Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

At issue in this civil lawsuit was whether a stipulation to a discovery schedule that expressly waived the usual requirement that written reports be produced and exchanged summarizing the anticipated testimony of all expert witnesses designated to appear at trial continued when the district court entered a scheduling order that extended the deadline of identifying expert witnesses but said nothing about whether the stipulation to waive expert reports continued in effect or not.The Supreme Court held (1) the intent of the parties controlled the duration and scope of the stipulation; and (2) in the absence of any intention that the stipulation be deemed to have been superseded by the new order, the stipulation should be read to continue in effect until and unless expressly vacated either by the court or by a subsequent agreement between the parties. View "Dechambeau v. Balkenbush" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the holdings of the circuit court and court of appeals determining that public defenders, as employees of the Department of Public Advocacy (DPA), a statutorily-created agency of the Commonwealth, are entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity within the proper context.After he was discharged from custody, Plaintiff filed a malpractice action against his former attorney, alleging that as a result of Defendants negligent advice regarding parole eligibility, Plaintiff had served longer in prison than he expected when entering his guilty plea. The circuit court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that Defendant was entitled to qualified official immunity from suit as an employee of the DPA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) public defenders performing discretionary tasks in good faith and within the scope of their employment are entitled to assert qualified immunity to any negligence claim; and (2) Defendant was entitled to the defense of qualified immunity under the circumstances of this case. View "Jacobi v. Holbert" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Ohio Supreme Court centered on whether whether oil-and-gas land professionals, who help obtain oil-and-gas leases for oil-and-gas-development companies, must be licensed real-estate brokers when they engage in the activities described in R.C. 4735.01(A) with respect to oil-and-gas leases. Specifically, the Court addressed address whether R.C. 4735.21 precluded a person not a licensed real-estate broker from bringing a cause of action to recover compensation allegedly owed for negotiating oil-and-gas leases. The Court concluded the plain language of R.C. 4735.01 did not exclude oil-and-gas land professionals or oil-and-gas leases from the relevant definitions set forth in the statute; appellants Thomas Dundics and his company, IBIS Land Group, Ltd., engaged in activities that required a real-estate-broker’s license and were precluded from bringing a cause of action to recover compensation for those activities. View "Dundics v. Eric Petroleum Corp." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of a petition for writ of administrative mandate. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Board's decision to impose disciplinary restrictions on plaintiff's veterinary practice after finding he committed certain negligent and/or incompetent acts while treating four animal patients. Although plaintiff forfeited his contentions on appeal, the court nevertheless reviewed the evidence cited by the trial court to determine that substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings. View "Shenouda v. Veterinary Medical Board" on Justia Law

Alaska’s medical peer review privilege statute protected discovery of data, information, proceedings, and records of medical peer review organizations, but it did not protect a witness’s personal knowledge and observations or materials originating outside the medical peer review process. A hospital invoked the privilege in two separate actions, one involving a wrongful death suit against a physician at the hospital and the other involving both a medical malpractice claim against the same physician and a negligent credentialing claim against the hospital. In each case the superior court compelled the hospital to disclose materials related to complaints submitted about the physician and to the hospital’s decision to grant the physician medical staff membership. The hospital and the doctor sought the Alaska Supreme Court's review of the discovery orders. Because the Supreme Court concluded these discovery orders compelled the hospital to disclose information protected by the peer review privilege, it reversed the discovery orders in part. Furthermore, the Court held that the false information exception to the privilege provided in AS 18.23.030(b) applied to actions for which the submission of false information was an element of the claim and thus did not apply here. View "Mat-Su Valley Medical Center, LLC v. Bolinder" on Justia Law

Reynolds claimed that the law firm (H&L) gave bad advice that led him to violate federal disclosure laws when he drafted his LLCs’ financial statements. The district court granted H&L summary judgment, stating that Reynolds could not bring a malpractice suit on his own behalf because he did not have a personal attorney-client relationship with H&L. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although H&L had an attorney-client relationship with the LLCs that Reynolds co-owned and managed, and it was in his capacity as a managing member of these LLCs that Reynolds communicated with, and was advised by, H&L, Illinois courts consistently have held that neither shared interests nor shared liability establish third-party liability. For third-party liability in Illinois, Reynolds must have been a direct and intended beneficiary; simply because the officers of a business entity were at risk of personal liability does not transform the incidental benefits of the law firm’s representation of the business entity into direct and intended benefits for the officers. View "Reynolds v. Henderson & Lyman" on Justia Law

Belsen Getty, LLC, a registered investment adviser owned by Terry Deru, obtained a claims-made financial-services-liability policy (the Policy) from XL Specialty Insurance Company covering Belsen Getty and its advisers for the period for one year. Under the policy, XL had no duty to defend. During the policy period James, Jenalyn, and Wade Morden brought claims against Belsen Getty and Deru alleging improper and misleading investment advice. XL denied coverage, asserting the Mordens’ claims and claims brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) before the policy period concerned “Interrelated Wrongful Acts,” as defined by the Policy, and that the Policy therefore required treating the two claims as one claim made before the policy period. Belsen Getty and Deru then settled with the Mordens, assigning their rights against XL; and the Mordens sued XL in federal district court, raising the assigned claims that XL breached its covenant of good faith and fair dealing and its fiduciary duties to Belsen Getty and Deru in denying coverage under the Policy. XL counterclaimed that the Policy’s Interrelated Wrongful Acts provision precluded coverage. The Mordens moved for partial summary judgment on the counterclaim and on several of XL's affirmative defenses. XL moved for summary judgment based on the policy and for failure to prove bad faith or breach of fiduciary duty. The district court denied XL's counterclaim, but granted summary judgment on the bad-faith and fiduciary-duty claims. The Mordens appealed summary judgment against them on their bad-faith and fiduciary-duty claims and on the denial of their motion to amend their complaint to add a breach-of-contract claim. XL cross-appealed the summary judgment against it on its counterclaim that the Policy’s Interrelated Wrongful Acts provision barred all the Mordens’ claims. The Tenth Circuit reversed the denial of XL’s motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim: this reversal undermined the Mordens’ challenges to the summary judgment against them and the denial of their motion to amend. The Court therefore affirmed summary judgment against the Mordens on their claims and the denial of their motion to amend. View "Morden v. XL Specialty Insurance" on Justia Law

D.A.R. appealed a circuit court judgment dismissing his complaint against R.E.L., D.H., and R.H. D.A.R., a licensed attorney practicing in Alabama, filed a complaint against R.E.L., D.H., and R.H. R.E.L. was also a licensed attorney, and was employed as an assistant general counsel for the Alabama State Bar ("the ASB"). D.H. and R.H. were brothers; they were not attorneys. According to the complaint, at some point before December 2007, R.E.L. and D.H. began "a personal, professional and/or sexual relationship," and R.E.L. and R.H. began "a personal and/or professional relationship." D.A.R. alleged that in December 2007, at R.E.L.'s recommendation and with his assistance, D.H. and R.H. "filed a baseless complaint against [D.A.R.] with the ASB." D.A.R. alleged that the motivation for the complaint was to use it "as a means to protect [D.H. and R.H.] from liability for a debt owed by [them] to a client represented by [D.A.R.] and/or as retaliation for his role in representing that client." According to D.A.R., R.E.L. knew when it was filed that the complaint against D.A.R. was baseless in fact and in law. R.E.L. asserted the defense of absolute immunity, but presented arguments to the trial court establishing why quasi-judicial immunity should apply to the facts presented in D.A.R.'s complaint. The Alabama Supreme Court found D.A.R. failed to demonstrate the trial court erred by dismissing his complaint on the grounds he presented to it, and as such, affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "D. A. R. v. R.E.L., D.H., and R.H." on Justia Law

Texas's special tolling rule in Hughes v. Mahoney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. 1991), which suspends the statute of limitations on legal malpractice claims until completion of the litigation from which they arise, does not extend to actions against public adjusters. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action alleging negligence and breach of contract based on defendants' failure to submit proof of loss timely to Fidelity. The court held that plaintiff's claims could not implicate the unique relationship that triggered the bright-line rule from Hughes. The court reasoned that only Texas has the power to say where lawyering ends and adjusting begins, just as its courts have the sole power to decide Hughes's outer bounds. Because Texas law was clear, the court rejected plaintiff's alternative requests for certification of the issue to the Texas Supreme Court. View "Bloom v. Aftermath Public Adjusters, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from plaintiff Lucia Serico’s motion for attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses pursuant to Rule 4:58 after a jury trial on medical malpractice claims against Robert Rothberg, M.D. At issue was whether Serico could collect attorney’s fees from Rothberg despite entering into a “high-low agreement” that limited the amount she could recover at trial to $1,000,000. Based on the expressed intent of the parties and the context of the agreement, the New Jersey Supreme Court found the agreement set $1,000,000 as the maximum recovery. Therefore, Serico could not seek additional litigation expenses allowed by Rule 4:58. View "Serico v. Rothberg" on Justia Law