Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Cathy L. Stroud sued Ozark National Life Insurance Company and its agent, Stephen Guinn, for negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty after her husband, Alan Stroud, converted his term life insurance policy to a whole life policy, reducing the death benefit. Cathy claimed that Guinn's advice led to the conversion, which was against their best interests. Alan had a 20-year term life insurance policy with a $60,000 death benefit, which he converted to a whole life policy with a $30,000 death benefit shortly before his death.The Sedgwick District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Ozark and Guinn, concluding that Cathy failed to establish a fiduciary duty and that Guinn did not supply false information. Cathy appealed, and the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment, agreeing that Cathy did not present sufficient evidence to establish a fiduciary duty or negligent misrepresentation.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that Cathy failed to establish a fiduciary relationship because there was no evidence that Guinn consciously assumed fiduciary duties. The court also held that Cathy did not present evidence of an affirmative misrepresentation by Guinn, as required for a negligent misrepresentation claim under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552. The court noted that Cathy's claim was more akin to fraud by silence, which was not pleaded or argued.The Kansas Supreme Court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate because Cathy did not establish genuine issues of material fact for trial on her claims of breach of fiduciary duty and negligent misrepresentation. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Cathy's motion to amend her petition to add a claim for punitive damages. View "Stroud v. Ozark Nat'l Life Ins. Co. " on Justia Law

Duane Gary Underwood, II was convicted of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, possession of a stolen firearm, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Underwood appealed his conviction on ten grounds, including the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), the legality of his detention and search, the validity of a search warrant for his phone, the admissibility of certain evidence, voir dire procedures, the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, and the licensure status of the prosecuting Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA).The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan denied Underwood's pretrial motions to suppress evidence and dismiss charges. The court admitted evidence from Underwood's phone and grand jury testimony under Rule 803(5). The jury convicted Underwood on all counts, and he was sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment. Post-trial, Underwood moved to dismiss his conviction, arguing that the AUSA's administrative suspension for nonpayment of bar dues constituted prosecutorial misconduct and a jurisdictional defect. The district court denied this motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) is constitutional, the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain and search Underwood, and the search warrant for Underwood's phone was valid. The court found no abuse of discretion in admitting the contested evidence or in the voir dire procedures. The evidence was deemed sufficient to support the convictions, and the jury instructions were appropriate. The court also ruled that the AUSA's administrative suspension did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct or create a jurisdictional defect, and there was no Brady violation. View "United States v. Underwood" on Justia Law

Virginia drivers whose licenses were suspended for failing to pay court fines challenged the constitutionality of the statute under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The District Court granted a preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of the statute. Before the case reached final judgment, the Virginia General Assembly repealed the statute, requiring reinstatement of the suspended licenses. The parties agreed to dismiss the case as moot.The District Court declined to award attorney’s fees to the drivers under §1988(b), reasoning that obtaining a preliminary injunction did not qualify them as “prevailing parties.” A Fourth Circuit panel affirmed this decision, but the Fourth Circuit en banc reversed, holding that some preliminary injunctions can provide lasting, merits-based relief, qualifying plaintiffs as prevailing parties even if the case becomes moot before final judgment.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the drivers, who only obtained preliminary injunctive relief before the action became moot, do not qualify as “prevailing parties” eligible for attorney’s fees under §1988(b). The Court reasoned that no court conclusively resolved their claims by granting enduring judicial relief on the merits that materially altered the legal relationship between the parties. The judgment of the Fourth Circuit was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Lackey v. Stinnie" on Justia Law

Walter Bedford Jr., an attorney admitted to practice law in 1974, prepared a will for Clara Howard Jackson in 2016, naming himself as executor and Margaret Hayes as the sole beneficiary. After Jackson's death in 2019, Bedford delayed filing the probate petition and missed court dates. He was eventually appointed executor but failed to manage the estate properly, writing checks to himself for unearned fees and depleting the estate's funds. Hayes, the beneficiary, had to hire another attorney to remove Bedford as executor and filed a bar complaint against him.The Inquiry Commission issued a three-count charge against Bedford for failing to act with diligence, failing to safekeep the estate property, and failing to return estate funds after removal as executor. Bedford admitted to these violations. He requested to be placed on Honorary Membership Inactive Status and proposed a negotiated sanction of a public reprimand and repayment of the unearned fees.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the proposed sanction and found it appropriate. The Court noted similar cases where public reprimands and repayments were ordered for comparable misconduct. Considering Bedford's substantial experience, lack of prior discipline, personal hardships, and remorse, the Court concluded that a public reprimand and repayment of the unearned fee were suitable sanctions.The Supreme Court of Kentucky publicly reprimanded Bedford and ordered him to repay $5,979.00 to the estate within one year. Bedford was also directed to pay the costs associated with the disciplinary proceedings. View "In re Bedford" on Justia Law

Attorney Jon Rhyan Fritz was admitted to practice law in Kentucky in 1998. He was retained by client Vera Williams to pursue a wrongful termination claim against her employer, House of Bread and Peace (HBP). Williams paid Fritz a $3,500 flat fee, which he deposited into his general business account without a written advance fee agreement. Fritz failed to provide billing statements or memoranda explaining how he was earning the fee. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) investigated Williams's case but ultimately declined to pursue it further. Fritz did not respond to Williams's subsequent emails or requests for meetings, and no lawsuit was filed against HBP within the statute of limitations.Williams filed a Bar Complaint against Fritz, leading the Office of Bar Counsel (OBC) to open the matter for informal resolution. Fritz responded to initial inquiries but failed to provide Williams's client file as requested. The Inquiry Commission charged Fritz with multiple violations of the Supreme Court Rules (SCR), including lack of diligence, communication, and safekeeping of property. Fritz did not respond to the formal Charge, and attempts to serve him were unsuccessful, leading to constructive service via the Kentucky Bar Association (KBA) Executive Director.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and found that Fritz failed to answer the Charge or participate in the disciplinary process. The court granted the OBC's motion to indefinitely suspend Fritz from practicing law in Kentucky. Fritz is required to notify all courts and clients of his suspension, cancel pending advertisements, and take steps to protect his clients' interests. The suspension order takes effect twenty days after its entry. View "In re Fritz" on Justia Law

A Texas attorney, Robert M. Roach, claimed to have an oral agreement with Fred Schrader, the former owner of Schrader Cellars, LLC, regarding the creation of another company, RBS LLC, which Roach asserted had an ownership interest in Schrader Cellars. After Fred Schrader sold Schrader Cellars to Constellation Brands, Roach sued Fred and Constellation in Texas state court, claiming the sale was improper. Schrader Cellars then filed the current action, seeking declaratory relief that Roach had no ownership interest in Schrader Cellars, and Roach counterclaimed.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Schrader Cellars on its claim for declaratory relief and dismissed Roach’s counterclaims. The court concluded that the oral agreement violated California Rule of Professional Responsibility 3-300 and that Roach did not rebut the presumption of undue influence. The case proceeded to trial on Schrader Cellars’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty, where the jury found that Roach’s breach caused harm but did not award damages due to the litigation privilege defense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Schrader Cellars on its claim for declaratory relief and Roach’s counterclaims, finding triable issues of fact regarding whether Roach rebutted the presumption of undue influence. The appellate court also held that the district court erred in concluding and instructing the jury that Roach breached his fiduciary duties. However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment after trial, concluding that the erroneous jury instruction had no effect on the outcome because the jury found that the gravamen of the breach of fiduciary duty claim was based on Roach’s filing of the Texas lawsuit, which was barred by the California litigation privilege. View "SCHRADER CELLARS, LLC V. ROACH" on Justia Law

Rudolph Rivas, a home builder and real estate developer, engaged the accounting firm Pitts & Pitts, operated by Brandon and Linda Pitts, for various accounting services from 2007 to 2017. The services included preparing quarterly financial statement compilations and tax returns. In 2016, errors were discovered in the financial statements prepared by the Accountants, leading to financial difficulties for Rivas, including overpayment of taxes and loss of credit, which allegedly forced his business into bankruptcy. Rivas sued the Accountants in August 2020, claiming negligence, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract.The district court granted summary judgment for the Accountants on all claims. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas affirmed the summary judgment on the negligence and breach of contract claims but reversed it on the fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims, holding that these claims were not barred by the anti-fracturing rule and had sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the anti-fracturing rule barred Rivas's fraud claim because the gravamen of the claim was professional negligence. The Court also held that no fiduciary duty existed as a matter of law under the undisputed facts, thus the breach of fiduciary duty claim failed. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered judgment for the defendants on all claims. View "Pitts v. Rivas" on Justia Law

In 1985, Terry D. Bemore was arrested and later convicted for the murder of a liquor store clerk. He was sentenced to death in 1989. Bemore's trial counsel was found to have provided ineffective assistance, and evidence of racial bias by his lead counsel was presented. In 2015, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Bemore's death sentence, and he was resentenced to life without parole in 2016. In 2020, the California Legislature enacted the Racial Justice Act (RJA), allowing defendants to challenge convictions based on racial discrimination. Bemore sought to use this new law to challenge his conviction.The trial court appointed the San Diego Office of the Primary Public Defender to represent Bemore in his RJA claim, despite his request to have his previous habeas counsel, Sayasane and Cotterill, appointed. Bemore filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the trial court should have appointed his preferred counsel due to their extensive prior representation and familiarity with his case.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that section 987.2 of the Penal Code governs the selection and assignment of counsel in noncapital postconviction habeas proceedings, including those under the RJA. The court found that the trial court erred in placing the burden on Bemore to demonstrate the Public Defender's unavailability and in failing to recognize the good cause shown for appointing Sayasane and Cotterill. Additionally, the court determined that the Public Defender had created a conflict of interest by opposing Bemore's petition, thus disqualifying itself from representing him.The Court of Appeal granted Bemore's petition, vacated the trial court's order appointing the Public Defender, and directed the trial court to appoint one or both of Bemore's requested attorneys. View "Bemore v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The appellant, Jamie Alexander Washington, was convicted of felony murder and related crimes connected to the aggravated assault of Desmond Carter and the shooting death of James Hawkins in Dougherty County. The crimes occurred on July 5, 2015. Washington, along with co-defendants Mylan Mahoney and Malcolm Bernard Offord, Jr., was indicted on October 1, 2015, and reindicted on February 8, 2017. Mahoney and Offord pled guilty and testified against Washington. Washington was tried before a jury in February 2020, found guilty, and sentenced to life in prison without parole for felony murder, with additional concurrent and consecutive sentences for other charges.Washington filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court on March 11, 2024. He then appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, raising several claims of trial-court error and ineffective assistance of counsel.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found the evidence sufficient to support Washington's conviction for felony murder, rejecting his argument that the evidence was insufficient under Georgia’s accomplice-corroboration statute. The court also found no plain error in the trial court's questioning of a witness, which Washington claimed expressed an opinion on the evidence. Additionally, the court concluded that any error in allowing the State to cross-examine Washington about his criminal history was harmless given the strong evidence against him.Regarding ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the court determined that Washington's trial counsel was not deficient in failing to locate a witness, object to hearsay testimony, request an alibi instruction, or object to certain prosecutorial comments during closing arguments. The court also found no cumulative prejudice from the alleged errors and instances of ineffective assistance.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Washington's convictions. View "WASHINGTON v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Robert Mack, a beneficiary of his parents' estates, contested the distribution of assets from his mother’s will and his father’s testamentary trust. After his parents passed away, his brothers Hugh and Eric, acting as co-personal representatives and co-trustees, filed a petition for distribution to Robert. The circuit court approved the distribution after Robert’s attorney did not object at the hearing. Robert later obtained new counsel and filed a motion for relief from the order of distribution, claiming his previous attorney did not inform him of the hearing or the proposed distribution.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit in Codington County, South Dakota, denied Robert’s motion for relief under SDCL 15-6-60(b). The court found Robert’s claim that he had no communication with his attorney since late 2022 not credible, based on his previous conduct in court proceedings. The court also concluded that the order of distribution was fair and equitable, despite Robert’s request for an evidentiary hearing to contest the valuation of the estate assets.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and found that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Robert’s motion for relief. The Supreme Court noted that Robert’s affidavit, which stated he had no knowledge of the hearing or the proposed distribution, was unrefuted. Additionally, the court highlighted the pending disciplinary proceedings against Robert’s former attorney, which raised concerns about the attorney’s ability to practice law. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded the case with directions to grant the motion for relief from the order of distribution and to set an evidentiary hearing on the petition for distribution. View "In the Matter of the Estate Of Mack" on Justia Law