Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

An assistant professor at a California public university submitted four articles on topics in her field of study to various academic journals unaffiliated with her university. All four of those articles were later either retracted or corrected by the journals, at least in part due to inaccurate references or text overlap from uncited sources. Soon after that, the professor left her position at the university. A third party investigating the article retractions sent the university a request under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) seeking certain postpublication communications between the professor, the university, and the journals regarding the retracted articles. The university determined the requested documents were subject to disclosure; the professor disagreed, filed a petition for writ of mandate, and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent disclosure. The trial court denied the professor’s motion for preliminary injunction, concluding she had not met her burden of establishing a likelihood of prevailing on the merits. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeal affirmed: the requested communications qualified as public records under the CPRA, and the professor did not establish the records are otherwise exempt from disclosure. View "Iloh v. The Regents of the U. of Cal." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Respondent, the Honorable Jeffrey F. Meade, Judge of the Gibson Circuit Court, engaged in judicial misconduct and that his misconduct warranted a seven-day unpaid suspension from office.The Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications filed a complaint against Respondent, charging that Respondent engaged in judicial misconduct by making intemperate comments from the bench, holding an off-the-record and unrecorded child-in-need-of-services hearing, and by failing to provide all parties to the proceedings with sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard. The Supreme Court agreed that Respondent's misconduct violated several provisions of the Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct and that the misconduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice. View "In re Meade" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court finding that this action brought by Plaintiff against Janice German and Dawes County Abstract & Title, Inc. (collectively, German) arising from title abstracting and issuing commitments and title insurance services German performed for a series of transactions, holding that the district court did not err.The district court concluded (1) the amended complaint stated a single cause of action for professional negligence against German as an abstracter with several theories of recovery; and (2) Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-2222, the two-year statute of limitations for professional negligence, applied, thus time-barring the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that Plaintiff was performing abstracter services during the time period in issue; and (2) abstracters of title provide "professional services" within the meaning of section 25-222. View "Mai v. German" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting summary judgment for Defendants in this medical malpractice action, holding that a plaintiff who files a noncompliant certificate of merit and then voluntarily dismisses the case need not rely on the certificate filed in the first case when bringing a second action.Plaintiffs timely filed a certificate of merit affidavit in their medical malpractice action but voluntarily dismissed the case when Defendants challenged the qualifications of the expert witness that signed the affidavit. Thereafter, Plaintiffs refiled their case, providing a certificate of merit affidavit signed by a different expert witness. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that the certificate of merit in the first case was deficient. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that Defendants were not entitled to dismissal of their case with prejudice. View "Kirlin v. Monaster" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice case the Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court vacating Plaintiff's prior voluntary dismissal of her action without prejudice and dismissing the case with prejudice, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to rule on Defendant's motion to dismiss.Plaintiff filed a medical negligence suit against Defendant. When Plaintiff failed to file a certificate of merit affidavit Defendant moved to dismiss her petition with prejudice. That same day, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her petition under Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.943. The district court subsequently granted Defendant's motion to dismiss, dismissing Plaintiff's claims with prejudice. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that her voluntary dismissal terminated the case. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that Plaintiff's voluntary dismissal was self-executing and ended the case, and therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to rule on Defendant's motion to dismiss. View "Ronnfeldt v. Shelby County Chris A. Myrtue Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

In this case involving a dispute about a statute that sets forth the requirements a firm must meet to provide engineering services in the state of Ohio the Supreme Court held that there is nothing in the statutory language of Ohio Rev. Code 4733.16(D) to preclude an independent contractor from serving as a full-time manager of an engineering firm.Section 4733.16(D) provides that an engineering firm must designate one or more full-time partners, managers, members, officers, or directors as in "responsible charge" of its engineering activities. The Ohio Board of Registration for Professional Engineers and Surveyors denied TWISM Enterprises, LLC a certificate of authorization to provide engineering services, adopting a hardline rule that section 4733.16(D) requires formal W-2 employment. The court of appeals upheld the determination. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that TWISM met the requirements for a certificate of authorization to practice engineering. View "TWISM Enterprises, LLC v. State Bd. of Registration for Professional Engineers & Surveyors" on Justia Law

Barsanti was delinquent on $1.1 million of senior secured debt it owed to BMO Harris Bank. Barsanti’s owner, Kelly, hired attorney Filer and Gereg, a financing consultant. After negotiations with BMO failed, Filer introduced Gereg to BMO as a person interested in purchasing Barsanti’s debt. Filer created a new company, BWC, to purchase the loans. BWC purchased the loans from BMO for $575,000, paid primarily with Barsanti’s accounts receivable. Barsanti also owed $370,000 in delinquent benefit payments to the Union Trust Fund. Filer, Kelly, and Gereg used BWC’s senior lien to obtain a state court judgment against Barsanti that allowed them to transfer Barsanti’s assets beyond the reach of the Union Fund, using backdated documents to put confession-of-judgment clauses into the loan documents and incorrectly claiming that Barsanti owed BWC $1.58 million. Filer then obtained a court order transferring Barsanti’s assets to BWC, which then transferred the assets to Millwork, another new entity, which continued Barsanti’s business after the Illinois Secretary of State dissolved Barsanti for unpaid taxes. Gereg was Millwork's nominal owner in filings with the Indiana Secretary of State. Barsanti filed for bankruptcy. Filer instructed others not to produce certain documents to the bankruptcy trustee.After a jury convicted Filer of wire fraud 18 U.S.C. 1343., the district court granted his motions for a judgment of acquittal. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdicts. View "United States v. Filer" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court compelling discovery pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 37, holding that the trial court was not required to make findings of fact to support its ruling.Plaintiff brought an action for wrongful death against the defendants from which the decedent sought medical care. At issue was Plaintiff's motion to compel Defendants to comply with an existing discovery order. The trial court granted the motion but did not make specific findings of fact. The court of appeals remanded the case for the trial court to enter factual findings and conclusions of law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendants did not specifically request findings of fact regarding the statutory elements set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. 90-21.22A; and (2) in the absence of such a request, the trial court was not required to make any findings of fact in resolving Plaintiff's motion to compel. View "Williams v. Allen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff's claims for breach of fiduciary duties, misrepresentation, and infliction of emotional distress, holding that Plaintiff's appeal was without merit.For thirteen months, Defendant represented Plaintiff in a criminal matter involving Plaintiff's indictment on a federal child pornography charge before withdrawing. After Plaintiff pled guilty to an obscenity charge he sued Defendant. The district court construed Plaintiff's claims as legal malpractice and granted summary judgment for Defendant because Plaintiff failed to offer any evidence that he was actually innocent of the charges for which Defendant was representing him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's claims of court error in the disposition of the parties' competing motions for summary judgment and in prejudgment interlocutory rulings were without merit. View "Buttercase v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying relief in this Administrative Procedure Act (APA) appeal of the Colonel William J. Bryant's denial of Appellant's application to obtain a license for his private security and investigations company, holding that there was no error.Col. Bryant, in his capacity as director of the Arkansas State Police, entered an administrative order finding that Appellant was ineligible to receive a license due to his prior convictions. Appellant filed a petition for judicial review. After a remand, the circuit court denied the petition finding that there was substantial evidence to support the agency's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant cited no authority for the proposition that it was reversible error for the circuit court to decide an APA appeal on a different ground than that found by the administrative agency; and (2) the director did not err in determining that Ark. Code Ann. 17-40-306 controlled over Ark. Code Ann. 17-1-103. View "Hackie v. Bryant" on Justia Law