Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court of North Carolina was tasked with reviewing the decision of the Court of Appeals related to a defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in 1999 and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Over two decades later, the defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR), arguing that his trial counsel did not inform him of his right to testify and prevented him from testifying. He also claimed that his appellate counsel was ineffective because they filed an Anders brief.The Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals correctly disposed of the defendant's claims. The record demonstrated that the defendant was aware of his right to testify, and there was no evidence to support his claim that his trial counsel prevented him from testifying. Furthermore, the defendant's claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge limitations on an expert witness’s testimony was without merit because the trial court had appropriately restricted the expert from using legal terminology. Therefore, the defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel were deemed baseless.The Supreme Court also held that the standard of review set forth in a previous case, State v. Allen, which involved reviewing MARs in the light most favorable to defendants, was a departure from the court's longstanding standard of review. Thus, the court returned to the previous standard of review, which involves a statutory review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(c). View "State v. Walker" on Justia Law

In 2005, Marta Urias and her incapacitated husband, Manuel Urias, were represented by Daniel P. Buttafuoco and his law firm in a medical malpractice suit. The suit, against four defendants, resulted in a $3.7 million settlement. Buttafuoco calculated his legal fees separately for each defendant, as per his interpretation of Judiciary Law § 474-a. His fee totaled $864,552, which he later reduced to $710,000. Marta Urias later sued Buttafuoco, claiming that he deceived her and the court about the legal fees they were entitled to by offering a false interpretation of the law. Buttafuoco moved for summary judgment, arguing that Urias's sole remedy was to move under CPLR 5015 to vacate the underlying judgment. Both the Supreme Court and Appellate Division dismissed Urias's claims.The Court of Appeals held that Judiciary Law § 487 allows a plenary action for attorney deceit, even if the claim could undermine a separate final judgment. However, the Court also found that Buttafuoco was entitled to summary judgment on Urias's claim. It found no material issue of fact as to whether Buttafuoco made false statements regarding his fee calculations. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division order, holding that Urias had failed to establish a material, triable issue of fact as to whether Buttafuoco's interpretations of the fee calculations or litigation expenses amounted to false statements. Therefore, while Judiciary Law § 487 permits a plenary action, Buttafuoco was entitled to summary judgment on that claim. View "Urias v Daniel P. Buttafuoco & Assoc., PLLC" on Justia Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of Georgia, Marquavious Howard was appealing his felony murder conviction for the 2017 shooting death of Jacorbin King. Howard was accused of participating in a robbery at King's apartment that resulted in King's death. Howard was indicted along with four others, and at trial, he was found not guilty of malice murder and firearm possession, but guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault. He was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole.Howard appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress evidence of a photo identification, and the trial court erred in excusing a juror for cause. The Supreme Court of Georgia rejected all of Howard's arguments and affirmed the lower court's decision.The Court found that there was enough evidence to support the conviction, including testimonies from several witnesses and a confession Howard allegedly made to a jail bunkmate. As for the claim of ineffective counsel, the Court ruled that Howard didn't prove that a motion to suppress the photo identification would have been granted. Regarding the excused juror, the Court stated that Howard didn't have a right to a specific juror and didn't prove that the selected jury was biased or incompetent. View "HOWARD v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

This case involved defendant Julie A. Corey who was convicted of first-degree murder on the grounds of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder with the underlying felony of aggravated kidnapping. Following her conviction, Corey filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that she received ineffective assistance of counsel due to her attorney's failure to call a cell phone expert to testify about her location on the night of the murder. She also requested that the court enter a required finding of not guilty. The trial judge, who was also the motion judge, denied Corey's motion for a new trial but vacated her conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder, finding that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Corey committed the predicate felony of aggravated kidnapping.On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with Corey’s argument that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found that her trial counsel's decision not to call a cell phone expert was not ineffective and would not have likely influenced the jury's conclusions. Furthermore, the court agreed with the Commonwealth that there was sufficient evidence to find Corey guilty of felony-murder with a predicate felony of aggravated kidnapping. Consequently, the court reinstated that conviction. The court also declined to exercise its powers under G. L. c. 278, § 33E to reduce Corey's conviction. View "Commonwealth v. Corey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed a case where a city was sued for negligence due to its failure to disclose a juror's potential conflict of interest during a trial. The City of Picayune had originally sued Landry Lewis Germany Architects, alleging defects in an addition to the Picayune City Hall. A juror, Lorenzo Breland, was the son of a Picayune city councilman. The City's representative informed the City's counsel of this relationship, but took no further action. At the end of the trial, the court was informed of this relationship, leading to the dismissal of Breland and a mistrial. Landry Lewis then counter-sued the City for negligence due to its failure to disclose this familial relationship.The trial court found in favor of Landry Lewis, awarding them $210,000 in damages. However, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed this decision. The court held that the City of Picayune did not owe a duty of care in tort to Landry Lewis that was breached by its failure to inform the trial court of the potential juror's familial relationship. The court reasoned that trials and voir dire are adversarial processes, and that it is incumbent upon both sides to perform their due diligence in identifying potential conflicts of interest. The court further noted that there were other mechanisms, such as sanctions or bar complaints, to address any perceived misconduct. Therefore, the award of damages for negligence was reversed and rendered. View "City of Picayune v. Landry Lewis Germany Architects, P.A." on Justia Law

In this case, Andre Pugh appealed his conviction for the murder of his wife and the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Pugh challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained via a search warrant for his cell phone records. He also alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging the search warrant's specificity and that his counsel during his motion for a new trial was ineffective in various respects.The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed with Pugh's claims and affirmed his conviction. The court found that the search warrant in question was supported by probable cause. The warrant was based on Pugh's unusual behavior at the crime scene, his relationship with the victim, inconsistencies between his statements and the evidence at the scene, and evidence suggesting that the crime was committed by someone familiar with the residence.The court also rejected Pugh's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. It found that the claims Pugh wanted his trial counsel to raise would not have been successful. Additionally, it determined that Pugh's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during his motion for a new trial were procedurally barred. View "PUGH v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Kentucky has removed Joseph “JS” Flynn from his position as Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk following allegations of inappropriate workplace behavior. Flynn was appointed in 2016 and elected in 2018. In March 2022, a complaint was lodged against Flynn by a former employee, alleging several incidents of inappropriate behavior. Flynn admitted to having a brief sexual relationship with the complainant, his subordinate, in 2021, which he did not report, and to physically poking and verbally abusing his employees.Other allegations against Flynn included pulling the complainant into a car back seat, forcefully kissing her, and exposing himself. Flynn denied these allegations, claiming physical impossibility due to two surgically inserted rods in his back. Furthermore, the complainant alleged that Flynn would regularly touch her inappropriately and put his hand up her dress. Another employee corroborated many of these allegations.Based on the evidence provided during a three-day hearing, the Supreme Court of Kentucky concluded that Flynn had created a hostile work environment and engaged in quid pro quo harassment. The Court noted that Flynn failed to perform his duties with courtesy and respect, thereby tarnishing the judiciary's reputation. As a result, Flynn was removed from his position, and the Office of the Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk was declared vacant. Flynn was ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings. View "IN RE: FLYNN, PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT CLERK" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a federal habeas corpus petition by Raymond Anthony Lewis, who was sentenced to death in 1991 after a California jury convicted him of the first-degree murder of Sandra Simms. Lewis argued that the state trial court's admission of his juvenile confession to a prior murder was unconstitutional and that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present evidence of his innocence of the prior murder. The court concluded that the California Supreme Court's affirmance of the trial court's admission of Lewis's juvenile confession was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law and that Lewis's trial counsel’s litigation of the evidence of the prior murder did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.Lewis also contended that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to investigate, develop, and present certain mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of the trial. The court found that Lewis failed to show that his trial counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard. His counsel made reasonable strategic decisions to ask for the jury’s mercy and to appeal to any lingering doubt the jurors may have had about Lewis’s guilt. The court also concluded that much of the evidence Lewis argued his trial counsel was ineffective in not introducing would have been cumulative of evidence his counsel did introduce.Lewis also raised uncertified claims on appeal, but the court denied a certificate of appealability on these claims. View "LEWIS V. ANDES" on Justia Law

This case involved an appeal by David Clapper, who had filed a lawsuit against American Realty Investors, Inc., and other associated entities. Clapper alleged that these entities had transferred assets to avoid paying a judgment from a previous lawsuit, in violation of the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act and the doctrine of alter ego liability. The jury had ruled in favor of the defendants, but Clapper appealed, asserting that the defendants' counsel had made multiple improper and prejudicial statements during the closing argument.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with Clapper and found that the defendants' counsels' closing argument had indeed irreparably prejudiced the fairness of the trial. The court noted that the counsels had made several improper and highly prejudicial statements, including launching personal attacks against Clapper's counsel, making references to Clapper's wealth, discussing matters not in the record, appealing to local bias, and suggesting Clapper's bad motives. These statements were considered collectively and in the context of the trial.The court reversed the decision of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court also highlighted the importance of civility in the practice of law, discouraging the use of abusive tactics and emphasizing the need for courtesy, candor, and cooperation in all lawyer-to-lawyer dealings. View "Clapper v. American Realty Investors" on Justia Law

Claude P. Lacombe appealed the United States District Court for the District of Delaware's denial of habeas relief, arguing that the Delaware Supreme Court wrongfully denied his claims that the State breached its plea agreement and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to demand specific performance of the plea agreement. Lacombe had pleaded guilty to several counts, including second-degree murder, in exchange for the State's agreement to recommend a sentence of 22 years. Instead, Lacombe received a life sentence. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's denial of habeas relief. The Court held that even if the State breached its plea agreement and Lacombe's counsel was ineffective, any constitutional error was harmless under Brecht, Strickland, and Puckett v. United States, as Lacombe could not establish that he suffered "actual prejudice" as a result of the State's rhetoric and his counsel's failure to object. The court did not decide whether the State actually breached the plea agreement, citing that a failure to show either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats an ineffectiveness claim. View "Lacombe v. Warden" on Justia Law