Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Retired district judge M. John Steensland, Jr. appealed a judgment of the Alabama Court of the Judiciary (COJ) that publicly censured him for misconduct that preceeded his retirement. In 2008, Judge Steensland had begun to serve a six-year term when the Judicial Inquiry Commission (JIC) began an investigation based on complaints of his courtroom conduct and demeanor filed by several parties that had come before the judge in prior cases. In 2010 while the JIC's investigation was ongoing, the Judge voluntarily retired from office. On appeal, Judge Steensland did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence or the nature of the discipline imposed. He merely renewed the grounds he originally asserted in his motion to dismiss the complaint: the absence of jurisdiction and the application of the doctrine of condonation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the COJ did not err in entering its judgment against Judge Steensland, and accordingly affirmed that decision. View "Steensland, Jr. v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Comm'n" on Justia Law

SSW Holding filed a complaint against BDO Seidman and other defendants, asserting several causes of action and seeking damages arising from a tax-advantaged investment strategy involving investments in distressed debt that SSW entered into and utilized on its federal tax returns for the 2001-2005 tax years. BDO filed an amended motion to compel arbitration and stay the motion, asserting that it and SSW entered into two consulting agreements that provided for arbitration before the American Arbitration Association. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) SSW's claims fell within the scope of the arbitration provisions; and (2) the circuit court erred in finding that the arbitration provisions were unenforceable and invalid due to fraud and procedural and substantive unconscionability. Remanded. View "BDO Seidman, LLP v. SSW Holding Co." on Justia Law

Petitioners, citizens of Mexico, entered the U.S. unlawfully in 1993 and 1998, respectively. Since 2000, husband has been seeking employment-based permanent residency. An individual who would not ordinarily qualify for lawful permanent residency because he entered without inspection, may apply as the beneficiary of a labor certification application or a visa petition filed on or before April 30, 2001, 8 U.S.C. 1255(i). According to the court, petitioners' former attorney provided incompetent, and at times ethically questionable, representation throughout the visa petition process, missing filing deadlines and sending associates to hearings without adequate information about the case, so that an IJ granted voluntary departure and the BIA affirmed denial of a motion to reopen. The Third Circuit denied review. The Due Process Clause does not guarantee an alien effective assistance of counsel in preparing, filing, and appealing a labor certification application and a visa petition before the start of removal proceedings. By the time removal proceedings began, petitioners had accrued more than one year of unlawful presence and would have been ordered removed regardless of counsel's actions.View "Contreras v. Attorney Gen. of U.S." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Body Aesthetic and three of its surgeons, claiming that they invaded her privacy and breached the fiduciary duty of confidentiality they owed to her when they gave nude photographic images of her body to a newspaper, which published the images. A jury found in favor of plaintiff on her breach of fiduciary duty claim and awarded her compensatory damages. Plaintiff appealed and requested a new trial, claiming the magistrate judge abused the court's discretion by excluding certain critical evidence that would have likely increased the verdict amount. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding testimony from the newspaper's writer and this abuse of discretion was substantially prejudicial to plaintiff's ability to show defendants' breach of fiduciary duty disregarded her privacy rights and adversely affected her claims for punitive damages. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's judgment on punitive damages and remanded for a new trial as to that issue. View "Doe v. Young, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant, a former shareholder in Wachovia, sought to recover personally for the decline in value of his shares of Wachovia stock during the recent financial crisis. The district court dismissed the suit, concluding that appellant's complaint stated a claim derivative of injury to the corporation and that he was therefore barred from bringing a direct or individual cause of action against defendants. The court held that because appellant's varied attempts to recast his derivative claim as individual were unavailing, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Rivers, Jr. v. Wachovia Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Trinity Mortgage Companies, Inc. (Trinity) appealed the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of David Dryer and Dryer and Associates, P.C. (Dryer). Trinity, formerly a mortgage brokerage company owned by Shawn Cremeen, entered into a franchise agreement with 1st Class Lending, Inc., which was owned by Dennis Junker and Richard Gheisar. In April 2007, Junker sued Gheisar and Trinity in Oklahoma state court for breach of contract, fraud, defamation, and conversion, all concerning his alleged wrongful termination. Between May 2007 and April 2008, Dryer represented Trinity, without a written contract. In October 2007, while the lawsuit was pending, Trinity entered into an agreement to sell most of its assets and to stop originating loans. Meanwhile, after Trinity failed to file an answer in the pending lawsuit, Junker moved for a default judgment against Trinity. Because Dryer failed to object to entry of default judgment against Trinity, the state court granted the motion against Trinity in January 2008. The another firm replaced Dryer as Trinity’s counsel, who unsuccessfully sought to vacate the default judgment against Trinity. Cremeen and Junker eventually entered into a settlement agreement concerning the lawsuit. Trinity confessed a final judgment in favor of Junker but the only recovery of this amount would be through his ownership interest in Trinity, which was the action against Dryer. Trinity moved for partial summary judgment on its malpractice and breach of contract claims. Dryer moved for summary judgment, contending that all claims were barred as a matter of law because Trinity unlawfully assigned them to Junker. In response, Trinity argued that there had not been an assignment of tort causes of action; there was never any collusion between Trinity and Junker; and that the malpractice case was not contingent upon disproving the merits of the underlying suit against Trinity. The district court granted Dryer’s motion for summary judgment and denied Trinity’s motion for partial summary judgment. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Dryer. View "Trinity Mortgage Companies, Inc. v. Dryer" on Justia Law

This case was before the court on a petition to review the opinion and order of the Commission permanently denying petitioner, an attorney admitted to practice in New York state, the privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission, pursuant to rule 102(3)(1)(ii) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, and Section 4C of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (Act), 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq. On appeal, petitioner contended that the procedure employed by the Commission was unconstitutional. The court held that the Commission acted within its authority in sanctioning him; petitioner was on notice of his duty to comply with the New York Bar disciplinary rules and the standard of conduct proscribed by Rule 102(3)(1)(ii) and Section 4C of the Act; there was substantial evidence for the Commission's finding that petitioner engaged in intentional improper professional conduct; and the Commission did not abuse its discretion in its choice of sanctioning petitioner. Accordingly, the petition for review was denied. View "Altman v. SEC" on Justia Law

Tunica County Circuit Court Judge Albert B. Smith III acknowledged that he abused his contempt powers and exhibited poor courtroom demeanor in several cases before him from 2006 to 2009. The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance recommended the punishment of: a public reprimand, a $1,000 fine, and an assessment of costs totaling $100. Finding that We find that Judge Smith violated Canons 2A, 3B(2), 3B(4), and 3B(8) of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct and, therefore, committed willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brought the judicial office into disrepute, the Supreme Court accepted the Commission’s recommendation. View "Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Perf. v. Smith" on Justia Law

Tara Thomas filed a lawsuit against her former attorney, Grant Kidani. Kidani represented Thomas in a real estate dispute wherein the jury decided the case against Thomas. Following that trial, Thomas sued Kidani, alleging legal malpractice. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Kidani, and the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) the ICA applied an incorrect standard of review on appeal where it invoked the clearly erroneous standard rather than a de novo review of Kidani's motion for summary judgment; but (2) Kidani was entitled to summary judgment in this case because Thomas did not meet her burden of proving that she would have prevailed at trial. View "Thomas v. Kidani" on Justia Law

This was an action for judicial review of a final decision and order of the board suspending Stephen Chadwick's license to practice dentistry in Massachusetts. Because the court agreed that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgt. Ass'n applied to the disciplinary proceeding, the court concluded that, while the board could mandate compliance with the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. 651 et seq., standards in dental practices and sanction dentists for professional misconduct after OSHA determined that a violation had occurred, the board could not interpret, apply, and enforce OSHA standards regarding workplace safety on its own record. The court further concluded that the preemptive effect of OSHA articulated in Gade also barred the board from sanctioning Chadwick based on conduct it found to be violative of Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines and department regulations, where such action constituted the direct and substantial regulation of occupational safety and health issues for which Federal OSHA standards were in effect. The court further concluded that the board's one finding unrelated to a formal OSHA standard was supported by substantial evidence View "Chadwick v. Board of Registration in Dentistry" on Justia Law