Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs, two grandchildren and a friend of the decedent, Wisniewski, filed a lawsuit against the defendant attorney, alleging professional negligence and breach of contract in the preparation of Wisniewski's will. They claimed that Wisniewski intended for his TD Ameritrade account to be distributed equally among five individuals, including the plaintiffs, but due to the defendant's failure to ensure the account's beneficiary designation was changed, the entire account was distributed to Wisniewski's daughter, the sole designated beneficiary.The trial court dismissed the professional negligence claim, ruling that the plaintiffs lacked standing because Connecticut law only allows third-party beneficiaries to sue attorneys for errors in drafting or executing a will, not for failing to change a beneficiary designation. The court later dismissed the breach of contract claim, finding it functionally identical to the dismissed negligence claim.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case. It agreed with the trial court that the plaintiffs did not allege a drafting error in the will. However, it concluded that public policy supports holding attorneys liable for failing to advise clients about the need to change beneficiary designations to effectuate their estate plans. The court held that the plaintiffs had standing to sue for professional negligence based on the defendant's failure to advise Wisniewski about the implications of the beneficiary designation on his estate plan. The court did not recognize a duty for attorneys to ensure that clients actually change beneficiary designations.The court affirmed the dismissal of the breach of contract claim, agreeing that the allegations did not sound in breach of contract but were essentially the same as the dismissed negligence claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the professional negligence claim related to the failure to advise. View "Wisniewski v. Palermino" on Justia Law

The appellant was charged with first-degree sexual assault and false imprisonment after an incident involving a 17-year-old victim, A.S., who alleged that the appellant, while intoxicated, forcibly removed her clothes and penetrated her vaginally. The incident occurred after a Fourth of July party at the home of the appellant's then-fiancée, who is also A.S.'s cousin. A.S. reported the assault the next day and underwent a forensic medical examination.The District Court for Hamilton County admitted evidence of the appellant's prior sexual assault conviction involving a 13-year-old victim, M.Z., under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-414, which allows evidence of prior sexual offenses to prove propensity. The court found similarities between the two incidents, including the ages of the victims, the use of force, and the presence of alcohol. The court also admitted a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) report prepared during A.S.'s examination, which included statements made by A.S. for medical diagnosis and treatment.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the prior sexual assault conviction, as the probative value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The court also found that the SANE report was admissible under the business records exception and the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule. The appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the SANE report was rejected, as any objection would have been meritless.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the appellant's convictions for first-degree sexual assault and false imprisonment. View "State v. Swartz" on Justia Law

Christine Sugar filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the Eastern District of North Carolina in September 2019. Her confirmed bankruptcy plan required her to make monthly payments and prohibited the sale of non-exempt property valued over $10,000 without court approval. Despite this, Sugar sold her residence without obtaining prior court authorization, believing it was fully exempt based on her attorney's advice. The sale resulted in proceeds of approximately $94,000.The bankruptcy court found that Sugar's sale of her residence violated the confirmed plan and the local bankruptcy rule. The court dismissed her Chapter 13 case and barred her from filing another bankruptcy application for five years. Additionally, the court imposed monetary sanctions on her attorney, Travis P. Sasser, for advising her incorrectly and for his conduct during the proceedings.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina affirmed the bankruptcy court's findings and sanctions. Sugar and Sasser appealed the decision, arguing that the local rule was invalid, the property was exempt, and that paying off the plan balance entitled Sugar to immediate discharge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the bankruptcy court's determination that Sugar violated the local rule by selling her residence without prior court approval. However, it vacated the judgment dismissing Sugar's Chapter 13 case and the five-year filing bar, remanding the case for the bankruptcy court to consider the effect of Sugar's reliance on her attorney's advice. The court affirmed the monetary sanctions against Sasser, finding that his advice and conduct warranted the penalties imposed. View "Sugar v. Burnett" on Justia Law

Pat Doe filed a complaint for protection from harassment against John Costin on behalf of her two minor children, alleging aggressive behavior by Costin, including blocking their car at school. The District Court issued a temporary order for protection, which was later made permanent for the children but not for Doe. Doe did not request attorney fees within the required time frame.Doe later moved to modify the order, fearing that Costin might access the school after a no-trespass notice expired. The court modified the order to prohibit Costin from entering the school when the children were present and awarded Doe attorney fees. Costin opposed the modification and the attorney fees, arguing the motion was frivolous and untimely.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court found the appeal regarding the modified order moot since it had expired. However, it reviewed the attorney fees award, determining that the lower court erred in awarding fees for services provided before the motion to modify. The court vacated the attorney fees award and remanded the case for reconsideration of fees related only to the motion to modify. View "Doe v. Costin" on Justia Law

In November 2021, Lincoln Medical administered a COVID-19 vaccine to the five-year-old child of Jeremiah Hogan and Siara Jean Harrington at a school clinic without obtaining parental consent. Hogan filed a notice of claim in the Superior Court against the doctor, Lincoln Medical Partners, and MaineHealth, Inc., alleging various torts including professional negligence, battery, and false imprisonment on behalf of the child, and emotional distress and tortious interference with parental rights on behalf of the parents.The Superior Court appointed a chair for the prelitigation screening panel, and Lincoln Medical moved to dismiss the notice of claim, citing immunity under the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act. The court granted the motion to dismiss, interpreting the PREP Act to provide immunity to the defendants with no applicable exceptions. Hogan appealed the decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The court held that the PREP Act provides broad immunity to covered persons, including individuals and corporations, from suits related to the administration of covered countermeasures, such as the COVID-19 vaccine. The court found that the federal statute preempts state law that would otherwise allow Hogan to sue, as the claims were directly related to the administration of the vaccine. The court concluded that the defendants were immune from Hogan’s claims under the PREP Act, and the state tort claims were preempted by federal law. View "Hogan v. Lincoln Medical Partners" on Justia Law

Charvez Ryals was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the beating and fatal shooting of Daniel Wise. The incident occurred on March 10, 2018, in DeKalb County, Georgia. Ryals and his girlfriend, Regina Welch, had a history of domestic violence involving Wise, who was Regina's ex-boyfriend and the father of her three children. On the night before the murder, Wise confronted Regina and Ryals, demanding money and threatening them. The next morning, Wise returned to Regina's apartment, leading to a confrontation where Ryals shot Wise multiple times, resulting in his death.The case was initially tried in the Superior Court of DeKalb County, where a jury found Ryals guilty on all counts, including malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, cruelty to children, and firearm possession. The trial court sentenced Ryals to life in prison for malice murder, along with additional concurrent and consecutive sentences for the other charges. Ryals filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court in March 2024.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case, focusing on Ryals' claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Ryals argued that his trial counsel failed to subpoena a key witness, obtain phone records, introduce the criminal histories of Wise and another victim, and request a jury charge on voluntary manslaughter. The court found that these claims did not demonstrate deficient performance or resulting prejudice. The court held that the decisions made by Ryals' counsel were reasonable and strategic, and that any potential deficiencies did not affect the outcome of the trial. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the lower court's judgment, upholding Ryals' convictions and sentences. View "RYALS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Brendan Riley was charged and convicted of murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Glentis Wheeler. The State appealed the trial court's decision to grant Riley's amended motion for a new trial on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, except for one count. Riley argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging the charging document, which he claimed was ambiguous and could have led to the dismissal of most charges if a general demurrer had been filed.The trial court found that the charging document did not meet the statutory requirements for an indictment and instead met the requirements of an accusation. Since certain crimes Riley was charged with could not be brought by accusation, the trial court ruled that his trial counsel was deficient for not challenging the document, resulting in prejudice to Riley. Consequently, the trial court granted Riley a new trial for most counts but did not address other arguments in his motion for a new trial.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that the charging document, while ambiguous, contained indications that it could be considered an indictment. The court found no binding precedent that would have required the trial court to dismiss the charges if a general demurrer had been filed. Therefore, the court concluded that Riley's trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to challenge the document. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court's decision to grant a new trial for most counts and remanded the case for consideration of the remaining arguments in Riley's amended motion for a new trial. View "THE STATE v. RILEY" on Justia Law

Attorney Steven C. Kim took a lien against his client’s real property to secure his attorney fee. The trial court ordered Kim’s client to convey that property to fulfill a sales contract. Kim’s lien obstructed the sale, and the trial court expunged Kim’s lien. Kim’s client appealed, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, no one sought review in the Supreme Court, and the judgment became final in 2018. Three days later, Kim brought a new suit against the same buyer of the same property, seeking a declaration that his expunged lien was valid and the result in the earlier suit was wrong. The buyer successfully invoked issue preclusion, and Kim now appeals this new defeat.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the buyer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend, reasoning that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred Kim’s effort to relitigate the lien question. The court later also ruled for the buyer on its cross-complaint, and Kim alone appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the judgment. The court held that the earlier litigation precluded relitigation of the lien question. The lien issue was actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit, and Kim was in privity with his client Central Korean. The court found that Kim had a financial interest in the lien question and controlled the litigation in cooperation with his client. The court dismissed Kim’s new arguments about section 1908 of the Code of Civil Procedure as they were raised for the first time in his reply brief. The trial court’s analysis of issue preclusion was deemed correct, and the judgment was affirmed, awarding costs to the respondents. View "Kim v. New Life Oasis Church" on Justia Law

Julene and William Dodd sued their attorney, Rory Jones, for legal malpractice after he missed the statute of limitations deadline for filing their medical malpractice lawsuit. The Dodds needed to prove that their original medical malpractice case had merit and that they would have won if Jones had filed on time. However, the district court struck the testimony of the Dodds’ experts, which was key to establishing the viability of their medical malpractice claim. The court found that the disclosures were untimely and that the experts failed to properly establish knowledge of the local standard of care, a foundational requirement of Idaho law. As a result, the Dodds’ legal malpractice claim was dismissed, and the court granted summary judgment in favor of Jones.The Dodds appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho, arguing that the district court erred by ruling that Jones was not judicially estopped from arguing that no medical malpractice occurred and by excluding their expert testimony. They also raised claims of judicial bias. The Supreme Court of Idaho found that Jones could not be judicially estopped from claiming that no medical malpractice occurred because he was not a party in the original medical malpractice case but was representing the Dodds. The court also upheld the district court’s exclusion of the Dodds’ expert testimony, finding that the experts did not demonstrate familiarity with the local standard of care in Nampa, Idaho, at the time of the alleged malpractice.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the Dodds failed to establish an essential element of their legal malpractice case. The court also awarded attorney fees to Jones under Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2, finding that the appeal was pursued frivolously and without foundation, and sanctioned the Dodds’ attorney, Angelo Rosa, for his conduct during the appeal. View "Dodd v. Jones" on Justia Law

Rachel Moniz and Paola Correa filed separate lawsuits against Adecco USA, Inc. under the Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (PAGA), alleging violations of the Labor Code. Moniz and Adecco settled their case, but Correa challenged the fairness of the settlement. The trial court approved the revised settlement over Correa's objections and awarded attorney’s fees to Moniz’s counsel. Correa's request for a service award and attorney’s fees for her own work was largely denied. Correa appealed, arguing the trial court's analysis of the revised settlement was flawed and that her request for attorney’s fees and a service award should have been granted.The San Mateo County Superior Court overruled Adecco's demurrer in Moniz's case, while the San Francisco Superior Court sustained Adecco's demurrer in Correa's case. Correa's motion to intervene in Moniz's suit was denied, and her subsequent appeal was also denied. The trial court approved Moniz's settlement with Adecco, awarding Moniz a service award and attorney’s fees, but denied Correa’s requests. Correa's motions for a new trial and to vacate the judgment were denied, leading to her appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. While the appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court decided Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc., which disapproved of the reasoning in Moniz II regarding Correa’s standing. The Court of Appeal concluded that Correa and her counsel lacked standing to challenge the judgment based on the Supreme Court's decision in Turrieta. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed. View "Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc." on Justia Law