Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

In a personal injury case, the plaintiff, Jerry Cradduck, sued Hilton Domestic Operating Company, Inc. for negligence related to an incident at a spa in 2019. During the trial, Cradduck's attorney, Todd Samuels, failed to appear due to a medical emergency, leading to a series of events that included a mistrial and ultimately the dismissal of the complaint. The trial court dismissed the case primarily because Samuels did not provide timely evidence of his medical condition and continued to work on other cases shortly after claiming he was too ill to speak.The Superior Court of Riverside County initially granted an eight-day continuance after Samuels' medical emergency but later dismissed the case when neither Cradduck nor Samuels appeared as ordered. Samuels' failure to provide adequate medical evidence and his continued legal work in other cases led the court to question the legitimacy of his claims. The court also found Samuels' conduct sufficiently egregious to warrant a referral to the State Bar of California.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and found no abuse of discretion by the trial court. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, agreeing that the trial court had acted within its discretion based on the evidence and circumstances presented. The appellate court also referred attorney Narine Mkrtchyan to the State Bar for her uncivil and disrespectful conduct during the proceedings. The judgment was affirmed, and the defendants were awarded their costs on appeal. View "Cradduck v. Hilton Domestic Operating Co." on Justia Law

Dr. Jeffery Weisman filed a lawsuit after resigning from Washington University’s residency program, alleging that he was forced to resign due to hostile treatment and that Washington University and Barnes Jewish Hospital prevented him from transferring to another residency program. Weisman brought claims for breach of contract, tortious interference, fraudulent inducement, and defamation under Missouri law. Washington University and Barnes Jewish Hospital counterclaimed for a violation of the Missouri Computer Tampering Act (MCTA).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed Weisman’s tortious interference and fraudulent inducement claims, and some of his breach of contract claims. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Barnes Jewish Hospital on the remaining breach of contract claims and the defamation claim. The court also dismissed the MCTA counterclaims and the defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees. Weisman appealed the adverse judgments on his claims, and the defendants cross-appealed the dismissal of the MCTA counterclaims and denial of attorneys’ fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the statute of frauds barred Weisman’s breach of contract claim related to the Lab-Residency Contract, as it was an oral agreement for a term of five years. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the tortious interference claims, concluding that Evers and Benzinger, as agents of Washington University, were not third parties to the contracts. Additionally, the court upheld the dismissal of the fraudulent inducement claims, as the alleged Separation Agreement did not exist. Finally, the court affirmed the dismissal of the MCTA counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as Weisman’s tender of full payment rendered the claims moot. View "Weisman v. Barnes Jewish Hospital" on Justia Law

Marietta Area Healthcare, Inc., Marietta Memorial Hospital, and Marietta Healthcare Physicians, Inc. (collectively "Marietta") filed a lawsuit against Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital Corporation, Camden-Clark Health Services, Inc., West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc., and West Virginia United Health System, Inc. (collectively "Camden-Clark"). Marietta alleged that Camden-Clark attempted to economically disadvantage them by causing its agents and employees to initiate and pursue a spurious qui tam action against Marietta. The claims included malicious prosecution, tortious interference, abuse of process, fraudulent legal process, civil conspiracy, negligent supervision, aiding and abetting tortious conduct, and vicarious liability.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia reviewed the case and denied Camden-Clark's motion to dismiss seven of the eight claims. However, the court deferred ruling on the negligent supervision claim, noting that the law regarding negligent supervision in West Virginia was unsettled. The district court then certified three questions to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia regarding the viability and elements of a negligent supervision claim and whether intentional or reckless torts by an employee could form the basis for such a claim.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that a claim for negligent supervision is viable under West Virginia common law. The court clarified that the elements of a negligent supervision claim include the traditional elements of negligence—duty, breach, causation, and damages—along with the necessity of demonstrating a tortious act or omission by the employee. The court further held that an employer could be liable for negligent supervision regardless of whether the employee's conduct was negligent, reckless, or intentional, provided the elements of the claim are met. View "Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Marietta Area Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jacqueline Statham suffered injuries during a hysterectomy performed by Dr. David S. Quang, assisted by Dr. Tan-Loc Nguyen and a medical student. The medical student, under the supervision of the defendant physicians, improperly inserted a sponge stick into Statham's rectum instead of her vagina, leading to a rectovaginal fistula. Statham sued the physicians and their medical practice, alleging professional negligence, negligent supervision, and vicarious liability for the medical student's actions.The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants, ruling they could not be held vicariously liable for the medical student's negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, with the lead opinion concluding that OCGA § 51-1-38 did not impose vicarious liability on the physicians and that the evidence did not support vicarious liability under general agency principles or the borrowed servant doctrine.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and agreed with the Court of Appeals that OCGA § 51-1-38 did not provide a basis for vicarious liability. The court also agreed that the borrowed servant doctrine did not apply as an independent basis for imposing vicarious liability. However, the court disagreed with the conclusion that the defendant physicians could not be held vicariously liable under general agency principles. The court held that under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a physician can be vicariously liable for a medical student's negligence if the student was acting as the physician's servant in furtherance of the physician's goals and within the scope of the physician's business.The Supreme Court found that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether the defendant physicians were vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Therefore, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to the defendants on the issue of vicarious liability. View "STATHAM v. QUANG" on Justia Law

Two Texas lawyers, Michael A. Pohl and Robert Ammons, represented out-of-state clients in personal injury cases filed outside Texas. The clients, from Louisiana and Arkansas, alleged that they were solicited by individuals on behalf of the lawyers, which led to the signing of legal-services contracts. The clients later sued the lawyers in Texas, seeking to void the contracts under Texas Government Code Section 82.0651(a), which allows clients to void contracts procured through barratry, and to recover fees and penalties.The trial court dismissed all claims, granting summary judgment in favor of the lawyers. The clients appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that Section 82.0651(a) applied because part of the lawyers' conduct occurred in Texas. The court also rejected the lawyers' arguments regarding limitations and res judicata and allowed Reese's intervention in the case.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that Section 82.0651(a) does not extend to the nonresident clients' claims because the core conduct targeted by the statute—solicitation of a legal-services contract through barratry—occurred outside Texas. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment to the extent it allowed the clients to proceed with their claims under Section 82.0651(a) and rendered judgment that they take nothing on those claims. However, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment regarding the breach of fiduciary duty claims and remanded those claims to the trial court for further proceedings. View "POHL v. CHEATHAM" on Justia Law

Several hundred children in Benton Harbor, Michigan, suffered from elevated lead levels in their blood after drinking lead-contaminated water from the city’s public water system for three years. Plaintiffs, represented by their guardians, filed a lawsuit against various state and city officials, as well as two engineering firms, alleging that these parties failed to mitigate the lead-water crisis and misled the public about the dangers of the drinking water. The claims included substantive-due-process and state-created-danger claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state-law negligence claims.The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed the complaint in full. The court found that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege a violation of their constitutional rights and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their federal claims against the city and state officials and the state-law claims against one of the engineering firms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the state officials, finding that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that these officials acted with deliberate indifference. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the claims against the city officials and the City of Benton Harbor, finding that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that these officials misled the public about the safety of the water, thereby causing the plaintiffs to drink contaminated water. The court also reversed the district court’s declination of supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims against the engineering firm and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of leave to amend the complaint. View "Mitchell v. City of Benton Harbor" on Justia Law

Ronald Rubin filed a lawsuit naming Kimberly Grippa as part of a criminal enterprise. His lawyer sent allegedly defamatory letters to state officials, asking them to investigate the alleged criminal enterprise and included copies of the complaint. Grippa sued Rubin for defamation, claiming the letters harmed her reputation and professional standing. Rubin moved for summary judgment, arguing the letters were protected by Florida’s absolute and qualified litigation privileges and that he could not be held vicariously liable for his lawyer’s actions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida denied Rubin’s motion for summary judgment on all grounds. The court found that the letters were not protected by the absolute litigation privilege because they were sent outside the litigation process and included additional statements beyond those in the complaint. The court also determined that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the statements were made with express malice, precluding the qualified litigation privilege. Lastly, the court rejected Rubin’s vicarious liability argument, suggesting that Rubin directed his lawyer’s actions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the denial of Florida’s absolute litigation privilege is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine but lacked jurisdiction to consider the denial of the qualified litigation privilege or the vicarious liability issue. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the absolute litigation privilege, concluding that the letters were sent outside the judicial process and included additional defamatory statements. The court dismissed the appeal regarding the qualified litigation privilege and vicarious liability for lack of jurisdiction. View "Grippa v. Rubin" on Justia Law

In November 2021, Lincoln Medical administered a COVID-19 vaccine to the five-year-old child of Jeremiah Hogan and Siara Jean Harrington at a school clinic without obtaining parental consent. Hogan filed a notice of claim in the Superior Court against the doctor, Lincoln Medical Partners, and MaineHealth, Inc., alleging various torts including professional negligence, battery, and false imprisonment on behalf of the child, and emotional distress and tortious interference with parental rights on behalf of the parents.The Superior Court appointed a chair for the prelitigation screening panel, and Lincoln Medical moved to dismiss the notice of claim, citing immunity under the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act. The court granted the motion to dismiss, interpreting the PREP Act to provide immunity to the defendants with no applicable exceptions. Hogan appealed the decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The court held that the PREP Act provides broad immunity to covered persons, including individuals and corporations, from suits related to the administration of covered countermeasures, such as the COVID-19 vaccine. The court found that the federal statute preempts state law that would otherwise allow Hogan to sue, as the claims were directly related to the administration of the vaccine. The court concluded that the defendants were immune from Hogan’s claims under the PREP Act, and the state tort claims were preempted by federal law. View "Hogan v. Lincoln Medical Partners" on Justia Law

Julene and William Dodd sued their attorney, Rory Jones, for legal malpractice after he missed the statute of limitations deadline for filing their medical malpractice lawsuit. The Dodds needed to prove that their original medical malpractice case had merit and that they would have won if Jones had filed on time. However, the district court struck the testimony of the Dodds’ experts, which was key to establishing the viability of their medical malpractice claim. The court found that the disclosures were untimely and that the experts failed to properly establish knowledge of the local standard of care, a foundational requirement of Idaho law. As a result, the Dodds’ legal malpractice claim was dismissed, and the court granted summary judgment in favor of Jones.The Dodds appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho, arguing that the district court erred by ruling that Jones was not judicially estopped from arguing that no medical malpractice occurred and by excluding their expert testimony. They also raised claims of judicial bias. The Supreme Court of Idaho found that Jones could not be judicially estopped from claiming that no medical malpractice occurred because he was not a party in the original medical malpractice case but was representing the Dodds. The court also upheld the district court’s exclusion of the Dodds’ expert testimony, finding that the experts did not demonstrate familiarity with the local standard of care in Nampa, Idaho, at the time of the alleged malpractice.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the Dodds failed to establish an essential element of their legal malpractice case. The court also awarded attorney fees to Jones under Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2, finding that the appeal was pursued frivolously and without foundation, and sanctioned the Dodds’ attorney, Angelo Rosa, for his conduct during the appeal. View "Dodd v. Jones" on Justia Law

Gregory Cohane filed a lawsuit against The Home Missioners of America, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Charlotte, and Al Behm, alleging child sexual abuse by Behm and negligence by the other defendants. Cohane claimed that Behm, a clergyman employed by Glenmary and supervised by the Diocese, groomed and sexually abused him over several years, starting when he was nine years old. Behm's abuse continued even after he was transferred to different locations due to other allegations of misconduct. Cohane's lawsuit was filed in 2021, invoking the revival provision of the SAFE Child Act, which allows previously time-barred claims of child sexual abuse to be brought within a specific two-year window.The Superior Court of Mecklenburg County dismissed Cohane's claims against Glenmary and the Diocese, ruling that the revival provision only applied to direct abusers, not to institutions that enabled the abuse. Cohane appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the plain language of the revival provision was broad enough to include claims against both direct abusers and enablers.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the revival provision of the SAFE Child Act, which revives any civil action for child sexual abuse otherwise time-barred under N.C.G.S. § 1-52, applies to claims against both direct abusers and those who enabled the abuse. The court emphasized that the plain language of the statute did not distinguish between different types of defendants and that traditional tort principles allow for recovery from both direct tortfeasors and those who contributed to the harm. Thus, Cohane's claims against Glenmary and the Diocese were revived under the SAFE Child Act. View "Cohane v. The Home Missioners of America" on Justia Law