Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Personal Injury
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In July 2020, the plaintiff used Uber's app to request a ride. Upon being dropped off in the middle of a roadway, she was struck by another vehicle and sustained injuries. She filed a personal injury lawsuit against Uber in November 2020, serving the complaint via the New York Secretary of State. Uber did not respond within the required 30 days, allegedly due to mail processing delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.In January 2021, Uber updated its terms of use, including an arbitration agreement, and notified users via email. The plaintiff received and opened this email. When she next logged into the Uber app, she was presented with a pop-up screen requiring her to agree to the updated terms to continue using the service. She checked a box and clicked "Confirm," thereby agreeing to the terms, which included a clause delegating the authority to resolve disputes about the agreement's applicability and enforceability to an arbitrator.The plaintiff moved for a default judgment in March 2021, and Uber responded by asserting that she had agreed to arbitrate her claims. Uber then sent a Notice of Intent to Arbitrate. The plaintiff moved to stay Uber's arbitration demand, arguing that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and violated ethical rules. Uber cross-moved to compel arbitration.The Supreme Court granted Uber's motion to compel arbitration, finding that the plaintiff was on inquiry notice of the arbitration agreement and had assented to it. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating that the plaintiff's challenges to the agreement's validity must be decided by an arbitrator due to the delegation provision.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that the clickwrap process used by Uber resulted in a valid agreement to arbitrate. The court also held that the delegation provision was valid and that the plaintiff's challenges to the arbitration agreement's enforceability should be resolved by an arbitrator. The court found no abuse of discretion in the lower court's decision not to sanction Uber for the alleged ethical violation. View "Wu v. Uber Tech., Inc." on Justia Law

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In September 2017, Attorney Karolyn Kovtun held a meeting with Jennifer Shenefield and her client Mark Shenefield, despite a criminal protective order prohibiting Mark from contacting Jennifer. During the meeting, Mark and Kovtun verbally and emotionally abused Jennifer, and Kovtun threatened to remove their daughter from Jennifer’s custody if she did not sign a custody agreement. Jennifer signed the agreement under duress and contacted the police. Kovtun continued to represent Mark, who was later convicted of violating the protective order. Kovtun then sued Jennifer for recording the meeting without consent, prompting Jennifer to file a cross-complaint against Kovtun.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Kovtun’s two anti-SLAPP motions and sustained her demurrer to two of Jennifer’s six causes of action. After a bench trial, the court found Kovtun liable for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation, awarding Jennifer $50,000 in damages. Kovtun appealed, arguing that Jennifer’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations and the litigation privilege.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Kovtun waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to timely and properly plead it. Additionally, the court determined that the litigation privilege did not apply to Kovtun’s communications during the meeting, as they were not made in good faith contemplation of litigation. The court affirmed the judgment against Kovtun, upholding the $50,000 damages award to Jennifer. View "Shenefield v. Kovtun" on Justia Law

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The petitioner, Rafael Antonio Mena Chavez, filed a lawsuit under the false name "Sergio Balboa" after sustaining injuries while working for Southern Recycling, LLC. Chavez used the alias to obtain employment and continued using it when seeking medical attention and workers' compensation benefits. He later filed a lawsuit against Metso Minerals Industries, Inc., alleging product liability and negligence. Southern Recycling and other intervenors joined the suit, claiming they had paid substantial workers' compensation benefits to "Sergio Balboa."The Orleans Civil District Court denied Metso's motion to dismiss the case, despite Metso's argument that Chavez's use of a false identity undermined the judicial process. The court found no fraud or willful deception at that stage and allowed the case to proceed. Metso's subsequent writ to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, was also denied. Metso then sought relief from the Louisiana Supreme Court.The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions, holding that courts have inherent authority to dismiss an action with prejudice when a petitioner’s conduct undermines the integrity of the judicial process. The court found that Chavez's prolonged use of a false identity was a calculated deception that harmed the judicial system and the defendants. The court dismissed Chavez's petition with prejudice and remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the intervenors' petition survives the dismissal of Chavez's petition. View "CHAVEZ VS. METSO MINERALS INDUSTRIES, INC." on Justia Law

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In 2009, a surgeon performed a shoulder replacement surgery on a patient, during which the patient suffered a fracture and subsequent nerve injury, resulting in permanent radial nerve palsy. The patient sued the surgeon and associated medical entities for professional negligence, claiming vicarious liability. The case went to trial twice; the first trial resulted in a verdict for the defendants, but the court granted a new trial due to juror misconduct. The second trial resulted in a verdict for the patient, awarding significant damages, which the court reduced according to statutory caps.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County oversaw the trials. After the second trial, the court reduced the pain and suffering damages to $350,000 pursuant to NRS 41A.035, awarded attorney fees, and capped expert witness costs. The defendants moved for a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct, which the court denied. Both parties appealed various aspects of the court's decisions, including the application of the damages cap, the res ipsa loquitur instruction, and the award of attorney fees and costs.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving a res ipsa loquitur instruction despite expert testimony, as the relevant statutory amendments did not apply retroactively. The court affirmed the reduction of pain and suffering damages to $350,000, applying the statutory cap to both the surgeon and the medical entities. The court also upheld the denial of a new trial based on juror misconduct, finding no intentional concealment or prejudice.Regarding attorney fees, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's award but modified it to comply with NRS 7.095, capping the total recoverable amount. The court found no conflict between NRCP 68 and NRS 18.005 but remanded the case for further proceedings on expert witness fees, requiring a more detailed application of the Frazier factors. The judgment and order denying a new trial were affirmed, the attorney fees award was affirmed as modified, and the order retaxing costs was reversed in part. View "NEVINS VS. MARTYN" on Justia Law

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In 2021, Hal de Becker contracted COVID-19 and was treated with ivermectin by his personal physician. Hal was later admitted to Desert Springs Hospital Medical Center, where his ivermectin treatment was stopped without consent, and he was administered remdesivir. Hal's condition deteriorated, and he died shortly after being discharged. Hal's family sued the attending doctors and the hospital, alleging negligence, professional negligence, and wrongful death, claiming the doctors and hospital failed to obtain informed consent and made treatment decisions based on media narratives.The Eighth Judicial District Court dismissed the claims against the doctors and the hospital. The court found that the claims against the doctors were barred by the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) and that the expert affidavit provided by the plaintiffs did not meet the requirements of NRS 41A.071. The court also dismissed the claims against the hospital, finding them similarly barred by the PREP Act and that the claims were for professional negligence rather than ordinary negligence.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the plaintiffs' claims were for professional negligence and required an expert affidavit under NRS 41A.071. The court found the expert affidavit insufficient as to the doctors because it did not specify acts of negligence separately for each doctor. However, the affidavit was sufficient as to the hospital. Despite this, the court concluded that the PREP Act barred the claim against the hospital because it related to the administration of remdesivir, a covered countermeasure. Therefore, the dismissal of the complaint was affirmed. View "De Becker v. UHS of Delaware, Inc." on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Robert V. Bolinske, Sr., filed a defamation claim against Dale V. Sandstrom and Gail Hagerty, alleging that defamatory statements were made and published online on October 18, 2016. Bolinske served a demand for retraction on January 14, 2017, but Sandstrom did not respond. Bolinske commenced the action on February 26, 2019, beyond the two-year statute of limitations for defamation claims.The District Court of Burleigh County initially dismissed Bolinske’s defamation claim, citing the statute of limitations. However, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed this decision in part, noting that the statute of limitations defense was not specifically pled by answer, and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, Sandstrom answered the amended complaint, including the statute of limitations defense, and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court granted, finding the defamation claim time-barred. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to Sandstrom, deeming Bolinske’s claims frivolous.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the defamation claim was indeed barred by the statute of limitations, as the action was commenced more than two years and 45 days after the publication of the alleged defamatory statements. The court also upheld the award of attorney’s fees, agreeing with the lower court’s assessment that Bolinske’s claims were frivolous and that the fees requested were reasonable. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decisions. View "Bolinske v. Sandstrom" on Justia Law

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Kathleen Saurman, who had mobility impairments, fell on a small stairway at a restaurant while celebrating her 60th birthday. She subsequently died from an infection following surgery for a broken hip. Her husband, Robert, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the restaurant's former owner and later sued the current owner, Peter’s Landing Property Owner LLC, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and the Disabled Persons Act (DPA).The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of the current owner, finding that Robert lacked standing to bring an ADA claim for injunctive relief and had not provided evidence of any act or omission by the current owner. The court also imposed nearly $100,000 in sanctions against Robert’s attorney for pursuing what it deemed a frivolous lawsuit.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that under California law, a successor in interest has standing to bring an ADA claim for injunctive relief in state court, even if federal standing requirements are not met. The court also found that there was a triable issue of fact regarding the current owner’s compliance with the Unruh Act and the DPA, as the property remained in the same condition as when Kathleen fell. Consequently, the court reversed the summary judgment on the ADA, Unruh Act, and DPA claims but affirmed the summary judgment on the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. The court also reversed the sanctions against Robert’s attorney and denied the current owner’s motion for sanctions for a frivolous appeal. View "Saurman v. Peter's Landing Property Owner, LLC" on Justia Law

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A defamation lawsuit was filed by Dana Cheng, a New York resident and political commentator, against Dan Neumann and Beacon, a Maine news outlet, for characterizing Cheng as "far-right" and a "conspiracy theorist" in an article. Neumann and Beacon sought dismissal of the case under both federal law and a New York anti-SLAPP law, which applies to meritless defamation lawsuits. The district court conducted a choice-of-law analysis, decided that New York law applied, and granted the motion to dismiss under New York's anti-SLAPP statute.The district court's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The appellate court agreed with the district court's ruling but for a different reason: it decided that Cheng's lawsuit had to be dismissed under binding First Amendment principles protecting free speech by the press. Back at the district court, Neumann requested attorneys' fees under the fee-shifting provision of New York's anti-SLAPP law. The district court denied Neumann's request after determining that Maine, not New York, law applied to the specific issue of attorneys' fees.Neumann appealed again, arguing that the district court erred in its choice-of-law analysis. The appellate court, noting the lack of clear controlling precedent on the issue, certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine the question of which state's law applies to the attorneys' fees issue. View "Cheng v. Neumann" on Justia Law

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In a medical malpractice case, Bobbi Ann Mertis filed a lawsuit against Dr. Dong-Joon Oh, North American Partners in Anesthesia (Pennsylvania), LLC (NAPA), Wilkes-Barre Hospital, and Commonwealth Health. Mertis alleged that Dr. Oh negligently administered a femoral nerve block, causing her a femoral nerve injury. Dr. Oh retained a law firm, Scanlon, Howley & Doherty, to represent him. Later, Dr. Eugene Kim, the orthopedic surgeon who performed Mertis’s knee surgery and was not named as a defendant, also retained the same law firm after receiving a subpoena to appear at a discovery deposition.The Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas denied Mertis's motion for sanctions to disqualify the law firm from representing Dr. Oh and to bar the firm's further ex parte communication with Dr. Kim. The court found no violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4003.6, which regulates obtaining information from a party's treating physician. Mertis appealed to the Superior Court, which reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case. The Superior Court found that Rule 4003.6 was violated and that the law firm's concurrent representation of Dr. Oh and Dr. Kim was tantamount to ex parte communication.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court concluded that a law firm representing a defendant treating physician cannot obtain information from a nonparty treating physician without the patient's written consent or through an authorized method of discovery. The court found that the client exception in Rule 4003.6(1) does not permit a law firm to obtain information from a nonparty treating physician by entering into an attorney-client relationship with that physician when the law firm's attorneys were already prohibited from obtaining information from that physician under Rule 4003.6 prior to entering such attorney-client relationship. View "Mertis v. Oh" on Justia Law

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The case involves a legal malpractice claim brought by Patricia Kappes against Diana Rhodes and Rhodes Law Firm, LLC. Kappes alleges that Rhodes' negligence resulted in the loss of a legal action against a defendant. The legal action in question pertains to the wrongful death of Kappes' mother, Lula M. Tanner, who was a resident at Deseret Health and Rehab at Rock Springs, LLC. Kappes had sought legal recourse for her mother's death against her mother's healthcare providers. However, Rhodes failed to timely file an application with the Wyoming Medical Review Panel and a wrongful death complaint against Ms. Tanner’s healthcare providers, which Kappes alleges constitutes legal malpractice.The District Court of Laramie County, Wyoming, certified four questions to the Supreme Court of Wyoming. These questions pertained to the role of the collectibility of the judgment in the underlying action in legal malpractice cases in Wyoming. The lower court sought to understand whether the collectibility of a judgment is a relevant consideration in a legal malpractice case, which party bears the burden of proving the underlying judgment would have been collectible, whether collectibility must be pled as an affirmative defense, and whether the Collectibility Doctrine is available as a defense to an attorney who has admitted liability.The Supreme Court of Wyoming concluded that the collectibility of the judgment is an essential part of the causation/damages element of a legal malpractice action. The client, in this case, Kappes, has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that any judgment she would have obtained in the underlying action would have been collectible. The court held that the client's burden includes showing she would have obtained a judgment in the underlying action and the judgment would have been collectible. The court did not find it necessary to answer the third and fourth certified questions as they were predicated on the court deciding collectibility is an affirmative defense to be pled and proved by the attorney. View "Kappes v. Rhodes" on Justia Law