Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Through the adoption of Nev. Rev. Stat. 630.356(2), the Legislature gave physicians the right to contest and the district courts the power to review final decisions of the Nevada State Board of Medical Examiners. In this case, the Board suspended the license of Appellant, a surgeon licensed in Nevada, for rendering services to a patient while under the influence of alcohol and in an impaired condition. The Board also issued a public reprimand and imposed additional sanctions. Appellant petitioned for judicial review of the Board’s decision and requested a preliminary injunction to stay the sanctions and prevent the Board, while judicial review was pending, from filing a report with the National Practitioner Data Bank. The district court denied Appellant’s injunction request, concluding that section 630.356(2), which prohibits district courts from entering a stay of the Board’s decision pending judicial review, precluded such an action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 630.356(2) impermissibly acts as a legislative encroachment on the district court’s power to do what is reasonably necessary to administer justice, and this is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. View "Tate v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs" on Justia Law

Stokes-Craven Holding Corporation d/b/a Stokes-Craven Ford ("Stokes-Craven") appealed a circuit court order granting summary judgment in favor of Scott Robinson and his law firm, Johnson, McKenzie & Robinson, L.L.C., (collectively "Respondents") based on the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations. Stokes-Craven argued on appeal the court erred in applying the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in "Epstein v. Brown," (610 S.E.2d 816 (2005)), and holding that Stokes-Craven knew or should have known that it had a legal malpractice claim against its trial counsel and his law firm on the date of the adverse jury verdict rather than after the Supreme Court affirmed the verdict and issued the remittitur in "Austin v. Stokes-Craven Holding Corp.," (691 S.E.2d 135 (2010)). After review of this matter, the South Carolina Supreme Court overruled "Epstein," reversed the circuit court's order, and remanded the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Stokes-Craven Holding Corp. v. Robinson" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance (the Commission) filed a “Formal Complaint” against Chancery Court Judge Joe Dale Walker alleging conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution. The Commission recommended that Judge Walker be removed from office following various allegations regarding Judge Walker's mismanagement of a conservatorship. Due to various irregularities occurring in his handling of the conservatorship, the matter was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as well as the Commission. As a result of that investigation, a grand jury was convened and witnesses called to testify regarding the administration of the conservatorship. In association therewith, Judge Walker entered a guilty plea related to a charge of attempting to corruptly influence a witness subpoenaed to appear before a Federal Grand Jury proceeding and attempting to impede the provision of documents by the witness to the Federal Grand Jury with the intent to influence the outcome of the proceeding. "Due to the seriousness of his admitted criminal acts and judicial misconduct," the Mississippi Supreme Court removed Judge Joe Dale Walker from the office of Chancery Court Judge, Post Two, of the Thirteenth Chancery Court District of Mississippi. View "Mississippi Comm'n on Jud. Perf. v. Walker" on Justia Law

After a second mistrial, Appellant was convicted of sex-related crimes. The convictions were affirmed on appeal. Appellant later filed a Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507 motion alleging ineffective assistance of both trial counsel and direct appeal counsel. The district court ultimately granted the motion and reversed the conviction. Thereafter, pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant entered an Alford plea on different charges. In exchange, the State dropped the original charges. Between entering into the plea agreement and sentencing, Appellant filed this legal malpractice action against trial and appellate counsel and the Board of Indigents’ Defense Services (BIDS). The district court ruled that BIDS lacked the capacity to be sued, that Appellant’s Alford plea foreclosed the relief sought, and that Appellant’s claim was time barred. The Court of Appeal agreed with the district court with the exception of the statute of limitations issue, ruling that Appellant’s claim was timely filed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Court of Appeals correctly found that BIDS is not subject to suit in a legal malpractice action; (2) Defendant may pursue this legal malpractice claim without first demonstrating actual innocence of the charged crimes; and (3) this suit was timely filed under the applicable statute of limitations. View "Mashaney v. Bd. of Indigents' Defense Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the trial court's denial of a petition for a writ of administrative mandate, seeking to reverse a decision by the California State Board of Pharmacy subjecting his pharmacist’s license to discipline following the discovery of an employee’s widespread theft of a dangerous drug from the pharmacy plaintiff supervised as the pharmacist-in-charge. The court concluded that the Board properly interpreted Business and Professions Code section 4081 to hold plaintiff strictly liable for violations leading to licensing discipline. Further, had plaintiff restricted access to the passcode or put in place measures to ensure employees placed orders only through the pharmacy’s phone system, he could have averted the employee’s theft. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to properly oversee the operations of the pharmacy and the Board could have concluded that theft would have been averted if he supervised and randomly audited drug deliveries, conducted checks of his staff’s work, and actively participated in the inventory and delivery process. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sternberg v. Cal. State Bd. of Pharmacy" on Justia Law

Lattimore brought a wrongful death action against two doctors and Salinas Valley Memorial Healthcare arising from their care and treatment of Yvonne’s father, who had gone to the hospital for a blood transfusion, experienced gastrointestinal bleeding, and died. The trial court granted defendants summary judgment. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the declaration of Lattimore’s medical expert was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact on whether treatment of her father violated the applicable standards of care applicable to physicians and surgeons. However, the medical expert declaration did not raise a triable issue of fact on the standard of care applicable to nurses and hospitals in general. View "Lattimore v. Dickey" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a failed development project undertaken by BRN Development, Inc. in Coeur d’Alene. The project was for the development of a high-end 325-unit residential and golf course community on the west side of Lake Coeur d'Alene known as "Black Rock North." American Bank was the lender for this project. The Bank ultimately brought a foreclosure action against BRN. BRN brought a cross-claim against Taylor Engineering, Inc., alleging negligence for its role in the development. Taylor recorded a lien against the development. BRN defaulted on the loan, and the Bank named BRN, Taylor, and any other entity claiming an interest in the development. Taylor made a demand on BRN for payment for services rendered. The demand stated that Taylor would "complete the necessary documents" and request the necessary signatures from the local government entities involved in the final PUD approval. Taylor advised BRN that "if the final subdivision approval is not completed and recorded by May 29, 2009, the PUD and preliminary plat approval will expire, the PUD and plat will not vest in the recorded ownership to the real property involved, and the property will revert to its prior zoning and density." This statement was erroneous; it was undisputed that the final plat did not need to be recorded by May 29 in order to vest the PUD. In BRN's cross-claim against Taylor, it alleged professional negligence, negligent and intentional misrepresentation, and failure to disclose based on the erroneous statement Taylor made in its demand letter. The district court separated the claims between Taylor and BRN from the remainder of the American Bank litigation and ultimately held that Taylor was not liable to BRN. BRN appealed. The Supreme Court found no reversible error with the district court's judgment that BRN failed to meet its burden of proving its claims against Taylor, and affirmed that court's judgment. View "American Bank v. BRN Dev." on Justia Law

After the merger of NationsBank and BankAmerica, shareholders filed class actions alleging violations of securities laws. The district court appointed Oetting as lead plaintiff and the Green law firm, as lead counsel. The litigation resulted in a $333 million settlement for the NationsBank class. The Eighth Circuit affirmed approval of the settlement over Oetting’s objection. On the recommendation of Green, the court appointed Heffler as claims administrator. A Heffler employee conspired to submit false claims, resulting in fraudulent payment of $5.87 million. The court denied Green leave to file a supplemental complaint against Heffler. Oetting filed a separate action against Heffler that is pending. After distributions, $2.4 million remained. Green moved for distribution cy pres and requested an additional award of $98,114.34 in attorney’s fees for post-settlement work. Oetting opposed both, argued that Green should disgorge fees for abandoning the class, and filed a separate class action, alleging malpractice by negligently hiring and failing to supervise Heffler and abandonment of the class. The court granted Green’s motion for a cy pres distribution and for a supplemental fee award and denied disgorgement. The Eighth Circuit reversed the cy pres award, ordering additional distribution to the class, and vacated the supplemental fee award as premature. The district court then dismissed the malpractice complaint, concluding that Oetting lacked standing. The Eighth Circuit affirmed that collateral estoppel precluded the rejected disgorgement and class-abandonment claims; pendency of an appeal did not suspend preclusive effects. View "Oetting v. Norton" on Justia Law

Matthew and Caralynn Fonder purchased a home and obtained a mortgage from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Wells Fargo selected Wells Fargo Insurance, Inc. Flood Services (WFFS) to conduct a flood hazard determination on the Fonders’ home. WFFS determined the home was not in a special flood hazard area, and therefore, the Bank did not require the Fonders to obtain flood insurance. A flood later destroyed the Fonders’ home. Wells Fargo later filed a complaint to foreclose on the Fonders’ home. The Fonders cross-claimed against WFFS seeking to recover damages sustained a result of their reliance on WFFS’s erroneous flood determination. The circuit court dismissed the cross-claim for failure to state a claim and dismissed the Fonders’ motion to amend their third-party complaint to assert a claim of negligent misrepresentation on the grounds that WFFS did not owe the Fonders a duty. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred when it dismissed the Fonders’ claims for professional negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress but did not err in dismissing the Fonders’ breach-of-fiduciary duty claim; and (2) upon remand, the Fonders may amend their cross-claim to include negligent misrepresentation. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Fonder" on Justia Law

Amber Johnson filed suit against her closing attorney, Stanley Alexander, arguing he breached his duty of care by failing to discover the house Johnson purchased had been sold at a tax sale the previous year. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Johnson as to Alexander's liability. On appeal, the court of appeals held Alexander could not be held liable as a matter of law simply because the attorney he hired to perform the title work may have been negligent. Instead, the court determined the relevant inquiry was "whether Alexander acted with reasonable care in relying on [another attorney's] title search"; accordingly, it reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals: even absent Alexander's admissions, the Court found it was error to equate delegation of a task with delegation of liability. The Court therefore agreed with Johnson that an attorney was liable for negligence in tasks he delegates absent some express limitation of his representation. Applying this standard to the facts, the Court found the grant of summary judgment was proper because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to liability. The case was remanded back to the trial court for a determination of damages. View "Johnson v. Alexander" on Justia Law