Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

The case involves an attorney who represented a plaintiff in a Fair Credit Reporting Act lawsuit against two defendants. The plaintiff alleged that he was a victim of identity theft, resulting in a fraudulent automobile finance account opened in his name. However, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas found that the attorney had not conducted even a minimal investigation before filing suit and sought damages barred by law or based on false factual allegations. The suit was also untimely against at least one defendant, as the plaintiff had discovered the alleged violations more than two years before filing.Initially, the district court sanctioned the attorney and his firm, ordering payment of approximately $33,000 in attorneys’ fees to the defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the sanctions, holding that the attorney needed a greater opportunity to defend his pre-suit investigation and that the conduct did not meet the requirements of § 1927, as it did not multiply proceedings.Despite the vacatur, another issue arose when the plaintiff’s appellate counsel submitted a reply brief containing numerous fabricated citations, quotations, and factual assertions, many of which appeared to be generated by artificial intelligence. After issuing a show-cause order and reviewing counsel’s responses, the Fifth Circuit found that the attorney used AI to draft substantial portions of the brief and failed to verify its accuracy. The court also determined that the attorney was not forthcoming in responding to the show-cause order. The Fifth Circuit held that such conduct is “unbecoming a member of the bar” and sanctioned the attorney $2,500 under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(c) and the court’s inherent authority to discipline attorneys for misrepresentations and abuse of the judicial process. View "Fletcher v. Experian Info Solutions" on Justia Law

A driver was cited for failing to display license plates on his vehicle, an infraction under a municipal ordinance. The matter was transferred from municipal court to the District Court of Stark County for a jury trial. Before trial, the defendant filed multiple motions, including to disqualify both the prosecutor and judge, to continue or stay the proceedings, and to dismiss the case, most of which were denied. Ultimately, a jury found that the defendant had committed the violation. Following these proceedings, the district court designated the defendant as a vexatious litigant, citing his numerous and largely meritless filings. After the jury’s verdict, the defendant appealed the vexatious litigant order to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction because he claimed the underlying proceeding was criminal, not civil, and further contending that the vexatious litigant designation violated his constitutional rights. He also challenged the district court’s findings, asserting abuse of discretion. The City of Dickinson responded by seeking sanctions, alleging the defendant’s appellate brief cited fictitious cases. The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the underlying proceeding was a noncriminal infraction under state law, so the district court had jurisdiction to issue a vexatious litigant order under the applicable administrative rule. The Court determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in designating the defendant a vexatious litigant, finding ample evidence of frivolous and burdensome litigation tactics. The constitutional challenges were rejected, as the vexatious litigant rule provided sufficient procedural safeguards. Additionally, the Court found that the defendant’s use of fictitious case citations warranted sanctions and ordered him to pay $500 to the City. The district court’s vexatious litigant order was affirmed. View "City of Dickinson v. Helgeson" on Justia Law

Several plaintiffs brought suit against a court-appointed receiver and his company, alleging breach of fiduciary duty. The underlying facts involve a criminal prosecution against one of the plaintiffs, Simon Semaan, for insurance fraud. In connection with the prosecution, the criminal court issued a temporary restraining order that froze certain assets and appointed the receiver to manage them. Later, the court ordered the receiver to liquidate specific stock holdings “as soon as practicable.” The receiver did not immediately liquidate the assets, citing ongoing settlement negotiations and concerns about account closure requirements. Plaintiffs alleged that, as a result of the receiver’s delay, the value of the investment accounts declined, causing them over $1.1 million in damages.After the receiver was replaced, the plaintiffs filed a civil lawsuit for breach of fiduciary duty in the Superior Court of Orange County. The defendants responded with an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing the claims arose from protected activity and that quasi-judicial immunity applied. The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion. The court found that the receiver’s conduct occurred within the scope of his appointment, that the litigation privilege applied, and that the receiver was protected by quasi-judicial immunity.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order. It held that a court-appointed receiver is protected by quasi-judicial immunity for discretionary acts and decisions performed in the course of carrying out court orders. The court found that the plaintiffs’ claims arose out of the receiver’s discretionary decisions as receiver, which are constitutionally protected activities under the anti-SLAPP statute. Because of this immunity, the plaintiffs failed to show that their claims had the minimal merit necessary to survive an anti-SLAPP motion. The court thus affirmed the order striking the complaint. View "Semaan v. Mosier" on Justia Law

A licensed clinical social worker, designated as a mandatory reporter under District of Columbia law, reported suspected sexual abuse of a minor patient to the Child and Family Services Agency. The child’s father, who was the subject of the report, subsequently filed suit against the reporter and her employer, alleging professional malpractice and emotional distress. The claims arose from both the initial report and the reporter’s testimony in related proceedings.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia reviewed the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, which invoked statutory immunity granted to mandatory reporters for reports made in good faith. The court granted summary judgment on some counts but denied it on others, including the immunity claim. The court reasoned that there was evidence suggesting the reporter’s actions could have been motivated by bias or malice, and thus the question of good faith should be decided by a jury. The defendants appealed the denial of summary judgment on the immunity issue before final judgment.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals considered whether it had interlocutory jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review the Superior Court’s denial of statutory immunity. The appellate court held that the statute provides immunity from liability, not from suit, and such immunity is effectively reviewable after final judgment rather than through an interlocutory appeal. As a result, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remanded the case for further proceedings in the trial court, without reaching the merits of the immunity claim. View "Geraci v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

Two men were convicted of malice murder and armed robbery following the shooting death of an individual in Muscogee County, Georgia. The crime occurred in August 2018, and both were indicted in November 2020. During their joint trial in October 2022, evidence included surveillance footage, cell phone records showing extensive communication between the defendants around the time of the murder, and testimony connecting one defendant to the murder weapon through a prior uncharged shooting. Witnesses also identified one defendant by his distinctive walk in the video footage, and another admitted to being present at the scene but denied involvement in the killing. Both defendants received life sentences, with one eligible for parole and the other not, while the felony murder counts were vacated by operation of law.After sentencing, both defendants moved for new trials in the Superior Court of Muscogee County. One motion was denied following an evidentiary hearing, and the defendant appealed his conviction, raising issues including the admissibility of surveillance identification, evidence from a prior shooting, alleged prosecutorial conflict of interest, and the admission of in-life photos and victim-impact testimony. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. The other defendant’s motion for new trial was granted solely on the ground that the prosecutor had previously represented him as a public defender in an unrelated case, which the trial court found to be a conflict of interest warranting disqualification.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed both appeals. It affirmed the convictions and sentences of the first defendant, finding no reversible error or ineffective assistance of counsel. For the second defendant, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of a new trial, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the initial motion to disqualify the prosecutor, as the prior representation was not “substantially related” to the current case under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9(a). The case was remanded for further proceedings on any remaining claims raised in the motion for new trial. View "FLAKES v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

A Colorado-based technology company specializing in wireless communications collaborated with a Massachusetts micro-display company to develop a headset, formalizing their respective rights in a contract. The contract established joint intellectual property ownership for the project and designated the Massachusetts company to select counsel and prosecute patents. The selected law firm worked with both companies during patent prosecution, opening billing files and receiving powers of attorney from the Colorado company’s employees. Over time, disputes arose regarding patent applications, including amendments that allegedly benefited the Massachusetts company at the expense of the Colorado company, abandonment of applications, and filing disclaimers—often without informing the Colorado company.After the business relationship ended in 2009, the Colorado company only discovered alleged misconduct by the law firm years later when investigating its patent portfolio in response to a potential acquisition. Subsequent litigation in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado led to the law firm’s disqualification due to a found attorney-client relationship, and discovery revealed possible concealment and conflicts of interest.The Colorado company then sued the law firm and individual attorneys in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging legal malpractice and related claims. The district court granted summary judgment for the law firm, concluding all claims were untimely under the statute of limitations, not saved by equitable tolling, and that no attorney-client relationship existed.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that whether the malpractice claims were timely is a factual question suitable for a jury, not summary judgment, and that an attorney-client relationship existed as a matter of law for the relevant period. The appellate court reversed the district court’s timeliness and relationship rulings on the legal malpractice claim, vacated determinations regarding other claims, and remanded for further proceedings. View "BlueRadios, Inc. v. Hamilton, Brook, Smith & Reynolds, P.C." on Justia Law

The dispute centers on an attorney’s contingency fee agreement concerning legal representation for heirs of an Alaska Native allotment. After the attorney successfully represented the heirs in a federal lawsuit against the government for mismanagement of oil and gas leases, a fee dispute arose. The attorney sued one heir in federal court, claiming unpaid fees under the agreement. That heir moved to compel arbitration of the fee dispute pursuant to Alaska Bar Rules, and the federal court stayed the litigation pending arbitration.An Alaska Bar Association arbitration panel was convened. Bar Counsel advised the panel to limit its review to whether the amount of the attorney’s fee was reasonable, excluding issues of enforceability of the agreement, such as claims of duress or illegality under federal Indian law. The panel accepted this narrowed scope and ultimately found the attorney’s fee reasonable, declining to address other challenges. The panel also chose not to refer any ethical concerns to Bar Counsel for disciplinary review.The heir petitioned the Alaska Superior Court (Second Judicial District, Utqiaġvik) to vacate the arbitration award, arguing the panel exceeded its authority, was not impartial, and that the fee agreement was unenforceable. The superior court confirmed the arbitration panel’s decision, finding the panel’s scope limitation a reasonably possible interpretation of its authority under the Bar Rules. The court also awarded the attorney enhanced attorney’s fees for costs incurred in the post-arbitration proceedings, citing Alaska Civil Rule 82.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that a fee arbitration panel’s decision to narrow its review to the reasonableness of a fee is proper if it is a reasonably possible interpretation of the panel’s authority. Additionally, it held that attorney’s fees may be awarded under Civil Rule 82 for post-arbitration proceedings governed by the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act. View "Koponen v. Romanov" on Justia Law

Six unrelated criminal defendants in Scott County, Iowa, were each charged with serious misdemeanors in late 2024 and requested court-appointed counsel due to indigency. The Iowa District Court for Scott County initially appointed the Davenport local public defender’s office to represent each defendant. Shortly after these appointments, the Davenport Public Defender, citing a temporary overload of cases as specified in Iowa Code section 13B.9(4)(a), filed motions to withdraw from representing these defendants. The office asserted it was ethically unable to handle the additional cases after considering all relevant factors, including attorney staffing and caseloads.The district associate judge denied these withdrawal motions, stating the Davenport office was fully staffed and that insufficient information had been provided about its workload. The court also noted the lack of available contract or noncontract attorneys to appoint in place of the public defender. Despite repeated filings by the Davenport PD asserting the overload, the district court continued to deny withdrawal, eventually ordering the chief public defender to appear in each case. The State Public Defender then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Iowa Supreme Court, challenging the district court’s refusal to allow the Davenport PD to withdraw.The Supreme Court of Iowa held that while district courts have a limited role in ensuring the statutory precondition of a temporary overload is met, they must be highly deferential to a local public defender’s professional representation regarding such overload. The court concluded that the Davenport PD’s representations satisfied its burden to establish a temporary overload. The district court exceeded its authority by refusing to accept these representations and denying withdrawal. The Supreme Court sustained the writ of certiorari and vacated the district court’s orders attaching the Davenport PD to the six cases. View "State Public Defender v. Iowa District Court For Scott County" on Justia Law

A dispute arose from a contingency fee agreement between the heirs of an Alaska Native allotment and an attorney who helped them recover substantial compensation from the federal government for mismanagement of oil and gas leases on their land. After a settlement was reached, years later, one of the heirs was sued by the attorney in federal court for allegedly failing to make required payments under the fee agreement. The heir then invoked mandatory fee arbitration under Alaska Bar Association rules, which prompted the federal court to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of arbitration.The arbitration was conducted before an Alaska Bar Association panel, which, following guidance from Bar Counsel, limited its review to whether the amount of the attorney’s fee was reasonable, and declined to address broader challenges to the enforceability of the fee agreement, including claims of duress and illegality under federal Indian law. The panel ultimately found the fee amount reasonable. Dissatisfied, the heir petitioned the Alaska Superior Court to vacate the panel’s decision, arguing that the panel exceeded its authority by not deciding enforceability issues and raising other statutory grounds under the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA). The Superior Court denied the petition, confirmed the arbitration award, and granted enhanced attorney’s fees to the attorney for post-arbitration litigation.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the Superior Court’s confirmation of the arbitration award. The Supreme Court held that a fee arbitration panel’s decision to narrow the scope of review is subject to a “reasonably possible” standard and that the panel did not exceed its authority in this case. The court also held that awards of attorney’s fees under Alaska Civil Rule 82 are permissible in post-arbitration proceedings governed by the RUAA and found no abuse of discretion in the Superior Court’s award. View "Oenga v. Givens" on Justia Law

480 King Street, LLC hired Glick/Boehm & Associates, Inc. (GBA), an architectural firm, to design and administer construction of a stair tower. 480 King alleged that GBA negligently designed elements of the project, including the elevator, electrical, HVAC, windows, and stairs, and also failed to properly administer construction, resulting in code violations and additional costs. As the statute of limitations was approaching, 480 King filed its complaint without the expert affidavit required by the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act, later submitting an affidavit from Louis Hackney, a professional engineer, attesting to deviations from the standard of care in both design and contract administration.The Circuit Court of Charleston County, after allowing time for the affidavit, ultimately dismissed all claims against GBA, finding Hackney was not qualified to opine on the standard of care for architects. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of negligent design claims but reversed as to claims for negligent construction administration, finding Hackney qualified under statutory standards for expert witnesses. The appellate court also reversed dismissal of breach of contract and warranty claims, remanding them for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that the expert witness affidavit requirement under section 15-36-100 does not mandate the affiant be from the same profession as the defendant, provided the statutory qualifications are met. Hackney’s affidavit was sufficient for the negligent construction administration claim, but not for negligent architectural design, as he declined to opine on the latter. Claims for negligent supervision were subsumed under construction administration. The breach of contract claim may proceed only as to construction administration, while breach of warranty and negligent design claims were properly dismissed. The disposition was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Blanchard v. 480 King Street, LLC" on Justia Law