Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Professional Malpractice & Ethics
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The issue before the court was whether Defendant John Rogers was "exonerated" when his conviction was reversed and his case remanded for trial, or on the day his indictment was dismissed. Defendant sued the Cape May Public Defender's office for malpractice. The date the case was reversed would subject Defendant's claim to a one-year time bar, but a dismissal would not. One year later, his attorney filed a motion for leave to file a late notice of tort claim, which was denied. The trial judge determined that Defendant's claim accrued in 2007, and because he filed his notice more than one year later, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear his case. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the late notice must be filed within one year after accrual of a claim; "exoneration" (and therefore accrual) occurred in 2007. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Defendant was not "exonerated" until the indictment was dismissed with prejudice in 2008. His claim was thus not barred by the one year filing limitation. Nevertheless, because the claim was filed ten days beyond the ninety-day limit, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the "extraordinary circumstances" as defined by the governing statute was satisfied. View "Rogers v. Cape May County Office of the Public Defender" on Justia Law

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Vernon S. Kellogg sought review of a memorandum and judgment of a single justice of the court affirming a decision and order of the Board of Registration in Medicine (board) that revoked Kellogg's license to practice medicine. Kellogg asserted that various aspects of the board's proceedings violated his Federal and State constitutional rights and that the requirement that he obtain malpractice insurance violated the contracts clause of art. I, section 10, of the United States Constitution, and that the board's regulatory authority violated the principle of the separation of powers articulated in art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Having reviewed the single justice's thorough memorandum and judgment in which he addressed each of Kellogg's claims of errors, the court was satisfied that there was nothing that warranted further consideration. Here, Kellogg failed to support his claims of error with sufficient legal argument or factual detail, and failed to cite to sufficient supporting authority. As both a legal and practical matter, Kellogg's submissions provided an insufficient basis for the court to reasonably consider his claims. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Kellogg v. Board of Registration in Medicine" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff sued defendants under Title VII, alleging claims of racial harassment and constructive discharge. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint based on a finding that plaintiff committed perjury and the district court's grant of defendants' motion for sanctions. Plaintiff argued that a less severe sanction was more appropriate and that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing to allow plaintiff to explain his conflicting testimony. Plaintiff's counsel, who was separately sanctioned, also appealed the denial of his motion for recusal of the magistrate judge. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to dismiss plaintiff's complaint with prejudice where plaintiff plainly committed perjury; plaintiff's argument that the district court failed to hold a hearing was meritless where he made no effort to explain why he and his attorney failed to show at the hearing held by the district court to address objections to the magistrate judge's report; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying counsel's motion for recusal where a reasonable person would not question the magistrate judge's impartiality in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Brown v. Oil States Skagit Smatco, et al." on Justia Law

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The Board of Physicians sanctioned Petitioner, a medical doctor, upon finding that Petitioner violated several subsections of Md. Code Ann. Health Occ. 14-404 when he falsely indicated on an application for renewal of his medical license that he was not involved in a medical malpractice action. The circuit court and court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Board did not err in either its interpretation of Md. Code Regs. 10.32.02.03.C(7)(d) or its application of that regulation to the statement of Petitioner's counsel that Petitioner would be in court on a date proposed to conduct an unrelated case resolution conference; (2) the Board properly decided that Petitioner violated section 14-404(1)(3) by failing to include on his application the pendency of the malpractice action; and (3) the Board did not err in determining that the term "willful" means intentional for purposes of section 14-404, and the record contained substantial evidence that Petitioner willfully made false statements in connection with his involvement in a medical malpractice action in his application for license renewal. View "Kim v. Bd. of Physicians" on Justia Law

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DTC filed a complaint with the Court of Chancery against the Union and Harry Bruckner, a para-transit driver, in the nature of a declaratory judgment action (Complaint) pursuant to Title 1, Chapter 65. The Complaint sought an order vacating or modifying a labor arbitration award issued by a certain arbitrator pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between DTC and the Union. The award reinstated Bruckner, who was terminated by DTC, with back pay less interim earnings. The Court of Chancery granted the Union's motion for summary judgment. DTC's sole argument on appeal was that the arbitrator's decision should be vacated due to the appearance of bias or partiality on the part of the arbitrator. The court held that the alleged bias or partiality which DTC attributed to the arbitrator failed to meet the "evident partiality" standard where the mere fact that an arbitrator may share a personal life experience with a party or a party's agent was legally insufficient to constitute a substantial relationship that a reasonable person would conclude was powerfully suggestive of bias. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Delaware Transit Corp. v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 842" on Justia Law

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This case involved a claim for breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty that stemmed from a dispute regarding assets of IFCT, a now defunct tech startup company founded by Stephen Marsh to develop potentially revolutionary micro fuel cell technology. The crux of plaintiff's argument was that the Director Defendants conducted an unfair and disloyal bidding process, whereby they favored the Echelon-backed bid and refused to follow up on or negotiate with other superior bids. As a result, IFCT missed its chance to sell its assets at the peak of their value and was forced to sell its assets at a discount in bankruptcy. Given that the Director Defendants have conceded the applicability of entire fairness review and given the fact-intensive nature of that review, the court found that the Director Defendants have not met their burden at this stage to achieve summary judgment against Encite. The court also found that material facts remained as to the liability of Echelon for aiding and abetting the alleged breach of fiduciary duty by the Director Defendants and therefore, the court denied Echelon's motion for summary judgment on that claim. The court finally found that material facts also remained regarding Echelon's third party claims, and so denied Marsh's motion for summary judgment. View "Encite, LLC v. Soni, et al." on Justia Law

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This case involved a dispute over earn-out payments related to a merger between Viacom and Harmonix where plaintiff was one of the selling stockholders of Harmonix. Plaintiff sued on behalf of the selling stockholders, alleging that Viacom and Harmonix purposefully renegotiated the distribution contract with EA so as to reduce the earn-out payments payable to the Harmonix stockholders, and thus breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the Merger Agreement. The court dismissed plaintiff's claim and held that it would be inequitable for the court to imply a duty on Viacom and Harmonix's part to share with the selling stockholders the benefits of a renegotiated contract addressing EA's right to distribute Harmonix products after the expiration of the earn-out period. View "Winshall v. Viacom Int'l, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs sought to reopen a judgment entered in 2001 after the district judge that entered judgment for defendants in plaintiffs' person injury case was impeached and removed from office. Plaintiffs filed what they termed an independent action in equity on grounds that the judgment was procured by fraud involving the district judge. A new district judge dismissed the suit as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The court reversed and remanded after applying a five-element analysis of an independent action in equity. View "Turner, et al. v. Pleasant, et al." on Justia Law

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Defendants Springhill Hospitals, Inc., Dennis Rushing, Ashley Flemming and Janel Ostriehmerer appealed a judgment entered in favor of Plaintiff Dimitrios Critopoulos. Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital for a heart catheterization. While in the hospital's cardiac-intervention unit, Defendant Rushing noticed discoloration and blisters on Plaintiff's neck and spine. Nineteen days after he was admitted for cardiac care, Plaintiff was released from the hospital. Plaintiff was subsequently admitted to a different infirmary and treated for the discoloration and blisters, which were found to be ulcers. He filed a medical-malpractice action against Defendants for failing to treat the ulcers when he was under their care for the catheterization. Defendants alleged on appeal to the Supreme Court that errors at trial warranted a reversal of the outcome. The Supreme Court reviewed the trial court record and applicable authority, and concluded that the trial court exceeded its discretion when it ruled in favor of Plaintiff. The Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for the entry of a judgment as a matter of law in favor of Defendants. View "Springhill Hospitals, Inc. v. Critopoulos " on Justia Law

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Defendants, moved the district court to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Mathew Trainor, a Fulton County Assistant District Attorney, was absolutely immune from plaintiff's claims. The court affirmed the district court to the extent it found Trainor absolutely immune from plaintiff's claim that Trainor violated her constitutional rights by making false statements in support of a material witness order. The court vacated and remanded the rest of the order and judgment because absolute immunity did not immunize prosecutors from liability for making defamatory statements to the press, accessing a person's voicemail without consent, or persuading a party to a conversation to record its contents; and, the district court should consider in the first instance whether Trainor was absolutely immune for continuing to withhold/preserve evidence - plaintiff's cell phone. View "Flagler v. Trainor" on Justia Law