Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

An attorney who represented a client in a high-profile employment discrimination case against Louisiana State University (LSU) officials later brought suit against two attorneys and their law firm who had served as outside counsel to LSU. The plaintiff alleged that these attorneys engaged in misconduct during a Title IX investigation and, during subsequent state court litigation, made defamatory statements about him, including accusations of fabricating evidence. The state court had previously imposed significant monetary sanctions against the plaintiff and his client, citing, among other things, the plaintiff’s alleged fabrication of evidence and abusive litigation tactics.After the state court proceedings, the plaintiff filed a new lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, asserting claims for defamation, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy under Louisiana law. The district court dismissed all claims with prejudice. It found the defamation claim barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, which limits federal review of state court judgments, and determined that the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was inadequately pleaded. The court also dismissed the conspiracy claim for lack of an underlying tort and denied leave to amend the complaint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine did not bar the defamation claim because the plaintiff’s alleged injury arose from the defendants’ conduct, not from the state court judgment itself. The court vacated the dismissal of the defamation and conspiracy claims and remanded for further proceedings. However, it affirmed the dismissal of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, finding the alleged conduct did not meet the required legal standard. The court also vacated the denial of leave to amend the complaint. View "English v. Crochet" on Justia Law

A man with severe chronic pain had long been prescribed oxycodone. When he visited his doctor for an unrelated issue, he was also prescribed clonazepam, a benzodiazepine. The combination of these two drugs carries a significant risk of respiratory depression and death, a fact underscored by an FDA-mandated black box warning. The man and his wife expressed concern about the new prescription, but his doctor reassured them. When the prescription for clonazepam was filled at a pharmacy, the pharmacist’s computer system flagged a warning about the dangerous interaction with oxycodone. The pharmacist overrode the warning and dispensed the medication. The man died the next day from toxicity due to both drugs.The man’s family and estate sued the pharmacy, alleging negligence, including a failure to warn about the drug interaction. The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, denied the pharmacy’s motion for summary judgment, which was based on the “learned intermediary rule.” This rule generally exempts pharmacists from warning patients about the general risks of FDA-approved drugs, on the assumption that the prescribing physician is best positioned to provide such warnings. The district court found that there were material factual disputes about whether the pharmacist knew of a patient-specific risk and whether the learned intermediary rule applied.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal. It held that the learned intermediary rule does not shield a pharmacist from liability when the pharmacist is aware of a patient-specific risk, as opposed to general risks associated with a drug. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment, clarifying that pharmacists retain a duty to act as a reasonably prudent pharmacist would when aware of such risks. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Walgreen v. Jensen" on Justia Law

The plaintiff brought a lawsuit against the City and County of San Francisco, seeking $5,000,000 in damages for injuries sustained after falling from a scooter that struck a pothole. During discovery, the City sought information about the plaintiff’s intoxication at the time of the incident. The plaintiff’s counsel failed to provide timely and complete responses to certain form interrogatories related to requests for admission about intoxication, despite repeated requests and meet and confer efforts by the City. Additionally, during an independent medical examination, observers chosen by the plaintiff’s attorney interfered with the process, preventing the examining doctor from completing the evaluation.The Superior Court of San Francisco City and County addressed two discovery disputes. First, it granted the City’s motion to compel responses to the interrogatories and imposed a $6,500 sanction against the plaintiff’s counsel for failing to provide timely, code-compliant responses. Second, it imposed a $1,500 sanction after finding that the plaintiff’s observers had improperly interfered with the medical examination. The parties settled the underlying action, but the plaintiff appealed the sanctions. The City moved to dismiss portions of the appeal, arguing that some orders were not appealable and that the sanctions for the medical exam were below the statutory threshold for appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, granted the City’s motion to partially dismiss the appeal, finding that the orders regarding the protective order and the $1,500 sanction were not appealable. The court affirmed the $6,500 sanction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing it, as the plaintiff’s counsel lacked substantial justification for opposing the motion to compel. The appellate court also imposed $30,000 in sanctions against the plaintiff’s counsel for filing a frivolous appeal and referred the matter to the State Bar. View "Morales v. City of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Kristopher Birtcher, experiencing a mental health crisis, was reported to law enforcement by a Hobby Lobby manager. Birtcher, unarmed and not threatening anyone, was detained by sheriff’s deputies. During the detention, Birtcher attempted to flee but was subdued by multiple deputies who restrained him in a prone position, applying bodyweight pressure to his back. Despite Birtcher’s pleas that he could not breathe, the deputies maintained the restraint, and Birtcher eventually stopped moving and died from asphyxiation and sudden cardiac arrest.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding no triable issues of material fact regarding the excessive force claim. The court concluded that the deputies’ actions were in accordance with their training and that Birtcher’s restraint was proper. The court also ruled that plaintiff failed to establish a legal basis for the negligent training claim against Sheriff William D. Gore.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that there were indeed triable issues of material fact regarding the excessive force used by the deputies. The appellate court found that the evidence, including expert testimony, suggested that the deputies’ use of bodyweight pressure on Birtcher while he was restrained in a prone position could be considered excessive force. The court also held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the negligent training claim against Sheriff Gore, as there was a statutory basis for the claim and evidence suggesting his involvement in the training policies.The appellate court reversed the judgment in favor of all defendants and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "A.B. v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

Roy McAlister invented and patented technologies related to clean fuels and incorporated McAlister Technologies, L.L.C. (MT) to hold and license these patents. In 2009, MT entered into a licensing agreement with Advanced Green Technologies, L.L.C. (AGT), which later retained Loeb & Loeb, L.L.P. for patent matters. Conflicts arose, leading McAlister to terminate the agreement, alleging AGT's breach. McAlister and MT claimed that Loeb & Loeb's actions clouded their patents, causing prospective licensees to back out, resulting in lost profits.The Superior Court in Maricopa County granted summary judgment in favor of Loeb & Loeb on the lost profit damages, finding the plaintiffs' evidence speculative and lacking reasonable certainty. The court excluded the plaintiffs' expert testimony on damages and ruled against them on claims for trespass to chattel, slander of title, and aiding and abetting, but allowed claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent supervision to proceed. Plaintiffs conceded no triable damages remained and stipulated to final judgment against them.The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the exclusion of the expert testimony and the summary judgment on most lost profit claims but reversed on a $5 million initial payment claim, remanding for further proceedings. It also reversed the summary judgment on trespass to chattel and slander of title claims.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on the lost profit damages and trespass to chattel claim. It concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove the lost profit damages with reasonable certainty, as material terms of the prospective licensing agreement were unresolved. Consequently, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Loeb & Loeb on the lost profit damages and trespass to chattel claim, vacating the relevant parts of the Court of Appeals' decision. The case was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings on the slander of title claim. View "McAlister v. Loeb" on Justia Law

In a personal injury case, the plaintiff, Jerry Cradduck, sued Hilton Domestic Operating Company, Inc. for negligence related to an incident at a spa in 2019. During the trial, Cradduck's attorney, Todd Samuels, failed to appear due to a medical emergency, leading to a series of events that included a mistrial and ultimately the dismissal of the complaint. The trial court dismissed the case primarily because Samuels did not provide timely evidence of his medical condition and continued to work on other cases shortly after claiming he was too ill to speak.The Superior Court of Riverside County initially granted an eight-day continuance after Samuels' medical emergency but later dismissed the case when neither Cradduck nor Samuels appeared as ordered. Samuels' failure to provide adequate medical evidence and his continued legal work in other cases led the court to question the legitimacy of his claims. The court also found Samuels' conduct sufficiently egregious to warrant a referral to the State Bar of California.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and found no abuse of discretion by the trial court. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, agreeing that the trial court had acted within its discretion based on the evidence and circumstances presented. The appellate court also referred attorney Narine Mkrtchyan to the State Bar for her uncivil and disrespectful conduct during the proceedings. The judgment was affirmed, and the defendants were awarded their costs on appeal. View "Cradduck v. Hilton Domestic Operating Co." on Justia Law

Dr. Jeffery Weisman filed a lawsuit after resigning from Washington University’s residency program, alleging that he was forced to resign due to hostile treatment and that Washington University and Barnes Jewish Hospital prevented him from transferring to another residency program. Weisman brought claims for breach of contract, tortious interference, fraudulent inducement, and defamation under Missouri law. Washington University and Barnes Jewish Hospital counterclaimed for a violation of the Missouri Computer Tampering Act (MCTA).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed Weisman’s tortious interference and fraudulent inducement claims, and some of his breach of contract claims. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Barnes Jewish Hospital on the remaining breach of contract claims and the defamation claim. The court also dismissed the MCTA counterclaims and the defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees. Weisman appealed the adverse judgments on his claims, and the defendants cross-appealed the dismissal of the MCTA counterclaims and denial of attorneys’ fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the statute of frauds barred Weisman’s breach of contract claim related to the Lab-Residency Contract, as it was an oral agreement for a term of five years. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the tortious interference claims, concluding that Evers and Benzinger, as agents of Washington University, were not third parties to the contracts. Additionally, the court upheld the dismissal of the fraudulent inducement claims, as the alleged Separation Agreement did not exist. Finally, the court affirmed the dismissal of the MCTA counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as Weisman’s tender of full payment rendered the claims moot. View "Weisman v. Barnes Jewish Hospital" on Justia Law

Marietta Area Healthcare, Inc., Marietta Memorial Hospital, and Marietta Healthcare Physicians, Inc. (collectively "Marietta") filed a lawsuit against Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital Corporation, Camden-Clark Health Services, Inc., West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc., and West Virginia United Health System, Inc. (collectively "Camden-Clark"). Marietta alleged that Camden-Clark attempted to economically disadvantage them by causing its agents and employees to initiate and pursue a spurious qui tam action against Marietta. The claims included malicious prosecution, tortious interference, abuse of process, fraudulent legal process, civil conspiracy, negligent supervision, aiding and abetting tortious conduct, and vicarious liability.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia reviewed the case and denied Camden-Clark's motion to dismiss seven of the eight claims. However, the court deferred ruling on the negligent supervision claim, noting that the law regarding negligent supervision in West Virginia was unsettled. The district court then certified three questions to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia regarding the viability and elements of a negligent supervision claim and whether intentional or reckless torts by an employee could form the basis for such a claim.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that a claim for negligent supervision is viable under West Virginia common law. The court clarified that the elements of a negligent supervision claim include the traditional elements of negligence—duty, breach, causation, and damages—along with the necessity of demonstrating a tortious act or omission by the employee. The court further held that an employer could be liable for negligent supervision regardless of whether the employee's conduct was negligent, reckless, or intentional, provided the elements of the claim are met. View "Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Marietta Area Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jacqueline Statham suffered injuries during a hysterectomy performed by Dr. David S. Quang, assisted by Dr. Tan-Loc Nguyen and a medical student. The medical student, under the supervision of the defendant physicians, improperly inserted a sponge stick into Statham's rectum instead of her vagina, leading to a rectovaginal fistula. Statham sued the physicians and their medical practice, alleging professional negligence, negligent supervision, and vicarious liability for the medical student's actions.The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants, ruling they could not be held vicariously liable for the medical student's negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, with the lead opinion concluding that OCGA § 51-1-38 did not impose vicarious liability on the physicians and that the evidence did not support vicarious liability under general agency principles or the borrowed servant doctrine.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and agreed with the Court of Appeals that OCGA § 51-1-38 did not provide a basis for vicarious liability. The court also agreed that the borrowed servant doctrine did not apply as an independent basis for imposing vicarious liability. However, the court disagreed with the conclusion that the defendant physicians could not be held vicariously liable under general agency principles. The court held that under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a physician can be vicariously liable for a medical student's negligence if the student was acting as the physician's servant in furtherance of the physician's goals and within the scope of the physician's business.The Supreme Court found that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether the defendant physicians were vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Therefore, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to the defendants on the issue of vicarious liability. View "STATHAM v. QUANG" on Justia Law

Two Texas lawyers, Michael A. Pohl and Robert Ammons, represented out-of-state clients in personal injury cases filed outside Texas. The clients, from Louisiana and Arkansas, alleged that they were solicited by individuals on behalf of the lawyers, which led to the signing of legal-services contracts. The clients later sued the lawyers in Texas, seeking to void the contracts under Texas Government Code Section 82.0651(a), which allows clients to void contracts procured through barratry, and to recover fees and penalties.The trial court dismissed all claims, granting summary judgment in favor of the lawyers. The clients appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that Section 82.0651(a) applied because part of the lawyers' conduct occurred in Texas. The court also rejected the lawyers' arguments regarding limitations and res judicata and allowed Reese's intervention in the case.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that Section 82.0651(a) does not extend to the nonresident clients' claims because the core conduct targeted by the statute—solicitation of a legal-services contract through barratry—occurred outside Texas. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment to the extent it allowed the clients to proceed with their claims under Section 82.0651(a) and rendered judgment that they take nothing on those claims. However, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment regarding the breach of fiduciary duty claims and remanded those claims to the trial court for further proceedings. View "POHL v. CHEATHAM" on Justia Law