's default rules and whether winding up was required under Section 801(5)(iii) due to a deadlock in management. The court also instructed the district court to determine if judicial supervision of the winding up was warranted. View "Schwinn v. Schwinn" on Justia Law